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Donna Faye Wilson

1997

The Politics of Compensation in the Homeric *Iliad*

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

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

J. Andrew Dearman

The Politics of Compensation in the Homeric *Iliad*

by

Donna Faye Wilson, B. A., M. Div.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

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of the Requirements

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The Politics of Compensation in the Homeric *Iliad*

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Typological analysis of exchange in the *Iliad* reveals a compensation theme that is systematically developed as a fundamental structuring device in the poem. The compensation themes are catalogued under the rubrics of *poinē*, *apoina*, and 'mixed'. A formal description of the conventions of compensation in Iliadic society exposes both the underlying thematic unity and the functional differences between these themes. Internal characters deploy, manipulate, and even abuse the conventions of the themes in the intense competition to define the situation that has developed out of the quarrel in Book 1. Typological and narratological analysis demonstrate that, although Achilleus feels he is owed *poinē* by Agamemnon for the seizure of Briseis, Agamemnon in fact offers him *apoina* on behalf of the Greek army. He does so because *apoina*, unlike *poinē*, allows him to mitigate his loss of personal status; yet by

figuring himself in the role of the father, seeking to preserve the life of the Greek *laos*, Agamemnon also casts Achilleus as the enemy. Narratological analysis further demonstrates that this internal struggle extends beyond the disputants, Achilleus and Agamemnon, to include figures often seen as impartial mouthpieces of traditional values, including Nestor, and even the Homeric narrator.

The compensation theme is developed temporally in the poem so that successful exchanges of *apoina* are relegated to time outside of the poem's own narrative sequence, or, primary fabula, until Book 24. Moreover, within the primary fabula, conventional limits on *poinē* are nearly eradicated. Willingness to accept *apoina* and acceptance of conventional limits on *poinē* are, further, aligned with *mētis*, and their opposites with *biē*. The *Iliad* thus constructs its own primary fabula as a time dominated by *biē* and threatened with social disorder. The *Iliad* constructs Achilleus' heroic identity as a figure who holds the polarities of *mētis* and *biē* in tension and, thereby, re-establishes order. The systematic development of the theme demonstrates that the *Iliad* does not transmit societal conventions of exchange and compensation indiscriminately; rather, the poem is itself deeply implicated in the construction of heroic identity and Greek social identity through critical appropriation of Iliadic tradition.

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Introduction

I.1 Poetics and Politics of Memory: Achilleus and Lykaon

῏Ω πόποι, ἦ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι (*Iliad* 21.54). With these words Achilleus registers his astonishment at the sight of Lykaon emerging unarmed from the Xanthos. The "marvel" is not only that the encounter with Lykaon is unexpected, but that the circumstances are uncanny. Achilleus had only recently taken Lykaon captive and sold him into slavery in Lemnos. Lykaon, whose release was subsequently gained by a *xeinos*, has been back home just a matter of days when Achilleus catches him unawares again, this time as Lykaon is clambering wearily out of the river. The narrator, Achilleus, and Lykaon in turn recall the previous encounter; each anticipates the outcome of the present meeting in terms of the former.[1] Memory of the earlier capture is ostensibly generated by the similarity and contiguity of two incidents.[2] A naive reading regards the first capture and release as a prior event and the present scene as an ill-starred repetition.[3] A critical reading, however, will

[1]Cf. 21.46-48, 60-62, and 92-93. The "earlier scene" is, however, never narrated independently in the poem. It thus constitutes an extra-textual allusion.

[2]See for example the use of *au* and *autis*: δυωδεκάτῃ δέ μιν αὖτις | χερσὶν 'Αχιλλῆος θεὸς ἔμβαλεν (21.46-47); νῦν αὖ με τεῆς ἐν χερσὶν ἔθηκε | μοῖρ' ὀλόη· μέλλω που ἀπεχθέσθαι Διὶ πατρί | ὅς με σοὶ αὖτις δῶκε (21.82-84).

[3]Martin (1989) 90, describes the oral-poetic audience as naive "inasmuch as it has internalized the conventions of the overarching genre." A naive, or native, reading is thus intentional about paying attention to individual characters as authors and performers more than to the narrative strategies of the 'poet'.

show that the present scene actually generates the 'anterior' one as an interpretive device.[4]

The narrative strategy of presenting and re-presenting this intercalated doublet raises a complementary pair of narratological issues. The first, which I mention only to defer to Chapter 3, is the syntagmatic arrangement of repeated scenes.[5] The corresponding paradigmatic question concerns the composition of the scenes themselves: In what respects is the scene that is recalled from the past like the present one, and are there others with which both share significant roles and sequences of action? The issue is—yet again—what constitutes a repetition in Homer?[6] The three reports (by the narrator, Achilleus, and Lykaon) of the previous

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[4]See Andersen's (1990) claim that the past does not have an independent existence in the *Iliad*, but is created by the characters as it suits the context, and thus becomes part of the truth in representation.

[5]I use 'syntagmatic' to refer the the sequential arrangement of scenes in a given performance of the *Iliad* and, specifically, to the sequential arrangment of scenes in our *Iliad*. I use 'paradigmatic' to refer to the 'type' comparisons that a Homeric audience, familiar with the epic repertoire, would make in real-time throughout the performance of the poem. The Homeric audience would thus hear any single performance both syntagmatically and paradigmatically. I use the terms syntagmatic and paradigmatic as intratextual counterparts to the terms diachronic and synchronic, which are regularly used by Oralists to denote the relation of a given performance of the *Iliad* to Iliadic tradition and of Iliadic tradition to other poetic and institutional traditions respectively. Indeed, a Homeric audience would be able to listen to a performance of the *Iliad* paradigmatically precisely because of the diachronicity of the *Iliad* tradition. On this, see Nagy (1996a) 17, 20-21, 82-83. I also use the term 'temporal' arrangement, by which I refer to the chronological relationships of the scenes, specifically whether they are represented as occurring in the linear sequence of events narrated in the poem beginning with Chryses' arrival at the Achaian ships, in a time prior to the poem's narrative sequence (external analepses), or in time subsequent to the poem's narrative sequence (external prolepses).

[6]The question of what is and is not a repetition—applied to both formula and theme—has occasioned extensive debate in Homeric scholarship, especially since Milman Parry's 1928 thesis *L'Epithète traditionnelle dans Homère*. For detailed discussion, see below.

capture and release are at once repeated passages and constitutive elements of the present scene. They are of interest for their different narrative voices, but as synopses of the same event, they are not discrete examples of recurring motifs.[7] The scene from the past, however, is interjected into the present as being similar enough to activate memory and generate expectation. That the roles in which the characters are cast in both scenes are typical is confirmed by Achilleus' generalizing (21.99-105). That the two scenes are typical of a recurring 'theme' may be evinced only by paradigmatic comparison, a process already begun in the story itself.[8]

The memory of Lykaon's previous capture appears to be occasioned by the similarity of the two scenes; but memory is also patently deployed by both Achilleus and Lykaon. Richard Martin demonstrates that recalling is an agonistic performance of memory in Homeric epic.[9] He maintains, as a general rule, characters in the *Iliad* do not remember anything simply for the pleasure of memory; recall always has an exterior goal. Lykaon, for instance, recalls his previous encounter with Achilleus as initiating a formalized relationship that might be used to put Achilleus under obligation (21.74-77).[10] I wish to extend the schema

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[7]See also the four reports of the opening scene between Agamemnon and Chryses (1.9-32, 92-100, 111-15, 366-79; cf. 18.444-45) and the two reports of Agamemnon's offer to Achilleus (9.120-161 and 260-306).

[8]I refer to a recurring unit of content as a 'theme'. See below.

[9]Martin (1989) 77-80. Cf. Andersen (1990) 42: "no need is felt for a definitive version of the past because no use can be made of it. Therefore there cannot really be *exploration* nor even *exposition* of the past in an oral culture, only *exploitation*."

[10]The introduction-formula for Lykaon's speech, if the line is authentic, may

of strategic activation of memory in this story to include the narrator. In so doing, I anticipate two observations that emerge out of the typological and narratological analysis in Chapters 2 and 3. The first is simply that the narration of Achilleus' and Lykaon's encounters activated memories and expectations in the poem's audience.[11] Moreover, the marshaling of memory played out between Achilleus and Lykaon is motivated by a parallel marshaling of memory played out between the poem and its audience. These observations suggest it is possible to derive a poetics of recurring Homeric themes.

There are several spheres in which the story of Lykaon and Achilleus might have activated memories and given rise to expectations relating to supplication or compensation. That is, there are several contexts—both intra- and intertextual—in which a listening audience might make comparisons.[12] For instance, the scenario may have activated memories of 'real' war-time experiences and societal conventions for conduct in battle. It may have activated memories of 'real' institutions by which persons might be released from slavery, or by which compensation

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already be an index of directive speech: φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα (21.73). See Martin (1989) 32-37. For the textual problem in 21.73, see Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[11]I use Bakker's (1993) term "activation" because it invokes memory not simply as a mental assessment (e.g. of likeness and differences), but as a sense of participation, identification, and expectation. I use 'memories' to suggest plurality in the fullest sense of the word, that is, not only multiplicity, but diversity and even cognitive dissonance. Cf. Nagy (1996b) Part I.

[12]I propose that societal institutions, including the context of poetic performance, be incorporated into the intertextual contexts with which the poem is interacting. See Cook (1995) 4.

might be secured for their death.[13] The Iliadic account may well have activated memories of competing poetic traditions.[14] The narrative of Achilleus and Lykaon, which, as we shall see, is an instantiation of a theme that recurs in the *Iliad*, doubtless activated memories of similar Iliadic scenes. It is, I believe, reasonable to assume that a native audience was possessed of sufficient knowledge of Iliadic tradition to make such intratextual comparisons paradigmatically. That is, the story of Achilleus and Lykaon may have evoked intratextual 'memories' not only of scenes that preceded it in a given oral performance, but of scenes yet to come.[15] In short, the narrative would have generated in the hearers a plurality of associations and expectations.

I propose that the *Iliad* uses narrative repetition and arrangement of recurring scenes to privilege intratextual associations and to manipulate the expectations that are played out against the backdrop of a real (historical) system.[16] The approach I am adopting claims a homology

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[13]By institutions I mean to include not only formalized institutions, but the various techniques for social relationships reproduced as practical knowledge in a society. See Benveniste (1973) 11.

[14]See Nagy's (1979) 1-11, argument that poetic traditions were aware of and interacted with one another; they variously appropriated, suppressed, privileged, and alluded to one another; see also Kullmann (1960; 1984); Cook (1995) 3.

[15]See Martin (1993) 227-228: "the traditional audience of an oral performance, the 'native speakers', as it were, of the poetry, have, all of them, the mental equivalent of a CD-ROM player full of phrases and scenes. . . . I would go further and say that the full 'meaning', and the full enjoyment, of traditional poetry comes only when one has heard it all before a hundred times, in a hundred different versions." See also Lowenstam (1993) 60: "particular scenes inform upon each another, not solely in linear progression but in a retroactive fashion. That is, scenes in one part of the poem are constantly affecting the reading of scenes in other parts"; see also Stanley (1993) 38. For detailed discussion, see below.

[16]With regard to the realistic expectations which might have been engendered by

between the intratextual and 'real' memories activated by the theme typified in the story of Achilleus and Lykaon, but not complete correspondence.[17] I do not presume either the degree or the precise contours of that homology. Ian Morris invokes the principle of dissimilarity in his investigation of the relationship of Homeric society to that of 8th century Greece. That is, if a feature has no obvious ideological, archaizing or distancing effect by its mere appearance in the poem, we may assume it was taken for granted in the 8th century.[18] Morris further suggests that this principle might be partially applicable to exchange systems in Homer. Though I find little to disagree with in theory, the analysis in the following two chapters demonstrates that it does not apply well to compensatory exchanges, because the poem manipulates them in consistent patterns. This manipulation does not mean the poem is at odds with historical conventions of compensation, but it leads us to expect that

typical scenes, Fenik (1968) 7, remarks that typical means, in the first instance, typical for the poem. The scenes represented—in the case he investigates, battle scenes—may be natural to real scenes, but the fact that some sequences are represented in the poem and other possible sequences are not has more to do with the "poet" (quotation marks mine) than with the subject matter. This builds on Lord's (1960) 68-123 observation that among guslari, type-scenes are highly individualized.

[17]I adopt a position compatible with Morris (1986b; 1994) on the relationship of 'Homeric society', by which I mean the society represented in the *Iliad*, and Greek society. This position is in contrast to Adkins (1960; 1969; 1971), who deals with many of the same institutions and themes that I do, but perceives the value system in the poem as both internally coherent and coherent with the value system of 'Homeric (=Greek) society'. The analysis that follows reveals already some internal contradictions; I suggest that the poem publicly exploits the contradictions for social reasons. See the Conclusion.

[18]Morris (1986b) 127; my own inclination is to explore the relationship between Homeric and Archaic society. I am, however, convinced by Nagy's (1997) 206 evolutionary model which suggests that we "need not think of a single Age of Homer, but rather, several ages of Homer." See also Nagy (1989); (1996a) 65-112; (1996b) 105-225.

the audience was confronted with a degree of non-coincidence. For this reason, I bracket temporarily external comparisons that the narrative of Achilleus and Lykaon might generate in a Homeric audience, in order to derive a typology of compensation within the *Iliad* itself. Although this kind of formal analysis does temporarily deracinate the scenes from their historical socio-cultural environs, it does so with a view to reintegrating them into their intertextual—and specifically their social-institutional—contexts. The methodological disposition for the formal analysis in Chapter 2 derives ultimately from an interdisciplinary approach which employs both intratextual and synchronic and diachronic perspectives to oral traditional poetry as a cultural phenomenon. The terminology, the methodology for identifying recurring units, and the posture that I adopt with respect to utility and artistry are familiar in moderate Parry-Lord models. Since, however, they are not undisputed, some clarification of each issue is necessary.

I.2 METHODOLOGICAL PRÉCIS

It is possible to investigate Homeric repetition either by way of the individual formulas, of which lines and groups of lines are composed, or by way of recurring narrative units (which may or may not entail verbal repetition). At either point of entry the issue of definition is vexed. The variety of verbal and syntactical phenomena encompassed by the term 'formula' and the flexibility of Homeric formulas have been the subject of

a long and often lively discussion that I will not rehearse here.[19] As regards recurring narrative units, it is still the case that the kinds of elements which constitute a typical scene, the limits of the typical scene, and the nature and significance of repetitions and permutations of scenes are to some extent indeterminate.[20] Individual scholars use terminology for recurring narrative units at their own discretion and with little consistency among themselves.[21] Further, the compositional relationship between formulas and narrative units ('themes' or 'type-scenes') is often left vague or unaddressed. In order to compile a catalogue of narrative units that may be upheld as repetitions, the narrative details that count as significant criteria and the weight accorded to verbal repetition must be established. Methodologically, this means a somewhat arbitrary and approximate initial set of criteria that may be adjusted and refined through observation of the scenes.

Since the groundbreaking work of Milman Parry and Walter Arend, a large number of Homeric scholars have contributed to the formal analysis of recurring narrative units, usually called 'themes' or 'type-scenes.'[22] They have scrutinized narrative repetitions as to their abstract

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[19]See, for example, O'Neill (1942); A. Lord (1960); Russo (1963, 1966, 1976); Hoekstra (1964); Notopoulos (1964); Rosenmeyer (1965); Kirk (1966); Nagler (1967, 1974); Hainsworth (1968, 1993); M. Parry (1971); Ingalls (1972); Kiparsky (1976); Nagy (1976); M. Edwards (1986, 1988); Sacks (1987); Visser (1988); Holoka (1991); Lowenstam (1993); Kahane (1994).

[20]See Cook (forthcoming).

[21]For discussion of the problem of terminology for type-scenes, see M. Edwards (1975) 51-53; Martin (1986) 112-18, 126-29.

[22]See for example Armstrong (1958); Arend (1933); Bannert (1988); M. Edwards (1975, 1980, 1991, 1992); Fenik (1968); Kirk (1990); Kirscher (1971); A. Lord (1951, 1960);

structure and with reference to particular themes; with respect to technical generation, and with respect to reception and artistry. I will not endeavor to further the theoretical discussion of what constitutes a Homeric repetition, either at the level of formula or theme. Instead, I rely on prior theoretical work, especially that of Albert Lord, Mark Edwards, and Gregory Nagy, to undertake the formal analysis of the recurring theme instantiated in the narrative of Achilleus and Lykaon, which I call the compensation theme.[23] I compile a catalogue of discrete compensation scenes in the *Iliad*, which share a three-part structural homology. The scenes, which recur temporally in the poem, are viewed paradigmatically in order to compare likenesses and differences, and to arrive at a description of the conventions they present. Although a measure of circularity is endemic to formal or type-scene analysis, if a series of consistently repeated patterns can be shown to exist in the poem, then type comparison within the poem can be made legitimately.[24] Circularity may be partially overcome by comparative methods as well.

M. Lord (1967); D. Miller (1982); Nagler (1967); A. Parry (1968); Pedrick (1982); Schlunk (1976); Thornton (1984).

[23]See below for Lord's definition of a theme, which forms the basis of the modern discussion.

[24]Lord (1960) 145: "The first step in thematic analysis must be to prove the existence of themes in the poem under consideration. In other words we must find, either in the poem under scrutiny or in other poems by the same singer or otherwise belonging to the same tradition, the same situations repeated at least once." Cf. Martin's (1993) 228, defense of paradigmatic analysis within the poem: "The method may seem counter-intuitive when an argument for the meaning of a scene in Book 1 is based on a repetition of a few phrases in, say Books 20 and 24. But in fact this is precisely the point where oral poetics must differ from standard literary criticism." On the methodology of collecting all attestations of formal elements and looking for patterns actually displayed, see also Sacks (1987) 2-17.

I.2.1 Definition and composition of a 'theme'

The seminal work on type-scenes in Homer is that of Walter Arend, whose monograph appeared independently of Parry's work on formula and theme.[25] Arend identifies sequences of actions occurring in the same order and using nearly the same verses and verse parts as "typische Szenen." Albert Lord, following the lead of Milman Parry, prefers the term "theme," which he most recently describes as "a repeated passage with a fair degree of verbal or formula repetition from one occurrence to the next."[26] He adds, perhaps in response to Nagy's use of the term, that theme does not simply mean "subject" or "topic":

> The theme in oral literature is distinctive because its content is expressed in more or less the same words every time the singer or storyteller uses it. It is a repeated *passage* rather than a repeated subject.[27]

Lord's theme is a formal, but not functional, counterpart to Arend's typical scene. Themes, in Lord's model, are analogous to formulas in the generation of orally composed poetry: themes "function in building songs" like formulas "function in building lines."[28] What is less clear from Lord's analysis is how formulaic lines relate to themes, or, put another way, how important verbal repetition is in identifying repeated narrative units. Lord's recent definition (quoted above) implies that verbal

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[25]Arend (1933).

[26]Lord (1991) 26, note 18. Lord (1960) 158-9, further distinguishes "theme" from more comprehensive narrative repetitions that he calls "story patterns." For Nagy's definition of theme, see below.

[27]Lord (1991) 27.

[28]Lord (1953) 127; see also (1991) 27.

repetition is a significant criterion. In his earlier writings, however, he, emphasized that themes and formulas need not coincide: "The theme, even though it be verbal, is not any fixed set of words, but a grouping of ideas."[29] My own investigation into the compensation theme leads me to adopt a model that mediates between Lord's earlier and more recent definitions, but that takes theme rather than formula as the starting point.[30]

Bernard Fenik employs the term "typical" to describe the combinations of elements that make up battle scenes in the *Iliad*, but distinguishes the repetitions he investigates from the "type-scenes" identified by Arend, and from "themes," by which Fenik means motifs such as a hero's anger.[31] Fenik wishes to go beyond Arend's formal model and Lord's functional model to arrive at a poetics of repetition, meaning the principles by which the poet selected and combined the elements of recurring scenes. A line-by-line examination of Iliadic battle scenes led him to the somewhat colorless conclusion that the poet had at his disposal pre-formed compositional elements (including formulas and narrative

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[29]Lord (1960) 69; 145; see also (1951) 72.

[30]The linear progression implied in the Parry-Lord model—from meter to formula to formulaic line, and theme to song—has markedly influenced the starting point for the study of the composition of Homeric epic. See for example the Table of Contents in the first volume of Kirk's (1985) vii, commentary on the *Iliad*, in which the structural elements of Homeric verse are outlined as (i) Word-groups and rhythmical cola, (ii) The formular style and its operation, (iii) From verse to sentence, and (iv) The cumulative technique. The perception that the formula, being the smallest unit, is the natural starting point should probably be attributed to the abiding influence of Parry's original work on traditional epithets, which loomed large over his later emphasis on theme (see A. Parry [1971] xli). On this, see also Thornton (1984) 93-96.

[31]Fenik (1968) 4-5.

details) from which the scenes were created.[32] Fenik's analysis of battle scenes is nothing if not thorough and is useful as a formal description, but it contributes little by way of theory for the identification of other typical scenes.

Mark Edwards moves the methodological discussion forward by analyzing several different types of scenes and generalizing their characteristic features.[33] Edwards defines a type-scene as a "subject pattern comprising a structure of certain elements in sequence," and adds the significant qualifier that there is no standard form from which a given example deviates.[34] He compiles catalogues of type-scenes on the basis of consistent repetition of a group of actions or details in sequence, and only secondarily on the basis of verbal repetition. His observations demonstrate that type-scenes are quite flexible: they may be expanded by elaboration of the elements of which they are composed; elements may be attenuated or even omitted; the structure of a particular scene need not be a single, uninterrupted sequence.[35] Edwards' description accounts for

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[32]Fenik (1968) 229.

[33]In his discussion of the problem of terminology, Edwards (1975) 53, suggests that the kinds of patterns and repetitions that Fenik demonstrates would be better called "narrative patterns." Edwards (1992) 285-87, prefers to classify narrative repetitions by scale, calling the recurrent structures of plot "story patterns," the smaller blocks of narrative with identifiable structure "type-scenes," and the small scale recurrent items "motifs" or "topoi". Cf. Thornton (1984) 74.

[34]Edwards (1992) 285-287. Cf. Nagler (1967; 1974), who describes the core of Homeric repetitions, whether at the scale of scenes or lines and line parts, as an abstract preverbal template which generates a family of allomorphs. See also Nagy (1979) 43: "There may theoretically be as many variations on a theme as there are compositions. Any theme is but a multiform, and not one of the multiforms may be considered a functional 'Urform'."

[35]Edwards (1992) 290; (1991) 13.

smaller blocks of Iliadic narrative comprising a sequence of repeated actions, and it provides useful guidelines for compiling a catalogue of scenes. It stops short, however, of articulating the relationship between discrete narrative units and larger structures of plot which share substantially like subject patterns.

Gregory Nagy offers a compelling account of the relationship of formulas, discrete narrative units such as those analyzed by Edwards, and more comprehensive plot structures.[36] His model, which I discuss below, accords well with my findings in the *Iliad*. Nagy, like Lord, prefers the term "theme" for narrative units, but defines theme as "a basic unit of content," or more specifically, "a basic unit in the traditional subject patterns of myth."[37] His definition is thus more akin to 'subject' than Lord would perhaps allow. According to Nagy's model, theme generates formula diachronically. Theme is, therefore, the key to other levels of fixity in oral poetry. The definition of formula accordingly derives from theme, rather than vice versa: formula is a fixed phrase conditioned by the traditional themes of oral poetry; formulas may 'contain' the themes, but formulas themselves are, historically speaking, theme-generated. Moreover, themes are not only expressed in smaller self-contained narrative units, they may be expanded to truly monumental proportions, as in the case of the *mēnis* theme that organizes the *Iliad*:[38]

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[36]See Nagy (1976) 250; (1990a) 9 n.10, 25-29; (1990b) 4 n. 15; (1996) 22-23.
[37]Nagy (1992) 27. See also Thornton (1984) 93-97; cf. Stanley (1993) 321 n. 97.
[38]Nagy (1996a) 77.

"My theory has it that theme is the overarching principle in the creation of traditional poetry like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; also, that the formulaic heritage of these compositions is an accurate expression of their thematic heritage." Such a view of Homeric poetry, as built from myths that organize it, can become a hermeneutic model for addressing the vexed question of the unity of Homeric composition.[39]

In this chapter, I adopt 'theme' (as the term is defined by Nagy) to designate both discrete narrative units such as those inventoried in Chapter 2, and larger narrative structures such as the cycle of damage and compensation belonging to Achilleus. By 'compensation theme', I mean both the abstract structural form the theme takes and each particular instantiation. I bracket temporarily the individual characters and their development through the poem in order to isolate roles and sequences of action typical to the theme.[40] Nagy's model stops short of a methodology for identifying and cataloguing individual narrative units; nevertheless, I have found a modified version of Edward's type-scene analysis a satisfactory means of identifying discrete themes. Although the compensation theme is not a type-scene in Edwards' sense of the term, many of the examples inventoried share a collocation of actions and details beyond the three-part structural homology that I show by my own analysis to characterize the theme.[41]

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[39]Nagy (1979) 3; (1996a) 137.

[40]The pronounced tendency of formalist narratology to ignore or even impede appreciation of the poetic art of characterization in favor of 'roles' has been justly criticized, most recently by Martin (1993) 223. I suggest that attention to recurring roles can, however, contribute to analysis of characterization that avoids the 'psychologizing' characteristic of New Criticism. For discussion, see Chapter 6.2.

[41]See summary of narrative details in Chapter 3.1.

In accordance with Nagy's position that theme, not formula, is the key to other levels of fixity, I privilege repetition of formal elements over verbal repetition in both the inventory and the organization of the catalogue.[42] The themes do, however, feature repeated words and phrases that can be demonstrated to 'contain' the compensation theme in the *Iliad*.[43] I refer to significant verbal and syntactical repetitions as 'recurring word groups'. The intent of the term 'recurring word groups' and of the limits imposed on its application is to allow for flexibility in designating repeated patterns, and to avoid the appearance of suggesting that lines and parts of lines not marked as repetitions are in some sense not 'formulaic'.

I readily concede that the boundaries of any particular theme are necessarily approximate, and, further, that the limits by which one narrative unit is included in the inventory and another excluded are also somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, I believe the catalogue of scenes will demonstrate that the repeated pattern of the compensation theme in the *Iliad* makes itself felt sufficiently to generate a model.

I.2.2 Homeric repetition: utility versus artistry

A final methodological issue that needs to be addressed is what to make of Homeric repetition. Gregory Nagy describes the dilemma as one of "metrical utility versus artistry," or, "how a seemingly mechanical

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[42]There is consensus among most adherents to a form of the Parry-Lord model that repetition of narrative units does not require word for word correspondence.

[43]By 'repeated', I mean occurring more than once in the theme.

method of generating the hexameter line could result in compositions that seem so integral."[44] Joseph Russo characterizes the polarity as the "oral" versus the "aural" function of repetition in Homer.[45] At stake are the implications of oral composition theories for critical interpretation. The question is whether Homeric repetition should be considered primarily (or only) as a technical aspect of oral composition-in-performance,[46] as an aesthetic aspect of oral poetics,[47] or whether there exists a middle ground that accommodates both perspectives.[48]

Deployment of like scenes by the narrator, Achilleus, and Lykaon (*Il.* 21.32-135; see above) argues against Charles Beye's charge that order and patterns are all in the mind of the critic not the poet, and that seeking significance in a "repeated line or two" is futile.[49] Mark Edwards makes a convincing case for the middle ground in critical interpretation of

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[44]Nagy (1976) 243.

[45]Russo (1976).

[46]See for example A. Parry's (1971) lvii n. 1, claim that themes are episodic: "they are successively used, completed and forgotten." See also Miller (1982) 92.

[47]Armstrong (1958) 354, represents the voice of opposition to so-called hard-Parryism when he maintains that the poem is not the product of a "mere mouthpiece of traditional stock lines and phrases, nor are they the second-by-second spoutings of a quick-witted, facile, oral improviser." Taken to extremes, this position becomes a campaign for Homer against the tradition; see for example Russo (1976).

[48]Holoka (1991) 470-472, calls the middle-ground position "revisionist," meaning the revision of "oral theory" to bring it into line with the ideal of a "consciously creative Homer." See for example M. Edwards (1980; 1986; 1987; 1988; 1992); Renoir (1986); Martin (1989); Lowenstam (1993); Kahane (1994) 17, who concludes that metrical structure can be semantically functional. The studies of orality as a cultural phenomenon, which take an interdisciplinary approach to oral traditional poetry, also tend to occupy this middle ground. See for example Nagy (1979; 1989; 1990a; 1990b; 1996a; 1996b); Ong (1982); Gentili (1988); Cook (1995); Bakker (1993; 1997); Dougherty and Kurke (1993).

[49]Beye (1966) 98.

repeated narrative units. He observes that comparison of a particular instance of a theme with other occurrences allows for identification of special features. Not only do themes vary in length, amplification, and complexity, but the short form of a theme often precedes a fuller version.[50] Further, the 'poet' may alter a theme for special effect.[51] While I do not share Edwards' view of the 'poet' and of auctorial intent, the inference that discrete manifestations of a theme may be profitably read against one another, both paradigmatically and syntagmatically, is consonant with the theory of activation of memory that I discuss above. Edwards' most astute intuition about thematic repetition, in my judgment, is on the surface the simplest: repeated themes lead the reader or hearer to recognize conventional structures.[52] The *Iliad* did not need to lead its audience to recognize the structure of a 'real' compensatory exchange; the historical conventions of compensation would have been second nature to them. I propose, however, that, by a strategy of repetition and arrangement of scenes, the *Iliad* did familiarize the audience with a set of conventions, thereby creating a specific set of expectations which could be fulfilled or manipulated.[53]

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[50]Edwards (1991) 13, 19. Edwards concludes that this arrangement works to familiarize the hearer with a concept before its most significant occurrence; amplification thus signifies importance. He calls this pairing of scenes an "anticipatory doublet." For my analysis of the arrangement of compensation themes, see Chapter 3.3.

[51]M. Edwards (1975) 296; (1992) 287.

[52]M. Edwards (1991) 14-15.

[53]See for example Renoir's (1986) 104, observation that "the presence of a given oral-formulaic element may lead the listener to expect certain things to occur, or at least to be mentioned." Dimock (1963) 60, adds that themes may provide a background of the

In Chapter 1, I describe the pattern of formal elements evinced by the compensation themes catalogued in Chapter 2. The consistent appearance of a three-part pattern (damage or defeat, a potential exchange, and a resolution) and the recurrence of an etymologically and semantically unified word family warrant my treatment of the themes as an identifiable group. Thus, although the topic of compensation in the *Iliad* impinges on exchange in Homeric society, I do not discuss gift exchange, such as *xeinia*, except as the theoretical framework in which compensatory exchanges are located.

In Chapter 2, I catalogue compensation themes in the *Iliad* under the rubrics of *apoina*, *poinē*, and a mixed-type theme.[54] I then analyze the typological and social conventions of compensation in Homeric society in Chapter 3. Exchanges of compensation, since they comprise exchanges of *timē* in a social system in which status is essentially fluid and under constant negotiation, either reproduce or manipulate relations of power and are, therefore, politically charged. Although successful and unsuccessful exchanges of compensatory goods are embedded side by side in the poem, the themes are systematically developed so that successful exchanges of *apoina* are relegated to a time prior to Chryses' offer of *apoina* and following Priam's; all offers of *apoina* that are located in

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expected against which the unexpected may show forth to better advantage. See also Fenik (1968) 213-14.; Thornton (1984) 73-74; Lowenstam (1993) 9.

[54]For definition and detailed discussion of these terms, see Chapter 1.

the poem's primary fabula fail. Furthermore, the *poinē* themes in the primary fabula demonstrate an erosion of conventional limits.

In Chapters 4 through 8, I analyze the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilleus, the embassy to Achilleus, the so-called 'reconciliation' between Achilleus and Agamemnon, and Hektor's and Priam's offers of *apoina*, in light of the development of the compensation theme. I show that internal characters deploy, manipulate, and even abuse the conventions of compensation in the intense competition to define the situation that has developed out of the quarrel in Book 1. Moreover, competition to define damage and compensation runs parallel to competition to 'write' the *Iliad* in relation to archetypal themes.[55] The compensation themes involving Achilleus emerge as a struggle for dominance based on a strategy of competing definitions and aggressive arrogation of roles.

[55]See especially Chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 1: Formal Elements of Compensation Themes

Compensation themes in the *Iliad* evince a consistently repeated three-part pattern which warrants type comparison within the poem: damage or defeat, a potential exchange, and resolution.

1.1 Damage or Defeat

The first element of the theme is that one party defeats or inflicts damage upon another. As we shall see, defeat on the battlefield, capture, or damage (such as insulting or killing) may lead to what I identify as a compensatory exchange. There are, of course, instances of defeat or damage in the *Iliad* that do not lead to a compensation theme, though there is evidence that the failure to secure compensation or recoup a loss results in an unsatisfactory condition.[1] My interest, however, is in those situations which do lead to a compensation theme. I designate the formal element 'damage or defeat' with the letter D, both in the catalogue of Greek passages and in the text of the discussion. The aspect of defeat or damage sets the compensation theme formally and terminologically apart from *xenia*, though both may be subsumed under the larger schema of gift and debt exchange in the *Iliad*.

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[1]See for example 13.656-59 and 14.484-85, Chapter 2 *ad loc.* Donlan (1993) 160, also observes that in Homeric society, loss of *timē* seems unbearable and must be reversed.

1.2 COMPENSATORY EXCHANGE IN REACTION TO DAMAGE OR DEFEAT

The second element in the compensation theme is a potential exchange by which the condition created by damage or defeat may be remedied to the satisfaction of one or both parties. The exchange is qualified by what I call, for the purpose of discussion, 'direction' and 'path'. By 'direction' I refer to the movement of exchange objects in relation to the two parties; by 'path' I refer to the movement of exchange objects in relation to 'spheres', or, categories, of wealth.[2] I designate the potential exchange with the letter E, as above with D. In the case that directionality and path appear as discrete elements, I designate directionality as E-d and path as E-p

The first aspect of the exchange is what I call 'direction'. When damage or defeat is addressed by means of a compensatory exchange in the *Iliad*, the compensation travels in one of two 'directions' in relation to the two parties.[3] Compensation for damage may be taken from the party inflicting damage or his *philoi*—whether by force or by agreement—by the victim's *philoi*, or, in a few cases, by the victim him- or herself.[4] Conversely, *philoi* of a defeated or captured person may

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[2]For detailed discussion, see below. On 'path', see Bohannan (1955); Appadurai (1986); and Ferguson (1992); on 'sphere', see Bohannan (1955; 1959); Appadurai (1986); Morris (1986a); and Ferguson (1988, 1992).

[3]For discussion of the conditions that influence which direction the injured party chooses, see Chapter 3.3.

[4]I employ the term *philoi* generically to signify a range of institutional and sentimental relationships by virtue of which people relate to one another as 'insiders'. The relations that fall within the compass of *philoi* in the *Iliad* include kinship and marriage, association as *hetairoi*, and friendships formalized through *xeinia*. See Chapter 3.1.

attempt to gain his or her release by offering a material exchange to the victor or captor. In the latter case, the family of the captive exchanges loss in one sphere for loss in another (loss of material goods instead of loss of a family member); the victor or captor exchanges gain in one sphere for gain in another (for example, a victor on the battlefield may accept material goods to compensate for the armor and *kudos* he would acquire by killing his victim).

Themes in which a defeated party offers a compensatory exchange to a victor or captor often feature word groups associated with *apoina*. Forms of *(apo)luein* are used regularly to express the intended result of the *apoina*, both from the perspective of the one offering it (middle voice, 'to gain the release') and from the perspective of the one who accepts or rejects it (active voice, 'to release').[5] Themes in which an injured party takes compensation from the party inflicting damage usually employ *poinē* and/or a form of *(apo)tinein*.[6] *Apoina* and *poinē* word groups do not occur in every theme; in their absence, directionality can be marked by the details of the narrative. Since, however, the recurring word groups—*apoina* and *poinē*—do so consistently convey the element of direction, I designate the directional alternatives as compensation themes of the *apoina* type and *poinē* type (see Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 below).

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[5]See Chapters 2.1 and 3.1.
[6]See Chapters 2.2 and 3.1.



Figure 1.1: Pattern of *apoina*-type exchange



Figure 1.2: Pattern of *poinē*-type exchange



Figure 1.3: Pattern of direct *poinē*-type exchange

I will use the diagrams, as shown in Figures 1.1 - 1.3 above, to map *apoina* and *poinē* themes and variations on the themes. The numerals refer to patterns of relations. The relation between the victim, who is most often an object of exchange, and the *philos* who

gives *apoina* or secures *poinē* I designate as 1. The relation between the victim and the victor or party who inflicts damage I designate as 2.[7] The relation between the victim's *philos* and the victor or party who inflicts damage I designate as 3. I anticipate the results of formal analysis of the theme, which I present in Chapter 3, when I say that damage, defeat (such as defeat in battle or capture), and both 'directions' of compensatory exchange comprise social-symbolic transactions which either reproduce or alter relations of status between the parties involved in the exchange. As a result, compensatory exchanges involve patterns of relationship which are also relations of power. In other words, 'direction' in compensatory exchange is politically charged.[8]

What I define as alternate directions within a single theme are often taken as two separate themes. Ransom of captives (an exchange of the *apoina* type), for example, has been treated as a theme apart from 'revenge' (*poinē* construed in a limited sense).[9] Supplication is also

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[7]In the discrete themes, the victim ordinarily does not secure his or her own *poinē* from the perpetrator of damage, as shown in Figure 1.3 above. The exceptions, Hera in Book 4 and, less likely, Neleus in Book 11, are exceptional among the scenes in several respects. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[8]For detailed discussion, see Chapter 3.3.

[9]Translations of *apoina* as 'ransom' and *poinē* as 'revenge, punishment, blood-price', etc. are perhaps unavoidable, but they tend to obscure the thematic association of the word group. *Apoina* and *poinē*, or, ransom and revenge, may both be described as recovery operations. The ancient Israelite tradition, in which the same word, *gōʾēl*, is used for the clan redeemer, whether he redeems a captive (an exchange corresponding to the *apoina* type) or blood (an exchange corresponding to the *poinē* type) is instructive for the unity of the Homeric theme. See discussion of 14.478-85 in Chapter 2.2.

frequently considered as a motif that comprehends only part of what I identify as the compensation theme.[10] The approach I take recognizes the traditional thematic unity of a unified etymological and semantic network. The etymological network—which includes *tiō, timē, timaō, tinō, tinumai, tisis, atitos, poinē* and *apoina*—derives from PIE *$k^{w}ey(H1)$, meaning 'to take notice of'.[11] '*Apoina*' is most commonly regarded as haplology of *apopoina* (analogous to *apotinumai*), though Emmet Robbins takes it to be an intensive form of *poinē*.[12] *Poinē* is itself a doublet of *timē*. Robbins infers from the etymological connection between *poinē* and *timē* that there is a corresponding connection in ideas: "restitution or indemnity (*timē*) is a form of satisfaction in a carefully calibrated exchange system whose satisfactions include penalties, ransom, and honor."[13]

Emile Benveniste is compelled by what he perceives as a disparity in the senses of "punish" (*tinō* and *poinē*) and "honor" (*tiō* and *timē*) to question the etymological and semantic unity of the word

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[10]See Gould (1973); Thornton (1984). On supplication in compensation themes, see Chapter 3.2.

[11]See Sihler (1995) 161, 164A; Killen (1992) 380; Hutton (1990-91) 126; Robbins (1990) 12 note 33; cf. Adkins (1960), who makes a semantic rather than an etymological connection. Adkins recognizes that the word group *timē, timaō, tiō*, and (*apo*)*tinō* is related to *poinē*, but omits mention of the form *apoina*. The word family arguably includes Mycenean *qe-te-o*, which Hutton (1990-91) has shown to mean more than just 'to pay', but possibly 'to pay as a fine or in penalty'. IE cognates include Sanskrit *cáyate* (take vengeance) and Avestan *kaēnā* (penalty).

[12]Robbins (1990) 12 note 33. On the intensive α, see Smyth (1956) 250. Steven Reece pointed out to me that the haplology of *apopoina* is the preferred alternative.

[13]Robbins (1990) 12 n. 33.

family.[14] Benveniste turns his attention therefore from etymology to usage, and performs a careful, albeit incomplete, investigation of *timē* and *poinē* in Homer. He concludes that *timē* is dignity of divine origin which is conferred by fate on a royal person but which has no religious significance; *poinē* (and therefore *tinumai, tisis,* etc.) is the price of a fine, especially for a "capital offense."[15] Benveniste believes he can refute the claim that *timē* and *poinē* are semantically connected by refuting the argument that the two are practically equated at *Il.* 3.285 and 289-90. He maintains that *timē* in 3.285 and 289 (associated with *apotinein* "only by chance") is tribute owed beyond restitution by the Trojans in recognition of [Agamemnon's] royal power. *Poinē,* on the other hand, is punishment for violation of the oath if the Trojans failed to pay *timē* in accordance with the agreement. Benveniste concludes from usage, in agreement with a theory of Wilhelm Schulze, that *tiō* and *timē* differ in root vowel from *tinō* and *poinē.* The two groups thus derive from separate etymological families that are joined only secondarily.[16]

What Benveniste, for all his linguistic acumen, fails to take into account is the evidence in Homer for a social system in which "honor"

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[14]Benveniste (1973) 340.

[15]Benveniste (1973) 343.

[16]Benveniste (1973) 343, cites the appearance of *apoteinuto* on a 5th century Cretan inscription in support of his claim that *teinu-* (from *k^w*ēi*) is the root of *tinumai.* Schulze (1892) had proposed that *tiō* and *timē* derive from *k^w*ēi,* and *tinō* and *poinē* from *k^w*ei.* Benveniste's argument about etymology does not necessarily undermine my argument, since even he accepts that *timē* and *poinē* are joined secondarily. His argument about Homeric usage does run counter to my own findings. See below and Chapter 3.

and "punishment" are not disparate concepts. Arthur Adkins, though he does not remark on the etymological connection, sees the semantic relationship between *timē* and *poinē,* and lays the groundwork for a systemic analysis of the social meaning of honor and punishment in Homeric society.[17] The scenes inventoried in Chapter 2 will demonstrate that, although the semantic network and the two 'directions' that compensation takes may seem to cohere only artificially to a modern reader, they nevertheless belong to a discrete system in the context of Homeric society.

The aspect of direction emerges as a decisive factor in the formal conventions and recurring word groups that characterize the compensation theme. Affiliations between parties involved have sometimes been treated as the determining element, particularly in analyses of ransom or supplication. Yet a taxonomy of exchanges by affiliation, such as Achaian and non-Achaian, fails to account for significant scenes which are in other respects typical of the theme. Specifically, it fails to account for Agamemnon's and Achilleus' conflict over compensation. The scenes will suggest, however, that prior relations between the parties, particularly as insiders or outsiders, are a significant factor in the conditioning environment.[18]

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[17]Adkins (1960). By 'Homeric society', Adkins, of course, means Greek society.
[18]See Chapter 3.3.

By 'path' I mean the relative valuation that is proposed as an acceptable (fictional) equivalency for purposes of making an exchange. Put simply, what can be exchanged for what? In the compensation theme, the issue involves some kind of damage or loss: what can compensate for damage incurred or suffice to recoup a loss? In compensatory exchanges in the *Iliad*, exchangeability is reckoned in terms of spheres, by which I mean wholly or partially distinct categories of persons and objects (for example, 'bronze, gold, and wrought metal,' and 'son').[19] The spheres to which persons and objects 'belong' are dynamic: they exist processually in a given society, rather than as an independent and fixed structure. Paul Bohannan describes such an organization of forms of wealth into hierarchical spheres as a "multi-centric economy":

> Briefly, a multi-centric economy is an economy in which a society's exchangeable goods fall into two or more mutually exclusive spheres, each marked by different institutionalization and different moral values. In some multi-centric economies these spheres remain distinct, though in most there are more or less institution-alized means of converting wealth from one into wealth in another.[20]

Bohannan calls an exchange of entities that belong to the same sphere (for example, prestige goods exchanged for prestige goods)

[19]See also Morris (1986a) 8-9, who describes exchangeability in the Homeric economy in terms of hierarchical 'exchange order' as opposed to 'exchange value'.

[20]Bohannan (1959) 492. Spheres in Homeric society tolerate some ambiguity, and thus are better described as "wholly or partially exclusive" rather than "mutually exclusive." See below.

"conveyance," and an exchange of entities that belong to different spheres (for example, the exchange of goods for a human being) "conversion."[21] Acceptable conversions, paths between spheres, are culturally conditioned and are maintained by a framework of social rules and meanings. As James Ferguson observes, paths express a particular set of interests; pathmaking is therefore an important exercise of power.[22] Spheres and paths thus lend themselves to manipulation—reproduction and redefinition—for political purposes.[23] I am suggesting not only that discrete transactions must either reproduce or challenge hierarchies within a field, but that the maintenance or disruption of certain paths of exchange may reproduce or challenge hierarchical relations.

I detect four spheres of wealth operative in the *Iliad*.[24] As I define them for purposes of the present discussion, the spheres comprise: subsistence goods (including foodstuffs, small livestock, and ordinary utensils),[25] prestige goods (including horses, chariots, armor

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[21]Bohannan (1959) 496; see also Ferguson (1992).

[22]Ferguson (1992) 59. See also Morris (1986a) 8-9.

[23]By 'political' I mean relating to relations of power. See Chapter 3.2. See also Donlan's (1981) 107, observation that the ultimate purpose of social-symbolic transactions in Homer was "the validation and maintenance of the established political hierarchy."

[24]Donlan (1981) 106, identifies only two separate and distinct economic spheres in Homeric society: one "real," and related to subsistence; the other social-symbolic treasure, and used for social-symbolic transactions. As we will see, however, a more precise taxonomy of wealth in Homeric society affords a more sophisticated analysis of compensatory exchanges.

[25]Subsistence goods appear as forms of wealth in the *Iliad*, but they are not ordinarily employed as exchange goods. They are for that reason of little consequence

and other metal goods; certain cloth goods; and captive women), persons (including adult males, wives, and children), and cultural wealth (including *kratos* and certain ritual roles or 'offices' and their symbols). These categories need not be coterminous with any 'sphere' recognized by the poet, any of the characters, or Archaic Greek society. They are, rather, objectivist heuristic devices.

Prestige goods include those forms of wealth that are regularly exchanged as gifts and compensation in the *Iliad*. Prestige goods, often subsumed under the denomination *keimēlia*, are less utilitarian than subsistence wealth; their acquisition is as restricted as their use.[26] Donlan notices that most items of *keimēlia* are made by specialists not attached to an *oikos*, and are therefore attainable primarily through avenues that presume high status (competitive activity, receipt as gift, commission from a craft-specialist, or purchase from foreign traders).[27] Cloth goods, which are produced by women in the *oikos*, furnish a noteworthy exception to the pattern of production that otherwise obtains. Donlan accordingly suggests that the fact of women (like

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for an investigation of exchanges of compensation. Cattle are ambiguous: as animals used for food, they belong in the sphere of subsistence goods; as the standard of measurement (*Il.* 2.449; 6.234; 21.79; 23.702), they are better included in the sphere of prestige goods. Donlan (1981) 102-3, notices that in transactions (in Homer) involving treasure, the numerical scale of the goods is always small; in enumeration of small animal wealth, including cattle, the numerical scale is large. By Donlan's reckoning, cattle, although they are the measuring stick of worth, belong in the sphere of subsistence goods with sheep and other small animals.

[26]See for example *Il.* 6.47 and 11.132.

[27]Donlan (1981) 105. Prestige goods are thus both scarce and expensive.

racehorses and mares!) producing treasure helps explain their inclusion in the category of prestige goods.[28]

The sphere of persons is a kinship and marriage group with respect to women and children, though it includes all adult males in warrior-society.[29] Ian Morris classifies women, cattle, horses, and finished objects of metal as constituting the top rank group in Homer.[30] There is ample evidence, however, that the sphere in which women are located is ambiguous in some instances (Andromachē's mother, 6.428-29), and hotly contested in others (for example, Briseis). Further, women in Homeric society are variously located in the sphere of persons or prestige goods, depending in part on the particulars of their relationships and, more importantly, on the rhetoric being deployed.[31]

The spheres of wealth as I describe them are admittedly open to Annette Weiner's criticism of the gender bias of exchange theories that classify women as objects exchanged between men, rather than as agents who act in their own interest and with their own resources.[32] I address the problem, although admittedly only in part, by restricting my formal analysis to the association of gender with sphere as it is

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[28]Donlan (1981) 105. Women are not, however, consistently located in the sphere of prestige goods. See below.

[29]Cf. Bohannan (1959) 494, who does not include adult males—as the ones who possess and exchange the wealth—in a sphere.

[30]Morris (1986a) 9, 12. Cf. Donlan (1993) 105, above.

[31]See especially Chapters 5-8.

[32]Weiner (1992) 12-15.

represented in the *Iliad*. I briefly discuss the resulting politics of gender and exchange in the Conclusion.

For the category of cultural wealth, I have drawn upon Pierre Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital. Cultural capital is, in Bourdieu's model, any given cultural competence, especially one which derives value from scarcity and yields a profit of 'distinction' for its owner. Might in battle (*kratos*), skill in performing a *muthos*, the attributes of a priest, and possession of a scepter transmitted from Zeus are examples of cultural capital in Homeric society. Cultural wealth is not ordinarily an object of exchange in Homeric society, though it may generate prestige goods and status for the one who possesses it.[33]

None of the four categories of wealth listed above encompasses *kleos* or *timē*. *Kleos* and *timē* comprise dual-notions of wealth; both are fundamental to exchange, and especially compensatory exchange, in Homeric society.[34] Pierre Bourdieu's category of symbolic capital readily accommodates the functions of *kleos* and *timē* and their relation to other spheres of wealth.[35] Symbolic capital is the successful

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[33]Cultural wealth may produce prestige goods, and thereby status, directly (for instance the armor that a victorious warrior strips from his enemy). The possession of cultural wealth may also impart a position of advantage in other exchanges. On this, see Weiner's (1992) 38-40, discussion of inalienable possessions as a source of power in gift exchange.

[34]Both contain a concrete and an abstract element. *Kleos* is immortality as conferred by traditional poetry; *klea andrōn* also refers to traditional poetry itself. On *timē* as a dual-notion, see Chapter 6.1.

[35]Bourdieu (1977; 1980; 1984a;1986; 1992). Bourdieu (1986) identifies four basic forms of capital that members of a society may possess and deploy: economic capital, cultural capital, social capital (a network of persons), and symbolic capital.

conversion of other forms of wealth by a cultural strategy of 'misrecognition' into 'natural' properties of one's person for purposes of achieving or maintaining position (=rank in a ranked society) in a given field.[36]

> In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined. . . by their present and potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relations to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).[37]

I would thus describe the relations of status in Homeric warrior-society as the 'field' of politics (relations of power).

Bourdieu further suggests that cultural capital (cultural 'wealth' above, such as *kratos*) is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, that is, to be misrecognized as legitimate competence in a given field.[38] In Homeric society, prestige goods are equally predisposed to function as symbolic capital. The relationship of prestige goods to status, sometimes referred to as the 'material basis of *timē*', may be analyzed as the successful conversion of prestige goods, by socially and semantically maintained 'misrecognition', into symbolic capital in the political field.

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[36]Misrecognition refers to the failure to recognize that practices or values accepted as legitimate in a society are 'arbitrary' and not 'natural'. Cultural strategies of misrecognition are strategies for the reproduction of cultural orthodoxy, or, 'common sense'. See Bourdieu (1990; 1991).

[37]Bourdieu (1992) 97; see also (1980) 67 and (1984b).

[38]Bourdieu (1986) 245, *et passim*.

In summary: the second element of a compensation theme in the *Iliad* is a potential exchange that is qualified by two factors: 'direction', which is mapped in relation to the two parties, and 'path', which is mapped in relation to spheres of wealth.

1.3 RESOLUTION

The third element exhibited in the theme is resolution of the condition resulting from damage or defeat. Resolution need not mean the potential exchange is effected, only that the opportunity is acted upon. In complete themes of the *apoina* type, the defeated party generally offers a material exchange on behalf of his father, and it is either accepted or rejected. In complete themes of the *poinē* type, the injured party attempts to secure compensation and either succeeds or fails. I designate the formal element 'resolution' with the letter R, as with D and E above.

A noteworthy variation of the basic theme appears three times in the discrete themes (6.45-55; 11.122-147; 21.34-135; cf. also 24.200-216).[39] In each case, an *apoina* theme is disrupted by a *poinē* theme, leading to competing definitions of the damage and of appropriate compensation. The two themes are interwoven so that the chronological and narrative order are in tension. The chronological order of events is as follows:

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[39]24.200-216 comprises a *poinē* theme which alludes to and competes with the larger *apoina* theme within which it is situated. On this, see Chapter 2 *ad loc* and Chapter 8.

D1 Party a (or one of party a's *philoi*) inflicts damage on party b (or party b's *philoi*). The damage remains uncompensated.

D2 Party b defeats party a on the battlefield (threatening him with loss of life).

E2 Party a offers *apoina* to party b in an attempt to preserve his own life by means of a material exchange.

E1 Party b identifies himself or his *philos* as the injured party, and seeks to secure a payment corresponding to *poinē* for the prior damage (=D.1).

R Party b, who now has the position of superiority, rejects *apoina* and secures *poinē* instead, usually by taking party a's life.

The actual narrative presentation of these mixed-type themes begins with elements D.2 and E.2, thus generating expectation for an *apoina* theme. Because of the recollection of the prior injury, however, the theme is actually resolved as a *poinē* theme. This privileging of *poinē* (recompense for prior damage) over *apoina* (offered in the present situation) is exploited by Achilleus in two scenes of great consequence for the compensation theme in the *Iliad*.[40]

I have presented the formal elements of the compensation theme in their logical order. There is, however, flexibility in the narrative sequence of elements in the themes. The variations in sequence are especially noticeable in epitomized themes, which are contained in only two to five lines. For example, in narratives of

[40]9.120-439 and 21.34-135; cf. 22.330-34.

retributive slayings on the battlefield, the element of resolution—successful exaction of *poinē*—often appears first in the narrative, followed by a vaunt that discloses the elements of damage and path of exchange.

Discrete compensation themes are distributed broadly through the *Iliad* and are, as we shall see, fundamental structuring devices in the poem. They exist alongside and sometimes intersect the overarching complex of major themes involving Achilleus (Books 1, 9, 19, and 24). The discrete themes establish conventional terminology and depict a conditioning environment that accommodates a variety of compensatory exchanges. The poem manipulates expectations, however, by the juxtaposition of similar scenes which have diametrically opposed outcomes (for example, the two encounters between Achilleus and Lykaon discussed in the Introduction).[41] The poem consistently marks one set of expectations as realized outside of its own chronological boundaries, and another as proper to the primary fabula.[42] Moreover, the discrete themes, as we shall see, introduce the tensions and finally the impasse that are exploited in the compensation scenes belonging to Achilleus.

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[41]See also Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[42]Bal (1985) 5, defines a fabula as "a series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors." The primary fabula is the series of events that take place during the time-span covered by the narrative. The primary fabula of the *Iliad* extends from the arrival of Chryses in the Greek camp to the burial of Hektor; see de Jong (1987) 84. See also Chapter 3.4.

The discrete themes share structural and verbal features with monumental themes, whose elements are sundered and dispersed through the length of and even beyond the limits of the *Iliad* (for example, the theme of compensation for the Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε).[43] The overarching themes involving Achilleus are longer and more elaborate than the discrete units. In these themes characters not only deploy the conventions established in the discrete themes, they problematize and even contravene them. For these reasons, I bracket the expansive narrative complex built around Achilleus' losses and compensations, in order to examine the discrete themes as the background against which Achilleus' themes are foregrounded.[44]

The synopsis of the formal structure of the theme provides a basis for comparison of significant details among the recurring narrative units. It does not yet address the factors that influence whether damage or defeat will lead to an exchange of *apoina* or of *poinē*. It also does not address the social meaning of compensation in Homeric society (much less in the poem itself and its performance-context). In order to proceed with those inquiries, however, the underlying system or conditioning environment in which the

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[43]Martin (1989) 208-9, calls the narrative device of separating theme elements a "splitting expansion."

[44]For the background-foreground technique I am employing, see Martin (1989) 161-171, and Leech (1985).

exchanges occur must be derived from a taxonomic analysis of the theme which takes all significant details into account.

Chapter 2: Catalogue of Compensation Themes

This catalogue of themes is organized into three groups according to directionality of exchange: themes of the *apoina* type, the *poinē* type, and the mixed-type. Within each group, I arrange the themes from the most simple examples to the more complex. By 'simple', I do not mean only that the narrative unit is short or compact, although unencumbered instantiations of the theme are short and compact. Rather, by 'simple' I mean that the narrative unit exhibits only one compensation theme. In other words, the narrative unit contains an element of damage or defeat, one exchange, and a resolution. Simple themes may be amplified by elaboration of one or more elements, but still contain only one theme. Complex themes, in contrast, weave more than one compensation theme, or parts of more than one theme, into a unified narrative. The themes in the catalogue are, therefore, not arranged in the order of their occurrence in the *Iliad*, except in the case of several simple *poinē* themes that appear in a single sequence of battle scenes. The arrangement of the catalogue reflects the paradigmatic view I am taking of the compensation theme in this chapter.

The formal elements of the theme are indicated in the margins as follows: damage or defeat is designated by D; the proposed exchange by E (directionality by E-d; path by E-p); and resolution by R. I underline only those recurring word groups which regularly contain the

compensation theme. I do not distinguish exact verbal repetition from modifications and structural formulas by conventional means of solid and broken lines.

2.1 Themes of the *Apoina* Type

All the scenes in this group contain a simple theme of the *apoina* type in which a defeated warrior (on behalf of his family) or the family of a captive offers a material exchange to a victor or captor (see Figure 1.1).[1] We almost always view the scenes from the perspective of the internal characters, generally from the perspective of the party who offers *apoina*, and generally from that of a Trojan warrior.[2] In fact, the poem subtly positions the audience through the focalization of the defeated warrior or family of the captive.[3] I suggest this is one of the ways the poem aligns the audience with the party in the dependent position and creates sympathy for the Trojans. Since it is the perspective the poem itself represents, I map the path of exchange from the perspective of the party who offers *apoina*. When the victor or captor offers a competing definition of the path, I report both perspectives.

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[1]All of the complex themes which contain offers of *apoina* are mixed-typed themes. See below 2.3.

[2]Of the six simple themes of the *apoina*-type, only one is narrated and focalized by the external narrator (11.101-12). See below *ad loc.*

[3]The auditors are subtly positioned in all the discrete compensation themes. In the quarrel and the embassy however, all subtlety evaporates as the characters openly compete to narrate and focalize the theme. See especially Chapters 4-7.

2.225-34

The setting is the Achaian assembly that follows Agamemnon's near-disastrous *diapeira*. Thersites begins a speech in which he blames Agamemnon with respect to his distribution of war booty:[4]

225 Ἀτρεΐδη τέο δ' αὖτ' ἐπιμέμφεαι ἠδὲ χατίζεις;
πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι, πολλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες
εἰσὶν ἐνὶ κλισίῃς ἐξαίρετοι, ἅς τοι Ἀχαιοὶ
πρωτίστῳ δίδομεν εὖτ' ἂν πτολίεθρον ἕλωμεν.[5]
ἦ ἔτι καὶ χρυσοῦ ἐπιδεύεαι, ὅν κέ τις οἴσει — E, R
230 Τρώων ἱπποδάμων ἐξ Ἰλίου υἷος ἄποινα, — D
ὅν κεν ἐγὼ δήσας ἀγάγω ἢ ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν,[6]
ἠὲ γυναῖκα νέην, ἵνα μίσγεαι ἐν φιλότητι,
ἥν τ' αὐτὸς ἀπονόσφι κατίσχεαι; οὐ μὲν ἔοικεν
ἀρχὸν ἐόντα κακῶν ἐπιβασκέμεν υἷας Ἀχαιῶν.

Thersites' speech includes a three-line epitome of a theme of the *apoina* type (2.229-231). He alludes to the practice of holding Trojans who were captured (D) and brought to camp by himself and the other

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[4]I use Van Thiel's (1996) edition of the *Iliad* throughout unless indicated otherwise. Atheteses attributed to Zenodotus or Aristarchus which affect significant details in the compensation theme are discussed in the notes. I compare Mazon's (1992), Allen's (1920), and Bolling's (1950) readings where they differ from van Thiel's in a way that is of consequence for the typology. Further, I augment the textual discussion with Apthorp's (1980) and Van der Valk's (1963-4) often opposed remarks where available. Apthorp and Van der Valk are both committed to recovery of an 'authentic' or 'genuinely Homeric' text. Studies of orality and the gradual fixation model for Homeric epic are rapidly changing the contours of traditional methods and goals of text criticism. See especially Nagy (1996b) and a forthcoming multiform edition of *Iliad* Book 1 by G. Bird (Harvard University doctoral thesis; see Nagy [1996b] 109 n. 15). There are few textual cruces in the discrete scenes which threaten to obscure or radically alter the structural and verbal features of the theme. Lines in these scenes which were athetized by Aristarchus are usually shown by the scholia to have been athetized as superfluous or unfitting, that is, not because of manuscript evidence.

[5]Lines 227-228 were athetized by Zenodotus (who read πλεῖαι δὲ γυναικῶν at 226). They are omitted by Bolling (1950) but retained by modern editors.

[6]Lines 231-234 were athetized by Zenodotus, no doubt for their portrayal of Agamemnon. Bolling (1950) does not include 2.231-234.

Achaians for the gold their fathers would bring to gain their release (E). Although Thersites is speaking, the path of exchange is focalized from the perspective of the father who brings *apoina* for a son (*huios apoina*, 2.230). *Apoina*, where the contents are described, always comprise prestige goods; therefore the path is prestige goods for a family member.[7]

Since Thersites' speech points to general practice, the resolution can be inferred from the premise of the charge: such an exchange could be expected to be offered by Trojan fathers and accepted by the victors with some regularity. Thersites depicts a system in which captives taken on the battlefield are exchanged for *apoina* through a central mechanism, namely Agamemnon. The blame Thersites casts at Agamemnon is that the mechanism is not working properly: he and the other Achaians bring in Trojans sons as captives, but Agamemnon keeps the gold.[8]

There are no indices of supplication in the theme. The absence may owe to its narrative situation in a speech referring to general practice. A scenario including supplication may be implicit in the allusion to the battlefield pattern.[9] The three-line epitome is punctuated with recurring word groups (see underlined words).

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[7]Family members are, by definition, included in the category of persons in the *Iliad*. See Chapter 3.

[8]Thersites' speech may be compared with Achilleus' rebuke of Agamemnon (1.148-171 and 9.318-377). On this, see Chapter 5. On the blame genre of Thersites' speech, see Nagy (1979) 259-62, (1989), (1990a) 16-17; Gentili (1988) 107-114; and Martin (1989) 109-111.

[9]Assuming that most of the Trojan sons were captured in battle, the battlefield scenes in which Trojan warriors supplicate their Achaian victors to spare their lives for *apoina* would surely be brought into view.

6.425-28

In conversation with Hektor, Andromachē recalls an earlier occasion when her mother was captured and released by Achilleus:[10]

425	μητέρα δ', ἣ βασίλευεν ὑπὸ Πλάκῳ ὑληέσσῃ,	D, E-p
	τὴν ἐπεὶ ἂρ δεῦρ' ἤγαγ' ἅμ' ἄλλοισι κτεάτεσσιν,	
	ἂψ ὅ γε τὴν ἀπέλυσε λαβὼν ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα,[11]	R, E-d
	πατρὸς δ' ἐν μεγάροισι βάλ' Ἄρτεμις ἰοχέαιρα.[12]	

When Hektor returns to Troy to instruct the women to make an offering to Athena (6.110-115), he catches up with Andromachē at the Skaian gate. She recounts for him how Achilleus had killed her father Eëtion, taken her mother captive (D), and, after accepting *apoina* 'without limit' (E), had released her (R).[13] Andromachē's use of *mētera* locates the captured woman firmly in her familial relationship. Hence the path is focalized as prestige goods for a family member. *Ktear* (6.426) is cognate to a word Achilleus uses elsewhere for women taken in siege; it locates the captive woman among the booty, and defines the path from the captor's perspective as an exchange of one set of prestige goods for another.[14] Andromachē's use of *ktear* should thus probably be ascribed to tertiary

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[10]Earlier in Andromachē's speech (6.416-20) she recalls Achilleus' respectful treatment of her father's body: he even saw to Eëtion's burial rites.

[11]On the formula *apereisi' apoina*, see Chapter 3.1.

[12]Line 428 is omitted in a few codices. It is included by Bolling (1950) and by modern editors.

[13]I infer from *deur'* (6.426) that Andromachē's mother was brought from Thebe to the Achaian ships. Chryseis was among the booty taken from Thebe (1.366-69). Briseis may have been taken in the same foray, but from nearby Lyrnessos (2.689-91).

[14]Cf. 16.57 in reference to Briseis (δουρὶ δ' ἐμῷ κτεάτισσα πόλιν εὐτείχεα πέρσας), and 21.829 where *ktear* is used in connection with an iron weight, also taken from Thebe.

focalization whereby her words reflect Achilleus' earlier speech.[15] The designations *mētēr* and *ktear* exemplify the different relations Andromachē and Achilleus have to the woman, who herself remains nameless in the *Iliad*.

Andromachē's mother was probably ransomed by her father (in whose house she subsequently died), though the account does not identify him explicitly. Eëtion, the captive woman's husband and Andromachē's father, had already been killed by Achilleus. *Apoina* are regularly offered by a father for a child, and the death of Eëtion leaves such a scenario likely here.[16] Andromachē's account suggests it was Achilleus who took the *apoina* and released her mother from the Achaian camp (ἀπέλυσε λαβὼν ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα, 6.427). It is unclear whether Achilleus by-passed a distribution system, either through Agamemnon or the Achaian *basilēes*, or whether Andromachē merely telescopes the process in her report.[17]

Lines 426-27, which contain all the elements of the compensation theme, are composed almost entirely of recurring word groups. Lines 425 and 428 furnish details about Andromachē's mother's life and death respectively. The narrative details that are provided are unusual in *apoina* themes in that they are not connected to the capture and release. The

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[15]Sacks' (1987) 203, translation "with her other possessions" is attractive, but less preferable in light of the grouping of captive women with prestige goods elsewhere in the *Iliad* (for example: 8.289-91).

[16]See Chapter 3.1. Pedrick (1982) 127 n. 12, and Willcock (1978) *ad* 6.428, also note the possibility that the woman was ransomed by her father.

[17]Cf. Achilleus' complaints elsewhere that he is subjected to Agamemnon's unfair distribution (1.148-171 and 9.318-377). See Chapters 5-7.

setting that is described is not the capture-scene, but the place where Andromachē's mother ruled or perhaps was queen.[18] *Hē basileuen* (6. 425) is unusual usage.[19] Kirk notices it, but compares it with *Od*. 11. 285 to suggest that it may mean no more than that she used to be wife to the *basileus*.[20] The account of the woman's death also has no relation to her capture, but functions to illustrate Andromachē's parentless state.

22.44-54

Priam watches from the city wall for his sons, Lykaon and Polydoros, among the Trojan warriors fleeing before Achilleus:

ὅς μ' υἱῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἐσθλῶν εὖνιν ἔθηκε
45 κτείνων καὶ περνὰς νήσων ἔπι τηλεδαπάων.
Καὶ γὰρ νῦν δύο παῖδε Λυκάονα καὶ Πολύδωρον — D
οὐ δύναμαι ἰδέειν Τρώων εἰς ἄστυ ἀλέντων,
τούς μοι Λαοθόη τέκετο κρείουσα γυναικῶν.
'Αλλ' εἰ μὲν ζώουσι μετὰ στρατῷ, ἦ τ' ἂν ἔπειτα
50 χαλκοῦ τε χρυσοῦ τ' ἀπολυσόμεθ', ἔστι γὰρ ἔνδον· — E
πολλὰ γὰρ ὤπασε παιδὶ γέρων ὀνομάκλυτος Ἄλτης.
εἰ δ' ἤδη τεθνᾶσι καὶ εἰν 'Αίδαο δόμοισιν,
ἄλγος ἐμῷ θυμῷ καὶ μητέρι τοὶ τεκόμεσθα·

Priam hopes, if his sons Lykaon and Polydoros have been taken captive (D), to obtain their release (E-d) by means of a material exchange (E-p); the exchange goods are specified as yellow metals. The expectation that Lykaon and Polydoros might be held in the Achaian camp is consistent with a pattern elsewhere in the themes in which the exchange

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[18]See for example 11.105-6 and 21.36-38 in which the capture scene is described.

[19]The line is almost an verbatim repetition of the narrator's description of Eëtion, the only difference being the verb: 'Ηετίων ὃς ἔναιεν ὑπὸ Πλάκῳ ὑλήεσσῃ (6.396).

[20]Kirk (1990) 216. Sacks (1987) 203, however, translates *hē basileuen* "who ruled." I do not wish to discount the possibility that Andromachē's mother 'ruled', but the issue goes beyond my present purpose.

of goods for captured sons or daughters is made in the camp. The path of exchange is focalized by the father as goods for the release of persons who are designated as family (*paide*, 22.46). Moreover, the possibility that Lykaon and Polydoros have died—which the external auditors know to be the case—is focalized as an *algos*, both to Priam and to their mother.[21] Hence, Priam represents his interest in the exchange as affection, not *timē*. The compensation theme is incomplete, but given the audience's insight into the circumstances, the omission of the resolution is rhetorically effective.[22]

The word group *pernēmi/piprasko* (see 22.45) is associated with sale of persons into slavery, but not with material exchanges brought by family or other *philoi* for release of captives or slaves.[23] From the perspective of the victor, selling a captive into slavery would accomplish the same

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[21]Achilleus, in fact, has already killed both Lykaon (21.88-91) and Polydoros (20.407-18).

[22]Another example of a compensation theme cut short is found at 20.463-472, in which Tros tries to grasp Achilleus by the knees and plead for his life (D). Achilleus slays Tros before an offer can even be made. The narrative deploys too little of the thematic elements to contribute to the analysis of the formal conventions, but the effect of raising an expectation of an *apoina*-type scene which is then disappointed illustrates both the force of the theme and the artistic value of its manipulation.

Τρῶα δ' Ἀλαστορίδην, ὃ μὲν ἀντίος ἤλυθε γούνων,
εἴ πώς εὑ πεφίδοιτο λαβὼν καὶ ζωὸν ἀφείη
465 μηδὲ κατακτείνειεν ὁμηλικίην ἐλεήσας,
νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ ᾔδη ὃ οὐ πείσεσθαι ἔμελλεν·
οὐ γάρ τι γλυκύθυμος ἀνὴρ ἦν οὐδ' ἀγανόφρων,
ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἐμμεμαώς· ὃ μὲν ἥπτετο χείρεσι γούνων
ἱέμενος λίσσεσθ', ὃ δὲ φασγάνῳ οὖτα καθ' ἧπαρ·
470 ἐκ δέ οἱ ἧπαρ ὄλισθεν, ἀτὰρ μέλαν αἷμα κατ' αὐτοῦ
κόλπον ἐνέπλησεν· τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσε κάλυψε
θυμοῦ δευόμενον·

[23]On this, see Chapter 3.2.

objective as accepting *apoina*: consolidation of his gains in *timē*. Although the captive's life would be preserved, he would not be restored to his family unless he were eventually ransomed from slavery and brought back home (as Lykaon was).[24]

24.683-88

Priam has just gained release of Hektor's body from Achilleus, and he is passing the night in Achilleus' hut. Hermes, however, rouses Priam from his sleep and urges him to slip out of the Achaian camp:

	ὢ γέρον οὔ νύ τι σοί γε μέλει κακόν, οἷον ἔθ' εὕδεις	
	ἀνδράσιν ἐν δηΐοισιν, ἐπεί σ' εἴασεν 'Αχιλλεύς.	
685	καὶ νῦν μὲν <u>φίλον υἱὸν ἐλύσαο</u>, <u>πολλὰ δ' ἔδωκας</u>·	[D, E, R][25]
	<u>σεῖο δέ κε ζωοῦ</u> καὶ <u>τρὶς τόσα δοῖεν ἄποινα</u>	D, E
	<u>παῖδες</u> τοὶ μετόπισθε <u>λελειμμένοι</u>, αἴ κ' 'Αγαμέμνων	
	γνώῃ σ' 'Ατρεΐδης, γνώωσι δὲ πάντες 'Αχαιοί.	

If Agamemnon and the Achaians should find Priam out, Hermes warns, his sons would have to pay three times as much *apoina* (E) for him alive (D) as he has given in exchange for Hektor's corpse. Priam's recent exchange with Achilleus is thus invoked in the service of a warning that a similar scene could follow.[26] The contents of the *apoina* that Priam's sons might have to pay are not described, though the symmetry with *polla d' edōkas* (24.385), which refers to the *apoina* Priam took to Achilleus, confirms the substance of *apoina* as prestige goods. The relationship by

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[24]Achilleus' surprise at seeing Lykaon by the Xanthos (21.54) might suggest that returning from slavery was not an everyday occurrence.

[25]Hermes alludes to Priam's successful exchange of *apoina* for Hektor's corpse. On this, see Chapter 8.

[26]For *polla d' edōken* in reference to *apoina*, see also *Il.* 21.42.

which the exchange is figured is familial; this time, however, the father is cast in the dependent position, and the sons in the role of the party who brings *apoina*. The path of the potential exchange is therefore prestige goods for a family member, and uniquely, for a father.

The narrative unit comprises a potential scenario. As such it has no explicit resolution, although the thrust of Hermes' warning is that the exchange would be transacted and would cost Priam or his sons dearly. The elements of the theme are clustered in lines 685-87; two of the three lines of the theme are composed almost entirely of recurring word groups.

11.101-12

Isos and Antiphos, two sons of Priam are defeated by Agamemnon on the battlefield. The narrative opens with the announcement that Agamemnon kills them (11.101) and closes with a description of the fatal blows and stripping of the armor. The account of a previous incident in which Achilleus captured and released the two, is intercalated in the narrative and then briefly alluded to again at the end:

αὐτὰρ ὃ βῆ ῥ' Ἶσόν τε καὶ Ἄντιφον ἐξεναρίξων
<u>υἷε</u> δύω Πριάμοιο νόθον καὶ γνήσιον ἄμφω
εἰν ἑνὶ δίφρῳ ἐόντας· ὃ μὲν νόθος ἡνιόχευεν,
Ἄντιφος αὖ παρέβασκε περικλυτός· ὥ <u>ποτ'</u> Ἀχιλλεὺς [27]
105 Ἴδης ἐν κνημοῖσι <u>δίδη</u> μόσχοισι λύγοισι,
ποιμαίνοντ' ἐπ' ὄεσσι <u>λαβών, καὶ ἔλυσεν ἀποίνων</u>.[28] D, E, R
δὴ τότε γ' Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
τὸν μὲν ὑπὲρ μαζοῖο κατὰ στῆθος βάλε δουρί,

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[27]ὥ is the reading of most of the manuscripts, contra Zenodotus (ὅν [AT]; cf οὕς. Eustathius). Hainsworth (1993) 237, explains Zenodotus' reading as a failure to recognize both the dual and the archaic orthography.

[28]*Apoinōn* is genitive of price. On the syntax of *apoina*, see Chapter 3.1.

Ἄντιφον αὖ παρὰ οὖς ἔλασε ξίφει, ἐκ δ' ἔβαλ' ἵππων.
110 σπερχόμενος δ' ἀπὸ τοῖιν ἐσύλα τεύχεα καλὰ
γιγνώσκων· καὶ γάρ σφε πάρος παρὰ νηυσὶ θοῇσιν
εἶδεν, ὅτ' ἐξ Ἴδης ἄγαγεν πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς.

The compensation theme in this story is complete, though compressed. The essential elements are contained in 11.106, where Achilleus' capture of Isos and Antiphos (D) and their release for *apoina* (E, R) is reported. Since *apoina*, where the contents are described, consist of prestige goods, the path of the exchange may be inferred as prestige goods for persons who are designated as sons. The cursory account omits the identity of the one who brings *apoina*, but the pattern in other themes leads to the expectation that Priam would offer it, as he later hoped to do for Lykaon and Polydoros (22.44-54).[29] The theme is narrated and focalized by the external narrator. Παρὰ νηυσὶ θοῇσιν recurs in *apoina* themes to refer to the place where captives are conventionally taken and where their fathers bring *apoina* to exchange for them. The narrator reveals that Agamemnon knew about the earlier exchange. The audience is not told, however, whether he had a hand in it.

Except for the description of the capture-scene, which is amplified with details that seem disproportionate to the length of the compressed story, the theme is contained almost entirely in recurring word groups. The theme is particularly interesting for its intercalation into the narrative about Isos' and Antiphos' death at Agamemnon's hand.

[29]See also 6.425-428; Pedrick (1982) 127 n. 12.

10.375-83 and 442-56:

When Dolon is caught in his nocturnal spying mission by Odysseus and Diomedes, he offers them *apoina* in exchange for sparing his life:[30]

375 ἄραβος δὲ διὰ στόμα γίγνετ' ὀδόντων
χλωρὸς ὑπὸ δείους· τὼ δ' ἀσθμαίνοντε κιχήτην,
χειρῶν δ' ἁψάσθην· ὃ δὲ δακρύσας ἔπος ηὔδα·
ζωγρεῖτ', αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐμὲ λύσομαι· ἔστι γὰρ ἔνδον — D, E-d
χαλκός τε χρυσός τε πολύκμητός τε σίδηρος, — E-p
380 τῶν κ' ὔμμιν χαρίσαιτο πατὴρ ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα
εἴ κεν ἐμὲ ζωὸν πεπύθοιτ' ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.
Τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς·
θάρσει, μηδέ τί τοι θάνατος καταθύμιος ἔστω

* * * *

Ἀλλ' ἐμὲ μὲν νῦν νηυσὶ πελάσσετον ὠκυπόροισιν,
ἠέ με δήσαντες λίπετ' αὐτόθι νηλέϊ δεσμῷ,
ὄφρά κεν ἔλθητον καὶ πειρηθῆτον ἐμεῖο
445 ἤ ῥα κατ' αἶσαν ἔειπον ἐν ὑμῖν, ἦε καὶ οὐκί.
Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη κρατερὸς Διομήδης·
μὴ δή μοι φύξίν γε, Δόλων, ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ·
ἐσθλά περ ἀγγείλας, ἐπεὶ ἵκεο χεῖρας ἐς ἁμάς·
εἰ μὲν γάρ κέ σε νῦν ἀπολύσομεν ἠὲ μεθῶμεν,
450 ἦ τε καὶ ὕστερον εἶσθα θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν
ἠὲ διοπτεύσων ἢ ἐναντίβιον πολεμίξων·
εἰ δέ κ' ἐμῇς ὑπὸ χερσὶ δαμεὶς ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσῃς,
οὐκέτ' ἔπειτα σὺ πῆμά ποτ' ἔσσεαι Ἀργείοισιν.
Ἦ, καὶ ὃ μέν μιν ἔμελλε γενείου χειρὶ παχείῃ
455 ἁψάμενος λίσσεσθαι, ὃ δ' αὐχένα μέσσον ἔλασσε — R
φασγάνῳ ἀΐξας, ἀπὸ δ' ἄμφω κέρσε τένοντε·
φθεγγομένου δ' ἄρα τοῦ γε κάρη κονίῃσιν ἐμίχθη.

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[30]The Doloneia has been widely regarded on the basis of internal evidence as an interpolation. The scholia [T] attribute the inclusion of the Doloneia to Peisistratus, but are silent about the existence of manuscripts in which it is lacking. Apthorp (1980) 63, concludes that, whether the scholium represents a tradition with historical origins regarding the Peisistratid recension or not, it is improbable that among the Alexandrians' manuscripts there were any lacking the Doloneia. As we will see, the compensation theme in the Doloneia accords in typology and in most details with the conventions and development of the theme elsewhere in the *Iliad*. See also the recent defense of the Doloneia on structural grounds by K. Stanley (1993) 118-28.

The scene begins with a vivid and detailed account of Dolon's response when he falls into Odysseus' and Diomedes' hands. Dolon initially makes no gesture of supplication. A compensation theme is formally introduced in 10.378 when Dolon pleads with Odysseus and Diomedes to spare his life (D), assuring them that he will get himself released (E-d). Though the middle voice of *apoluein* is common usage in themes of the *apoina* type, the offer to release oneself is unique. As it turns out, however, the father would have been the agent of Dolon's release after all (*kharisaito patēr*, 10.380). Dolon offers prestige goods, on behalf of his father, in an effort to save his life (E-p). The path is thus focalized by the defeated warrior as goods for life, which would eventually be resolved as goods for release of a family member. Dolon is hopeful that he has persuaded Odysseus to allow the exchange (10.383; 442-44). Nevertheless, he twice mentions the *nēusin Akhaiōn*, which is the location in which exchanges of *apoina* conventionally take place, as if to hasten the scene to a resolution.

This theme is amplified with details about Dolon, the metal goods Dolon's father has in store, and with speeches in which Dolon pleads for an exchange his captors finally deny. It is broken up by Dolon's traitorous revelations, which delay the resolution and thereby create narrative tension. The theme is picked up again with Dolon's reminder of the anticipated resolution (10.382-83) and his second mention of the Achaian ships (10. 442). Dolon's expectations, however, are dashed by Diomedes'

response that, left alive, he posed too great a threat to the Achaians.[31] Dolon's last-ditch effort at supplication (γενείου. . . ἁψάμενος λίσσεσθαι, 10.455-56) is cut short by Diomedes' sword (R).

2.2 THEMES OF THE *POINĒ* TYPE

This group of scenes features exchanges or attempted exchanges in which a *philos* of an injured party, or the injured party himself, attempts to secure compensation for damage from a person who has inflicted damage, or from his *philoi* (see Figure 1.2). We also view almost all of these scenes from the perspective of the internal characters, and generally from the perspective of the *philos* who secures *poinē* for a victim.[32] The audience is thus positioned by the focalization of both Achaians and Trojans who have attained a position of superiority. In most of the themes, *poinē* is taken by inflicting life for life; in only a few is *poinē* taken as a payment in goods.[33] In one instance, the *poinē* that is secured for a victim is *kratos,* which I have identified as a form of cultural wealth (17.198-208). As I did with *apoina* themes, I map the path of exchange in accordance with the perspective that the poem represents for the audience.

The themes in which a warrior's life is taken as a "payment" corresponding to *poinē* afford little information about the medium in

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[31]Thus, the function of narrator-focalizer shifts to Diomedes for the resolution of the theme; Dolon's perspective is reintroduced through tertiary focalization of the supplication.

[32]The exceptions are 5.265-67, which is viewed from the eyes of an internal character, but not one of the characters involved in the exchange, and 18.497-508.

[33]See below and Chapter 3.1.

which such a payment is conceived. Put another way, there is no explicit declaration of what is being transferred in payments of *poinē* that are taken as life for life. For this reason, I anticipate the results of paradigmatic comparison of the themes, which I discuss in Chapter 3, by proposing that the medium of exchange in such *poinē* themes is generally, but not exclusively, *timē*: what is exchanged in the social-symbolic transaction is status.[34]

2.2.1 Simple themes of the *poinē* type

All the scenes in this group contain a single compensation theme of the *poinē* type. Most are compact battlefield scenes that are sufficiently alike to make subgroups unnecessary; these scenes are therefore catalogued in order of their occurrence in the *Iliad*. One vignette (11.694-705) stands formally apart from the rest, and is placed at the end of the simple themes.

5.265-67

Diomedes, after instructing Sthenelos to seize Aineias' horses if the opportunity arose, mentions that they are descended from horses that Zeus gave as *poinē* to Tros:

265 τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς ἧς Τρωΐ περ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
δῶχ' υἷος ποινὴν Γανυμήδεος, οὕνεκ' ἄριστοι — D, E, R
ἵππων ὅσσοι ἔασιν ὑπ' ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε.

[34]This general conclusion is contradicted by themes that imply administration of justice; it is, moreover, called into question in some of the battlefield scenes in which family members are involved. See below and Chapter 3.

A *poinē* theme is here exhibited in its most basic form: Zeus carried off Ganymedes (D) and gave (R) magnificent horses to Tros as *poinē* for his son (E). Diomedes represents the path as prestige goods for a family member (*huios poinēn*. 5.266). The exchange presumes a culturally maintained path by which wealth in persons, taken from a family by a party inflicting damage, may be returned to the family in the form of prestige goods. Zeus both inflicts the damage and initiates the payment of *poinē*.

13.410-16

After Idomeneus kills Asios, Deïphobos returns a cast at Idomeneus:

410 οὐδ' ἅλιόν ῥα βαρείης χειρὸς ἀφῆκεν,
ἀλλ' ἔβαλ' Ἱππασίδην Ὑψήνορα, ποιμένα λαῶν
ἧπαρ ὑπὸ πραπίδων, εἶθαρ δ' ὑπὸ γούνατ' ἔλυσε.
Δηίφοβος δ' <u>ἔκπαγλον ἐπεύξατο μακρὸν ἀΰσας·</u>
Οὐ μὰν αὖτ' <u>ἄτιτος</u> <u>κεῖτ'</u> Ἄσιος, ἀλλά ἕ φημι D, E, R
415 εἰς Ἄϊδός περ ἰόντα πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο
γηθήσειν κατὰ θυμόν, ἐπεί ῥά οἱ ὤπασα πομπόν.

Upon missing Idomeneus (Asios' killer and Deïphobos' intended target) and fatally striking Hypsenor, Deïphobos vaunts that Asios (D) no longer lies *atitos*, unpaid (E, R). Although the term *poinē* does not appear in this theme, *atitos* conveys directionality.[35] Deïphobos assumes the role of a *hetairos* who secures a payment corresponding to *poinē* for a warrior

[35]*Poinē* and *atitos* both derive from PIE $*k^{w}ei$. See Chapter 1.2.

who has been killed in battle (see Figure 1.2).[36] The path, which is focalized by Deïphobos as life for life, runs parallel to a payment in *timē* for *timē*. In other words, Deïphobos kills Hypsenor and causes him to lose *timē*, which constitutes a recovery of *timē* for Asios, even though he is dead. The vaunt suggests, in fact, that Deïphobos' kill serves a dual purpose: it redresses a negative balance in *timē* for Asios, and at the same time augments Deïphobos' status.[37]

13.445-47

Idomeneus vaunts that three men have been killed in exchange for one:

> Ἰδομενεὺς δ' ἔκπαγλον ἐπεύξατο μακρὸν ἀΰσας
> Δηΐφοβ' ἦ ἄρα δή τι ἐΐσκομεν <u>ἄξιον</u> εἶναι
> τρεῖς ἑνὸς <u>ἀντὶ πεφάσθαι</u>; D, E, R

The three that have been killed are Othruoneus, Asios and Alkathoos (E, R), in exchange for Hypsenor (D).[38] The path is an exchange of life for life, which, as we have seen, runs parallel to a path of *timē* for *timē*. This theme may be compared to 14.469-74 in form and language.[39]

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[36]I employ the term *hetairoi* to refer specifically to the association of comrades in the warrior-society. The term does not, however, appear in most of the discrete themes. On the association of *hetairoi* in relation to the compensation theme, see Chapter 3.3.

[37]Cf. Beidelman (1989) 233-34, on the public nature of contests for status, including killing an enemy warrior in battle.

[38]As Janko (1992) 103, observes, Asios' driver, who was killed by Antilochos, is conveniently ignored.

[39]For *axios. . . anti pephasthai*, see 14.472-73.

13.656-59

Harpalion, near death or already dead, is carried from the battlefield, with no *poinē* secured for his life:

> Τὸν μὲν Παφλαγόνες μεγαλήτορες ἀμφεπένοντο,
> ἐς δίφρον δ' ἀνέσαντες ἄγον προτὶ Ἴλιον ἱρὴν[40]
> ἀχνύμενοι· μετὰ δέ σφι πατὴρ κίε δάκρυα λείβων,
> ποινὴ δ' οὔ τις παιδὸς ἐγίγνετο τεθνηῶτος. [D, E, R]

Pylaimenes, Harpalion's father (13.643-44), here shown weeping and following his son out of battle, has already had his own death narrated at 5.576-79. The inconsistency in the story line resulted in a flurry of textual criticism and commentary by the Alexandrians, and has provided grist for the Analysts' mill.[41] As egregious as the contradiction is, it is still of a kind that might reasonably be expected to occur in oral composition, especially since only a few lines earlier mention had been made of Harpalion following his father to Troy (13.643-44). Pylaimenes' following Harpalion from the battlefield may have seemed to complete the circuit.[42] The discrepancy in the story thus need not eliminate this text from consideration as an example of the compensation theme. In fact, the

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[40]Line 657 was athetized by some according to Eustathius and the scholia [BLT] on the grounds that elsewhere in the *Iliad* only the wounded, not the dead, were carried out in this manner.

[41]Lines 657-58 were athetized by Aristophanes. Aristarchus was apparently undecided whether to athetize the lines or to posit two men of the same name [AT] (but cf. Mazon and Bolling [1950], who mark lines 656-58 as athetized by both Aristophanes and Aristarchus). Others tried to resolve the discrepancy by inserting a negative into 658 (μετὰ δ'οὔ σφι) [cf. A]. Bolling (1950) omits the lines.

[42]See Janko (1992) 126-27.

association of a father with the *poinē* theme contained in line 659 is traditional.[43]

A *poinē* theme in which there is no *poinē* [E, R] taken for the death of a family member (*pais*, D) is narrated in a single line punctuated heavily with recurring word groups.[44] Harpalion's death, inglorious as it may be, is located in a battlefield context. The mention of his weeping father and the focalization of Harpalion as *paidos tethnēōtos* create a domestic cameo, however, which seems to supplant the martial setting. In fact, 13.659 is almost an exact verbal echo of Aias' words to Achilleus at 9.633: ποινὴν ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος. The sitz of 9.633 is *oikos* or *polis* institutions for the administration of justice in which a path of goods for life is represented as socially maintained.[45] This theme thus puts before the audience an uneasy juxtaposition of disparate conventions that belong to the *oikos* and to warrior-society.

14.469-74

Angered over the death of Prothoënor, Aias makes a cast at Poulydamas and misses, but hits Archelochos:

	Αἴας δ' αὖτ' ἐγέγωνεν ἀμύμονι Πουλυδάμαντι·	
470	Φράζεο, Πουλυδάμα, καί μοι νημερτὲς ἐνίσπες.	
	ἦ ῥ' οὐχ οὗτος ἀνὴρ Προθοήνορος <u>ἀντὶ πεφάσθαι</u>	D, E, R
	<u>ἄξιος</u>; οὐ μέν μοι κακὸς εἴδεται οὐδὲ κακῶν ἔξ,	

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[43]Again, see also Janko (1992) 126. For discussion, see below.

[44]Paris' kill in the subsequent scene lacks the typical boast that payment for X had been made, and thus is not represented as *poinē* for Harpalion's death. See Janko (1992) 127.

[45]For detailed discussion of 9.632-36, see Chapter 7.4.

ἀλλὰ κασίγνητος Ἀντήνορος ἱπποδάμοιο
ἢ πάϊς· αὐτῷ γὰρ γενεὴν ἄγχιστα ἐῴκει.

Aias vaunts over Archelochos and declares him an *axios* man to be slain *Prothoēnor anti* (in exchange for or in return for Prothoënor; cf.13.446-47; D, E, R). I take *Prothoēnor anti* to be a functional equivalent of *poinē* with the genitive. The path is viewed from the perspective of a *hetairos* who secures *poinē* for a warrior who has been killed and constitutes life for life. As we shall see, an exchange of life for life in the context of warrior society runs parallel to an exchange of *timē* for *timē*. The kill allows Aias to redress a negative imbalance in *timē* for a *philos*, and to augment his own status as well.

14.478-85

Archelochos' death at Aias' hands becomes in turn a death which leads to a compensation theme. This time there is a brother nearby, Akamas, who kills Promachos and promptly vaunts over him:

	τῷ δ' Ἀκάμας ἔκπαγλον ἐπεύξατο μακρὸν ἀΰσας·	
	Ἀργεῖοι ἰόμωροι, ἀπειλάων ἀκόρητοι	
480	οὔ θην οἴοισίν γε πόνος τ' ἔσεται καὶ ὀϊζὺς	
	ἡμῖν, ἀλλά ποθ' ὧδε κατακτενέεσθε καὶ ὔμμες.	
	Φράζεσθ' ὡς ὑμῖν Πρόμαχος δεδμημένος εὕδει	R
	ἔγχει ἐμῷ, ἵνα μή τι κασιγνήτοιό γε ποινὴ	D, E
	δηρὸν ἄτιτος ἔῃ· τῶ καί κέ τις εὔχεται ἀνὴρ[46]	
485	γνωτὸν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἀρῆς ἀλκτῆρα λιπέσθαι[47]	

[46]I read καί κέ τις with van Thiel; cf. Mazon, καί τέ τις (supra linear correction in A). See also Janko (1992) 220.

[47]*Arēs*, the text in Bolling (1950), Mazon, and T. Allen (1920), is Zenodotus' reading [ABLT]. Van Thiel reads *areōs alktēra*, with the vulgate. Several codices of the vulgate show the variant *areos*. Van der Valk (1958-63) 2:587, suggests that Zenodotus is in agreement with the archaic vulgate. Aristarchus read *areō* (which does not occur elsewhere in Homer, but does occur in Ionic, as Van der Valk [1958-63] 2:587, points out).

After he kills the Boiotion Promachos (E, R), Akamas boasts that *poinē* for his brother (Archelochos; D) has not gone long unpaid (*atitos*).[48] Akamas defines the path as life for life; he further defines Archelochos in terms of familial relations as *kasignētos* (14.483). Akamas exacts payment of *poinē* from a *hetairos* of his brother's killer. Akamas concludes his boast (*epeuxato*, 14.478) with a gnomic saying to the effect that a man boasts or prays (*eukhetai*, 14.484) to have a kinsman (*gnōtos*) left as an *arēs alktēr* for this very reason: that his *poinē* not be long *atitos*.[49] The boast or prayer is put in the mouth of a future victim of homicide or war.[50]

The phrase *arēs alktēra* was the object of intense critical activity as early as the Alexandrians; it remains a textual and interpretational crux. The first issue for discussion is the form and meaning of *arēs*; the second is the meaning of the phrase. Janko proposes, with good reason, that *ărē* was an obsolete form that became fossilized in two formulas, *arēs alktēra* and *arēn amunai*.[51] *Arē* denotes destruction, ruin, death. An *arēs alktēr* is thus

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The formula, with the same assemblage of variant readings, also appears in 18.100 and 18.213. The vulgate transmits *areōs alktēra* at 14.485 and 18.213 and *arēs alktēra* at 18.100; Zenodotus reads *arēs alktēra* in all three lines; Aristarchus reads *areō alktēra* in all three lines. The formula *arēs alktēr* also appears in *Aspis* 29, 128; cf. *Theog* 657. For discussion, see below.

[48]Cf. 13.414 above.

[49]*Gnōtos*, when it is used as a substantive in Homer, designates a kinsperson, most often a brother. See *Il.* 3.174 ; 15.350; 17.35; 22.234; cf. *Od.* 3.196-98.

[50]On the secular usage of *eukhomai* in this passage, see Muellner (1976) 89-90, 97.

[51]Janko (1992) 220-221. *Arēs alktēr* appears in *Il.* 14.485; 18. 100. 213. *Arēn amunai* appears at *Il.*12.334; 16.512; and 24.489. Janko further proposes that, since *ărē* was obsolete, and since *Arēs* is "in origin a mere personification of 'harm'," the poet substituted the epic genitive *Areos* for *arēs* in 14.485 and in 18.213, preserving the obsolete formula *arēs alktēra* only in 18.100. *Areos* would have been subsequently Atticized to read *Areōs*. Van der Valk (1958-63) 2:587-88, also reconstructs the original formula as *arēs alktēra*, but he makes a convincing case that it was Aristarchus (and not the poet) who

someone who protects against or wards off doom, ruin, destruction.[52] *Arē* is used most often in the *Iliad* in the context of combat, where it designates a life-threatening enemy attack. Hence, to ward off *arē* (*arēs alktēr, arēn amunai*) is to be a defender in battle.[53] Since, however, Akamas did not ward off death from his brother, but took action only after the fact, *arē* must encompass a wider range of meaning.[54] In fact, Akamas claims to be a kinsman who protects against *arē* specifically by securing *poinē* for a family member who has already been killed in battle.[55] Considered thematically, the *arēs alktēr* is the *philos* (family member or *hetairos*) in a position of superiority who secures *poinē* for a dependent party (see Figure 1.2)

If Akamas' saying is considered in the context of warrior-society, it refers to *poinē* as recovery of *timē*. The *alktēr* may further ward off ruin by

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emended the obsolete form to *areō*; *areō* then became *areōs* by corruption. He elects to read *arēs alktēra* in all three disputed passages in the *Iliad*. The obsolete, and therefore more difficult, *arēs alktēra* seems to best explain the rise of the variant readings in all three passages, and it is the text I adopt.

[52]I take *arēs* as an objective genitive by analogy with *arēn amunai* and by reason of usage. See also Janko (1992) 220.

[53]*Arēn amunai*: 12.334; 16.512; 24.489. *Arēs alktēr*: 18.100, 213.

[54]Usage of *arēs alktēr* outside of Homer attests a range of meanings. Cf. *Aspis* 27-29, which refers to Zeus' plan to beget Herakles as *arēs alktēr* for mortals and immortals: πατὴρ δ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε | ἄλλην μῆτιν ὕφαινε μετὰ φρεσίν, ὥς ῥα θεοῖσιν | ἀνδράσι τ' ἀλφηστῇσιν ἀρῆς ἀλκτῆρα φυτεύσαι. The shield Herakles carries is also described as *arēs alktēr* (*Aspis* 129). The other use of *arēs alktēr* outside of Homer is found in *Theog*. 657, where Kottos refers to Zeus' rescue of Obriareos, Kottos and Guēs from the chill doom of Tartaros: ἀλκτὴρ δ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἀρῆς γένεο κρυεροῖο.

[55]Janko (1992) 220, comments that when a man dies in battle, his avenger wards off the *harm* of being unrevenged, but gives no indication as to what the harm might consist in.

standing over the body so as to prevent further *lōbē* against it.[56] The claim to be an *arēs alktēr*, a skilled warrior who is able to secure *poinē*, may thus also be intended to deter future attacks on one's family or *hetairoi*. The reference to a *gnōtos* in the saying evokes the familial relation, however, where the interest in compensation is frequently represented not as status, but as affection. Considered in the context of the kinship group, the *arēs alktēr* would be the family member who secures *poinē* as a way of bringing back to the family the property that had been taken from it.[57]

Although compensation themes tend to represent slain or captured men either in their relations as family members or in their relations as a member of the *philoi hetairoi*, warriors are implicitly related to both. Akamas' vaunt is set firmly in the battlefield context, in which *poinē* taken as life for life runs parallel to *timē* for *timē*. If the saying is rooted in the kinship group, it has been generalized and appropriated for the *hetairoi* (a

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[56]This interpretation seems to be warranted by the lines preceding Akamas' vaunt· ἔνθ' Ἀκάμας Πρόμαχον Βοιώτιον οὔτασε δουρὶ | ἀμφὶ κασιγνήτῳ βεβαώς· ὃ δ' ὕφελκε ποδοῖιν (14.476-77).

[57]Given a family faced with the threat of attrition or extinction, especially in a prolonged war, the loss of one of its members diminishes the group concretely. *Poinē* may, consequently, be considered as both a deterrent and a recovery mechanism. In other words, by the same logic in which diminishment of one person's *timē* is represented as a gain in *timē* for another, taking the killer's life may be represented as replenishment of the family's life. The role of the *gōʾēl* in ancient Israelite tradition may be analogous to that of the *arēs alktēr* in Akamas' saying. The right and responsibility of the *gōʾēl*, which fell first to a brother and then moved through a specified line of blood relatives, included redeeming family members from slavery (Lev. 25:35-55) and avenging the murder of a kinsman (Num. 35). In the last capacity, the *gōʾēl* is known as the *gōʾēl haddam*, the one who brings back the blood (=life) that rightly belongs to the family. See Wright (1992); Westbrook (1991; 1992).

factitious family). Interests of warrior-society and the interests of the family as regards compensation are consequently both brought into view.

15.113-18

Ares declares his intention to get himself paid (*tisasthai*) for the slaying of his son Askalaphos, but he is dissuaded by Athene:

Ὣς ἔφατ', αὐτὰρ Ἄρης θαλερὼ πεπλήγετο μηρὼ
χερσὶ καταπρηνέσσ', ὀλοφυρόμενος δ' προσηύδα·
115 Μὴ νῦν μοι νεμεσήσετ', Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
τίσασθαι φόνον υἷος ἰόντ' ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν, D, E
εἴ πέρ μοι καὶ μοῖρα Διὸς πληγέντι κεραυνῷ
κεῖσθαι ὁμοῦ νεκύεσσι μεθ' αἵματι καὶ κονίῃσιν.

This short theme is interrupted and, consequently, incomplete. The compensation theme is contained by *tinesthai phonon* (15.116).[58] Ares, an immortal father, seeks to 'get himself paid' for the death of a son from the *hetairoi* of the son's killer (D, E-d). The path would be life, or more likely, many lives for life (E-p), which runs, I suggest once more, parallel with *timē* for *timē*.

16.394-98

Patroklos cuts a path of destruction through the Trojans, hemming them in around the ships and killing them one after the other:

Πάτροκλος δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν πρώτας ἐπέκερσε φάλαγγας,
395 ἂψ ἐπὶ νῆας ἔεργε παλιμπετές, οὐδὲ πόληος
εἴα ἱεμένους ἐπιβαινέμεν, ἀλλὰ μεσηγὺ
νηῶν καὶ ποταμοῦ καὶ τείχεος ὑψηλοῖο
κτεῖνε μεταΐσσων, πολέων δ' ἀπετίνυτο ποινήν. D, E, R

[58]Cf. for example 9.634 and 16.398.

The compensation theme is contained in its entirety in one line (16.398): Patroklos kills [Trojans] (R), getting himself paid *poinē* for many (E, D). The path is life for life, which runs parallel to *timē* for *timē*. The 'many' for whom Patroklos exacts *poinē* are his *hetairoi*, not kinsmen.

17.34-42, 50

Menelaos boasts over having killed Hyperenor, Euphorbos' brother (see 14.516-19). Euphorbos declares his intent to make Menelaos pay (*teiseis*, E-d) for his brother (D):

	Νῦν μὲν δή, Μενέλαε διοτρεφές, ἦ μάλα <u>τείσεις</u>	E
35	<u>γνωτὸν ἐμόν, τὸν ἔπεφνες</u>, ἐπευχόμενος δ' ἀγορεύεις,	D
	χήρωσας δὲ γυναῖκα μυχῷ θαλάμοιο νέοιο,	
	ἀρητὸν δὲ τοκεῦσι γόον καὶ πένθος ἔθηκας·	
	ἦ κέ σφιν δειλοῖσι γόου κατάπαυμα γενοίμην	
	εἴ κεν ἐγὼ κεφαλήν τε τεὴν καὶ τεύχε' ἐνείκας	E-p
40	Πάνθῳ ἐν χείρεσσι βάλω καὶ Φρόντιδι δίῃ.	
	Ἀλλ' οὐ μὰν ἔτι δηρὸν ἀπείρητος πόνος ἔσται	
	οὐδέ τ' ἀδήριτος ἤ τ' ἀλκῆς ἤ τε φόβοιο.	
	* * * *	
50	δούπησεν δὲ πεσών, ἀράβησε δὲ τεύχε' ἐπ' αὐτῷ.	R

Euphorbus intends to exact life for life. The damage is described in terms of the loss to Hyperenor's family, namely his wife and parents, whose mourning would come to an end if Euphorbos should bring them armor and a sure sign that Hyperenor's death had been requited. Euphorbus occupies a position of superiority in relation to his brother, but not to Menelaos. Euphorbos is unable to bring his claim to successful resolution, and loses his own life in the process (17.50).

18.497-508

In the city at peace on Achilleus' shield, two men are depicted as striving in the *agora* over ποινῆς ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου· (D, E):[59]

Λαοὶ δ' εἰν ἀγορῇ ἔσαν ἀθρόοι· ἔνθα δὲ νεῖκος[60]
ὠρώρει, δύο δ' ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς E
ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου· ὃ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι [61] D
500 δήμῳ πιφαύσκων, ὃ δ' ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι·[62]
ἄμφω δ' ἱέσθην ἐπὶ ἵστορι πεῖραρ ἑλέσθαι.
λαοὶ δ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπήπυον, ἀμφὶς ἀρωγοί·
κήρυκες δ' ἄρα λαὸν ἐρήτυον· οἳ δὲ γέροντες
εἵατ' ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις ἱερῷ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ,
505 σκῆπτρα δὲ κηρύκων ἐν χέρσ' ἔχον ἠεροφώνων·
τοῖσιν ἔπειτ' ἤϊσσον, ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον·
κεῖτο δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσσοισι δύω χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
τῷ δόμεν ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι.

Although no kinship terminology appears in this theme, the location of the scene in an institution for administration of justice would

[59]Juxtaposed to the city at peace on the shield is a city at war. The city at war also features an exchange scene (18.509-13), but because the scene presents only a cameo, it is impossible to tell whether the exchange proposed is compensatory, what the direction is, and how the path should be charted. For that reason, I do not analyze it as a compensation theme, though there is apparently a failure of some exchange mechanism, with the result that a bloody battle ensues.

[60]18.483-608, which comprises the description of the shield almost in its entirety, was athetized by Zenodotus, ἀρκεσθεὶς τῇ κεφαλαιώδει προεκθέσει [A]. Bolling (1950) omits the lines on the basis of his theory that Zenodotus did not athetize unless the attestation seemed seriously defective. Bolling (1944) 30, 161, concedes, however, that this passage caused him some difficulty. He offers the theory that the description of the shield might have been omitted deliberately, like the catalogue of ships sometimes was, in order to save space (1944) 162. Van der Valk (1958-1963) 2:35, accepts the authenticity of the lines. He conjectures that Zenodotus athetized the lines because of a pronounced tendency to make abridgments, and not because of manuscript evidence. Apthorp (1980) 187 n.119, also regards the lines as genuine.

[61]Zenodotus (καί ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις [A]) read *apoktamenou* in place of *apophthimenou*. *Apophthemenou* denotes only that the man had died, but does not indicate the death was a homicide as the immediate context implies. As such, *apophthimenou* would be the more difficult, and by standard criteria, the preferred reading. Cf. Nagy (1997) 204-5.

[62]For *piphauskein* in the compensation theme, see 21.95.

nonetheless lead an audience to conjecture that the plaintiff is a kinsman of the victim.[63] The trial scene on the shield has attracted a good deal of scholarly interest in the institution depicted on the shield in relation to historical institutions.[64]

The precise point of the dispute depicted on the shield has itself become a matter of dispute: ὃ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι . . .ὃ δ' ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι. Is the dispute over whether or not the defendant had paid the *poinē* in full, or whether the plaintiff would accept the *poinē*? Put another way, is the question a factual one about the resolution, or a legal one about the path? The syntax alone is inconclusive. Leonard Muellner makes a persuasive argument, based in part on the usage of *eukhomai* (18.499), that the issue is a legal and not merely a factual one.[65] He observes that this is the only example of *eukhomai* in Homer that falls into a legal context. As such, the usage in 18.499 may not be confirmed elsewhere in Homer. It can, however, be confirmed from the Linear B tablets, where we find "the only other example in the Greek language of εὔχομαι in a legal context."[66] Muellner compares the litigation scene on

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[63]Cf. 9.632-36.

[64]See for example Bonner and Smith (1930); Muellner (1976); MacDowell (1978); Vatin (1985); Gagarin (1986); Westbrook (1992).

[65]On the dispute as a legal rather than a factual question, see *inter alia* Leaf (1887); Andersen (1976) 12-15; Macdowell (1978) 19-20; Vatin (1985); M. Edwards (1991) 214-16; see also Nagy (1997). For the view that the dispute is one of fact, see Bonner and Smith (1930) 32-35. Gagarin (1986) 32-33, suggests that the scene is more complex than to be simply either a factual or a legal issue.

[66]Muellner (1976) 103.

the shield with a dispute over land recorded in Pylos tablet Ep 704.[67] Raymond Westbrook marshals legal traditions from the ancient Near East to suggest that, by claiming the right to pay *poinē* in goods, the defendant is making an implicit claim that the case is one of mitigated homicide. By refusing to take the *poinē,* the plaintiff alleges that the case is aggravated homicide, and further, that he therefore has the right to take the killer's life.[68] Westbrook concludes that the court scene involves a case of mitigated homicide, in which the court imposes the appropriate limits of *poinē*: "Thus, both parties literally wished to obtain from the judge a limit [*peirar*]" (see 18.501).[69] Gagarin argues that the disputants would have submitted their case to a public forum voluntarily. The inclination to submit the case to the *dāmos* and the binding force of the verdict would be supported by the pressure of public opinion and a judge whose 'straight judgments' were recognized.[70]

The *poinē* is patently a payment in goods (E) 'for' a man who has died (D); it is in another sense 'for' the life of the defendant. The path is, by either accounting, an exchange of goods for life. The dispute is certainly legal rather factual.[71] It is tenable that the case turns on

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[67]The transliteration, Greek text, and translation of Ep 704 may be found in Nagy (1997) 197. Nagy incorporates Westbrook's (1992) adjustments into his translation.

[68]Westbrook (1992) 75. M. Edwards (1992) 216, concurs with Westbrook's conclusion and suggests, in agreement with Ø. Andersen (1976) 15, that the issue can be said to parallel the situation in which Achilleus first refuses the 'recompense' offered by Agamemnon, but later accepts it. On this, see Chapters 6 and 7.

[69]Westbrook (1992) 76. See also Nagy (1997) 200.

[70]Gagarin (1986) 22.

[71]It does not, however, affect the formal structure of the theme if the issue is factual; it simply means that the dispute turns on the resolution rather than the path.

mitigated versus unmitigated homicide. The public forum in which the dispute is staged, however, is probably voluntary; its judgments would thus be enforced by convention rather than external coercion.

The theme achieves no resolution, but the participants are transfixed in the dilemma. Muellner proposes that the syntax of *mēden* (18.500) means that the man, thus frozen in his refusal, will never accept any compensation.[72] It is not, however, compensation that he will not accept, but a particular path of exchange. He refuses goods for life in favor of life for life. If the scene is stop-action, it is, nevertheless, not static: the litigants, the *dāmos*, the elders, and the cheering *laos* are carried into the heat of battle, suspended in a perpetual search for a *peirar*.

21.26-33

Achilleus pauses from his slaughter of Trojans in the river long enough to choose twelve young men whom he will burn on Patroklos' funeral pyre:

	Ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ κάμε χεῖρας ἐναίρων,	
	ζωοὺς ἐκ ποταμοῖο δυώδεκα λέξατο κούρους	E-p
	ποινὴν Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο θανόντος·	D, E-d
	τοὺς ἐξῆγε θύραζε τεθηπότας ἠΰτε νεβρούς,	
30	δῆσε δ' ὀπίσσω χεῖρας ἐϋτμήτοισιν ἱμᾶσι,[73]	
	τοὺς αὐτοὶ φορέεσκον ἐπὶ στρεπτοῖσι χιτῶσι,	
	δῶκε δ' ἑταίροισιν κατάγειν κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας.	
	αὐτὰρ ὁ ἂψ ἐπόρουσε δαϊζέμεναι μενεαίνων.	

[72]Muellner (1976) 105-106. Nagy (1979) 109, concludes that the utter inflexibility of the man reflects the same temperament that Apollo faults in Achilleus. See Chapters 5 and 8.

[73]Cf. 11.105.

The twelve Trojans are intended as *poinē* for the dead Patroklos (D, E).[74] Achilleus, Patroklos' *hetairos*, will exact from them, Hektor's *hetairoi*, a payment of life for life, or, *timē* for *timē*. The ratio of twelve lives for one is somewhat unusual in the discrete battlefield *poinē* themes, though it will go much higher. The narrator describes Achilleus' behavior as *meneainōn* (21.33), which leads the listener to suspect that the narrator is at least ambivalent about Achilleus' actions.

Recurring word groups typical of themes of the *poinē* type appear in line 28 (*poinēn. . . . thanontos*). The remaining verbal repetitions are common to themes of the *apoina* type.[75] The cross-over in terminology can be explained with the requirement of the story line that the Trojan youths be removed to the Achaian ships, a detail ordinarily characteristic of *apoina* themes. The verbal echo sets their unhappy fate in relief against the fate of other Trojan warriors who were in times past bound and taken to the ships to be exchanged for *apoina*.

11.694-705

Nestor mentions a time when Neleus secured payment for a damage inflicted by the Epeians:

	αὖθ' ὑπερηφανέοντες Ἐπειοὶ χαλκοχίτωνες	
695	ἡμέας <u>ὑβρίζοντες</u> ἀτάσθαλα μηχανόωντο.	D
	Ἐκ δ' ὃ γέρων ἀγέλην τε βοῶν καὶ πῶϋ μέγ' οἰῶν	R, E
	<u>εἵλετο</u> κρινάμενος τριηκόσι' ἠδὲ νομῆας.	

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[74]Cf. 23.175-76: δώδεκα δὲ Τρώων μεγαθύμων υἱέας ἐσθλοὺς | χαλκῷ δηϊόων· κακὰ δὲ φρεσὶ μήδετο ἔργα.

[75]*exēge; dēse; katagein koilas epi nēas;* cf. *euktēmoisin himasi* and 11.105; cf. also l. 32 and 6.51-52.

καὶ γὰρ τῷ χρεῖος μέγ' ὀφείλετ' ἐν Ἤλιδι δίῃ
τέσσαρες ἀθλοφόροι ἵπποι αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσφιν [76] D
700 ἐλθόντες μετ' ἄεθλα· περὶ τρίποδος γὰρ ἔμελλον
θεύσεσθαι· τοὺς δ' αὖθι ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αὐγείας
κάσχεθε, τὸν δ' ἐλατῆρ' ἀφίει ἀκαχήμενον ἵππων.
τῶν ὁ γέρων ἐπέων κεχολωμένος ἠδὲ καὶ ἔργων
ἐξέλετ' ἄσπετα πολλά· τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἐς δῆμον ἔδωκε
705 δαιτρεύειν, μή τίς οἱ ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης.

This vignette contains almost none of the repeated word groups typical for the compensation theme, but it does contain all the elements: damage and a delayed, but ultimately successful, attempt to secure redress. Augeias had taken and kept Neleus' four prize-winning horses and the chariot (D), although letting the charioteer go. In addition, he had apparently insulted Neleus, as the old man had been angered by both Augeias' deeds and words (11.703). When Neleus was able to secure redress for the seizure of his prestige goods (and presumably also for the insult), he took a vast herd of cattle and sheep. He kept for himself a herd of three hundred cattle and sheep, together with their herdsman (E, R). The herds constitute small animal wealth and should probably be considered as subsistence goods, though the cattle and the herdsman might be figured as prestige goods.[77] The path is a large quantity of subsistence goods for a much smaller quantity of prestige goods and

[76]Mazon thinks that line 699 was athetized, along with 8.185, by someone, probably Aristarchus, on the grounds that the four-horse chariot was not used by the heroes (cf. BLT at 8.185). There is a note in the scholia at 8.185 that τέσσαρες ἀθλοφόροι ἵπποι was suspect (ὑπώπτευται ὡς νόθον), though the suspicion is not credited to Aristarchus; Aristonicus makes no mention at 11.699 of an athetesis by Aristarchus. Van der Valk (1958-63) 2:426-27 and 1:212 note 54, disputes that the line was athetized.

[77]The large numerical scale of sheep and cattle suggests that they are valued as small animal wealth and not as treasure. On this, see Donlan (1981).

diminishing of *timē*. It appears that a similar type of distribution system is operative here as we find depicted in *apoina* type exchanges among the Achaians at Troy: after exacting recompense for his own losses, Neleus distributed the remaining goods to the *dēmos* who had also suffered abuse at the hands of the Epeians (11.694-95).

2.2.2 Complex themes of the *poinē* type

17.198-208

Zeus watches Hektor don Achilleus' armor. Knowing that Hektor's death is impending, Zeus promises to give him *kratos* as *poinē*:

	Τὸν δ' ὡς οὖν ἀπάνευθεν ἴδεν νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς	
	τεύχεσι Πηλεΐδαο κορυσσόμενον θείοιο,	
200	κινήσας ῥα κάρη προτὶ ὃν μυθήσατο θυμόν·	
	Ἆ δείλ', οὐδέ τί τοι θάνατος καταθύμιός ἐστιν,	E
	ὃς δή τοι σχεδὸν ἐστι· σὺ δ' ἄμβροτα τεύχεα δύνεις	D
	ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος, τόν τε τρομέουσι καὶ ἄλλοι·	
	τοῦ δὴ ἑταῖρον ἔπεφνες ἐνηέα τε κρατερόν τε,	
205	τεύχεα δ' οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων	
	εἵλευ· ἀτάρ τοι νῦν γε μέγα κράτος ἐγγυαλίξω,	[E-p, R]
	τῶν ποινὴν ὅ τοι οὔ τι μάχης ἐκ νοστήσαντι	[E-d, D]
	δέξεται Ἀνδρομάχη κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πηλεΐωνος.	

There are two compensation themes of the *poinē* type in this short narrative unit, one implicit and the other explicit. The implicit theme begins with a reference to Hektor's impending death (R). It includes a description of the damages Hektor has inflicted (17.200-206a): Hektor killed Achilleus' *hetairos* and stripped him of Achilleus' armor οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (D). The theme is conveyed less by recurring word groups than by the visual image that the words project: a glimpse of Hektor putting

on Achilleus' armor, seen through the window of Zeus' gaze. As a result, the audience is positioned by Zeus' perspective.

The explicit *poinē* theme is the *mega kratos* [E-p] which Zeus promises Hektor as *poinē* [E-d] for *tōn*, "these things" (17.207). I take *tōn* as anticipatory, referring to ὅ τοι οὔ τι μάχης ἐκνοστήσαντι [D].[78] Thus the *poinē* is for Hektor's life. This exchange of *poinē* is singular among the self-contained compensation themes. *Poinē* is ordinarily paid to the injured party (usually the dead man's family) by the one who inflicted damages. In this case however, Zeus vouchsafes *poinē* for a life that someone else will take. That Zeus' promise is a tacit admission of liability for Hektor's death is unlikely, given Zeus' ambiguous relation to fate in the *Iliad*.[79] Further, it is noteworthy that Zeus does not represent the *kratos* as *poinē* for the fact that Achilleus will kill Hektor. This scene, therefore, offers a unique instance of a third party compensation. In supplying the *poinē*, Zeus assumes the role of a *hetairos* who procures compensation for a friend's death, uniquely before the fact.

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[78]See also, among others, Ameis-H (1908) *ad loc.*; Leaf and Bayfield (1960) *ad loc.*; Willcock (1984) *ad loc.*; and M. Edwards (1991) 82. For similar usage of anticipatory demonstrative, see 8.362. The plural (*tōn*) is somewhat problematic. It should not refer back to *epephnes* and *heileu* without an adversative particle. The plural might be used in anticipation of the two results of Hektor's death that are forthcoming: he will not have a return and Andromachē will receive no arms from him. This, however, seems somewhat strained. Eustathius (1102.50 ff) comments that the poet could have used the singular, but employed the plural for the effect of exaggeration.

[79]Contra Griffin (1987) 93, who comments on this passage that Zeus wills Hektor's death. Adkins (1960) 17-23, posits an ambiguous relationship between Zeus and *moira*, but concludes that *moira* refers specifically to the fate of death, which is particularly out of the control of the gods. Nagy (1979) 81-82, identifies *moira* with the traditional plot of the narrative and the *Dios boulē* as the self-proclaimed plot of our *Iliad*.

The path of compensation is singular among the discrete themes. Zeus promises *kratos* as *poinē* for Hektor's death. *Kratos* is a form of cultural capital that has implicit material results, but it is not ordinarily an object of exchange. If we infer that *kratos* leads to *kudos*, which is in turn preserved as *kleos*, then Zeus promises to compensate Hektor with *kleos* for death in battle.[80] The offer thus accords with the heroic or at least Iliadic paradigm of *kleos* purchased with premature death. The implicit claim that Zeus compensates the hero with *kleos* further suggests that a close connection is being forged between Zeus and traditional poetry. The politics of such an exchange impinge significantly on Achilleus' compensation.[81]

2.3 THEMES OF A MIXED-TYPE

Each of the themes in this group comprises two compensation themes, an *apoina*- and a *poinē* type, woven together into a unified narrative. The themes are set in opposition to each other: an *apoina* theme is disrupted by a *poinē* theme, which leads to competition to determine the character of the resolution. In every case, the alternative of *poinē* is expressed as the preferred resolution; in every case but one (24.200-216), *poinē* is in fact imposed as the resolution.

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[80]Cf 9. 410-20, where Achilleus rejects this exchange as inadequate. On this, see Chapter 6.

[81]See the Conclusion.

6.45-65

Adrestos, a Trojan warrior who has fallen before Menelaos' spear, seizes Menelaos' knees in a gesture of supplication and begs for his life (D2):[82]

45	Ἄδρηστος δ' ἄρ' ἔπειτα λαβὼν ἐλλίσσετο γούνων·	
	Ζώγρει, Ἀτρέος υἱέ, σὺ δ' ἄξια δέξαι ἄποινα·[83]	D2, E2
	πολλὰ δ' ἐν ἀφνειοῦ πατρὸς κειμήλια κεῖται	
	χαλκός τε χρυσός τε πολύκμητός τε σίδηρος,	
	τῶν κέν τοι χαρίσαιτο πατὴρ ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα	
50	εἴ κεν ἐμὲ ζωὸν πεπύθοιτ' ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.	
	Ὣς φάτο, τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθε·	
	καὶ δή μιν τάχ' ἔμελλε θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν	
	δώσειν ᾧ θεράποντι καταξέμεν· ἀλλ' Ἀγαμέμνων	
	ἀντίος ἦλθε θέων, καὶ ὁμοκλήσας ἔπος ηὔδα·	
55	Ὦ πέπον, ὦ Μενέλαε, τί ἦ δὲ σὺ κήδεαι οὕτως	
	ἀνδρῶν; ἦ σοὶ ἄριστα πεποίηται κατὰ οἶκον	D1
	πρὸς Τρώων; τῶν μή τις ὑπεκφύγοι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον	E1
	χεῖράς θ' ἡμετέρας, μηδ' ὅν τινα γαστέρι μήτηρ	
	κοῦρον ἐόντα φέροι, μηδ' ὃς φύγοι, ἀλλ' ἅμα πάντες	
60	Ἰλίου ἐξαπολοίατ' ἀκήδεστοι καὶ ἄφαντοι.	
	Ὣς εἰπὼν ἔτρεψεν ἀδελφειοῦ φρένας ἥρως,	
	αἴσιμα παρειπών· ὃ δ' ἀπὸ ἔθεν ὤσατο χειρὶ	R
	ἥρω' Ἄδρηστον· τὸν δὲ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων	
	οὖτα κατὰ λαπάρην· ὃ δ' ἀνετράπετ', Ἀτρεΐδης δὲ	
65	λὰξ ἐν στήθεσι βὰς ἐξέσπασε μείλινον ἔγχος.	

The compensation theme begins with a defeat on the battlefield which leads to an offer of *apoina* (E2). The theme is contained in nine lines

[82]For the schematic arrangement of the next three scenes, see Chapter 1.3.

[83]ἄξια δέξαι ἄποινα, 6. 46 =11.131. Kirk (1990) 160, suggests that *apereisia* (6.49) is in subtle contrast with *axia*. *Axia*, however, meets a different metrical requirement than *apereisia*. In the compensation themes, *axia*, like *aglaa*, is a generic epithet used with *apoina* to connote favorable exchangeability. In these recurring lines (6.6.46-50=11.131-35) *axia* frames the list of goods on the other side of *apereisia*, a particular epithet. The effect is compounding and perhaps slightly ascending. σὺ δ' ἄξια δέξαι ἄποινα·6.46=11.131) and καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα (1.23=1.377) would appear to violate the principle of economy. On *aglaa* in Homer, see Sacks (1987).

(6.45-50) that are composed almost entirely of word groups recurring in themes of the *apoina* type.[84] Adrestos' offer is introduced with words and gestures of supplication. It is further elaborated with a description of the prestige goods that his father would bring: *keimēlia*, including bronze, gold and worked iron (6.47-48).[85] The listener is set up to expect a resolution. Indeed a successful resolution appears imminent: Menelaos prepares to send Adrestos to the *nēas Akhaiōn* where the exchange with his father would conventionally take place (6.51-53). The progression of the *apoina* theme is abruptly interrupted, however, by the arrival of Agamemnon.

Agamemnon introduces a competing interpretation of the situation. Alluding to Alexandros' previous ill-treatment of Menelaos (D1), Agamemnon identifies Menelaos as the injured party, and argues that the prior unanswered damages demand a different direction and path. Instead of accepting *apoina* for this one Trojan's life, they should take his life in return for Alexandros' misdeed; and not only his life, but the lives of all the Trojans, including their unborn sons; and not only their lives, but their funeral rites, and even their cultural memory; all, presumably, for the loss of an *alokhos* and the insult inflicted by Alexandros (E1).[86] Agamemnon recalls prior damages with the intent of securing *poinē* for a

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[84]Cf. 11.131-35 and 10.378-381.

[85]6.48=11.133 and 10.379; 6.47=11.132. The recurring word groups in these formulaic lines represent the most detailed listing of *apoina* outside of Agamemnon's offer to Achilleus and Priam's *apoina*.

[86]Paris' damage against Menelaos is alluded to only as ἦ σοὶ ἄριστα πεποίηται κατὰ οἶκον πρὸς Τρώων (6.56).

past situation as opposed to accepting *apoina* in the present one. He assumes the role of a *philos* who secures *poinē* for a dependent party. He generalizes liability to pay for Alexandros' deed beyond Alexandros and his family to all of his male *philoi* for all time. The path is ostensibly all of life for a life. Since, however, Helen is eventually recovered, the path devolves into all of life for outrage, that is a loss of *timē*. Agamemnon's proposal to reject *apoina* in favor of *poinē* for prior damage earns the apparent approval of Menelaos, who shoves Adrestos, who had taken hold of his knees in supplication, away, and of the narrator, who declares Agamemnon's words *aisima*.[87] Agamemnon himself carries out the verdict he has rendered and kills Adrestos with his spear.

The phrase *aisima pareipōn* has troubled critics and translators, following as it does upon Agamemnon's inexorable judgment, and positioned emphatically as it is in non-periodic enjambement. *Aisima pareipōn* is usually rendered something like "encouraging him suitably," or "what he said was fitting." The scholia regard the phrase as expressing the poet's approval of Agamemnon. Moreover, they sanction the poet's approval in light of the Trojan violation of the code of hospitality.[88] Modern scholars, however, are more inclined to resolve what they regard as incongruity between Agamemnon's speech and the evaluative

[87]A. Parry (1972) 17, observes that Menelaos is always persuaded by protreptic speech. See also Martin (1989) 99.

[88]εἱμαρμένα, ἢ τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις. ἠμαρτύρησε δὲ ὁ ποιητὴς αὑτῷ ὡς καλῶς διαθεμένῳ τοὺς λόγους [bT].

comment.[89] Naoko Yamagata, for example, asserts that if *aisimos* is taken to mean 'within measure' or 'fitting', as he agrees it should be, then only two options are possible: assume that what Agamemnon says is entirely acceptable in light of Homer's norm of behavior, or, find another kind of measured portion inherent in the meaning of *aisima* that does not cause any such clumsiness.[90] He concludes that *aisima* does not have to do with Agamemnon's advice *per se*, but with his eloquence in producing a balanced argument. Simon Goldhill takes a lexical approach to the dilemma. He argues that *aisima* in 6.62 is better taken as meaning fated or fateful.[91] Goldhill concludes that as a consequence of his solution, lines 61-2 "cannot be taken as proof that the rejection of supplication in battle is the (acceptable) norm for the Homeric poems."[92] Bernard Fenik accepts the traditional translation of *aisima*, and addresses the problem from a formular perspective.[93] He claims, unconvincingly, that this is a "misused formula," a formular reflex that led the poet to say something at odds

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[89]Some scholars are skeptical about whether or to what degree the poet expresses authentic authorial or narratorial judgments. See for example, Donlan (1993) 159; Griffin (1986); Richardson (1990) 158-66. Other critics do not discuss the tension inherent in the comment. See for example Pedrick (1982), Thornton (1984), and Crotty (1994) on supplication; Gould (1973) 80, calls Agamemnon's action "the most direct affront to the rite of supplication," but makes no reference to the evaluative comment.

[90]Yamagata (1990) 428.

[91]Goldhill (1990). See also Nagy (1976) 40, 81-82, on *moira/aisa* as a term for what is known by those familiar with the heroic poetic tradition to have happened in the story. Goldhill's suggestion does not, however, satisfactorily resolve the problem. If the 'poet' is attesting that Agamemnon spoke what was fated, meaning what conforms to epic tradition, the poem itself is witness that his words are not fulfilled: the Trojan dead are not all left unburied; and, so long as the Greeks tell the story of Achilleus, neither are the Trojans *aphantoi*, unmarked in cultural memory.

[92]Goldhill (1990) 374.

[93]Fenik (1986) 26-27.

with his own thoughts.[94] Oliver Taplin claims that *aisima pareipōn* does not mark the poet's own 'moral collaboration', but only that the sentiments strike Menelaos as *aisima*.[95] De Jong suggests that judgmental words in narrator text should be taken as imbedded focalization where possible, since such words occur most often in direct speech.[96] Thus *aisima* could represent either Agamemnon's or Menelaos' evaluation. She also demonstrates, however, that speech introduction and capping formulas are narrator focalization, that is, they represent the perspective of the narrator, or, better, how the narrator wants the addressee to interpret and react to words or events.[97] I agree that the phrase in question is in fact narrator focalization.

It is generally agreed that *aisimos* can bear the sense of 'fated, destined, apportioned' and the sometimes overlapping sense 'fitting, proper, in due measure'. Comprehensive surveys of Homeric usage of *aisimos* have been presented elsewhere, but are inconclusive as evidence for this phrase.[98] The phrase occurs only one other time in the *Iliad*. When Agamemnon restrains Menelaos from taking up Hektor's challenge to a duel, the narrator indicates that he persuades his brother, *aisima pareipōn* (7.121). The capping formula that closes Agamemnon's speech to

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[94]Cf. Cook's (1990) 209-210, refutation.

[95]Taplin (1990) 72 note 11. See also Kirk (1993) 161; A. A. Long (1970) 135-6. Taplin's interpretation of *aisima pareipōn* is tenable were it not for the narrative situation of the phrase.

[96]De Jong (1987) 136-46.

[97]De Jong (1987) 195-97, 207.

[98]See Goldhill (1990).

Menelaos concerning the duel (7.120-21) is virtually identical to the capping formula that closes his speech to Menelaos concerning Adrestos (6.61-62).[99] The narrator's positive evaluation of Agamemnon's attempt to dissuade Menelaos from taking up Hektor's challenge poses little difficulty for the modern reader: it is clear that Agamemnon advises Menelaos to take a prudent course of action. On the strength of the parallel usage, I infer a similar meaning for *aisima* in the theme involving Adrestos. I therefore interpret *aisima pareipōn* in 6.62 as a narratorial comment meaning "speaking persuasively appropriate things."

Agamemnon is represented in 6.45-65 as speaking in his capacity not as avenger of a private damage, but of damage that is now a public matter.[100] The rape of Helen was committed by a member of the Trojan royal household; his action is, moreover, condoned by his father Priam and by a number of the leaders of Troy.[101] According to the narrator, Agamemnon thus has justifiable grounds for annihilation of the Trojans.[102]

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[99]7.120-21: Ὣς εἰπὼν παρέπεισεν ἀδελφειοῦ φρένας ἥρως | αἴσιμα παρειπών; 6.61-2, Ὣς εἰπὼν ἔτρεψεν ἀδελφειοῦ φρένας ἥρως. | αἴσιμα παρειπών.

[100]Raymond Westbrook pointed out to me a basic principle of international law according to which a wrong by a private citizen becomes an inter-state issue if condoned by the state. See note 102 below for an example of the principle taken from ancient Israelite tradition.

[101]Priam supports Alexandros in the assembly (7.345-78). Cf. 3.259, where Priam shudders (*rhigēsen*) at the news that Alexandros was going to meet Menelaos in a duel. On this, see Kirk (1985) *ad* 306-7; Edwards (1987) 194; van Wees (1992) 179. Antimachos also supports Alexandros, apparently because of Alexandros' wealth and his distribution of gifts (11.122-47 below).

[102]The story of the rape of Dinah, preserved in Genesis 34, presents a situation that is regarded by the injured parties similarly to how Agamemnon views the rape of Helen. Dinah, the daughter of Jacob, is raped by Shechem, the son of Hamor, the leader (*naśî'*) of the land. Hamor approaches Jacob and his sons to ask that Dinah be given in marriage to Shechem. Dinah's brothers, the injured parties, ostensibly agree on the

Significantly, Agamemnon kills Adrestos himself, making this an act of public, not private, *poinē*.[103] The narrator commends Agamemnon's judgment as fitting; a social fault-line is therefore exposed when the poem betrays its ambivalence toward untrammeled *tisis*.[104]

11.122-47

Two brothers, Peisandros and Hippolochos, are overtaken by Agamemnon on the battlefield.[105] The Trojan warriors are introduced with an anecdote about their father Antimachos, who had once colluded with Alexandros to prevent the return of Helen to Menelaos:

	Αὐτὰρ ὁ Πείσανδρόν τε καὶ Ἱππόλοχον μενεχάρμην	D2
	υἱέας Ἀντιμάχοιο δαΐφρονος, ὅς ῥα μάλιστα [106]	D1
	χρυσὸν Ἀλεξάνδροιο δεδεγμένος ἀγλαὰ δῶρα	
125	οὐκ εἴασχ' Ἑλένην δόμεναι ξανθῷ Μενελάῳ,	
	τοῦ περ δὴ δύο παῖδε λάβε κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων	D2
	εἰν ἑνὶ δίφρῳ ἐόντας, ὁμοῦ δ' ἔχον ὠκέας ἵππους·	
	ἐκ γάρ σφεας χειρῶν φύγον ἡνία σιγαλόεντα,	
	τὼ δὲ κυκηθήτην· ὃ δ' ἐναντίον ὦρτο λέων ὣς	
130	Ἀτρεΐδης· τὼ δ' αὖτ' ἐκ δίφρου γουναζέσθην·	
	Ζώγρει, Ἀτρέος υἱέ, σὺ δ' ἄξια δέξαι ἄποινα·	E2
	πολλὰ δ' ἐν Ἀντιμάχοιο δόμοις κειμήλια κεῖται [107]	

condition that all the men of Hamor's city be circumcised, or, in other words, be made 'insiders'. The men of the city agree, but while they are in a weakened condition, Dinah's brothers kill all the males, take the women and children captive, and completely plunder the city. In the case of both Alexandros and Shechem, the relation of the abductor to the ruler of a city, the endorsement of their actions by their fathers and the other men of the city, and the relation of the two groups as outsiders render the damage and the reaction public instead of private and, consequently, lead to annihilation of the city in response to the damage.

[103]See also van Wees (1992) 188.

[104]See for example 24.200-216 and 4.24-56 below.

[105]The scene involving Agamemnon, Peisandros, and Hippolochos echoes the scenes with Adrestos and with Dolon formally and verbally. Cf. especially 6.46-50, 11.131-35, and 10.378-81.

[106]Zenodotus read *kakophronos* for *daiphronos* in lines 123 and 138.

[107]I note that Eustathius offers the variant reading *aphneiou patros* for *Antimakhoio*

χαλκός τε χρυσός τε πολύκμητός τε σίδηρος,
τῶν κέν τοι χαρίσαιτο πατὴρ ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα,
135 εἰ νῶϊ ζωοὺς πεπύθοιτ' ἐπὶ νηυσὶν 'Αχαιῶν.
"Ως τώ γε κλαίοντε προσαυδήτην βασιλῆα
μειλιχίοις ἐπέεσσιν· ἀμείλικτον δ' ὄπ' ἄκουσαν·
Εἰ μὲν δὴ 'Αντιμάχοιο δαΐφρονος υἱέες ἐστόν,
ὅς ποτ' ἐνὶ Τρώων ἀγορῇ Μενέλαον ἄνωγεν, D1
140 ἀγγελίην ἐλθόντα σὺν ἀντιθέῳ 'Οδυσῆϊ
αὖθι κατακτεῖναι μηδ' ἐξέμεν ἂψ ἐς 'Αχαιούς,
νῦν μὲν δὴ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεικέα τίσετε λώβην. E1
Ἦ, καὶ Πείσανδρον μὲν ἀφ' ἵππων ὦσε χαμᾶζε R
δουρὶ βαλὼν πρὸς στῆθος· ὁ δ' ὕπτιος οὔδει ἐρείσθη.
145 'Ιππόλοχος δ' ἀπόρουσε, τὸν αὖ χαμαὶ ἐξενάριξε,
χεῖρας ἀπὸ ξίφεϊ τμήξας ἀπό τ' αὐχένα κόψας,
ὅλμον δ' ὣς ἔσσευε κυλίνδεσθαι δι' ὁμίλου.

The anecdote about Antimachos is intercalated into a scene in which Agamemnon defeats his two sons (D2); the flashback adumbrates the resolution of the theme it introduces. A theme of the *apoina* type commences with the report that Peisandros and Hippolochos supplicate Agamemnon (11.130, ἐκ δίφρου γουναζέσθην). They plead for their lives and offer *apoina*, which their father, whom they mention by name, will bring to the ships if he hears they are being held there (D2, E2). The description of *apoina* as metal goods including *khrusos* (11.131-135) is recurrent. Even so, the mention of Antimachos' name in conjunction with the *khrusos* he has in store would recall the *khrusos* that he had received from Alexandros (11.123-25). It thus comes as no surprise that Peisandros' and Hippolochos' plea with *meilikhia epea* elicits an *ameilikton* response (11.137).[108]

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domois, perhaps on the strength of the parallel at 6.47.

[108]On *epea meilikhia*, see especially Chapter 6.

The *apoina* theme is interrupted by Agamemnon. He recalls Antimachos' conspiracy to murder Menelaos while Menelaos and Odysseus were on embassy to Troy and presumably under Priam's protection (11.139-41). Agamemnon thus introduces prior damage inflicted against his brother, Menelaos, for which he himself will seek compensation. He counters the *apoina* for life that the Trojan warriors offer with a competing direction and path of exchange: Peisandros and Hippolochos must pay with their lives (E1) for Antimachos' attempt on Menelaos' life (τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεικέα τίσετε λώβην 11.142; D1).[109] As he did in the Adrestos incident, Agamemnon deploys memory with the intent of securing *poinē* for prior damages as opposed to accepting *apoina* in the present.[110] Agamemnon triumphantly exacts the payment he had demanded.

The path of exchange in this complex theme is not immediately apparent. It may, in fact, be contested within the theme itself. Peisandros and Hippolochos offer goods for life, but it is rejected. By Agamemnon's recollection of Antimachos' damage, the path is life for attempted murder, characterized as *lōbē*. Agamemnon is not, however, the only one who recalls the earlier event. The narrator also recalls Antimachos' misdeed, but as collusion to obstruct the return of Helen—an insult, but short of

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[109]I take *aeikea lōbēn* as the damage for which Peisandros and Hippolochos must pay, and not the price they pay (*contra*, for example, Lattimore's translation: "your mutilation shall punish the shame of your father"). On this, see discussion of the syntax of *tinein* and *poinē* in Chapter 3.1; see also Chapter 7.

[110]On recalling as an agonistic performance of memory, see Martin (1989) 77-80.

attempted murder. Agamemnon and the narrator are, it appears, competing to write this theme.[111]

Family relations typical to the compensation theme appear in this narrative, but with a twist: a father would give *apoina* in exchange for the release of his sons, which is common; but the father turns out to be the one for whose damage the sons' lives are exacted in payment.[112]

21.34-135

Achilleus comes upon Lykaon just as Lykaon is clambering unarmed out of the river. The narrator begins to describe their encounter, but shifts abruptly to a 'previous incident' in which Achilleus had captured Lykaon and sold him into slavery.[113] Lykaon had only recently been ransomed and returned to his family:[114]

Ἔνθ' υἷι Πριάμοιο συνήντετο Δαρδανίδαο
35 ἐκ ποταμοῦ φεύγοντι, Λυκάονι, τόν ῥά ποτ' αὐτὸς
<u>ἦγε λαβὼν ἐκ πατρὸς</u> ἀλωῆς οὐκ ἐθέλοντα,
ἐννύχιος προμολών· ὁ δ' ἐρινεὸν ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ
τάμνε νέους ὅρπηκας, ἵν' ἅρματος ἄντυγες εἶεν·
τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἀνώϊστον κακὸν ἤλυθε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.
40 καὶ τότε μέν μιν Λῆμνον ἐϋκτιμένην ἐπέρασσε
νηυσὶν ἄγων, ἀτὰρ υἱὸς Ἰήσονος ὦνον ἔδωκε·
κεῖθεν δὲ ξεινός <u>μιν ἐλύσατο, πολλὰ δ' ἔδωκεν</u>
Ἴμβριος Ἠετίων, πέμψεν δ' ἐς δῖαν Ἀρίσβην·
ἔνθεν ὑπεκπροφυγὼν πατρώϊον ἵκετο δῶμα.
(21.34-44)

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[111]Robbins (1990) 13, also notices the discrepancy between Agamemnon's and the "poet's" accounts of Antimachos' plot. He concludes that Agamemnon's story is a fabrication, and that the poet allows the audience to see it as such.

[112]Cf. Achilleus' refusal of *apoina* from the embassy (Chapter 7).

[113]Cf. the Introduction.

[114]I include only those lines of the Greek text that I treat directly in this chapter.

The narrator, having brought the story back up to the present moment, resumes the account of the meeting at the river and even reveals the outcome: unlike their last encounter, this time Achilleus will kill Lykaon (21.45-48). Achilleus then proclaims his own surprise at coming upon Lykaon, and tells his *megalētora thumon* how he had only recently captured and sold Lykaon, thinking never to see him again.

Ὢ πόποι, ἦ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι·
55 ἦ μάλα δὴ Τρῶες μεγαλήτορες, οὕς περ ἔπεφνον
αὖτις ἀναστήσονται ὑπὸ ζόφου ἠερόεντος,
οἷον δὴ καὶ ὅδ' ἦλθε φυγὼν ὕπο νηλεὲς ἦμαρ
Λῆμνον ἐς ἠγαθέην πεπερημένος· οὐδέ μιν ἔσχε
πόντος ἁλὸς πολιῆς, ὃ πολεῖς ἀέκοντας ἐρύκει.
60 Ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ δουρὸς ἀκωκῆς ἡμετέροιο
γεύσεται, ὄφρα ἴδωμαι ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἠδὲ δαείω
ἢ ἄρ' ὁμῶς καὶ κεῖθεν ἐλεύσεται, ἦ μιν ἐρύξει
γῆ φυσίζοος, ἥ τε κατὰ κρατερόν περ ἐρύκει.
(21.54-63)

The previous meeting is recounted yet again, this time by Lykaon.

Ὣς ὥρμαινε μένων· ὁ δέ οἱ σχεδὸν ἦλθε τεθηπὼς
65 γούνων ἅψασθαι μεμαώς, περὶ δ' ἤθελε θυμῷ
ἐκφυγέειν θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν.
ἤτοι ὁ μὲν δόρυ μακρὸν ἀνέσχετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεὺς
οὐτάμεναι μεμαώς, ὁ δ' ὑπέδραμε καὶ λάβε γούνων
κύψας· ἐγχείη δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ νώτου ἐνὶ γαίῃ
70 ἔστη, ἱεμένη χροὸς ἄμεναι ἀνδρομέοιο.
αὐτὰρ ὁ τῇ ἑτέρῃ μὲν ἑλὼν ἐλλίσσετο γούνων,
τῇ δ' ἑτέρῃ ἔχεν ἔγχος ἀκαχμένον οὐδὲ μεθίει·
[καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·][115]
Γουνοῦμαί σ' Ἀχιλεῦ· σὺ δέ μ' αἴδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον·
75 ἀντί τοί εἰμ' ἱκέταο, διοτρεφές, αἰδοίοιο·
πὰρ γὰρ σοὶ πρώτῳ πασάμην Δημήτερος ἀκτήν,
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε μ' εἷλες ἐϋκτιμένῃ ἐν ἀλωῇ,

[115]Line 73 was omitted by Aristarchus [AT]. Apthorp (1980) 148-150 makes a cogent argument against its authenticity (contra Van der Valk 2:489-92) on the basis of the tendency of post-Aristarchean interpolations to introduce an explicit verb of speaking immediately before the direct speech.

καί μ' ἐπέρασσας ἄνευθεν ἄγων πατρός τε φίλων τε
Λῆμνον ἐς ἠγαθέην, ἑκατόμβοιον δέ τοι ἦλφον.
80 Νῦν δὲ λύμην τρὶς τόσσα πορών·

(21.64-80)

Lykaon reviews his present situation and concludes that he will die by Achilleus' hand. Lykaon has made no explicit offer of *apoina*, but he overtly claims that he is not liable for *poinē* for the death of Patroklos. Achilleus responds to Lykaon's earlier allusion to *apoina* and to his argument against *poinē*.

νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐνθάδ' ἐμοὶ κακὸν ἔσσεται· οὐ γὰρ ὀΐω
σὰς χεῖρας φεύξεσθαι, ἐπεί ῥ' ἐπέλασσέ γε δαίμων.
Ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι·
95 μή με κτεῖν', ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὁμογάστριος Ἕκτορός εἰμι, [116]
ὅς τοι ἑταῖρον ἔπεφνεν ἐνηέα τε κρατερόν τε.
Ὣς ἄρα μιν Πριάμοιο προσηύδα φαίδιμος υἱὸς
λισσόμενος ἐπέεσσιν, ἀμείλικτον δ' ὄπ' ἄκουσε·
Νήπιε μή μοι ἄποινα πιφαύσκεο μηδ' ἀγόρευε· [117]
100 πρὶν μὲν γὰρ Πάτροκλον ἐπισπεῖν αἴσιμον ἦμαρ
τόφρα τί μοι πεφιδέσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φίλτερον ἦεν
Τρώων, καὶ πολλοὺς ζωοὺς ἕλον ἠδ' ἐπέρασσα·
νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅς τις θάνατον φύγοι ὅν κε θεός γε
Ἰλίου προπάροιθεν ἐμῇς ἐν χερσὶ βάλῃσι,
105 καὶ πάντων Τρώων, περὶ δ' αὖ Πριάμοιό γε παίδων.

(21.92-105)

Achilleus insists that all the Trojans are liable for the deaths of Patroklos and the Achaians, his *philoi*, who died while he himself sat by his ships.

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[116]Aristonicus [A] reports that Zenodotus read *iogastrios* for *homogastrios* on the basis of the analogy with 24.496: ἰῆς ἐκ νηδύος.

[117]*Tauta* appears as a variant for *apoina* in Eustathius (1225,29). This kind of change from a 'loaded' to an 'empty' word is characteristic of Aristarchus. See for example *Il.* 1.5 where Zenodotus read *daita*; Aristarchus, however, read *pasi* on the grounds that Homer does not use *dais* of animal food (but cf. 24.43). Since Eustathius' source is not named and no extant manuscripts preserve this reading, its origin is difficult to identify with certainty.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς ὀλέεσθε κακὸν μόρον, εἰς ὅ κε πάντες
τίσετε Πατρόκλοιο φόνον καὶ λοιγὸν Ἀχαιῶν,
οὓς ἐπὶ νηυσὶ θοῇσιν ἐπέφνετε νόσφιν ἐμεῖο.
(21.133-35)

This lengthy and complex narrative unit is constituted of three different compensation themes involving the same two characters. The first theme comprises a previous encounter in which Achilleus caught Lykaon unawares (21.36-39, 77-78; D), spared his life, and sold him into slavery.[118] Lykaon was later released from slavery with *apoina* brought by a *xeinos* (a foreign *philos*), Eëtion (E, R).[119] Eëtion may have been acting on behalf of Priam; or, more likely, Priam gave Eëtion a handsome gift in return for the ransom he had given to gain Lykaon's release (see 21.80: *lumēn. . . porōn*).[120] The narrator, Achilleus, and Lykaon each bring this

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[118] I note the terms used to refer to the sale into slavery: *eperrase*, 21. 40; *ōnon edōke*, 21. 41; *peprēmenos*, 21. 58; *eperassas*, 21. 78; *ēlphon*, 21. 97. On the difference between sale and the compensation theme, see Chapter 3.2.

[119] *Elusato* (21.42) refers to Eëtion's ransom of Lykaon. See 23.740-749 for a description of the price Jason's son, Eunaos, paid to Patroklos for Lykaon—a silver Sidonian-made mixing bowl. Cf. Lykaon's claim that he brought Achilleus a price of one hundred oxen. The contradiction might be resolved if the hundred oxen are considered as the value of the bowl and if Patroklos is considered as Achilleus' agent (cf. Proklos' testimony in the *Cypria* 105.13). As Andersen (1990) 36, notes, however, each story is appropriate to its context: the bowl is given as a prize at Patroklos' funeral games in 23; in 21 Lykaon is stressing the links between Achilleus and himself. The discrepancy is further lessened by the destabilization of the *hekatomb* already in the *Iliad* (see 23.146).

[120] The scholia take *lumēn* (21.80) as an optative referring to Lykaon's hope of being rescued again: e.g., ἀντὶ τοῦ λυθησοίμην (BCE^{3}E^4); *lutrōtheiēn* (A^{im}; πρὸς ὃ φησι μή μοι ἄποινα); *lutrōsaimēn* (D). I agree with Richardson (1993) 60, that this is not plausible. *Lumēn* must be an aorist middle or aorist passive indicative referring to the earlier ransom. The narrator's report that Lykaon escaped (*hupekprophugōn*, 21.44) his *xeinos* seems somewhat at odds with Lykaon's own words that he (or Priam) provided for his release (*lumēn. . . porōn*). *Hupekprophugōn* may mean nothing more than that Priam was obligated to respond to Eëtion's gift before Lykaon could return home without violating the conventions of *xenia*.

scene from the past to bear on the present one (the second theme) by way of memory.[121]

The second theme comprises the present encounter, which is also narrated three times and constituted in part by recollections of the first theme. Achilleus catches Lykaon at a disadvantage on the battlefield (D), which introduces a theme of the *apoina* type. Lykaon supplicates Achilleus, deploying the earlier situation as the basis for claiming a formalized relationship which should obligate Achilleus to honor his supplication (21.75-77).[122] Lykaon does not offer *apoina*; he does, however, remind Achilleus of his ability to bring a handsome sum (21.80).[123] In other mixed-type themes, the captor introduces a competing definition of damages and appropriate compensation at this point in the theme.[124] Here, surprisingly, the competing definition is introduced by Lykaon, who anticipates an impending reversal. Lykaon points out that he is not

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[121]21. 36-45, 57-59, 75-80.

[122]21.65, 68, 72, 74. Gould (1973) 90-94, tries to make a case for *xenia* and *hiketia* being institutions which "permit the acceptance of the outsider within the group and which create hereditary bonds of obligation between the parties." This is the argument wielded without success by Lykaon (21.74-77). Compensation themes in the *Iliad* do not demonstrate either the degree of overlap between the Homeric institutions of *xenia* and *hiketia* or the deconstruction of the insider-outsider polarity that Gould implies (and which he further deduces for [Dark Age?] Greek society). Pedrick (1982) 131, observes that only Lykaon and Priam are called *hiketēs*, which she thinks may initiate a non-binding relationship; *hiketēs* is, however, a technical term not applicable to everyone who assumes a suppliant posture.

[123]It may be that Lykaon does not make the offer explicitly because he realizes that it will not work this time (21.92-93) and that he must use a different strategy; or perhaps because an offer of *apoina* is inappropriate in the context of the formalized relationship that he is claiming. Elsewhere in the discrete themes, *apoina* are offered only to one's enemy.

[124]Cf. 6.45-65 and 11.122-47.

from the same womb (*homogastrios*, 21.95) as Hektor, and therefore should not be liable for *poinē* for Patroklos. Lykaon appeals to a convention limiting liability for *poinē* to a matrilineally-circumscribed kinship group. Limits, however, have been broadened in the poem to the point of dissolution.

The third compensation theme is a *poinē* type theme that arises from the damage Hektor inflicted by killing Patroklos (D).[125] Lykaon introduces the damage in hopes of disarming it. Achilleus, however, recalls the prior damage as grounds for unqualified rejection of *apoina* (μή μοι ἄποινα πιφαύσκεο, 21.99; E) or of any other sparing of life (21.102-3). Although it was his practice before to spare life in exchange for goods, that exchange no longer works (πρὶν μὲν. . . . νῦν δ', 21.100, 103).[126] He repudiates Lykaon's disavowal of liability for *poinē*, and pronounces the direction and path of compensation that he demands: all Trojans, and especially the sons of Priam, are liable for the deaths of Patroklos and of the other Achaians who died during Achilleus' absence from battle (21.103-5, 133-35; E).[127] Achilleus kills Lykaon and then, taking him by the foot, flings him into the river, bringing the scene to a grisly resolution (R).

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[125]This theme is part of a larger complex of themes involving Achilleus' compensation for the death of Patroklos. I discuss it here because it is narratively and thematically intertwined with the theme involving Achilleus and Lykaon.

[126]Achilleus marks the death of Patroklos as a watershed in time. He uses *nun de* no less than 15 times after Patroklos' death. On this, see Bassett (1938) 58. In reality, since the quarrel with Agamemnon, Achilleus has refused to spare life, the lives of his *hetairoi*; the Achaians have refused to spare the lives of their enemies.

[127]On the use of *loigos* (*loigon Akhaiōn*, 1.134) to refer to the destruction brought on the Achaians by Achilleus' absence from battle, see Nagy (1979) 74-78; Blickman (1987); Slatkin (1991)87-88; see also Chapter 5.

The complex of themes almost resists schematization. If, however, we call Lykaon's plea for his life in the present scene *apoina* theme 1, the previous encounter between Achilleus and Lykaon *apoina* theme 2, and the prior situation resulting from Patroklos' death the *poinē* theme, then we may derive the following schema (D, E, and R refer to damage, exchange, and resolution as above):

Lines 34-48	*apoina* 1 D; *apoina* 2 D,E, R	
Lines 49-63	*apoina* 1 D; *apoina* 2 D, E, R	
Lines 64-98	*apoina* 1 D; *apoina* 2 D, E, R; *poinē* E	
Lines 99-135	*apoina* 1 E;[128]	*poinē* D, R

The schema illustrates the correlation of past and present in the overall narrative unit. Each report of the present scene (*apoina* 1) refers to one or both of the scenes from the past (*apoina* 2, *poinē*) as an interpretive device. Lykaon invokes the past, first as grounds for putting Achilleus under obligation (*apoina* 2; 21.74-6), and secondly with a view to excluding himself from obligation to pay *poinē* (*poinē*; 21.95-6). Achilleus invokes the past first as pretext for killing Lykaon (*apoina* 2; 21.60-64), then as justification for seeking not only Lykaon's life, but the lives of all the Trojans (*poinē*; 21.99-107, 128-35). The narrator invokes the past (*apoina* 2; 21.35-48), as we will see, as a contrast to the present in order to manipulate expectation.

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[128] Achilleus does not refer this time to the previous incident with Lykaon, but generalizes the previous event as a ransom sequence that happened often.

The theme involving Achilleus and Lykaon is a linch-pin of the compensation theme on several levels. Formally, it is significant for the sophisticated expansion and intercalation of three related themes, two with diametrical outcomes. It is thus a paradigm not only of the activation of memory through thematic repetition, but also of a way in which the characters and the narrator manipulate memory. The scene is pivotal for the overarching story of Achilleus, for it brings Achilleus (and the audience) face to face with the hero's former conduct at a moment of great savagery and violence, and it sets the comparison of his former and present conduct firmly in the context of the compensation theme.

24.200-216

Zeus has sent Thetis to Achilleus (24.120-37) and Iris to Priam (24.159-87), with instructions that an exchange be negotiated: Priam should take *apoina* to Achilleus in order to gain the release of Hektor's body; Achilleus should accept the compensatory exchange. After Priam has already begun preparations for his mission, he summons Hekabē to the storeroom and tells her of the divine command and of his own eagerness to ransom their son's body. When he asks how the plan seems to her, she responds with a *muthos*:

200 Ὣς φάτο, κώκυσεν δὲ γυνὴ καὶ ἀμείβετο μύθῳ·[129]
Ὤ μοι, πῇ δή τοι φρένες οἴχονθ', ᾗς τὸ πάρος περ
ἔκλε' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ξείνους ἠδ' οἷσιν ἀνάσσεις;
πῶς ἐθέλεις <u>ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν ἐλθέμεν</u> οἶος,
ἀνδρὸς ἐς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὅς τοι πολέας τε καὶ ἐσθλοὺς

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[129] Aristarchus read *anēreto* instead of *ameibeto* [AT].

205 υἱέας ἐξενάριξε· σιδήρειόν νύ τοι ἦτορ.
εἰ γάρ σ' αἱρήσει καὶ ἐσόψεται ὀφθαλμοῖσιν,
ὠμηστὴς καὶ ἄπιστος ἀνὴρ ὅ γε, οὔ σ' ἐλεήσει,
οὐδέ τί σ' αἰδέσεται. νῦν δὲ κλαίωμεν ἄνευθεν
ἥμενοι ἐν μεγάρῳ· τῷ δ' ὥς ποθι Μοῖρα κραταιὴ
210 γεινομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ, ὅτε μιν τέκον αὐτή,
ἀργίποδας κύνας ἆσαι ἑῶν ἀπάνευθε τοκήων D
ἀνδρὶ πάρα κρατερῷ, τοῦ ἐγὼ μέσον ἧπαρ ἔχοιμι
ἐσθέμεναι προσφῦσα· τότ' ἄντιτα ἔργα γένοιτο[130] E
215 παιδὸς ἐμοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὔ ἑ κακιζόμενόν γε κατέκτα, D
ἀλλὰ πρὸ Τρώων καὶ Τρωϊάδων βαθυκόλπων
ἑσταότ', οὔτε φόβου μεμνημένον οὔτ' ἀλεωρῆς.

This scene comprises two themes only because it contains an allusion to the larger compensation theme in which it is located. The surrounding *apoina* theme (the ransom of Hektor's corpse) is felt in Hekabē's angry denunciation of the proposed exchange. She interrupts an ongoing *apoina* theme and claims prior damage: Hektor lies away from his parents and met his death at Achilleus' hands (24.211, 215; D). She introduces a competing direction and path for compensation: whereas Priam elects to offer *apoina*; Hekabē wants to exact *poinē* (E-d).[131] An exchange of *apoina* would effect the return of Hektor's corpse; Hekabē is willing to leave her son's corpse to its dreadful fate, eaten by dogs in the Achaian camp, *apaneuthe tokēōn*. She therefore consigns her son to the same mutilated and bier-less end as Achilleus intended (22.345-54) and was even then carrying out (24.14-18). Hekabē's wish thus not only

[130] *Antita* was read by some as *an tita* [A]. *Antita* is apparently a synchronized form of *anti-titos* (LfgrE s.v.). Cf. 13.414 and 14.484.

[131] The decision to take *apoina* to Achilleus is no less Priam's decision for being enjoined by Zeus. It has been amply demonstrated elsewhere that double-motivation does not detract from the merit or responsibility for a hero's actions. See Adkins (1960); Gaskin (1990); Lesky (1961).

contravenes her own role of leading public lament, which she would fulfill if Hektor's body were returned, it threatens to rob Hektor of the *kleos* she is thereby empowered to bestow.[132] The path Hekabē proposes is life for life, but it is more than that. The only *antita erga* for her son would be if she could go beyond life for life, sinking her teeth into Achilleus' liver and eating it raw (E-p).

The formula introducing Hekabē's speech (24.200) marks it as a *muthos;* Hekabē is designated simply as *gunē*. Richard Martin has demonstrated conclusively that *muthos* in the *Iliad* regularly denotes the speech-acts of heroes and, further, that it always denotes the speech of someone who is in power or who is laying claim to power.[133] Martin surmises, however, that given the "male heroic in-group orientation" of *muthoi*, Hekabē's *muthos* is anomalous.[134] He infers that it would be a social taboo for women to employ this kind of speech. Martin compares Hekabē's *muthos* to Helen's (3.171-80) and determines that both speeches contain traditional elements of lament. He concludes that Hekabē is thus not violating categories of male heroic speech, but is instead enacting a lament.[135] Martin's own model is perhaps more useful in this instance, however, than he allows.[136]

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[132]Cf. Sultan (1996).

[133]Martin (1989) 22.

[134]Martin (1989) 87-88.

[135]*Kōkuein* is an expression of horror, always allotted to women. It is not, however, confined to formal laments. Cf. Hekabē's cry (22.407-409) when Hektor is dragged away.

[136]See below.

As we will see, competing definitions of damage and appropriate compensation are common in agonistic exchanges between men. Hekabē challenges the exchange of *apoina* that Priam proposes, and declares her preference for *poinē*. Her *muthos* is thus anomalous not so much in content as in the gender of the speaker. Hekabē's assertion of heroic identity in the (male-dominated) realm of *muthos* is constrained by her self-assertion in the (male-dominated) realm of exchange. Hekabē deploys "transgressive" speech to assert a "transgressive" role in the exchange, which, moreover, constitutes a transgressive wish.[137] The speech earns Hekabē a rebuke from Priam, who holds to his original course of action. Priam's response would seem to be somewhat out of place were Hekabē merely expressing 'gender-appropriate' lament and not laying claim to power in Priam's domain. Indeed, Priam claims that it is he who will lament Hektor (ἐπὴν γόου ἐξ ἔρον εἵην), but only when he finally holds his son's body in his arms (24.226-27).

Hekabē traffics in the male domain of public exchange when she endeavors to obstruct the compensatory exchange between Achilleus and Priam. Her *muthos* shares a significant set of details with the scene in which Hera attempts (successfully) to obstruct an exchange negotiated by the Achaians and Trojans (4.24-67).[138] For my immediate purposes, I simply point out three details in Hekabē's *muthos* that are significant to the compensation theme: she negates an exchange of compensatory goods

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[137]On omophagy, see below.

[138]See below and Chapter 3.3.

between men in favor of untrammeled *tisis* (*antita erga*); she expresses a wish to commit omophagy; and in the process of seeking compensatory damages, she negates common interest with *philoi*, in this case, her own son.

2.4 EXCURSUS

The two scenes which follow participate broadly in the compensation theme, though they do not manifest all of the formal conventions and recurring word groups. Taken together, the two scenes portray a compensatory exchange successfully negotiated, but never transacted because a third party subverts it in favor of redressing prior damages.

3.276-91 and 455-61

The speeches of Agamemnon contained in these lines are only a small part of a compensation theme which spans the length of the *Iliad* and beyond.[139] The damages involve the loss of Helen and the *ktēmata* (D). The context for Agamemnon's speeches is that the war waged in response to the loss of Helen has come to an impasse. The Achaians have

[139]This scene is preceded by several partial themes dispersed over several hundred lines. The smaller units are thematically connected with one another in a sequence that leads up to the duel between Menelaos and Alexandros, but no one of the small scenes comprises a complete theme. Some of the recurring word groups from themes of the *poinē* type appear, particularly *tinesthai* (3.28, 351 and 366). The scenes report Menelaos' intent to 'get himself paid' for the damage that Alexandros first inflicted upon him. See 3.21-29; 3.349-54; and 3.364-68.

In the same category should be included: 2.354-356, where Nestor, in a speech following the trial of the hosts urges that no one be in a hurry to return home until he has slept with the wife of a Trojan in order to 'get themselves paid' (*tinesthai*) for the 'Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε ; cf. 2.585-590.

not been able to secure the return of Menelaos' *alokhos* and *ktēmata*; but the Trojans have been successful only at fending the Achaians off, not at sending them back home. Alexandros and Hektor propose to resolve the situation with a duel between Menelaos and Alexandros.[140] Menelaos accepts the proposal and sends for Priam to ratify the agreement, ostensibly because the Trojans are untrustworthy (3.97-110). Priam, however, had not heard the initial agreement except as it was reported to him by the herald Idaios (3.250-58). When Priam arrives, Agamemnon exploits Priam's ignorance of the initial agreement to add a demand for additional *timē* to his oath:

Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ἴδηθεν μεδέων, κύδιστε μέγιστε,
Ἠέλιός θ', ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις·
καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ γαῖα, καὶ οἳ ὑπένερθε καμόντας
ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθον, ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ,
280 ὑμεῖς μάρτυροι ἔστε, φυλάσσετε δ' ὅρκια πιστά·
εἰ μέν κεν Μενέλαον Ἀλέξανδρος καταπέφνῃ,
αὐτὸς ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην ἐχέτω καὶ κτήματα πάντα,
ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν νήεσσι νεώμεθα ποντοπόροισιν·
εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτείνῃ ξανθὸς Μενέλαος,
285 Τρῶας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην καὶ κτήματα πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι, D, E
τιμὴν δ' Ἀργείοις ἀποτινέμεν ἥν τιν' ἔοικεν, E
ἥ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται·
εἰ δ' ἂν ἐμοὶ τιμὴν Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
τίνειν οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν Ἀλεξάνδροιο πεσόντος,
290 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα ποινῆς *E*
αὖθι μένων, εἵως κε τέλος πολέμοιο κιχείω.

Lines 455-461: Following the foiled duel, Agamemnon demands that the Trojans fulfill their oaths:

455 τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων·

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[140] Alexandros had earlier recoiled at the sight of Menelaos (3.30-37), but was shamed into the duel by Hektor.

Κέκλυτέ μευ Τρῶες καὶ Δάρδανοι ἠδ' ἐπίκουροι·
νίκη μὲν δὴ φαίνετ' ἀρηϊφίλου Μενελάου,
ὑμεῖς δ' Ἀργείην Ἑλένην καὶ κτήμαθ' ἅμ' αὐτῇ
ἔκδοτε, καὶ <u>τιμὴν ἀποτινέμεν ἥν τιν' ἔοικεν,</u>
460 ἥ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται.
Ὣς ἔφατ' Ἀτρεΐδης, ἐπὶ δ' ᾔνεον ἄλλοι Ἀχαιοί.

The compact that Alexandros, Hektor, and Menelaos initially agreed to adopt under oath would have awarded Helen and the *ktēmata* (as prizes, as it were) to the victor in the duel. If Menelaos should prevail, he would recover his losses and correct the negative balance created by Alexandros' damage. Agamemnon, however, by subterfuge, appends a provision compelling the Trojans to make an additional payment of goods (*timē*) should Alexandros lose. Agamemnon calculates that he is in a position to achieve better than just a balance for Menelaos; he elects to seek a favorable disequilibrium. Thus the additional payment of *timē* is intended to compensate the Achaians for the prestige goods they would have plundered from Troy when and if they took the city.[141] That the *timē* is part of a compensatory stratagem is confirmed by Agamemnon's vow to fight *heineka poinēs* if the Trojans fail to pay it (3.290).[142] Although the duel is foiled, Agamemnon declares Menelaos the winner by default and demands that the terms of the agreement be honored. Resolution of the overarching compensation theme and of the war driven by it—and, as a result, the end of the poem!—seems imminent.

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[141]On this, see van Wees (1992) 381 note 27 and 382 note 28.

[142]See also the use of *(apo)tinein* (3.286, 288-89, and 459), which appears frequently in themes of the *poinē* type.

The prayer and the speech exhibit only a few of the recurring word groups typical of the compensation theme, but those that do occur are significant in themes of the *poinē* type: (*apo*)*tinein* (3.286, 289 and 459), *poinē* (3.290), and *timē* (3.286, 288 and 459).

4.24-56

As deftly as Aphrodite had swept Paris out of Menelaos' grasp and into Troy, the narrator sweeps the listener from the scene of the foiled duel to Olympos. Zeus, with intent to provoke Hera, is musing aloud whether the gods should allow the settlement negotiated between the Achaians and Trojans to prevail. Hera, motivated purportedly by the effort she had expended in gathering a force against Priam, swiftly moves to obstruct the impending exchange.

"Ἥρῃ δ' οὐκ ἔχαδε στῆθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηύδα·
25 Αἰνότατε Κρονίδη, ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες·
πῶς ἐθέλεις ἅλιον θεῖναι πόνον ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον,
ἱδρῶ θ' ὃν ἵδρωσα μόγῳ, καμέτην δέ μοι ἵπποι
λαὸν ἀγειρούσῃ, Πριάμῳ κακὰ τοῖό τε παισίν;
Ἔρδ'· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.
30 Τὴν δὲ μέγ' ὀχθήσας προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς·
Δαιμονίη, τί νύ σε Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
τόσσα κακὰ ῥέζουσιν, ὅ τ' ἀσπερχὲς μενεαίνεις
Ἰλίου ἐξαλαπάξαι ἐϋκτίμενον πτολίεθρον;
εἰ δὲ σύ γ' εἰσελθοῦσα πύλας καὶ τείχεα μακρὰ
35 ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον Πριάμοιό τε παῖδας
ἄλλους τε Τρῶας, τότε κεν χόλον ἐξακέσαιο.
Ἔρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις· μὴ τοῦτό γε νεῖκος ὀπίσσω
σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ μέγ' ἔρισμα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται.
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν·
40 ὁππότε κεν καὶ ἐγὼ μεμαὼς πόλιν ἐξαλαπάξαι
τὴν ἐθέλω ὅθι τοι φίλοι ἀνέρες ἐγγεγάασι,
μή τι διατρίβειν τὸν ἐμὸν χόλον, ἀλλά μ' ἐᾶσαι·
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοὶ δῶκα ἑκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ·
αἴ γὰρ ὑπ' ἠελίῳ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἀστερόεντι

45 ναιετάουσι πόληες ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
τάων μοι περὶ κῆρι τιέσκετο Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο.
οὐ γάρ μοί ποτε βωμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς ἐΐσης
λοιβῆς τε κνίσης τε· τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς.
50 Τὸν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη·
Ἤτοι ἐμοὶ τρεῖς μὲν πολὺ φίλταταί εἰσι πόληες
Ἄργός τε Σπάρτη τε καὶ εὐρυάγυια Μυκήνη·
τὰς διαπέρσαι, ὅτ' ἄν τοι ἀπέχθωνται περὶ κῆρι·
τάων οὔ τοι ἐγὼ πρόσθ' ἵσταμαι οὐδὲ μεγαίρω.
55 εἴ περ γὰρ φθονέω τε καὶ οὐκ εἰῶ διαπέρσαι,
οὐκ ἀνύω φθονέουσ' ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐσσι.

When Hera tries to put a stop to the settlement, Zeus poses a question about why she rages so incessantly (*asperkhes meneaineis*, 4.32) to destroy the house of Priam?[143] His question contains an implicit allusion to the judgment of Paris (D) and Hera's desire for revenge (E-d).[144] The path Hera pursues is thus life for loss of *timē* (E-p). Hera's anger, Zeus accuses, would be cured only if she could raw-eat (*ōmon bebrōthois*, 4.35) not only Priam and his sons, but all the Trojans. If Zeus' allegation is upheld, the path is an extraordinary extension of *tisis*. In what at first seems like a diversion, Zeus offers Hera an exchange: the destruction of Troy, which used to be held in honor (*tiesketo*, 4. 46) in his heart, for the future destruction of one of Hera's cities of her own choosing.[145] Hera offers him not one, but three of the cities dearest (*philtatai*, 4. 51) to her—

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[143] *Asperkhes meneineis* occurs elsewhere in the *Iliad* only at 22.10, where it is applied to Achilleus when he pursues Apollo under the delusion that Apollo is Agenor.

[144] The judgment of Paris is not explicitly mentioned in the poem until 24.25-30, but its force as mythological background for the war is felt as early as Book 4. On the power of allusion to evoke an entire mythological tradition, see especially Slatkin (1991).

[145] Zeus speaks from the perspective of a future time in which he wants to destroy a city himself. The use of the imperfect tense in reference to Troy adds a touch of pathos: Zeus' affection for the city is already gone.

Argos, Sparta, and Mykenai. Hera's willing sacrifice of cities where she was honored as patron goddess surely would have activated recognition for a Homeric audience of the disappearance of the Bronze Age Mycenean palace culture.[146] Hera's words must have seemed no idle threat.

When Hera abrogates the material compensation negotiated between men, and privileges her own attempt to exact life for Alexandros' insult, Zeus accuses her of the wish to eat her enemy raw. Outside of Achilles, Hera and Hekabē are the only two figures in the *Iliad* to whom the wish to commit omophagy is attributed.[147] As Cook has observed, the wish to eat raw attests that one has already descended below the boundaries of the human to a state of bestiality.[148] It thus sets one outside the commensal political order and marks formalized relationship with one who expresses such a wish as impossible. The charge of savagery that

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[146]One of Hera's two major cult centers in the Dark Ages was the Heraion located between Argos and Mycenae. Foley (1995) 86, concludes from her investigation that the date of the founding of the Heraion is open to question. Antonaccio (1992) 89-90, contends that initial cult activity at the sanctuary site probably dates to the late 8th or early 7th centuries, and construction of the Heraion to later in the 7th century.

Kirk (1985) 209-10, on the strength of recent evidence for continual occupation of Argos, suggests that any allusion in Hera's words to the disappearance of Bronze Age palace culture is doubtful. Whitley (1991) 346, in particular, identifies Argos as a stable Dark Age site that evinces continuous habitation. Antonaccio (1995) 12-13, however, concludes that "continuity even between the tenth and ninth centuries seems certain for a few areas only." Dickinson (1994) shows that, although the collapse at the end of the Bronze Age was uneven in its effects, over a period that might have covered a generation or more the world of the Third Palace period effectively disintegrated. Even in individual settlements that survived, like Athens and Argos, there was very considerable dislocation in patterns of settlement, burial customs, religious practice and social structure. In short, even if Argos escaped the major damage suffered by Mykenai and Tiryns at the end of LHIIIB, the disappearance of Bronze Age palace culture in the Argolid generally would have been no less striking for Homer's audience.

[147]On Achilleus' wish to eat Hektor raw, see Chapter 8.3

[148] Cook (1995) 160.

Zeus levels at Hera would mean little except that Hera demonstrates the verity of the accusation by giving her own cities over to destruction. Hera, in other words, affirms the validity of Zeus' allegation by agreeing to the exchange he offers.

Scholars have often pointed out that the poem forges a narrative link between Hera and Hekabē by the wish—implicit or explicit—to commit omophagy. The correspondence between these two female figures does not, however, end there. A three-part typology is evinced in these two themes involving female figures who assert themselves in the realm of exchange: negation of the exchange of compensatory goods (whether *apoina* or *poinē*) between men, in favor of untrammeled *tisis*; *tisis* expressed as a wish to commit omophagy; and negation of common interest with *philoi*. In the cases of Hera and Hekabē, the typology is associated with a female who traffics in the male-dominated realm of public exchange. In the Conclusion, I suggest that the typology is constructed as a model of political disaster and, further, that it is programmatically gendered in the poem as female.

Chapter 3: Typological and Social Conventions of Compensation

In Chapter 2, I examined all the discrete scenes in the *Iliad* that share three structural elements: damage or defeat, compensatory exchange, and resolution. In this chapter, I compare the significant narrative details in each formal element in order to arrive at a composite description of the conditioning environments and the social rules, or conventions, for compensation in Homeric society.[1] Paradigmatic analysis not only reveals a set of consistently repeated patterns, but it also discloses certain inconcinnities. Further, comparison of narrative details leads me to distinguish the compensation theme from the sale of persons (which is sometimes treated as synonymous with ransom) and from supplication.

3.1 Summary of Narrative Details

3.1.1 Thematic element of damage or defeat

In the discrete themes, there are a several scenarios that may lead to compensation themes: a warrior is killed; a warrior is defeated on the battlefield; a warrior is captured off the battlefield; a woman and/or goods are captured in a raid; one person insults another. The damage or defeat is most often represented as involving the sphere of wealth in persons. The poem positions the audience to view it as such, in part, by regularly focalizing the scenes through the victim's perspective in *apoina*

[1] I reiterate that by 'Homeric society', I mean the society depicted in the *Iliad* and not Greek society.

themes and through the perspective of a *philos* of the victim in *poinē* themes. The poem also frequently identifies victims in terms of familial relations. Figure 3.1 shows the familial relationships by which victims are designated in the discrete themes.

Son	sons of Trojans	2.225-34	*apoina*
	Ganymedes	5.265-67	*poinē*
	Adrestos[2]	6.45-65	mixed
	Dolon[3]	10.375-83	*apoina*
	Peisandros and Hippolochos	11.122-47	mixed
	Harpalion	13.656-59	*poinē*
	Askalaphos	15.113-18	*poinē*
	Hyperenor[4]	17.34-42	*poinē*
	Lykaon[5]	21.34-135	mixed
	Lykaon and Polydoros	22.44-54	*apoina*
	Hektor	24.200-216	mixed
Brother	Archelochos	14.478-85	*poinē*
	Hyperenor (dup)	17.34-42	*poinē*
Husband	Hyperenor (dup)	17.34-42	*poinē*
Father	Priam	24.683-88	*apoina*
Mother	Andromachē's mother[6]	6.425-428	*apoina*

Figure 3.1: Familial relationships by which victims are designated

[2]I categorize Adrestos as son because he specifically names his father as the one who will ransom him.

[3]I include Dolon as a son because he also names his father as the one who will bring ransom.

[4]Hyperenor is referred to in relation to his brother (who tries to secure *poinē* for his death), his wife, and his parents. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[5]See especially 21.36: ἦγε λαβὼν ἐκ πατρὸς. This is a mixed-type scene in which Lykaon is described and describes himself in terms of a variety of defining relationships. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[6]Andromachē's mother is referred to in the theme as *mētēr*, though her relationship as daughter to the one who ransomed her can be reasonably inferred.

Adult males in warrior-society (Trojan and Achaian) enjoy unequivocal status as persons.[7] Nevertheless, they are frequently described in familial terms when compensation is at issue. Women, whose status is ambiguous in Homeric society, appear to be located in the sphere of persons, where compensation is concerned, by virtue of marriage and kinship relations.[8] So, for example, Andromachē's mother is labeled as *mētēr;* her name remains unknown (5.428). The only loss of a wife in the discrete themes appears in allusions to Menelaos' *poinē* theme (6.56; 11.125).[9] For my present purpose, suffice it to say that, in the *Iliad,* defining or redefining a woman in terms of familial relationships locates her in the sphere of persons and augments the compensation one may demand for her loss.

In four additional discrete themes, the familial relations of the victims are only implied. For example, it may be reasonably inferred that Isos and Antiphos (11.101-112) were ransomed by their father. The conventions of the theme are sufficiently established that it is possible to classify them as sons in the theme and, moreover, to conjecture that the audience would have tended to interpret the exchange as one involving sons. Although Agamemnon does not mention his relationship with Menelaos when he exacts payment for Antimachos' *lōbē* (11.122-47), the

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[7]The exception may be Lykaon, when he is sold as a slave. See 21.34-135, Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[8]When women are viewed in relation to their captors, they are located in the sphere of prestige goods. See 5.428 and Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[9]The *poinē* theme arising from the rape of Helen is the archetypal *poinē* theme in the *Iliad.* For discussion, see Chapter 4.3.

relationship between Menelaos and Agamemnon is so familiar that he can hardly act except as the brother of the injured party. The declaration at 17.198-208 that Hektor's death is impending only obliquely locates him in relation to his wife; it is Hektor, not his family, who will be compensated for his death. The relationship of the disputant to the *anēr apophthimenos* (18.499) in the scene on Achilleus' shield is not described, but comparison to Aias' *exemplum* in Book 9 (9.632-66) suggests that the disputant who refuses *poinē* is a member of the victim's family.[10]

In the remaining themes in which damage is inflicted in the sphere of persons, the victims are referred to simply by name.[11] The victims are, however, arguably figured in relation to warrior-society by means of thematic connection to the comrades who secure *poinē* for them. Each man in warrior-society is implicitly related to both a kinship group and his *hetairoi*. Nonetheless, in the compensation themes a thematic identity is established for slain or captive men. The sphere of 'persons' can thus ultimately be said to be figured relationally: the slain or captured person is represented in relation to the *philoi*—whether family, *xeinos*, or *hetairos*—who react to his or her loss.[12] I employ the term *hetairoi* to designate the association of men in warrior-society, and *philotēs* to refer to the bond or ethical principle that organizes their relationship.[13] Although the term

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[10]But cf. Nagy (1997).

[11]13.410-16; 13.445-47; 14.469-74; 16.394-98; 21.26-33; 21.34-135.

[12]I emphasize 'figured' because I am only diagnosing narrative representation.

[13]On the term *hetairoi*, see Kakridis (1963) 51-75; Stagakis (1975); Ulf (1990) 129; and Konstan (1997) 31-33. Nagy (1979) 241, defines *philotēs* as the ties that bind the *philoi hetairoi* together.

hetairoi occurs only once in the discrete themes (17.204), it is frequently used of male association by the narrator and by characters. I employ the term *philoi* generically to signify a range of institutional and sentimental relationships by virtue of which people relate to one another as 'insiders'.[14] Those relationships that fall within the compass of *philoi* in the *Iliad* include kinship and marriage, association as *hetairoi*, and friendships formalized through *xeinia*.[15]

In one scene only among the discrete *poinē* themes is damage inflicted unambiguously in the sphere of goods (11.694-705); the compensatory exchange, however, includes shepherds. The sphere to which the shepherds belong is neither explicit nor does it seem to be of consequence for the theme.

Given the symbolic nature of *timē* and its relation to cultural wealth and prestige goods in Homeric society, damage inflicted in any sphere—life, defeat in battle, or captivity—implicitly constitutes a diminishing of *timē*. One discrete theme, however, represents a direct affront to *timē* as damage leading to a compensatory exchange. The payment Agamemnon exacts from Adrestos (6.45-65) is ostensibly for damage in the sphere of

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[14]The scholia at *Od.* 1.238 say that *philoi* are relatives (*oikeioi*) or those belonging to the same descent-group (*genos*), while those connected by *philia* are comrades (*hetairoi*). See Ebeling (1963) 2.434. The predominant view is that *philos* as a substantive in Homer denotes relations of affection in a broad sense, and does not exactly equal "friend." Cf. Konstan (1997) 12. Given the extension of usage of *philos* allowed in Homer, it is possible to use the term generically without insisting that it is inherently generic. On the usage of *philos* in Homer, see also Robinson (1990) and Sinos (1975).

[15]Benveniste (1973) 288, summarizes the semantics of *philos* as a "complex network of associations, some with institutions of hospitality, others with usages of the home, still others with emotional behavior."

persons; but, since Helen is eventually returned, the payment is in effect for diminished *timē*.[16]

3.1.2 Thematic element of exchange

The second element in a compensation theme is a potential exchange. As I indicated above, since most instances of damage, defeat, and capture are represented as inflicted in the sphere of persons, almost all of the exchanges involve an exchange for a family member or for life.[17] Since themes of the *apoina* type and the *poinē* type differ somewhat in narrative details, I discuss them separately below.[18]

Apoina

The syntax of *'apoina'* in the discrete themes varies but little. *'Apoina'*, with one exception, occurs in the accusative plural; the other usage is as a genitive of price (11.106).[19] *'Apoina'* appears most commonly as the object of *dekhesthai*,[20] though it also appears as the object of other verbs of receiving and giving: *lambanein*,[21] *kharizesthai*,[22] *pherein*,[23] *didonai*,[24] and *piphauskein*.[25] *'Apoina'* is twice construed with the genitive of the

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[16]See discussion in Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[17]If the person is killed or "stolen" with no hope of return (e.g., Ganymedes), I mark the exchange as an exchange for life.

[18]Since mixed-type themes are not an entirely separate typology, I incorporate the narrative details from the mixed-type into the discussion of *apoina* and *poinē* types.

[19]6.46; 6.427; 10.380; 11.131; 21.99; 24.686.

[20]6.46; 11.131; cf. 1.95, 111-12, 377.

[21]6.427.

[22]6.49; 10.380; 11.134.

[23]2.229-30; see also 1.372.

[24]24.686; cf. 24.685.

[25]21.99; cf. 18.500.

person for whom it is given in exchange: *huios* (2.230) and *seio* (24.686). More often, the person for whom *apoina* are exchanged appears as the object of the verb *(apo)luein* (release) or *(apo)luesthai* (gain the release).[26] The victim of defeat or capture is thus positioned as an object of exchange, not as a participant in the exchange (cf. Figure 1.1)

In the discrete themes where *apoina* are described, they consist of prestige goods. *Apoina* are a response to three different scenarios: a warrior defeated on the battlefield may offer *apoina* on behalf of his father in an effort to preserve his life and eventually be released; warriors captured off the battlefield may be released in exchange for *apoina*; women taken in a raid may be released for *apoina*. *Apoina* are in almost every case offered by the father of the victim.[27] The exception, Lykaon's ransom by a *xeinos*, may prove the rule, inasmuch as Eëtion was apparently reimbursed (or 'gifted in return') by Priam.[28] The path of *apoina* is, therefore, presented from the perspective of the one who offers it and always comprises prestige goods for a family member.[29] Figure 3.2 shows the relation which the one who brings *apoina* has to the injured party.

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[26]For the active voice, which denotes the action (or desired action) of the captor, see 6.427, Achilleus; 10.449, Odysseus and Diomedes; 11.106 Achilleus. For the middle voice, which denotes the intent of the one offering *apoina*, see 10.378, Dolon; 21.42, Eëtion; 21.80, Eëtion/Priam; 22.50, Priam; 24.685, Priam.

[27]Cf. the potential *apoina* theme in which Priam's sons might have to release him (24.683-88).

[28]See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[29]The path of goods for persons entails what is sometimes called 'conversion', or an exchange between two spheres of wealth. Cf. Bohannan (1959) and Ferguson (1992). It implies an exchangeability between goods and persons that is maintained by social rules in certain circumstances.

Father	sons	2.225-34
	son	6.45-65
	daughter[30]	6.425-28
	son	10.375-456
	sons	11.122-47
	sons	22.44-54
	sons[31]	11.102-112
Sons	father	24.683-88
Xeinos	*xeinos*[32]	21.34-135

Figure 3.2: Relationship of the one who brings *apoina* to the victim

Apereisia is the epithet that occurs most often with *apoina* in the discrete themes.[33] The only other noun that receives *apereisios* as an epithet in the *Iliad* is *hedna* (16.178), a noun that also denotes exchange goods.[34] *Aglaa* and *axia* appear as epithets of *apoina*, though they are less common than *apereisia*.[35] The longest description of *apoina* in the discrete themes is one and one-half lines long, and it lists only kinds, but not

[30]That the father paid the ransom can be reasonably inferred. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[31]That Priam sent the ransom is attested by comparison with 22.44-54.

[32]*Lumēn* in 21.80 refers to Lykaon's ransom by Eëtion. See discussion in Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[33]6.49, 427; 10.380; 11.134. The formula *apereisi' apoina* always occupies the metrical space from the hepthemimeral caesura to line end. *Apereisios*, like *apeiresios*, is metrical lengthening for **aperesios* (cf. Sihler [1995] 302). *Apeiresios* appears elsewhere in the *Iliad* only at 20.258 as an epithet of *gaia*, and elsewhere in Homer at *Od.* 9.118 of goats (*aiges apeiresiai*), *Od.* 11.621 of Heraklēs' misery (*oizun apeiresiēn*), and *Od.* 19.174 of the peoples of Crete (*apeiresioi anthrōpoi*). Cf. also Hesiod, *Catalogue* 22.7; Fr. 240.3-4; and Fr. 150.10.

[34]Outside of the *Iliad*, *apereisios* occurs only twice in Homer and Hesiod, both times in the formula *apereisia hedna* (*Od.* 19.529 and Hesiod Fr. 198.10, *ape[reisia he]dna*). *Apereisia hedna* in each instance occupies the same metrical space (from the hepthemimeral caesura to line end) as *apereisi' apoina*.

[35]Ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα (1.23; see also 1.377); ἄξια δέξαι ἄποινα (6.46; 11.131).

quantities, of metal goods.[36] The epithet *apereisia* is thus neither meaningless nor misplaced, but aptly propounds the value of the material exchange for increasing one's social assets and status.[37] In other words, the economic value of the *apoina* is relatively less important than its symbolic value, and since the latter is worth a person's life, the *apoina* can fairly be called *apereisia*.[38] *Apereisia* thus articulates the rhetoric of gift exchange traditionally associated with the compensation theme.[39]

The arrangement by which *apoina* might be exchanged 'at the ships' is presented as an operation known to both Trojans and Achaians.[40] I infer from Thersites' speech a scenario in which exchanges were regularly brokered and the goods distributed by a leader or leaders.[41] The distribution system could no doubt be circumvented. Achilleus, for example, apparently bypassed the system when he sold Lykaon into slavery. Loopholes notwithstanding, Thersites and Achilleus both complain about Agamemnon's apportionment of war booty (2.230-31).

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[36]6.48; 10.379; 11.133. Donlan (1981) 102, observes that in Homeric society, treasure transactions in general consist of only one to three items, although the accompanying description implies vast quantities. See for example *Il.* 6.218; 7.299; 8.290-91; 10.269; *Od.* 13.135; 8.392, 403, 430; 13.13.

[37]*Apereisios* is among those epithets Parry (1971) 162, designated as 'particular', or, as Rosenmeyer (1965) 298, translates, 'purposive'.

[38]Achilleus effectively makes this demand literal in Book 9, or claims that even truly *apereisia apoina* are not equal to his life. See Chapter 7.

[39]For detailed discussion, see 3.2.2 below.

[40]On the exchange ἐπὶ νηυσὶν 'Αχαιῶν, see 10.381 (=11.135); 11.110; 6.52.

[41]*Gera*, special prizes which apparently fell outside the regular distribution of booty, may have been awarded by the Achaians rather than by an individual (see Taplin [1992] 61-2), or by an individual on behalf of the Achaians.

Agamemnon's role of distributor in fact constitutes a principal means by which he maintained his status.[42]

Poinē

Adkins recognized that the word family including *timē*, *(apo)tinō*, *timaō*, *tiō*, and *poinē* forms a semantic network having to do with transfers of *timē*. His summary of the syntax of the word family makes a valuable contribution to the study of honor and punishment in Homeric society. Adkins' investigation, however, is in the main confined to systems of lexemes which he tries to appropriate directly for reconstruction of a system of (historical) social relations.[43] His conclusions, therefore, do not take sufficient account of theme as the overarching system that drives and organizes the lexical system in Homeric epic.[44] When viewed in light of the compensation theme, the syntax of *(apo)tinō* and *poinē* forms a congruous pattern in relation to damage and payment. *Tinō* and *tinumai* are usually construed with the accusative of the damage for which the perpetrator must pay (*tinō*) or for which a *philos* of the victim seeks to secure payment (*tinumai*).[45]

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[42]On Agamemnon's status as a leader of the panAchaian *laoi*, see below.

[43]Adkins (1960) especially 27-30. Whereas Adkins thought he had a reliable reflection of Greek society in Homeric epic, I confine my description of Homeric society to that society depicted in the *Iliad*.

[44]See Chapter 1.2.

[45]The usage in Agamemnon's speech in 3.276-91, in which *timē* is what the Trojans must pay (*tinō*), does not seem to conform to the pattern elsewhere (*tinein timēn*, 3.288-89). On *tinumai*, see also usage in incomplete themes: τίσασθαι . . . ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε, 2.351 and 590. The three uses in the incomplete scenes in which Menelaos thinks he will exact payment from Alexandros present a variation on the pattern in which the perpetrator of damage, rather than the damage, is the accusative object of

	Active	
τίσετε	ἀεικέα . . .λώβην	11.142
τείσεις	γνωτὸν ἐμὸν	17.34-5
τίσετε	Πατρόκλοιο φόνον καὶ λοιγὸν 'αχαιῶν	21.134
	Middle	
τίσασθαι	φόνον υἷος	15.116

Figure 3.3: Syntax of *tinō*

Apotinumai in the discrete themes is construed with the accusative of what the victim's *philos* seeks in payment (*apotinumai*).[46]

	Middle	
ἀπετίνυτο	ποινήν	16.398

Figure 3.4: Syntax of *apotinō*

Evidence for (*apo*)*tinō*/*tinumai* in connection with payments corresponding to *poinē* may go back as far as the Mycenaean period. Pylos tablet Ea 805 concerns land held by one o-pe-te-re-u; the land is held e-ne-ka a-no-qa-si-ja. John Killen makes a compelling argument in favor of Mühlstein's earlier proposal that a-no-qa-si-ja be rendered ανορκʷhασιας, 'manslaughter' (< **anr-gʷhh-tia*; cf. Homeric ἀνδροκτασία).[47] Killen

tinumai: *tisesthai aleitēn*, 3.29; τίσασθαι . . . δῖον 'Αλέξανδρον, 3.351-2; τίσασθαι 'Αλέξανδρον κακότητος 3.366 (the damages in the genitive case).

[46]See also usage in incomplete themes: *apotinemen timēn*, 3.286 and 459.

[47]Killen (1992). Mühlstein, however, thought that 'manslaughter' referred not to compensation, but to the man's fame as a warrior. Other possibilities that have been offered for a-no-qa-si-a include Ruijgh: ἀνογʷασιας, "état d'un cavalier"; Lejeune: ἀνωπασίας, "absence d'attribution, a'allocation"; and Palmer's interpretation of the term as a female divine name (Killen [1992] 379).

interprets the phrase e-ne-ka a-no-qa-si-ja to mean that o-pe-te-re-u holds his plot by way of compensation for manslaughter. He supports this view with another record in the E series (Eb 294/Ep 704), which records a plot of ke-ke-me-na land held by o-pe-te-re-u (Eb 294)/o-pe-to-re-u (Ep 704). This o-pe-te-re-u/o-pe-to-re-u is qualified as qe-ja-me-no, a term that appears nowhere else on the records. Killen argues that qe-ja-me-no may be interpreted as an aorist middle or passive *k^{w}eiamenos* (τειάμενος) from **k^{w}ei/k^{w}oi,* from which *poinē* derives.[48] He contends that it is thus possible that o-pe-te-re-u/o-pe-to-re-u holds the land either by way of "taking compensation" (middle) or "being compensated" (passive). Although there is no way to prove that the o-pe-te-re-u mentioned in Ea 805 and the o-pe-te-re-u/o-pe-to-re-u mentioned in Eb 294 and Ep 704 are the same person, Killen is willing to entertain the possibility that they are, and that the records may therefore refer to two parcels of land that o-pe-te-re-u holds by way of compensation for manslaughter.[49] William Hutton's investigation into the use of qe-te-o in Linear B may further support Killen's attempt to connect qe-ja-me-no with payment of compensation (*poinē*).[50] Hutton compares usage of qe-te-o in the tablets to the parallel terms o-pe-ro (deficit) and o-no (ration, payment, benefit; > ὀνίνημι). He infers that qe-te-o may be a different kind of payment than o-pe-ro and o-no. Hutton concludes that, although the contextual and linguistic

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[48]On the word family deriving from PIE **k^{w}ey*, see Chapter 1.2. See Killen (1992) 380 note 39.

[49]Killen (1992) 380 note 39; cf. Duhoux (1976) 60-65.

[50]Hutton (1990-91) 105-131.

evidence is ambiguous, qe-te-o (like qe-ja-me-no) may derive from $*k^{w}ei$, and may refer to payment of some sort of fine or restitution.

In the Iliadic themes, *poinē* also appears as the object of *didomi* or *dekhomai* (see Figure 3.5 below); it is frequently construed with the damage in the genitive case.[51] *Poinē* is used to signify both a payment in goods and reciprocal damage. Goods paid as satisfaction for damage are called "composition."[52] There is no typological difference in *poinē* themes in which the path is an exchange of goods for life and those in which reciprocal damage is exacted. For purposes of distinguishing path, however, I identify exchanges in which payment is taken in goods as "composition," and those in which reciprocal damage is taken as "*tisis*."

verb	*poinē*	genitive	path	
—— (εἵνεκα)	ποινῆς		*tisis*	3.290
δῶχ'	ποινὴν	υἷος	composition	5.266
(ἐγίγνετο)	ποινὴ	παιδὸς	*tisis*	13.659
——	ποινὴ	κασιγνήτοιό	*tisis*	14.483
ἀπετίνυτο	ποινήν	πολέων	*tisis*	16.398
——	ποινὴν	τῶν	composition	7.207
—— (εἵνεκα)	ποινῆς	ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου	composition	18.498-99
	ποινὴν	Πατρόκλοιο	*tisis*	21.28

Figure 3.5: Syntax of *poinē*

Since *poinē* is most often a response to damage in the sphere of persons, the path of compensation is, therefore, usually either goods for

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[51]I regard ἄντιτα ἔργα. . .παιδὸς ἐμοῦ (24.214-15) as a functional equivalent of *poinē* plus the genitive.

[52]See Black (1990) 358: composition is "a sum of money paid, as satisfaction for a wrong or personal injury, to the person harmed, or to his family if he died, by the aggressor." See also Roth (1987).

life or, more commonly, life for life.[53] The rape of Helen, alluded to at 6.45-65, is unusual among Iliadic themes as a 'capture' that elicits a response of *poinē* while the captive might still be recovered by other means.[54] The path of *poinē* is only occasionally life for *timē* or prestige goods for prestige goods.[55] Figure 3.6 shows the relation the person who takes or attempts to take *poinē* has to the victim, the sphere in which damages are inflicted, and the sphere in which *poinē* is taken or sought.[56]

Party who secures *poinē*	Victim	Sphere of Damage	Sphere of *poinē*	
Father	son	life	goods	5.265-67
	son	life	life	15.113-118
Brother	brother[57]	life/*timē*	all of life	6.45-65
	brother[58]	*lōbē*	life	11.122-47
	brother	life	life	14.478-85
	brother	life	life	17.34-42
Mother	son	life/*timē*	life	24.200-216
Unnamed kin[59]		life	goods or life?	18.497-508
Hetairos		life	life	13.410-16
		life	life	13.445-47
		life	life	14.469-74
		life	life	16.394-98

[53]As we shall see, in the agonistic conditioning environment of warrior-society, life for life runs parallel to *timē* for *timē*. See below.

[54]Achilleus will adopt this pattern and use it against Agamemnon. See Chapters 5 - 7.

[55]See for example 6.45-65 and 11.694-705 (Chapter 2 *ad loc*).

[56]I omit the story of Harpalion since, although Harpalion's father is shown weeping over the fact that no *poinē* was paid for his son, he is not represented as attempting to secure it himself (13.656-59).

[57]See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[58]The *lōbē* is, however, specified by Agamemnon as attempted murder. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[59]For my present purpose, I am regarding the man who refuses *poinē* in the scene as a kinsman of the dead man; his identity is, however, ambiguous. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

		life	life	21.26-33
		life	life	21.34-135
Self		pr. goods	goods	11.694-705
[Zeus]	*philos*[60]	life	*kratos*	17.198-208

3.6: Relationship of the one who takes *poinē* to the victim

Kinsmen are most often depicted as securing or attempting to secure *poinē* for a victim, although *hetairoi* frequently assume the role as well. (Cf. Figure 1.2.) Moreover, though both kinsmen and *hetairoi* are represented as taking life for life, the one figure who is unambiguously represented as taking composition for life is Tros, a kinsmen.[61] Exchanges of composition do not ordinarily take place in battlefield settings; the *kratos* awarded Hektor by Zeus is the noteworthy deviation from the pattern.[62] The scene on the shield (18.497-508), which is situated in an institution for the administration of justice, raises the possibility of composition; the unidentified kinsman, however, is resolute in his refusal of it.[63] Hence, the only two themes in which *poinē* for life is taken as anything other than reciprocal damage are the themes in which Zeus gives *poinē* to Tros (5.265-67) and secures *poinē* for Hektor (18.497-508). I have already suggested that the compensation theme forges a link between

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[60]I suggest in Chapter 2, *ad loc.*, that Zeus acts as a *philos* who secures *poinē* for Hektor.

[61]The martial setting of the *Iliad* accounts for this phenomenon in part. There is, however, a narrative strategy at work in the representation of 'path' in *apoina* and *poinē* themes. On this, see below.

[62]*Kratos* has material implications. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[63]By 'administration of justice' I do not mean to imply a statutory code or penal system in which blame is assigned and punishment meted out. Iliadic society presents a society constrained by conventions, or social rules, for compensation, including public *fora* for settling disputes. See also Mackenzie (1981) 80, 86.

Zeus and traditional poetry;[64] the discrete themes further suggest an alignment between Zeus and the bestowal of *poinē*, corresponding to composition, for life.

Battlefield *poinē* scenes that explicitly involve family members and those that involve *hetairoi* are structurally homologous: the themes do not differ in formal elements, in appeal, nor in outcome. Nevertheless, some battlefield themes involving family members create a domestic cameo that either supplants or seems displaced in the battlefield context. The poem thus makes no sharp demarcation between *poinē* secured by family members and by *hetairoi*. It does, however, occasionally juxtapose seemingly different interests of the family and warrior-society with respect to compensation.[65]

Unlike *apoina*, which are for rhetorical purposes *apereisia*, *poinē* is often constrained by a limited ratio (the principle of *talio*) or by some other limit. In other words, there seem to be social rules in force, even in warfare, for some kind of '*peirar*' with respect to *poinē*.[66] Lykaon, for example, claims that liability to pay *poinē* is limited by prescribed blood-relationships (21.95-96). The role of securing *poinē* may be extended to family and *hetairoi* of the victim; liability to pay *poinē* may likewise be extended to family and *hetairoi* of the one inflicting damage, apparently

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[64]See 17.198-208; Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[65]See for example 13.659.

[66]Achilleus' capture of twelve Trojans to burn of Patroklos' funeral pyre seems, in the context of the scenes, to be disproportionate (21.26-33). The narratorial comment also suggests that such is the case. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

without exceeding conventional *peirata*. Even so, in some themes, such as the scene involving Agamemnon and Adrestos, or Hekabē and Achilleus, constraints on *poinē* are represented as nearly eradicated. As we shall see, the ambiguity about limits for *poinē* that is found in the discrete themes is put on display in Achilleus' themes.[67] One of the most striking displays is the *poinē* scene on the shield in which the disputants are seeking a limit for *poinē* in an institution for the administration of justice (18.497-508), but are depicted on a shield that is carried into a battle of cosmological proportions by a warrior bent on unlimited *tisis*.

3.1.3 Thematic element of resolution

The third element of the compensation theme is resolution. The party in the position of superiority either rejects or accepts *apoina* or secures or bestows *poinē*. It is regularly, though not always, readily apparent which party is in a position of superiority.[68] The resolution and the way it is carried out are not entirely arbitrary, but are in part structured by institutions and social rules.[69] Moreover, the social rules in

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[67]See Chapter 8.

[68]See for instance Euphorbos' claim that Menelaos will have to pay for Hyperenor (17.34-50); Euphorbos is not, however, able to make good on his claim.

[69]For the relationship between the individual and social rules, I draw upon Gidden's (1979) 80-81, methodological distinction between institutional analysis and the analysis of strategic conduct: "To examine the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study the mode in which actors draw upon structural elements—rules and resources—in their social relations. . . . Institutional analysis, on the other hand, places an epoché upon strategic conduct, treating rules and resources as chronically reproduced features of social systems. It is quite essential to see that these are not two sides of a dualism, they express a duality, the duality of structure."

different conditioning environments may impose competing claims.[70] The scene on the shield and Lykaon's appeal to specific familial relations illustrate forces other than physical might and/or social status in the resolution of reaction to damage.

Successful and unsuccessful offers of *apoina*, and exchanges of *poinē* as composition and as *tisis* (life for life, *timē* for *timē*, etc.), are embedded side by side in the text. Figure 3.7 displays the elements of path and resolution of the compensation themes in the order of their occurrence in the *Iliad*.

apoina		***poinē***		
path	**resolution**	**path**	**resolution**	
goods for person	accepted[71]			2.225-34
		goods for life	successful	5.265-67
goods for person	rejected	life for life/*timē*	successful	6.45-65
goods for person	accepted			6.425-28
goods for person	rejected			10.375-456
goods for person	accepted			11.101-12
goods for person	rejected	life for *lōbē*[72]	successful	11.122-47
		goods for goods	successful	11.694-705
		life for life	successful	13.410-16
		life for life	successful	13.445-47
		life for life	Inc./failed	13.656-59
		life for life	successful	14.469-74
		life for life	successful	14.478-85
		life for life	incomplete	15.113-18
		life for life	successful	16.394-98
		life for life	incomplete	17.34-50
		kratos for life	successful	17.198-208
		goods for life	ambiguous	18.497-508
		life for life	successful	21.26-33
goods for person	successful			21.34-135

[70] On this, see below.

[71] See chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[72] See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

apoina		*poinē*		
path	resolution	path	resolution	
goods for person	rejected	life for life	successful	21.34-135
goods for person	incomplete[73]			22.44-54
		life for life[74]	ambiguous	24.200-216
goods for person	accepted[75]			24.683-88

Figure 3.7: Comparison of compensation themes in narrative sequence

3.2 *APOINA* DISTINGUISHED FROM SIMILAR THEMES

Themes of the *apoina* type are frequently conflated in the scholarship with other traditional narrative units that are, on the surface, similar in content and vocabulary.[76] The relationship between *apoina* and the sale of persons and between *apoina* and supplication are of particular importance for critical interpretation of the *Iliad*.[77] Typological analysis of the compensation theme, however, discloses substantial formal and functional distinctions between *apoina* and both supplication and sale.

3.2.1 *Apoina* and the sale of persons

Analysis of the thematic elements and narrative details of the compensation theme casts new light on the IE heritage with respect to ransom and purchase. Benveniste treats exchanges of *apoina* and the

[73] The theme itself is incomplete and might be considered an incomplete internal prolepsis. The offer would, in any case, be unsuccessful since Priam's two sons have already been killed by Achilleus.

[74] The wish to exact life, and more, for life emerges as the preferred alternative in the theme, and is in that sense successful. Since, however, Hekabē's wish is repudiated by Priam and never carried out, it ultimately fails.

[75] See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[76] For detailed discussion and examples, see below.

[77] It has, for example, been suggested to me that Priam is simply buying a body in Book 24.

purchase and sale of persons as the same kind of exchange.[78] His proposal is based on the IE root of the Greek *alphanō*, "getting a price," as designating the price of a human being: "Thus buying was originally 'redeeming', because by purchase, a man was freed from a precarious situation, for instance being a prisoner of war.[79] The proper sense of 'to be worth', according to Benveniste, is the price of a human being put up for sale. Benveniste further notes that all the uses of *alphanō* and *ōneomai* in Homer are applied to purchase and sale of persons. He concludes that the notion of buying persons is attached to the intent of liberating a prisoner offered for sale and is thus identical with redemption. He bases his conclusions in part on the parallel syntax of *Il.* 1.99 (*apriatēn anapoinon*), deducing that **apriatos* and *anapoinos* mean the same thing. In fact, **apriatos* and *anapoinos* designate two alternatives for consolidating the gains Agamemnon has forfeited.

Benveniste's equation of purchase and 'redemption' of persons is not supported by the compensation themes in the *Iliad*. In the *Iliad*, gaining release of a *philos* by means of a material exchange (which Benveniste calls 'redemption') is the activity of families, and of fathers in particular. The intent of the exchange is to return the captive to the kinship group from which he or she was taken. The material exchange is less the 'price' or 'value' of the captive than the 'value' of the status which

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[78]Benveniste (1973) 105-112.

[79]Benveniste (1973) 106. By 'redeeming' Benveniste means gaining a person's release from prison or slavery with an exchange of material goods; see below.

the victor loses by releasing him or her.[80] It is for this reason that the rhetoric of *apoina* is not that of price, but of pricelessness. *'Apereisi' apoina'* is a fiction deployed to preserve the status of the victor and to persuade him to allow the family to recover their loss by means of an exchange of material goods.[81] The vocabulary of sale is distinguished from the vocabulary of *apoina*: *pernēmi, alphainō,* and *oneomai* do not recur in compensation themes. The verbs that denote release for material exchange in themes of the *apoina* type are *luō* and *luomai*. The distinction is especially apparent where words for sale do appear in a compensation theme, for example, the narrative of Lykaon's purchase by Iason's son and his subsequent release from slavery by his *xeinos,* Eëtion.[82] In addition, sale of persons in the *Iliad* conventionally takes place far away, in the islands, while ransom conventionally takes place by the Achaian ships.[83] Moreover, offers of *apoina* are frequently buttressed by appeals to the victor's mercy and sense of reverence (*aideo . . . eleēson,* 21.74) with gentle words (*meilikhia epea,* 11.137) and with supplication, measures patently unnecessary in a sale.

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[80]While it still involves the person's 'price' or 'value', it assigns value in terms of status.

[81]When a material exchange is given to gain the release of a family member from slavery, the slave-holder arguably simply makes a sale. The family, however, is not purchasing a slave, but redeeming a family member.

[82]The sale is signified by *eperrase,* 21.40; *ōnon edōke,* 21.41; *peprēmenos,* 21.58; *eperassas,* 21.78; and *ēlphon,* 21.97. Cf. 22.45. Lykaon's release by a *xeinos* is signified by *elusato,* 21.42; *polla d' edōken,* 21.42; *lumēn,* 21.80. For *luomai* in themes of the *apoina* type, see 1.13, 20; 10.378; 11.10; 22.50. For *polla d' edōken* in reference to *apoina,* see 24.685.

[83]See 22.45; 21.40; 21.58;- 21.78-79. This pattern may, however, be an accident of the setting rather than a significant narrative detail of the theme of sale into slavery.

3.2.2 *Apoina* and supplication

There are no sanctions associated with offers of *apoina* in the *Iliad*. Since no obligation is felt to accept such offers, they are often accompanied by supplication and further appeals to the victor's *aidōs* and *eleos*. Offers of *apoina* have frequently been subsumed under the motif of supplication. Analysis of the compensation theme, however, shows it to be formally distinct from supplication and sheds important light on the relationship between the two themes.

There are numerous supplication scenes in the *Iliad* that are not associated with a compensation theme. Words and gestures of supplication are nonetheless often found in compensation themes, especially themes of the *apoina* type.[84] Adrestos' offer of *apoina* is introduced by supplication (λαβὼν ἐλλίσσετο γούνων, 6.45), as is that of Peisandros and Hippolochos (*gounazesthēn*, 11.130). There are formal indices of supplication in the narrative of Dolon (γενείου χειρὶ παχείῃ ἁψάμενος λίσσεσθαι, 10.454-55). Dolon's supplication is not, however, directly associated with the offer of *apoina* (10.379-81), but is made only later, when Dolon realizes that Odysseus and Diomedes are not going to spare his life. Lykaon's appeal for his life is replete with markers of

[84] I take the formal markers of supplication from Pedrick (1982) 126-27: for gestures, *gounōn labein, gounōn helein, gounōn hapsasthai, gounazesthai*, and *gouneisthai;* for the suppliant's arrival, *hikanein* and *hikesthai;* for the beseeching tone of the plea, *lissesthai*. The technical term *hiketēs* (*hiketeuein*) is used in the *Iliad* only of Lykaon and Priam. M. Edwards (1980a) lists four elements of a supplication type-scene: approach, gesture of supplication, speech (vocative, request, offer) and response. Cf. Gould (1973); Thornton (1984); Crotty (1994).

supplication.[85] Since Lykaon makes no explicit offer of *apoina* (despite Achilleus' response indicating that such an offer was implicit), it is impossible to establish a necessary correlation between supplication and *apoina* in this particular theme.[86] The final mention of Lykaon's supplicatory speech (*lissomenos epeessin*, 21.98) may be read in connection with his argument against his being liable for *poinē*, but even so, the association is indirect. The story of Tros, although it is cut off before the compensation theme is developed, is instructive nonetheless for the supplicatory gestures and words with which Tros hopes to persuade Achilleus to spare his life.[87] Hermes' warning to Priam contains an allusion to Priam's exchange with Achilleus, which did include supplication, but there is no explicit mention of Priam's supplication (24.683-88).[88] In sum, in those cases where supplication scenes and *apoina* themes overlap, there is a direct association of supplication with the offer of *apoina* in two themes,[89] and an indirect association in two others.[90]

There are six discrete themes of the *apoina* type that contain no indices of supplication.[91] Each of these themes is situated temporally

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[85]*Gounōn hapsasthai*, 21.65; *labe gounōn*, 21.68; *helōn ellisseto gounōn*, 21.71; *hiketao* and *aidoioio*, 21.75; *lissomenos epeessin*, 21.98. There is, however, no mention of supplication in the narratives of Lykaon's former capture by Achilleus.

[86]See 21.99: μή μοι ἄποινα πιφαύσκεο.

[87] ἀντίος ἤλυθε γούνων, 20.463; ὁ μὲν ἥπτετο χείρεσι γούνων | ἱέμενος λίσσεσθ', 20. 468-69.

[88]The possibility that Priam's sons would supplicate the Achaians in conjunction with *apoina* is also not mentioned.

[89]6.45-65; 11.122-147.

[90]10.375-456 and 21.34-135.

[91]2.225-34; 6.425-428; 11.101-112; 21.35-44 (cf. 21.57-59 and 76-82); 22.44-54; 24.683-88.

outside the primary fabula, that is, outside the narrative sequence of the *Iliad*. The events that transpire in them are either recalled by the narrator or by a character as having taken place prior to the time of Chryses' arrival at the ships (external analepses), or they are anticipated as potential and therefore future events (external prolepses). As such, the scenes tend to be epitomized. The force of the fully developed themes, which occur in the primary fabula, might lead an audience to infer a scenario including supplication in the epitomes found in analepses, though none of the elements of a supplication scene are actually exhibited. The remaining theme of the *apoina* type, which is alluded to only to be negated, also contains no mention of supplication (24.200-216).

Suppliancy, as Pedrick points out, occurs in Homeric epic in a broad range of contexts: it is employed in life-threatening situations as well as in circumstances where it seems little more than a conventional means of making a request.[92] It is not limited to relations with outsiders and it may or may not be accompanied by a gift.[93] Supplication, by Pedrick's account, can be the "basis for any plea forced by a weakened condition or inferior position."[94] *Apoina*, as we have seen, are deployed in life-threatening situations and other positions of dependence; they are offered only to victorious enemies; and they always comprise a material exchange for the release of a person. Accordingly, the gestures and

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[92]Pedrick (1982) 126.

[93]*Contra* Edwards (1980) 5, who includes the offer of a gift as one of the formal elements of a supplication type-scene. See also Edwards (1992) 311.

[94]Pedrick (1982) 128.

vocabulary of supplication befit the demeanor from which *apoina* are offered: *apoina* constitute acknowledgment the victor's position of superiority.[95] In the *Iliad*, supplication, like *apoina*, exercises no binding force except the respect it commands by reason of convention.[96] In light of the above, I propose that an offer of *apoina* and gestures of supplication are mutually reinforcing. Supplication therefore overlaps compensation substantially as a narrative detail in themes of the *apoina* type. Supplication and compensation are, however, fully autonomous themes and as such can exist independently of one another. Put another way, neither are compensation and supplication sub-sets one of the other, nor are they coterminous one with the other.[97]

3.3 CONDITIONING ENVIRONMENTS AND SOCIAL RULES

3.3.1 Conditioning environments

The impulse not to leave damages unanswered and the narrative details in the discrete themes may be used to reconstruct the conditioning

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[95]Cf. Crotty (1994) 33-4 n. 17; cf. 90: "since suppliants in the *Iliad* regularly promise wealth in return for what they ask, the ceremony is a means by which a victorious warrior gains prestige among his fellows, and to that extent, it participates in the values of *timē* and *kleos* that animate warrior society. Because the suppliant must acknowledge the other's victory over him, supplication is a form of praise."

[96]Pedrick (1982) 129, argues that supplication has less power of coercion in the *Iliad* than in the *Odyssey*. She observes that in the *Iliad*, the suppliant "neither insists on any privileges nor claims a god's protection by right of his ritual posture. . . . Thus the main purpose of the supplication in this epic is to get one's request heard."

[97]The distinction that I make is in contrast to Thornton (1984) 113, who combines damages, supplication, and compensation in the following motif-sequence: damage is done; supplication is made with the object of having the damage repaired; the supplication is angrily rejected; the suppliant prays to his god for hurt to the man who rejects him; the god damages the man supplicated in vain; the man is forced to fulfill the suppliant's plea; the suppliant prays for the safety of his former enemy.

environments in which compensation is exchanged in Homeric society.[98] The conditioning environments for exchange, including exchanges of *apoina* and *poinē*, are, first of all, male-dominated. Compensatory exchange is one of the avenues by which men in Homeric society maintain and manipulate relations of power.[99] Compensation is thus ensconced in the field of politics; and politics in the *Iliad* is represented as "men's work." Thomas Beidelman even denies that women are directly involved in Homeric agonistic exchange, except as objects of exchange.

> Leaving aside various goddesses, women figure weakly in the *Iliad*. Helen, Hecuba, Kassandra, Brisseus, and Andromache are figures for whom men contend. With the defeat of the men with whom they are linked, they will ceremoniously mourn or will number among the rewards (*geras*) bestowed to the victors. As women they are not allowed public conduct and consequently cannot engage in any formal exchange.[100]

There are two important exceptions to this sexual division of labor with respect to compensation: Hera and Hekabē.[101] These two females traffic in compensation indirectly, by attempting to abrogate an exchange between men in order to assert their own claims. In each instance, the net

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[98]The view that, since epic poetry took its form through a continuous process of oral performance in composition, it presents an incoherent amalgam of social institutions has been rendered untenable by socio-anthropological analyses of Homer. I regard the conditioning environments and social rules that the compensation themes depict as features of a synchronous 'Homeric society' that evinces some inconsistencies, rather than as a patchwork of incongruous cultural layers. On this, see especially Morris (1986 a and b); Redfield (1994); Donlan (1993). See also Giddens (1979) 141. The economies depicted in the *Iliad* have been investigated and documented elsewhere. In this section I will not reproduce an 'ethnography' of Homeric society, but I will instead briefly describe the force the economies are represented as exerting on compensation.

[99]On this, see below.

[100]Beidelman (1989) 234.

[101]*Il.* 4.24-56 and 24.200-216. See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

political profits garnered by the women are negligible. Priam repudiates Hekabe's wish and renders the claim to power inherent in her *muthos* of no effect. Hera seems on the surface to have been more successful in her project. Zeus, however, could not have abided a settlement between the Achaians and Trojans either, because of his promise to Thetis.[102] Inasmuch as Hera only thinks she has gained prolongation of the war in exchange for three of her cities, she is a comic failure. Since Zeus represents his affection for Troy as already a thing of the past (*tiesketo*, 4. 46), he loses nothing by agreeing to Troy's destruction.[103] What Zeus (and the narrator) gains is not three cities, but the high ground of laying at Hera's feet the destruction of Argos, Sparta, and Mykenai. As we have seen, the two themes in which female figures attempt to engage in formalized exchange share a three part typology: negation of the exchange of compensatory goods in favor of *tisis*; a wish to commit omophagy; and negation of common interest with *philoi*.[104] I return to this female typology in Chapter 8 in relation to Achilleus, and in the Conclusion in relation to the social meaning of compensation in the *Iliad*.

The first conditioning environment in which compensation operates is the kinship group.[105] The kinship group evinces an impulse to

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[102]On this, see Chapter 4.

[103]Nagler (1988) 86, observes, that Zeus thereby transfers, or displaces, the tension between himself and Hera to the human community; see 4.37-38. On the displacement of *eris*, see Chapter 8 and Conclusion.

[104]See Chapter 2 *ad loc*.

[105]I do not imply that the conditioning environments are separate and independent. I merely distinguish them for purposes of description.

restore to the family what has been lost to it, whether it be family members or *timē*. The kinship group is represented as inclining regularly toward exchanges of *apoina* when the loss can still be recovered by that means. I note, however, in the discrete scenes, offers of *apoina* and the willingness to 'take a loss' in *timē* that they represent are consigned entirely to the Trojan camp. The socio-economic mechanisms of *apoina* and *poinē* may have originated in kinship-based systems of justice. Whether or not this is so, they are generalized and appropriated for wider circles of relations in Homeric society; specifically, they are appropriated for warrior-society.[106]

The second economy that emerges in the themes is a zero-sum and fluid ranking system, in which warriors try to establish status in relation to one another by means of ritualized conflict, either among themselves in public speeches, gift exchanges, and athletic competition, or with the enemy in battle. That rank might be established by means of conflict with the enemy in battle implies an analogous ranking system among the Trojans.[107] Warrior-society is thus a political field.[108] The fluid economy

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[106]Adkins (1971) contends that what he called cooperative, or *oikos*, values are set in opposition to competitive, warrior excellences in Homeric society. Crotty (1994) 26-38, in contrast to Adkins, treats cooperative and competitive excellences as tensions within warrior society. Crotty's approach is, in my view, more compatible with the evidence of the scenes.

[107]On this, see Beidelman (1989). On agonistic exchange, see especially Mackenzie (1981); Donlan (1981; 1993); Morris (1986b); Beidelman (1989); Weiner (1992); and von Reden (1995). Martin (1989) and Cook (1995) extend the concept of agonistic exchange to include the poet.

[108]See Appadurai's (1986) 57, definition of politics in the broad sense as "relations, assumptions and contests relating to power."

presumes a cultural strategy of misrecognition by which prestige goods and cultural wealth are disposed to be converted into symbolic capital. Hence, what is gained and lost in social-symbolic transactions is not merely economic advantage, but *timē*. *Timē* may be understood as a dual notion comprising material forms (prestige goods) and non-material status, or, recognition. The etymological and semantic unity of the word family including *poinē* and *timē*, therefore, corresponds to a thematic unity that emerges in the currency of social-symbolic exchange in heroic society. When a victim is killed on the battlefield, he loses life and *timē;* what is transferred to that victim when another life is taken as *poinē* for him is *timē*. Thus, an exchange of life for life runs parallel to *timē* for *timē*. It is the status economy which, in part, fuels the generalizing tendency of the kinship economy. Consequently, in the exercise of establishing rank, warriors can be seen to appropriate both the prerogatives and the rhetoric of the kinship group. Put another way, warrior-society is represented as an extended, factitious kinship group.[109]

The fluid status system is not uninhibited, but is constrained by a relatively fixed-rank system in which Agamemnon occupies a privileged position as commander in chief of the assembled Greek forces. Agamemnon maintains his position of superiority not by virtue of hereditary political rank, but by cultural strategies of misrecognition of

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[109]Generalization to a false family is already a social reality once the *polis* comes into being. The phratry, if it ever was a kinship group, is a factitious brotherhood by the 8th century. See Snodgrass (1980) 24-25.

authenticating economic and cultural capital and by strategies of keeping and giving in social-symbolic transactions.[110] In other words, Agamemnon is not 'the' *wanax*, but he leads the largest contingent of Achaian warriors (1.281), and he possesses the *skēptron* of Pelops (2.100-108).[111] Nestor claims that, in comparison to Achilleus, Agamemnon is *pherteros* (1.281) because he leads more men. Agamemnon's position as leader of the largest contingent thus converts readily to symbolic capital: it legitimates him as *pherteros*, i.e., as commander in chief.[112] As such, it guarantees him a steady supply of prestige goods. The prestige goods support Agamemnon's role as distributor, by which he consolidates his status.[113]

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[110]I am anticipating my findings in Chapters 4 - 7 and making inferences from evidence in the *Iliad* beyond the discrete compensation themes. In Chapters 4 - 7, I discuss in detail the roles assumed by Agamemnon in Books 1 and 9. The conclusions I reach about the nature of Agamemnon's leadership already have currency in Homeric scholarship. See for example Drews (1982) 100-104; Taplin (1990); Donlan (1993); Stanley (1993) 328 n. 13. For the view that Agamemnon is 'the' *basileus*, see for example Vian (1968); Collins (1988); van Wees (1992); Lowenstam (1993). The idea that Agamemnon is a traditional hereditary monarch and Achilleus a warrior who opposes him derives from Dumézil's (1956) identification of an IE trope involving a power struggle between monarch and warrior figures. Taplin (1992) 48, observes that the assimilation of *basileus* to monarch, and the assumption of Agamemnon to this sovereignty, goes back at least to the era of the Hellenistic kings, the first age of professional Homeric scholarship. On the nature of the conflict between Achilleus and Agamemnon, see Chapter 5.2.

[111]On Agamemnon's *skēptron*, see Easterling (1989); Donlan (1979); Palaima (1995); cf. Cramer (1997).

[112]Nestor is not an outside observer who pronounces Agamemnon's rightful position. He is a competitor in the quarrel between Achilleus and Agamemnon. See Chapter 5.4.

[113]See Donlan (1993) 160: "It is by giving gifts especially that one man gains power over another; generous gifts publicly proclaim the giver's potency and, at the same time, put the receiver under obligation."

The *skēptron* of Pelops is an example of what Annette Weiner calls "inalienable possessions": it is the symbol of what Agamemnon strategically keeps out of exchange.[114] As an inalienable possession, the *skēptron* confirms, for those who share in the 'common sense', the difference between Agamemnon and Achilleus.[115] It comes with a history which authenticates it and validates Agamemnon's authority among the Argives: Hephaistos made the scepter and passed it on to Zeus; Zeus gave it to Hermes, who in turn passed it on to Pelops; Pelops gave it to Atreus (*poimēni laōn*, 2.105); Atreus to Thyestes; and Thyestes to Agamemnon. φορῆναι, | πολλῇσιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν (2.107-8).[116] As long as Agamemnon successfully deploys his symbolic capital to maintain 'legitimacy' as panAchaian leader, he is in a position to exercise control over the *timē*-based and fluid ranking system.[117] Whatever happened historically, we have in the *Iliad* the rhetoric of a relatively fixed system and a status system based on *timē* in which rank is fluid and under constant negotiation.

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[114]Weiner (1992) 96, points out that political strategies of giving are undergirded by strategies of keeping "inalienable possessions," which are symbolic goods or offices that traditional story endows with cosmological authentication. "The work necessary to produce social identities in things and people is a tremendous burden, creating a political dependency on inalienable possessions. But at the same time, these possessions become vehicles for political autonomy. The right to control inalienable possessions can be used as the means to effect control over others" (39).

[115]See Weiner (1992) 40-42.

[116]Cramer (1997) also observes that the *skēptron* is a symbol of *eris* and generational succession.

[117]On this, see Chapter 5.

3.3.2 Social rules and politics of compensation

A system of social rules or conventions for compensation in Homeric society emerges from analysis of the discrete themes. The politics of compensation thus involves strategies for mobilizing status and resources, while staying within the 'rules' (or manipulating the rules to an extent), so as to win *timē* in relation to the other *hetairoi*. Damage or defeat creates a status disequilibrium between the victor/captor and victim: the victor/captor or perpetrator of damage has increased his *timē* at the expense of the victim, whose *timē* has consequently been diminished. A strategy of *apoina* preserves the new disequilibrium in *timē;* an exchange of *poinē* reverses the disequilibrium. Consequently, compensatory exchanges take a direction of *apoina* or *poinē* depending on several factors: the conditioning environment, prior relations of the parties involved, and the relative status and resources of the participants, including the status and resources of the victim's *philos* who provides *apoina* or secures *poinē* for the dependent victim.[118]

Offers of *apoina* in the *Iliad* presuppose a situation of hostility. Never in the discrete compensation themes is *apoina* exchanged between *philoi; apoina* are offered only to enemies.[119] An offer of *apoina* is a conventional reaction to being cast into a position of dependence, usually

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[118]Mackenzie (1981) 80, takes only *poinē* into account when she suggests that reaction to injury takes place "when the victim is in a position to exact payment from his opponent."

[119]This distinction is of particular importance in the theme involving Agamemnon and Achilleus, since Agamemnon offers Achilleus *apoina*. See Chapters 6 - 8.

of defeat on the battlefield or capture. The offer may be made by the victim, on behalf of his father, in an effort to persuade the victor to spare his life, or the father may offer the *apoina* so as to gain the release of a son or daughter who has been captured. The father is not necessarily cast into a position of dependence; he is rather the party with adequate resources to gain the release of his son or daughter. The victim is thus in a dependent position in relation to both the captor and the father. In the discrete themes, *apoina* are never offered to one's *philoi*; nor do *philoi* in the discrete themes seize each other's possessions or capture one another for the purpose of securing a material exchange. An obligation imposed by "a gift" is fair play in agonistic exchange among the *philoi hetairoi*, but it is quite a different matter than defeating an opponent and taking his life or exchanging his life for goods.

Apoina are thus intended to compensate the victor with prestige goods for the armor or *kudos* he loses by not killing his victim, or for the material *timē* he loses by releasing a captive. The rhetoric typically associated with *apoina*, "*apereisia*," is an accepted fiction embodying the claim that the goods will consolidate and not diminish the victor's status. In other words, the system dictates that accepting *apoina* should cost the victor none of his gains in *timē*. *Apereisia* is thus a necessary fiction, because in fact the material goods offered are usually quite modest. Since there are no sanctions associated with *apoina* in the *Iliad*, such offers are

often accompanied by supplication and further appeals to the victor's *aidōs* and *eleos*.

The social rules for *apoina* in the *Iliad* suggest that such exchanges accommodate both the kinship group and the warrior-society. They provide a framework in which defeated warriors can negotiate for capture rather than death and in which families can recover sons and daughters from captivity. At the same time, *apoina* exchanges also serve the fluid ranking system in which warriors try to win status by means of agonistic exchange and ritualized conflict.

In exchanges of *poinē*, a *philos* of the victim, or, less often, the victim him- or herself, takes compensation from the party who inflicts damage. Liability for *poinē* also may be extended vicariously to the perpetrator's family and *hetairoi*. *Poinē* may be taken either as reciprocal damage (*tisis*), or it may be taken in the form of prestige goods. By either method, an exchange of *poinē* addresses both the damage incurred and the disequilibrium effected by the damage. In a completed exchange of the *poinē* type, the original perpetrator of damage loses *timē*; his loss of *timē* constitutes a gain in *timē* for the victim, who is thus avenged. This is true whether the exchange comprises prestige goods or reciprocal damage. *Poinē* may be exchanged between *philoi*, or it may be exchanged between enemies. In the *Iliad*, exchanges of *poinē* between *philoi* are represented as regularly constrained by institutions for the administration of justice;

those between enemies also evince conventional limits, but those limits are strained to the breaking point.

Damage tends to lead to *poinē* when the person or goods cannot be recouped in themselves. Therefore taking life, or effectively taking life (5.265-67), leads to *poinē* if it leads to a compensation theme. Furthermore, damage tends to lead to *poinē* when the injured party judges that he or she can make the perpetrator of damage pay, so as to bring the status relationship back to balance or to a favorable disequilibrium. Since *poinē* is rarely 'given', and is only negotiated within a social framework of 'insiders', it is ordinarily exacted by force. Thus a decision to try to secure *poinē* depends in part on the damage, in part on the status situation, and in part on calculation of available resources and the risks one is willing to take.[120] Moreover, damage manifestly recoverable by *apoina* may lead directly to *poinē* when the injured party calculates that he can both recover his loss and gain a favorable balance in *timē*.

3.4 A Temporal Perspective

Given the social rules for *apoina* in Homeric society, a 'realistic' assessment of such exchanges would imply a mixed success and failure rate for offers of *apoina* across the board. Instead, the poem is monolithic in relegating all unambiguously successful exchanges of *apoina* in the discrete themes to a time outside of its own narrative boundaries. Composition also is, with one notable exception, represented as not

[120]On this, see Mackenzie (1981) 80-86.

working. Figure 3.8 displays patterns of path and resolution in the primary fabula as opposed to external analepses and prolepses.[121] Figure 3.8 may be compared with Figure 3.7 above.

apoina path	resolution	*poinē* path	resolution	
		EXTERNAL ANALEPSES		
goods for person	successful			2.225-34
		goods for life	successful	5.265-67
goods for person	successful			6.425-28
goods for person	successful			11.101-12
		goods for goods	successful	11.694-705
goods for person	successful			21.34-135
		PRIMARY FABULA		
goods for person	rejected	life for life/*timē*	successful	6.45-65
goods for person	rejected			10.375-456
goods for person	rejected	life for *lōbē*	successful	11.122-47
		life for life	successful	13.410-16
		life for life	successful	13.445-47
		life for life	inc./failed	13.656-59
		life for life	successful	14.469-74
		life for life	successful	14.478-85
		life for life	incomplete	15.113-18
		life for life	successful	16.394-98
		life for life	incomplete	17.34-50
		kratos for life	successful	17.198-208
		life for life	successful	21.26-33
goods for person	rejected	life for life	successful	21.34-135
goods for person	incomplete			22.44-54
		life for life	incomplete	24.200-216
		EXTERNAL PROLEPSIS		
goods for person	successful (potentially)			24.683-88

Figure 3.8: Comparison of compensation themes in temporal sequence

[121]The trial scene on the shield (18.498-507), like Aias' *exemplum* (9.632-36; see Chapter 7), is marked not for time but for space: its *locus* is *oikos* or *polis* institutions for the administration of justice. For this reason, I omit the trial scene from this chart.

I will return in the Conclusion to the question of why regularly successful compensatory exchanges are not working in the time span of the *Iliad*. For my present purpose, suffice it to say that the narrative arrangement creates narrative tension, and invites the listener to compare intratextually the 'past' to the 'present'.[122] Further, I suggest that other alternatives for explaining the organization of ransom and revenge (for example, location on the battlefield versus elsewhere, homicide versus warfare, characterization of Agamemnon versus Achilleus, complete versus incomplete supplication, etc.) fail to produce a consistent account of the narrative presentation of the theme.[123] Although goods for life is rejected in the primary fabula whereas *tisis* succeeds, a certain ambivalence over *tisis* is betrayed. The paradigm of disorder associated with omophagy looms darkly; yet Agamemnon's rejection of *apoina* in preference for virtually unlimited *tisis* is marked by the narrator as *aisima*

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[122]See especially the themes in which capture scenes from the past are intercalated into similar scenes in the present (11.101-12, Isos and Antiphos, and 21.34-135, Lykaon). Achilleus himself furnishes the model for temporal comparison when he recalls that before Patroklos' death it was his custom to spare life in exchange for goods, but now he will take only life for life (21.100-105).

[123]See for example Robbins (1990) 12-13, who divides supplication scenes in the *Iliad* into those that occur on the battlefield and those that occur elsewhere. He concludes that rejection of ransom on the battlefield is Achilleus' aberrant behavior but Agamemnon's regular behavior. He contends further that the pattern of success and failure of supplication invites the listener to compare Agamemnon and Achilleus in this matter, unfavorably, of course, to Agamemnon. Pedrick (1982) 139-40, also argues that supplication scenes invite the listener to contrast Agamemnon and Achilleus. Examination of the compensation themes, however, has shown that both heroes accepted goods for life in the past and reject it in the present. I have assessed Gould's theory of complete and incomplete supplication above. I have also already suggested that the poem allows no clear line of demarcation between compensation in institutions for the administration of justice and on the battlefield.

(6.62). The imbedding of scenes from the past into the narrative sequence forces these inconcinnities to the surface. In the overarching themes involving Achilleus, these inconcinnities will be put on public display.

Chapter 4: Chryses' *Apoina* and *Poinē* Themes

4.1 A Typological Approach to Book 1

Book 1 of the *Iliad* is sometimes called an *Iliad* in miniature.[1] As such, and not just as the beginning of the poem, it is frequently made the starting point for inquiry into Iliadic themes, characterization, psychology, values and ethics, and so on. Most important for my purposes, Book 1 (in conjunction with Books 9 and 24) is a *locus classicus* for analyses of gift exchange and compensation as practice embedded in Homeric society.[2] The quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilleus has been treated by more than one scholar as a natural starting point for inquiry into the issue of

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[1]See for example Schadewaldt (1966) 144; Rabel (1988) 473; Taplin (1992) 54; Richardson (1993) 4; Stanley (1993) 59.

[2]By 'embedded' I mean that exchange and compensation are social-symbolic transactions and may not be considered as an economy independent of social interaction and meaning. 'Practice' refers to the dynamic of social relations in a given group. Practice may be described from a phenomenological perspective, from an 'objective' (outside observer) perspective, or from a dialectical perspective. See Bourdieu (1977) 1-30.

The bibliography on the quarrel in Book 1 and the Embassy in Book 9 is extensive. Sources I have found useful on the quarrel and compensation, which represent a range of approaches to practice, include: Adkins (1960, 1969a, 1969b; 1971; 1982); Beidelman (1989); Benveniste (1971; 1973); Blickman (1987); Collins (1988); Donlan (1979; 1981; 1993); Easterling (1989); Edwards (1980); Gould (1973); Mondi (1980); Kakridis (1949; 1971); Kirk (1985); Lloyd-Jones (1983; 1987); Long (1970); Lord (1960); Lord, M. (1967); Lowenstam (1993); Mackenzie (1978; 1981); Martin (1989); Morris (1986a; 1986b); Muellner (1976; 1996); Nagy (1979); Owens (1947); Pedrick (1982); Qviller (1981); Rabel (1988; 1991; forthcoming); von Reden (1995); Redfield (1994); Reinhardt (1961); Robbins (1990); Sale (1963); Schadewaldt (1966); Seaford (1994); Segal (1971b); Slatkin (1991); Stanley (1993); Taplin (1990; 1992); Thornton (1984); van Wees (1992); Whitman (1958).

compensation in the *Iliad*.[3] It can be shown, however, that already in the opening scene of Book 1 typologies and social rules are taken for granted, deployed, and exploited with sophistication.[4] These typologies and social rules are established in discrete themes distributed through the poem.[5] These discrete themes disclose a coherent system which nevertheless tolerates a fair degree of ambiguity and ambivalence; ambiguity not only allows for, but occasion, competition to define legitimate beliefs and rules.[6] Analysis of the discrete themes in Chapters 2 and 3 has thus furnished us with an apparatus for reading the compensation themes involving Agamemnon and Achilleus. The quarrel is comprised primarily of speeches in which Agamemnon and Achilleus compete to control the discourse about damages, patterns of relation, and compensation in order to interpret and control transfers of *timē*. Even Nestor's speech in Book 1 is not neutral or definitive, but competitive. Thus, to read the quarrel (or the embassy) as establishing conventions of compensation in Homeric society (much less in Greek society) is to mistake competition to impose a

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[3]von Reden (1995) 13-27, for example, begins her description of compensation in Homer with the exchanges involving Achilleus and Agamemnon; so also Mackenzie (1978), (1981) 67-87, and Taplin (1992). Exceptions to the inclination to make the quarrel and embassy the starting point for inquiry into compensation in Homeric society include Donlan (1979; 1981; 1993); Beidelmann (1989); and Morris (1986a and b).

[4]Some scholars take this phenomenon as evidence that the conventions are familiar to the Homeric audience because they reflect historical institutions. I have proposed that Iliadic compensation themes are related to historical institutions as ideological reactions to a known system. On this, see the Introduction.

[5]They can, in fact, be assumed as familiar to the audience already in Book 1 because they are inherited and traditional.

[6]See Chapter 3. Cf. Taplin (1992) 5-7.

legitimate vision of the social world for 'the' legitimate vision of that world.

The quarrel thus evinces what Bourdieu calls a "struggle for the production of common sense," epitomized in Agamemnon's and Achilleus' competing claims with respect to what is 'not fitting': 'Αργείων ἀγέραστος ἔω, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε (1.119); λαοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐπέοικε παλίλλογα ταῦτ' ἐπαγείρειν (1.126).[7] The struggle to monopolize the common sense is a political struggle—it is ultimately about relations of power and the politics of status.[8] Homeric scholarship has in recent years been more inclined to explore the politics of the quarrel and of Agamemnon's and Achilleus' respective efforts to secure compensatory *timē*.[9] This has not, however, always been the case. The quarrel and the embassy in particular have been and still are frequently treated primarily as windows into the psychology and morals of the Homeric hero.[10]

Approaches to the quarrel that focus primarily on the interior space of Homeric heroes often address ethical and moral values in the society. They do so, however, on the assumption that what drives the quarrel (and the embassy and, in fact, the *Iliad*) is not a social matter but the psychological or ethical make-up of the hero in relation to an established and rigidly fixed or static code of behavior, often identified as 'the' heroic

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[7]See Bourdieu (1990) 239.

[8]On this, see Taplin (1992) 60.

[9]See for example Mackenzie (1978; 1981); Beidelman (1989); Donlan (1981; 1993); Taplin (1992).

[10]See discussion below. See for example Bowra (1930); Whitman (1958); Sale (1963); Schadewaldt (1966).

code.[11] Such approaches are often concerned with assessing heroes' moral rectitude or error, and often on the basis of modern concepts of psychology or morality.[12] Moreover, they frequently proceed on the assumption that Agamemnon is a traditional king and Achilleus a warrior figure who opposes traditional authority.[13] The ambiguity in the quarrel (which I attribute to social contradiction and subsequent conflict) thus contributes to a corresponding allotment of psychological or moral praise and blame by the critic. Bowra, for instance, adjudges Achilleus in the wrong for his "determination to dispute his commander's decision," and Agamemnon in the wrong for his *hubris*.[14] Along with many others, Bowra accepts Nestor implicitly as the moral authority in the poem.[15] New Critics are perhaps the most avid proponents of taking the speeches in Book 1 at face value and, on that basis, psychologizing or moralizing the quarrel. A case in point is Whitman's interpretation of Achilleus' conduct in Book 1: Achilleus takes "the general threat to the systems specifically upon himself," "insists on being the test case," and further, in a "furious denunciation of greed," he reminds Agamemnon that "a federation of princes . . . can hold together only on the basis of mutual

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[11]Much of the impetus for this approach has arisen from Unitarian interest in Book 9. For detailed discussion, see Chapter 6.

[12]Cf. Schadewaldt's (1966) 144-45, conclusion that Agamemnon is "nicht von vornherein ganz im Unrecht," although in the final analysis Achilleus seems more in the right.

[13]See Collins (1988); Lowenstam (1993); see Chapter 3.2.

[14]Bowra (1930) 18-19.

[15]Bowra (1930) 18, comments, for instance, with respect to Nestor's speech in Book 1: "The moral is pointed to clearly by Nestor, who knows the rules of chivalry."

respect of each other's honor and rights."[16] Such judgments commonly presume the existence of 'a' materialistic code which Achilleus (alone) eventually rejects in favor of more spiritual values.[17] The Achilleus of Book 9 thus faces an ethical dilemma and the poet is chiefly interested in the psychology of the hero's wrath. I do not wish to refute the claim that 'Homer' evinces extraordinary insight with respect to human emotions; I suggest however that the poem explores passion not as a psychological or ethical phenomenon, but as created by and in reaction to a socio-political system. As we will see, the source of Achilleus' wrath is articulated implicitly in his speech to Thetis and explicitly in Book 9.

In recent years scholars have begun to analyze the quarrel with an interest in the poet's presentation of 'practice' in a constructed society as 'practice' in the poet's own complex society. Their approach, which is often referred to as cultural poetics, developed out of a growing concern to take account of poetics and of cultural history in its diversity, and to integrate the two using sociological or anthropological models. In this chapter and the next, I use this interdisciplinary approach to analyze the compensation themes that comprise the quarrel in Book 1 with respect to poetics of theme and with respect to practice in Homeric society.[18] Of course, to do so, I must cover some familiar ground (see note 2 above). What I hope to add to the discussion is a typological perspective gained

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[16]Whitman (1958) 184-85.
[17]See Whitman (1958); Golden (forthcoming); Griffin (1995); cf. Redfield (1994).
[18]I discuss the *Iliad* as 'practice' in Archaic Greek society in the Conclusion.

from intratextual comparison. For this reason, I limit discussion to the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of the compensation themes, and to the social and rhetorical strategies deployed in the competition among the poem's characters (including the narrator) to define damage and determine appropriate compensation. I pay particular attention to the problematization of various thematic elements, such as competition to define damage, and to violation or conflation of typologies. As I will show, such problematization exploits ambiguities and discloses characters' (and, as we will see, the narrator's) political and narrative strategies. Problems and strategies introduced in the quarrel recur and are magnified in the embassy scene; the speeches and events in Book 1 thus sign-post and anticipate the speeches and events of Book 9.[19]

The quarrel between Achilleus and Agamemnon is made up largely of a series of compensation themes which begins ostensibly with Chryses' arrival in the Achaian camp.[20] The themes interlock in such a way that the resolution of one theme constitutes the damage of the next.[21] The only theme whose damage is not coterminous with the resolution of a previous theme is, in fact, the first one, the capture of Chryses' daughter.[22] The

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[19]See Chapters 6 and 7.

[20]As we will see, in the course of the quarrel, damages are claimed that go back to a time long before the incident with Chryses. See Chapters 5.5 and 6.

[21]The themes are broken up by splitting expansions and are amplified with speeches. Stanley (1993) 39, calls attention to interlocking narrative patterns, but not interlocking thematic elements.

[22]In light of the monumental compensation scene in which the *Iliad* itself is subsumed—the rape of Helen—the capture of Chryseis might be considered *poinē* exacted for damage inflicted by Paris (see 2.354-56 πρίν τινα πὰρ Τρώων ἀλόχῳ κατακοιμηθῆναι, | τίσασθαι δ' Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς te; cf. 5.588-90). The

poem is, as we will see, less interested in accounting for the initial damage than in establishing a chain of causal relationships that follow upon the initial resolution. The poem begins, notably, not with Chryses' appearance in the Achaian camp, but with the consequences of Agamemnon's rejection: the destructive wraths of Achilleus (1.1-2) and of Apollo (1.9-12).[23] The last compensation theme in the interlocking sequence in Book 1 is incomplete (see Figure 4.1 below); in fact, it initiates an extended theme that drives the story at least up to Book 19. Figure 4.1 shows the thematic elements and the syntagmatic relationship of the four compensation themes in the primary fabula of Book 1.

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connection is not, however, overtly established in the themes with which the poem opens.

[23]The effects of Agamemnon's rejection of Chryses are mentioned in the proem in reverse chronological order; Achilleus' wrath follows Apollo's in the chain of events, but as the theme of the poem, it is announced first.

Damage	Victim	Party Inflicting Damages	Response	Resolution
1. *thugatēr/ tēn'*[24]	Chryses	Agamemnon	*apoina*	rejected (*ētimasen*) =
2. *timē/ dakrua*	Chryses/ Apollo	Agamemnon	*poinē (loigos)*	successful =
3. disputed[25]	Agamemnon	disputed	disputed	successful (*ētimasen*) =
4. *timē/geras*[26]	Achilleus	Agamemnon	*poinē*[27] - - - - -	

Figure 4.1: Interlocking compensation themes in Book 1

4.2 Theme 1: Chryses, Chryseis, and Agamemnon

The first compensation theme in Book 1 (see Figure 4.1) presents a damage with an implicit motivation (the capture of Chryses' daughter), and a resolution which is initially unexplained (rejection of *apoina*). The Homeric narrator introduces the *apoina* theme involving Chryses and Agamemnon by linking it to the *nousos kakē* (1.10) that follows. The narrator distinctly proclaims the *nousos* a consequence of Agamemnon's depriving the priest of *timē* (*ētimasen arētēra*, 1.11).[28]

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[24]For Agamemnon's refusal to designate Chryseis relationally, see below.

[25]For detailed discussion, see below.

[26]That Achilleus has lost a *geras* and *timē* is only his initial assessment of the damage. See Chapter 6.

[27]Achilleus requests *timē* corresponding to *poinē* from Zeus; no transfer of *timē* transpires in Book 1, but the nod of Zeus ensures that Achilleus will take *tisis* for *timē*.

[28]Adkins (1960) 28-30, demonstrates that *atimaō* in Homeric society is not merely descriptive of an attitude; it is rather to diminish the other's *timē* and thereby to move him down on the social scale. Agamemnon therefore does not simply fail to acknowledge the priest's *timē*, he actually takes it away.

Τίς τάρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;
Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός· ὃ γὰρ βασιλῆϊ χολωθεὶς
10 νοῦσον ἀνὰ στρατὸν ὦρσε κακήν, ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί,
οὕνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα
Ἀτρεΐδης· ὃ γὰρ ἦλθε θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν
λυσόμενός τε θύγατρα φέρων τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα,
στέμματ' ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος
15 χρυσέῳ ἀνὰ σκήπτρῳ, καὶ λίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιούς,
Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν·
Ἀτρεΐδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,
ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν, εὖ δ' οἴκαδ' ἱκέσθαι·
20 παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι,[29]
ἁζόμενοι Διὸς υἱὸν ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα.
Ἔνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοὶ
αἰδεῖσθαί θ' ἱερῆα καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα·
ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἥνδανε θυμῷ,
25 ἀλλὰ κακῶς ἀφίει, κρατερὸν δ' ἐπὶ μῦθον ἔτελλε·
Μή σε γέρον κοίλῃσιν ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχείω
ἢ νῦν δηθύνοντ' ἢ ὕστερον αὖτις ἰόντα,
μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο·
τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω· πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν
30 ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ ἐν Ἄργεϊ τηλόθι πάτρης
ἱστὸν ἐποιχομένην καὶ ἐμὸν λέχος ἀντιόωσαν·[30]
ἀλλ' ἴθι μή μ' ἐρέθιζε σαώτερος ὥς κε νέηαι.
(1.8-32)

Chryses dwells in the Troad and is a priest of Apollo. When the Achaians capture his daughter, he comes to the Achaian camp bringing *apoina* to exchange for her release.[31] Inasmuch as Chryses and the narrator

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[29]λύσαιτε and λύσατε both appear in the mss. (var. λῦσαι τε), as do δέχεσθαι and δέχεσθε. An inclination to grammatical simplification may be discerned in the imperatives.

[30]Lines 29-31 were athetized by Aristarchus on the grounds that they undermined the point and, further, that it was unfitting for Agamemnon to say such things [A]. Bolling (1950) omits 1.30; the lines are included in modern editions, most recently van Thiel's.

[31]Recurring word groups are especially in evidence in this theme; noteworthy are three occurrences each of line-end *apoina* (l. 13, 20, 23) and of *luō* (l. 13, 20, and 29). The scene also features familial relationships characteristic of exchanges of *apoina* in the discrete themes, the posture from which *apoina* are offered, and the Achaian ships as the

each designate the girl in terms of familial relationships (*pais*, 1.20 and *thugatēr*, 1.13, respectively), they represent the path of exchange as prestige goods for life. Agamemnon refers to the captive girl only as *tēn* (1.29). His reduction of Chryseis' identity to the demonstrative (*tēn*) is an indirect, but nonetheless effective, denial of the social meaning of her relationship to her father.[32] The sphere in which Agamemnon locates Chryseis is left in doubt, though the absence of personal or relational appellation suggests that, for his present purposes, he regards her as 'goods'.[33] Whether or not the ambiguity is intentional, as we shall see it allows Agamemnon to manipulate Chryseis' status to suit his purpose.

The verb *lissomai* (1.15), which appears elsewhere as a formal element of supplication, is indicative of Chryses' demeanor. Chryses does not, however, adopt the language or the physical gestures of supplication to buttress his plea.[34] He relies instead on the accouterments of his office as a priest of Apollo.[35] The στέμματ'... ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος constitute cultural capital which Chryses hopes will be converted to symbolic capital, or *timē*. In fact, Chryses' admonition to revere Apollo (*hazomenoi*. . . *Apollōna*, 1.21) appeals directly to the *timē* due the god. The exchange

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locus of exchange.

[32]Palmer (1963) 138, notes that the demonstrative force of the substantive 'article' in Homer draws attention to contrast "often with a note of contempt."

[33]On the ambiguous status of women in Homeric society, see Chapter 3.

[34]Cf. Thornton (1984) 113, who regards Chryses as a suppliant and, moreover, regards his supplication as paradigmatic for the supplication motif in the *Iliad*; cf. Gould (1973) 74 n. 1. Crotty (1994) 20-21, affirms that Chryses is not technically a suppliant in this scene.

[35]Again, see Crotty (1994) 21.

would, nevertheless, not alter Chryses' position in relation to Agamemnon nor diminish Agamemnon's gains in *timē*: the *apoina* would compensate Agamemnon for the prestige goods (status) he would lose by surrendering the girl. Notwithstanding, Agamemnon summarily refuses, choosing to retain the girl, despite the fact that 'all the Achaians' heartily approve of Chryses' offer (1.22-23). Agamemnon offers no justification for his refusal until he does so in response to Kalchas' directive that he send the girl back to her father (1.102-20).

It is not immediately apparent why all the Achaians favor the exchange. They profess to be motivated by *aidōs*: they urge Agamemnon to "feel *aidōs* before" the priest (αἰδεῖσθαί θ' ἱερῆα) and accept the *apoina* (1.23).[36] *Aidōs* is not connected to religious sanctions attached to the offer of *apoina* or to supplication, since neither is binding in Homeric society.[37] Crotty demonstrates that *aidōs* is a form of social pressure and the exercise of *aidōs* "implies restraint in exercising one's prerogatives as victor."[38]

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[36]Taplin (1990) 79, suggests that the hosts urge the 'appropriate' response. The question remains, however, in what sense, or in what realm, accepting *apoina* is 'appropriate'.

[37]See for example Gould (1973) 88, who contends that supplication in Homer is a binding ritual with religious sanctions; Donlan (1993) 163, also singles out Agamemnon's mistreatment of a suppliant as the highly irregular act that is "censured by everyone"; see also Thornton (1982). Cf. Pedrick's (1982) 129, argument that supplication in the *Iliad* does not constitute a claim to privileges or a god's protection by right of one's ritual posture. Therefore, even if Chryses were fully a suppliant, Agamemnon's rejection would not carry religious sanctions on that account. On supplication in *apoina* themes, see Chapter 3. 2.

[38]Crotty (1994) 33-4 n. 17. Crotty distances himself from Adkins (1960) with respect to the relation of cooperative and competitive excellences. Crotty argues that cooperative and competitive excellences exist in parity in warrior society. On a related issue, cf. Cook's (1995 and forthcoming) argument that *mētis* and *biē* exist in tension in heroic identity; see also Chapter 8 and Conclusion.

Thus both Chryses and the Achaians acknowledge Agamemnon's victory (the one by bringing *apoina*, the others by endorsing it), but petition him to exercise restraint.[39] Self-restraint is the quintessential quality of *mētis;* we may, therefore, infer that the *laos* urges Agamemnon to act in accordance with *mētis.*[40] The poem thereby forges a parallel relation between *mētis* and the willingness to accept *apoina.*

As temporal analysis of the discrete themes reveals, the poem represents offers of *apoina* as regularly successful prior to the *Iliad*'s primary fabula. Agamemnon's rejection is thus presented as less a transgression of a presumed obligation to reciprocate than a departure from regular practice, including his own.[41] Moreover, if willingness to accept *apoina* corresponds to *mētis*, then Agamemnon's harsh rejection may be construed as corresponding to *biē*. The Achaians' 'hearty approval' may be little more than an index of regular practice in Homeric society. Their explicit reference to the priest, however, suggests they are cognizant of the relations that constrain this particular exchange: *aidōs* toward the priest constitutes reverence toward Apollo. The poem, by juxtaposing the reactions of Agamemnon and the *laos*, figures Agamemnon's action as unilateral, unrestrained (=not in accordance with *mētis*), implicitly impious, and a gross miscalculation. To reiterate a point

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[39]Donlan (1993) 163, recognizes that one of the acts the Achaians censure is Agamemnon's refusal to compromise "as custom dictated." For discussion of restraint, see Chapter 8 and Conclusion.

[40]See Cook (1995) 49-92.

[41]See *Il.* 2.225-34. *Contra* Whitman's (1958) 183, contention that Agamemnon "characteristically" refuses to accept ransom; so also Robbins (1990) 12.

made earlier, his action is impious and a miscalculation not because he refuses *apoina*, but solely because he refuses a priest of Apollo.[42]

By the formal conventions of compensation, when Agamemnon sends Chryses away, the *apoina* theme is complete; Agamemnon's warning for Chryses not to come around the ships (1.26-27) says as much, since this is the conventional locus for exchanges of *apoina* in the *Iliad*.[43] A captive was taken; the victim's father offers a material exchange for her release; the offer is refused. Although this negative resolution might be the end of the matter, it is not. Agamemnon's rejection constitutes further damage to Chryses' *timē* (*ētimasen arētēra*, 1.11), and now, by extension, to Apollo's. Although Agamemnon believes he is in a position to impose a resolution, he greatly underestimates the strength of the position Chryses enjoys by virtue of his relation to the god.

The ransom of Chryseis is not simply the first example of an *apoina* theme in the *Iliad*: every *apoina* theme that follows, especially the one involving Priam and Achilleus in Book 24, is implicitly located in narrative relationship to it.[44] It is also a temporal watershed for all other *apoina* themes until Book 24: offers of *apoina* that occurred prior to the

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[42]Taplin (1992) 53, observes that the *aidōs* is attached to Chryses' priesthood rather than his *apoina*.

[43]See Chapters 2 and 3.

[44]Scholars have long noted how the failed ransom of the father Chryses (Book 1) and the successful ransom of the father Priam (Book 24) are linked narratively by means of ring-composition. See for example Whitman (1958) 259-60; Reinhardt (1961) 63-68; Macleod (1982) 32-35; Rabel (1990); Stanley (1993) 241-47. Redfield (1994) 219, argues that the ransom of Hektor brings only formal closure to the condition created by Agamemnon's rejection of Chryses, but not substantive closure. On this, see Chapter 8.

ransom of Chryseis were successful, those that occur after are not. Nevertheless, paradigmatic comparison reveals that the ransom of Chryseis is not 'typical' in every respect. Chryses' *apoina* theme is organized by the three sets of relations, schematized in Figure 4.2, that also organize the discrete themes: (1) the relation of the *philos* (who brings *apoina*) to the victim (the *philos* is, as we have seen, almost always the father of the victim); (2) the relation of the victor/captor to the victim; and (3) the status relation between the *philos* and the victor/captor, which determines or emerges from the exchange.



Figure 4.2: Chryses' *apoina* theme

In discrete themes of the *apoina* type the sets of relations are stable and taken for granted. They remain in the background and form part of the apparatus by which theme generates expectation. Although an occasional warrior, defeated on the battlefield, may seem to alter the pattern of relations by representing himself as seeing to his own ransom, a father (or

another *philos*) consistently emerges to fill the role.[45] The defeated warrior is inevitably relegated to a more passive position as an object of exchange. The party in the position of superiority imposes the resolution; that the victor holds the position of superiority is undisputed. Although the father himself is not cast in a dependent position in relation to the victor, he is also not in a position to determine the resolution; the father regularly depends on the appeal of the material exchange and on the victor's restraint. In Chryses' *apoina* theme, however, as in most of the overarching compensation themes, the patterns of relation are foregrounded and problematized: Agamemnon's presumed position of superiority in relation to the priest is exposed as ambiguous and is, in fact, successfully contested. Agamemnon's relation to the captive woman is no less subject to dispute and redefinition.

4.3 THEME 2: CHRYSES/APOLLO, CHRYSEIS, AND AGAMEMNON

As long as his daughter was potentially recoupable with an exchange of material goods, Chryses was willing to concede the gain in *timē* Agamemnon had realized in the capture of Chryseis. When, however, Chryses is frustrated in recouping his daughter and suffers additional injury to his *timē*, he concedes neither his losses nor Agamemnon's unilateral resolution. By refusing Agamemnon's refusal, Chryses calls Agamemnon's position of superiority into question. In

[45]See for example 10.375-83 and Chapter 2 *ad loc*. I infer that all themes of the *apoina* type are governed by a thematic reflex, in which fathers offer *apoina*, or that they are a reflex of the archetypal theme.

order to do so, Chryses reconfigures the pattern of relations that governed the *apoina* theme: he calls Apollo to intervene on his behalf. His petition for favor is made on the basis of favor given (1.39), an exchange of *timē* for *timē*.[46]

βῆ δ' ἀκέων παρὰ θῖνα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης·
35 πολλὰ δ' ἔπειτ' ἀπάνευθε κιὼν ἠρᾶθ' ὃ γεραιὸς
Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, τὸν ἠΰκομος τέκε Λητώ·
Κλῦθί μευ, Ἀργυρότοξ', ὃς Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας
Κίλλάν τε ζαθέην Τενέδοιό τε ἶφι ἀνάσσεις,
Σμινθεῦ εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα,
40 ἢ εἰ δή ποτέ τοι κατὰ πίονα μηρί' ἔκηα
ταύρων ἠδ' αἰγῶν, τὸδέ μοι κρήηνον ἐέλδωρ·
<u>τίσειαν</u> Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν.
(1.34-42)

The typology of Chryses' request corresponds to the typology of *poinē* (see Table 4.1).[47] Chryses prays for Apollo to cause the Achaians to "lose honor in payment" (*tiseian Danaoi*) for his tears (*ema dakrua*)—a negative strategy of *tisis* which restores Chryses' *timē* at the expense of Danaan *timē*. Chryses asks, moreover, that the Achaians to be made to pay with their lives for the loss of his daughter. Yet by appealing to the god to kill the Danaans, Chryses places Agamemnon in a position analogous to his own, in that he suffers the loss, now irrecoverable, of people in a dependent position for whose welfare he is responsible. The

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[46]The formal device, known as a *hypomnēma*, is introduced by the formula *ei pote* (1.39); cf. 1.394 and 1.503. On *hypomnēmata* in prayers, see Norden (1956) 318-26; cf. Race (1990) especially 85-117.

[47]On the etymological relationship of *tinō* (1.42, *tiseian*) and *poinē* and their semantic association in themes of the *poinē* type, see Chapters 1 and 3.

path is thus simultaneously *timē* for *timē* on a social level and *akhos* for *akhos* on a personal level.[48]

Mackenzie asks why Chryses does not petition Apollo to help him recover his daughter rather than secure recompense for his tears.[49] She reasons, as do I, that *ema dakrua* (1.42) refers to Chryses' loss of *timē*. She infers, however, that loss of *timē* therefore corresponds to the emotional as opposed to the material aspect of injury:

> From the accounts of the effects of injury, it is made clear that while *timē* can be lost in active failure, it can also be lost in passive suffering, so that the major characteristic of being injured is loss of *timē*; hence both Chryses' and Achilles' emphasis on the *emotional aspect* of their loss.[50]

Mackenzie concludes that all relations between men are reducible to their *timē* and that, consequently, Chryses' grief (loss of *timē qua* grief) is more important than his daughter.[51] Chryses' concern for his *timē* is not, however, exclusive of his concern to recover his daughter. In fact, the objective of Chryses' *tisis* is to diminish Agamemnon's *timē* by making him *tinō* (lose *timē* in payment) to the point that not only is Chryses' own *timē* restored but that Agamemnon is forced into a dependent position in relation to him.[52] Successful resolution of the *poinē* theme will therefore

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[48]Since Agamemnon's position as commander of the Achaian *laoi* is a large part of his *timē*, their death diminishes his honor. Moreover, if the Achaians know they are dying because of Agamemnon's miscalculation, they will also 'dishonor' him by lowering their opinion of his abilities compared to those of other leaders.

[49]Mackenzie (1978) 7.

[50]Mackenzie (1978) 13 (emphasis mine).

[51]Mackenzie (1978) 7.

[52]On the zero-sum status system operative in warrior society, see Chapter 3. See also Mackenzie (1978) 10.

put Chryses in a position to secure the return of his daughter. This is not to deny that there is a profound emotional aspect to loss of *timē*, but only to say that it is related to status and therefore to loss of wealth, including wealth in persons.[53]

Chryses succeeds in converting an *apoina* theme (in which he takes the position of the dependent party) to a *poinē* theme (in which he forces Agamemnon into a dependent position) by adding a fourth position to the pattern of relationships in the exchange. He summons Apollo as an advocate to secure *poinē* for him (Figure 4.3). Although Chryses' strategy of *tisis* requires Apollo's assistance, dependence on a god does not reflect negatively on Chryses' *timē*. On the contrary, Apollo's *tisis* only verifies and augments the *timē* of the priest (τίμησας μὲν ἐμέ 1.454).[54]



Figure 4.3: Chryses' *poinē* theme

[53]This concept is of particular importance for reading Achilleus' speeches to the embassy, on which, see Chapter 7.

[54]See Mackenzie (1978) 10; on double motivation, see also Adkins (1960) and Lesky (1961).

The pattern of relations that organizes Chryses' *poinē* theme is significant because it is paradigmatic for Achilleus' *poinē* theme which follows. The Chryses episode anticipates the quarrel and the embassy syntagmatically, through the interlocking sequence of themes, and paradigmatically, through formal analogy and patterns of relationship. Achilleus, for his part, aggressively appropriates the Chryses/Apollo model, and his appropriation is supported by Nestor and by the narrator.[55] Although Chryses' *poinē* theme is the first *poinē* theme to appear in the *Iliad*, it is itself patterned on a theme that is logically prior. Behind the capture of Chryseis is the *muthos* that drives both the war and the poem: the rape of Helen.

The rape of Helen is the archetypal *poinē* theme against which other examples of the *poinē* theme in the *Iliad* are implicitly read. Moreover, as we will see, Agamemnon and Achilleus both try to 'write' their *poinē* themes in relation to the Helen *muthos* so as to arrogate its symbolic power and thereby justify their own demands for compensation.[56] The paradigmatic force of the Helen theme derives in part from the relationships between the parties involved (see Figure 4.4 below).

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[55]See Rabel (1988; 1990); Robbins (1990); for detailed discussion, see below. By using 'Chryses/Apollo' I do not mean to conflate Chryses and Apollo, though Achilleus will do so. I only mean to indicate the *poinē* theme in which Apollo secures *timē* for Chryses.

[56]For detailed discussion, see below.



Figure 4.4: Pattern of relations in archetypal *poinē* theme

(1) Helen's relation to Menelaos is as *alokhos* (marriage and kinship group); (2) Helen's relation to Alexandros, from the Greek perspective, is as captive woman to abductor; (3) Menelaos and Alexandros are related as injured party and perpetrator of damages; and (4) Agamemnon is an advocate in a position of superiority who secures *poinē* for Menelaos.[57]

Menelaos and Alexandros were formerly *xeinoi* (foreign *philoi*). Alexandros' abduction of Helen, however, constituted a violation of *philotēs* such that the two men are now enemies. The power relation between Menelaos and Alexandros, and consequently the success of Menelaos' attempt to exact *tisis* for *timē* and to recover his wife, is determined in part by Agamemnon's role as advocate. As such it is fully comparable to Chryses' dependence upon Apollo and Achilleus' on Zeus.

[57]Agamemnon is also Menelaos' brother. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, family members, and brothers in particular, as well as other *philoi* occupy a homologous position as 'advocates' who secure *poinē* for warriors killed on the battlefield.

As we saw in Chapter 3, Agamemnon's position is not that of a traditional hereditary monarch. In fact, Agamemnon's privileged position in the relatively fixed system and his role in the archetypal pattern of relations are functions one of the other. Agamemnon's position of superiority is thus internally consistent; nevertheless, it rests on an unstable foundation: Agamemnon may claim to be *aristos Akhaiōn* (1.91), but the poem does not support him in that claim.[58]

In relation to the archetypal *poinē* theme, Chryseis, in Chryses' *poinē* theme, occupies a position analogous to that of Helen (see Figure 4.3 above).[59] The Achaians are thus cast in the position of perpetrators of damage, and Chryses in the position of injured party. In refusing to return the captive woman, Agamemnon is assimilated to the role of Alexandros. The one who assumes Agamemnon's position as advocate, and turns it against him, is no mere mortal, but Apollo. The *poinē* theme that results from the capture of Chryseis thus reenacts the cause of the Trojan war.[60] Moreover, inasmuch as it figures the Achaians as the 'other' through a narrative strategy of conflation, it undermines the moral basis for the war.

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[58]Or, alternately, the poem mystifies Agamemnon's position by offering multiple perspectives on what it is to be *aristos Akhaiōn*.

[59]On the narrative structure of Book 1 and the relationship between Helen, Chryseis, and Briseis, see Stanley (1993) 49-50.

[60]Stanley (1993) 59, suggests the plague and the quarrel become "figures" for the war; I contend that participants in the plague and the quarrel appropriate the war itself. For discussion, see below.

The plague does not automatically effect the return of Chryseis to her father. Final resolution to Chryses' *poinē* theme (and the eclipsed *apoina* theme) is deferred while the Achaian *basilēes* compete in a public forum to define the conditions of damage, and to determine the appropriate direction and path of compensation. Whether Agamemnon is unable to 'read' the incident involving Chryses and the subsequent plague in relation to the archetypal *muthos*, or whether he perversely refuses to, he in any case fails to interpret the meaning of the plague and formulate a response. Achilleus, on the other hand, seizes the opportunity to do so. On the tenth day of the plague he summons an assembly to 'discover' the reason for Apollo's anger.[61] At Achilleus' instigation and under his protection, Kalchas, a prophet of Apollo, declares the nature of the offense against Apollo and what must be done to remedy the damages. In the course of his speech, Kalchas reports both the *apoina* theme involving Chryses and Agamemnon, and the *poinē* theme in which he participates even as he speaks:[62]

> Οὔ ταρ ὅ γ' εὐχωλῆς ἐπιμέμφεται οὐδ' ἑκατόμβης,
> ἀλλ' ἕνεκ' ἀρητῆρος, ὃν <u>ἠτίμησ'</u> Ἀγαμέμνων,

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[61]Taplin (1992) 54, points out that Achilleus takes it for granted that everyone knows the plague is the result of an offense against Apollo, but he "makes out that he is ignorant of the nature of the offence." See also Robbins' (1990) 8, suggestion that Achilleus knows the answer to his inquiry; his question is camouflage.

The reference to the tenth day of the plague evokes the tenth year of the Trojan war; for bibliography, see note 2 above.

[62]de Jong (1985) 9, notes that, in embedded text, the actor who speaks can: a) refer to the *'hic et nunc'* of the primary story and thereby remain in his position as an actor, or, b) tell a secondary story and thereby become a 'real' narrator. Kalchas thus occupies a dual role in this speech: he reports the earlier scene as a narrator, but his report also moves the plot of the primary fabula forward.

95 <u>οὐδ᾽ ἀπέλυσε θύγατρα καὶ οὐκ ἀπεδέξατ᾽ ἄποινα,</u>[63]
τοὔνεκ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἄλγε᾽ ἔδωκεν Ἑκηβόλος ἠδ᾽ ἔτι δώσει,
οὐδ᾽ ὅ γε πρὶν Δαναοῖσιν ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀπώσει [64]
πρίν γ᾽ ἀπὸ πατρὶ φίλῳ δόμεναι ἑλικώπιδα κούρην
ἀπριάτην <u>ἀνάποινον</u>, ἄγειν θ᾽ ἱερὴν ἑκατόμβην
100 ἐς Χρύσην· τότε κέν μιν ἱλασσάμενοι πεπίθοιμεν.
(1.93-100)

Kalchas conveys the *apoina* theme in a single line made up entirely of recurring word groups (1.95).[65] His use of *thugatēr* for Chryseis (1.95) repeats the narrator's own designation of her.[66] He thus marks out the path of the *apoina* theme, in accordance with Chryses' and the narrator's representations, as an exchange of goods for a person. Kalchas represents Agamemnon's refusal of the priest's *apoina* as the intersection between an *apoina* and a *poinē* theme. He echoes the narratorial appraisal of Agamemnon's action as dishonor (*ētimēsen*, 1.94) and, additionally, the narratorial judgment that the dishonor is the offense for which Apollo has brought *algea* and a *loigos* upon the Achaians (1.96-97). Kalchas' summary

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[63]The scholia note that Aristarchus athetized a line as superfluous with respect to line 94, but it is unclear whether line 95 or 96 is meant: πρόκειται γὰρ ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκ᾽ ἀρητῆρος (Aristonicus [A]). Mazon and Bolling (1950) agree the athetesis applies to line 95; T. W. Allen marks both 95 and 96 as athetized by Aristarchus. Erbse (1969-88) I:36, applies the note to line 96, as do Kirk (1985) 63, and Van der Valk (1963-64) 2:469. Van der Valk argues that Aristonicus' observation points more toward the superfluity of τοὔνεκ᾽ ἄρ᾽... than of οὐδ᾽ ἀπέλυσε. . . . Bolling (1950) omits line 95, though modern editors, most recently van Thiel, retain both 95 and 96. The line can be defended on the basis that its epitome of the theme fills out the content in the same way that 1.12-32 fills out the content of *ētimasen* in 1.11.

[64]I depart from van Thiel's (1996) text (οὐδ᾽ ὅ γε πρὶν λοιμοῖο βαρείας χεῖρας ἀφέξει), which transmits Zenodotus' reading. I read with Mazon instead. See Kirk (1985) 63; see below note 79.

[65]Cf. 1.3, 20, 23 (*apoluein, dekhesthai*); 1.13 (*thugatēr*); 1.13, 20, 23 (*apoina*). On *apoluein* and *dekhesthai* in compensation themes, see Chapter 3.1.

[66]1.95; 1.13; cf. Chryses' use of *pais*, 1.20.

of Chryses' *poinē* theme (1.96) lacks typical word groups and clear articulation of thematic elements; the typology is nevertheless recognizable. Furthermore, the *poinē* theme as he construes it conforms to the pattern of relations formulated in the narratorial account (see Figure 4.2 above). Kalchas assesses the damage and he issues a mandate for an exchange by which the *timē* due Apollo and Chryses might be paid in currency other than Achaian lives: Apollo will be satisfied with the return of Chryseis to her father, *anapoinon*, and a *hekatomb* for the god. Kalchas thus articulates for the internal audience the same meaning of the plague as the narratorial account conveys to the external audience.[67]

The poem encourages a naive reading of Achilleus' action in summoning the assembly: Hera put it into his mind because she pitied the dying Achaians (1.55-56).[68] The poem moreover makes it clear that Kalchas, in fact, identifies the 'true' cause of the plague and recommends the 'appropriate' remedy. There is evidence in the text, however, to support a political reading of Achilleus' summons and of Kalchas' complicity. Achilleus and Kalchas both single out Agamemnon, implicitly or explicitly, as the potential target of the prophecy and, therefore, as a threat from which Kalchas might require Achilleus' protection.[69] In fact, Achilleus puts the ambiguity of Agamemnon's position on display when he swears to protect Kalchas, even from Agamemnon, ὃς νῦν πολλὸν

[67]By the 'narratorial account' I mean the account of the episode as narrated and focalized in 1.8-52.

[68]Cf. for example Whitman (1958) 183.

[69]1.78-79 and 90-91; 1.76-77 and 88-89. See for example Taplin (1992) 54.

ἄριστος 'Αχαιῶν εὔχεται εἶναι (1.91).[70] Achilleus and Kalchas represent themselves as eager to propitiate Apollo, and Kalchas represents Agamemnon as impious toward Apollo's priests and prophets. More important, Kalchas chooses to figure Agamemnon, not in Chryses' *apoina* theme, but in his *poinē* theme as the abductor of a woman who is located in the sphere of persons via her familial relationship (1.95). He thus invokes the Helen *muthos*, albeit obliquely, against Agamemnon.[71] Furthermore, he claims Agamemnon's own *laos* are being compelled to pay with their lives for the damage Agamemnon inflicted. Kalchas declares the return of the captive woman *anapoinon* as the only payment in *timē* that will satisfy the damage and persuade Apollo to lift the plague. Kalchas thus deploys his own cultural-symbolic capital as prophet of Apollo to subject Agamemnon to Achilleus' constraint and, moreover, to divest Agamemnon of considerable *timē* so as to 'bring things back to rights'. The poem allows us to see Kalchas and Achilleus imposing a meaning of the plague as legitimate, in the interest of reducing Agamemnon's status and advancing their own.[72] It should thus come as no surprise when Agamemnon interprets Kalchas' prophecy as the machination for a power-grab by Achilleus.[73]

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[70]See Kirk (1985) 62: "The irony suggested by *eukhetai* . . . is all the heavier since Akhilleus assumes himself to be 'best of the Achaeans'. . .."

[71]Inasmuch as the Helen *poinē* theme is archetypal in the *Iliad*, all other *poinē* themes in the poem, and especially those having to do with stolen women, are implicitly related to it.

[72]Bourdieu (1990; 1992) calls such imposition of orthodoxy in the interest of symbolic power "symbolic violence." On this, see Chapter 7.

[73]See Martin (1989) 116.

How Achilleus knows the cause of the *loigos*, and, additionally, how he later knows that Chryses prayed to Apollo (1.380-81) generates recurrent speculation. Bassett suggests that the internal audience, including Achilleus, automatically gains the benefit of whatever is known to the external audience.[74] Alternately, it is supposed that the 'poet' was not troubled by such minor inconsistencies.[75] De Jong proposes that Achilleus simply infers Chryses' prayer from the evidence available to him.[76] It is equally possible that Kalchas and Achilleus are to be imagined as having conferred before the assembly, and, further, that Apollo had communicated with Kalchas before that in the latter's capacity as priest. I suggest that Achilleus is represented as a sagacious and aggressive reader of the poem: he 'correctly' reads Chryses' *poinē* theme in relation to the archetypal *poinē* theme involving Helen. Martin has observed that the poem represents Achilleus as the most skillful <u>speaker</u> of *muthoi*.[77] Before Achilleus performs a single *muthos* however, the poem allows us to see him as the most skillful <u>reader</u> of *muthos*.

Kalchas' speech anticipates Nestor's in Book 9, in which Nestor also accuses Agamemnon of dishonoring (*ētimēsas*, 9.111) a man by taking and keeping a woman.[78] Both Kalchas and Nestor single out Agamemnon's

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[74]Bassett (1938) 130.

[75]See for example Perry (1937).

[76]de Jong (1985) 15, 20 n. 37.

[77]Martin (1989) 146-230.

[78]Stanley (1993) 41, suggests that Kalchas, the voice of prophecy, stands in parallel narrative association with Nestor, the voice of tradition. Although the narrative presentation certainly invites the comparison, Nestor is depicted as believing in the orthodoxy of Homeric society and Kalchas as, at least in this context, more calculating.

action as the cause of destruction of the *laoi;* both instruct him to make good the damages he has inflicted and thereby persuade the injured party to bring his *tisis* to an end.[79] The poem thus deploys Kalchas' speech to forge a narrative and thematic link between the quarrel and the embassy and between Apollo and Achilleus, inviting the internal and external audience to 'read' Achilleus' *poinē* theme in relation to Chryses'.

4.4 THEME 3: AGAMEMNON, CHRYSEIS, AND ACHILLEUS/ACHAIANS

In the same manner that rejection of *apoina* could have concluded Chryses' *apoina* theme, but did not, the return of Chryses' daughter *anapoinon* could conclude the causal chain of compensation themes, but it does not. Agamemnon's reaction to Kalchas' speech is to mount a defense against an overt threat to his *timē* and an implicit threat to his position of superiority. He rises up in anger and casts aspersions on Kalchas and his traffic in prophecy (1.102-8). Agamemnon briefly alludes to the plague, but only to point out that Kalchas, the *'mantis kakōn'* (1.106), accuses him of causing it. Agamemnon acknowledges no responsibility for causing the plague; he in fact defends his refusal of Chryses' *apoina*. He does,

[79]Kalchas declares that the Achaians may persuade (*pepithoimen*, 1.100) Apollo to ward off the plague (*aeikea loigon*, 1.97) by propitiating (*hilassamenoi*, 1.99) him with gifts and the return of the girl. Nestor urges Agamemnon to persuade (*pepithoimen*, 9.112) Achilleus to ward off Hektor's onslaught (elsewhere called an *aeikēs loigos*) by conciliating (*aressemenoi*, 9.112) Achilleus with words and gifts (including implicitly the return of Briseis). Although the vulgate transmits *loimos* instead of *loigos* at 1.97 (see note 65 above), *loigos* is defensible on thematic as well as manuscript grounds. *Loigos* is a key term for the destruction of the Achaians that comes in the wake of Achilleus' angry withdrawal, especially in the formula *loigon amunai* (1.341; 16.32, 75, 80; 18.450). The use of *loigos* for the *loimos* (1.97 and 456) forges a formal connection between the wrath of Achilleus and of Apollo. On this, see Nagy (1979) 74-78; Blickman (1987) 7; Rabel (1990) 432; Slatkin (1991) 64-65.

however, present himself as willing to help avert the plague; to that end he consents to return the captive woman on one condition. Competition to define and resolve Chryses' (and Apollo's) *poinē* theme shifts to competition to define and resolve damages which Agamemnon claims to incur as a result of returning Chryseis to her father *anapoinon*.

καὶ νῦν ἐν Δαναοῖσι θεοπροπέων ἀγορεύεις
110 ὡς δὴ τοῦδ' ἕνεκά σφιν ἑκηβόλος ἄλγεα τεύχει,[80]
οὕνεκ' ἐγὼ κούρης Χρυσηΐδος ἀγλά' ἄποινα
οὐκ ἔθελον δέξασθαι, ἐπεὶ πολὺ βούλομαι αὐτὴν
οἴκοι ἔχειν· καὶ γάρ ῥα Κλυταιμνήστρης προβέβουλα
κουριδίης ἀλόχου, ἐπεὶ οὔ ἑθέν ἐστι χερείων,
οὐ δέμας οὐδὲ φυήν, οὔτ' ἂρ φρένας οὔτέ τι ἔργα.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧς ἐθέλω δόμεναι πάλιν εἰ τό γ' ἄμεινον·
βούλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σῶν ἔμμεναι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι·
αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γέρας αὐτίχ' ἑτοιμάσατ' ὄφρα μὴ οἶος
Ἀργείων ἀγέραστος ἔω, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε·
120 λεύσσετε γὰρ τό γε πάντες ὅ μοι γέρας ἔρχεται ἄλλῃ.
(1.109-120)

Agamemnon's speech furnishes another account of Chryses' *apoina* theme. He reckons the loss Chryses suffered as a *kourē* (1.111), and designates the goods Chryses offered him as *apoina* (1.111). He thus represents the (rejected) offer as an exchange of goods for a *kourē.* The path is ambiguous and Agamemnon may intend it to be so. In light of the designations for Chryseis elsewhere in the speech (1.114, 119-20), *kourē* might be construed either as person or prestige goods.[81] Agamemnon studiously avoids the overt relational terms for Chryseis (*thugatēr, pais*) and Chryses (*arētēr*), and the overt evaluative term for his refusal

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[80]Aristarchus athetized line 110; it is, however, retained by modern editors.
[81]See below.

(*ētimēsen*) that appear in the narratorial account and in Kalchas' speech.[82] Whereas he offered no justification for refusing *apoina* when he sent Chryses away from the ships (1.8-32), in this speech Agamemnon launches into an *apologia* (1.113-15) in which he furnishes warrant for rejecting the exchange of Chryseis for prestige goods: he compares Chryseis favorably to Klytaimestra. Agamemnon insists that he wished to keep the *kourē* because she was inferior in no respect to his *kouridiē alokhos* (1.114). Kirk attests that the formula *kouridiē alokhos* usually has "an affectionate and pathetic ring, as in 'young bride'."[83] He contends, however, that here it means little more than wedded wife in a legal or economic sense. I propose that Agamemnon is in fact exploiting the full emotive and economic force of the term; for implicit in the comparison with Klytaimestra is a claim that the loss of this *geras* would not be less than the loss of an *alokhos*. Since Achilleus, in his response to the embassy, deploys a similar claim with respect to Briseis (9.336), Agamemnon's strategy in introducing the category *alokhos* bears closer investigation.[84]

Had Agamemnon accepted Chryses' *apoina*, he would have consolidated the gain in *timē* represented by the captive woman. When Agamemnon refuses *apoina*, Chryses is able, with Apollo's help, to force Agamemnon to lose *timē* in payment (*tiseian*, 1.42). Agamemnon's *timē*, in

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[82]Agamemnon also avoided familial terms when referring to Chryseis in his speech to Chryses (1.26-32). Agamemnon's reference to the girl as Chryseis (1.111) is in itself insufficient to relocate her in the sphere of persons as any reference to familial relationships remains implicit.

[83] Kirk (1985) 65.

[84]On Achilleus' claim see Chapter 7.

fact, plummets. Agamemnon loses *timē* first as a result of the *loigos*. He sustains another loss when he is publicly subjected to Achilleus' and Kalchas' constraint. He stands to lose even more if Achilleus and Kalchas succeed in casting him as perpetrator of damage in Chryses' *poinē* theme. According to Kalchas' 'orthodox' interpretation, Agamemnon has already forfeited the culturally sanctioned avenue of *apoina*; he must return the girl to her father and receive nothing in return. Agamemnon will, as is clear to everyone, return the captive woman **apriatos* and *anapoinos*. In this speech (1.109-120), he begins a protracted struggle to organize the discourse about the return of Chryseis so as to lose as little *timē* as possible and so as to affirm his own privileged position. This will require that he contest Kalchas' and Achilleus' conventional argument, which is, not insignificantly, also the narrator's, with a culturally and personally acceptable reformulation of his own. It will furthermore require that he maneuver skillfully between keeping and giving: Agamemnon must find a way to represent as 'giving' what he cannot keep, namely Chryseis, and to keep what he will not and cannot afford to surrender, namely his balance of *timē* and (belief in) his position of superiority.

Agamemnon might have simply claimed the loss of a captive woman as damage in the sphere of goods. It may, however, have been difficult to avoid the charge that he was contravening social rules by acting as though a payment in *poinē* could be construed as 'damages' in

goods for which he might exact *poinē*.[85] In other words, Agamemnon must finesse his reformulation in order to avoid, if possible, flagrant violation of social rules. By comparing Chryseis favorably to his own *alokhos*, Agamemnon defines her as 'person', which radically alters her exchange order in the *Iliad*. He pointedly designates Chryseis with a familial term, not, however, in relation to Chryses (*thugatēr/pais*), but to himself (*kouridiē alokhos*). Agamemnon thus represents the exchange as across spheres: he did not reject goods for goods, but goods for a family member.[86] By transferring Chryseis to the sphere of persons, Agamemnon attempts to turn Kalchas' deployment of the Helen *muthos* to his own advantage. Should Chryseis be taken from him, he would sustain nothing less than loss of an *alokhos* analogous to the loss of Helen. As Kakridis demonstrates, in Archaic mythological traditions an *alokhos* is not figured as any member of one's *philoi* might be, but she holds the highest rank in an ascending scale of affection.[87] That is not to say that Agamemnon in fact loves Chryseis (or his *alokhos*, Klytaimestra, for that matter) above his other *philoi*. It is only to say that tradition assigns to the *alokhos* the highest rank of affection and that Agamemnon invokes the tradition for his strategic advantage.

By figuring Chryseis as *alokhos* in relation to himself, Agamemnon potentially re-writes his narrative in relation to the Helen *muthos*. He

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[85]One of the functions of *poinē* among *philoi* (albeit not between enemies) is clearly to preclude just such cycles of retribution. See Aias' *exemplum* in Book 9.

[86]Cf. Muellner (1996) 98-99.

[87]Kakridis (1949) 21-24.

thereby counters Kalchas' use of the archetypal *poinē* theme and 'legitimately' scripts himself out of the position of abductor/perpetrator of damage and into the position of injured party in relation to Chryseis (see Figure 4.4 below). The evocative force of the Helen *muthos* justifies his demand for compensation and, however thinly, veils the fact that he blatantly ignores the *poinē* due Chryses and Apollo in order to figure the loss of the girl as initiating a new *poinē* theme.[88]



Figure 4.4: Agamemnon's *poinē* theme

Agamemnon's strategy could have caused Kalchas' to backfire. But Agamemnon wields convention inconsistently at best, ineptly at worst. He fails as a 'writer' of *muthoi*, as he did in Book 2 with the assembly (2.110-54). Agamemnon's reformulation of the archetypal *poinē* theme suffers from two unstable positions (see Figure 4.4 above). It is unclear in

[88]Agamemnon's discourse notwithstanding, Chryses' *poinē* theme will be resolved with the return of the girl *anapoinon*.

this speech whom he casts as perpetrator(s) of damage, although Achilleus is the most logical candidate since he poses a threat to Agamemnon's *timē*. It is also unclear whom, if anyone, he might summon as advocate. Achilleus, however, will seize upon the unstable positions and reconfigure Agamemnon's own paradigm in a way that Agamemnon cannot afford to accept.[89]

Agamemnon seems to adopt one strategy with his use of the term *alokhos*, but then shifts to another direction of exchange, which requires a redefinition of Chryseis. He presents himself as willing to give back Chryseis (ἐθέλω δόμεναι πάλιν, 1.118)—not pay back (*tinein*)!—if it will preserve the *laos* (1.116-17). He subsequently defines the captive woman as his *geras*.[90] Whether Agamemnon means *palin* (1.118) to signify returning Chryseis to the Achaians (who had bestowed her) or to her father, he treats her as the price that must be paid for Achaian lives to be spared. He offers, in effect, to let the *laos* use his *geras* as *apoina* (see Figure 4.5 below).[91] Agamemnon thus positions himself in the role of the father who gives *apoina* in exchange for the life and release of a son who has been defeated in battle. He positions the Achaians as the defeated warriors/sons whose lives are thus spared, and he holds them responsible to compensate him for his own loss of *timē*. Although Agamemnon does

[89]See below.

[90]Agamemnon's use of *geras* in 1.118-120 is the first use of the term in reference to Chryseis.

[91]If Agamemnon is treating Chryseis as *apoina* to ward off a *loigos* from the Achaians, his action anticipates Book 9, where he will offer Achilleus *apoina* to ward off the *loigos* brought on by Achilleus' withdrawal from battle. See Chapter 6.

not name Apollo, his writing of the theme effectively positions Apollo in the role of victorious (enemy) warrior. As such, Agamemnon assimilates the god into his own position in Chryses' *poinē* theme, while he scripts himself into the role of the priest. Nevertheless, Agamemnon studiously avoids mention of Chryses or Apollo and thereby avoids acknowledgment of their *poinē* theme.



Figure 4.5: Agamemnon's *apoina* theme

The final appeal, with which Agamemnon contests Kalchas' construction of the situation of debt, is an appeal to convention, but not to conventions of compensation. Rather, he appeals to the 'common sense' that legitimates his position of superiority: it would not be fitting (*oude eoike*, 1.119) for him to be left *agerastos* alone of the Achaians.[92] The issue is not that Chryseis is Agamemnon's only *geras*, but that she is being used to diminish his *timē*. Control over the disposition of Chryseis represents Agamemnon's control over transfers of *timē* and, in part, his control over

[92]Some modern commentators, for example Kirk (1985) 66, take the position that Agamemnon's claim is not rhetoric, but a valid assessment of his rightful position. On this, see Chapter 3.3.

other Achaian *basilēes*, Achilleus in particular. Agamemnon therefore both presumes and imposes his symbolically-maintained position in the relatively fixed-system in order to recover his *timē* in the *timē*-based status system.

In sum, Agamemnon tries to manipulate the discourse in order to define the unavoidable (the return of Chryseis) within the rules of the system, but in terms that will conserve his own *timē* and his position of superiority. He defines Chryseis as person, and reconfigures himself in relation to her as the injured party. In this way, he invokes the archetypal *poinē* theme involving Helen, but potentially holds Achilleus responsible for the damages. At the same time, he also treats Chryseis as *apoina* for Achaian lives, and therefore defines her as *geras*. What Agamemnon refuses to accept by either strategy is that he is responsible for the plague or liable to pay *poinē* to Chryses and Apollo. On this basis, Agamemnon can 'legitimately' demand that if he surrenders the captive woman, it must be with no loss to his own status.[93]

Kirk adjudges Agamemnon's demand for immediate production of an equivalent prize unreasonable, but his assessment is correct only from a paradigmatic perspective.[94] Agamemnon, it is true, not only exploits the ambiguous status of women in Homeric society, he arguably strains categories of wealth with respect to Chryseis: he tries to locate her in two

[93]Cf. van Wees's (1992) 35-36, reconstruction of a Homeric social organization in which expenses incurred by the princes for public matters such as entertaining guests were recovered from the people.

[94]Kirk (1985) 64.

exchange orders for the same exchange. Although Agamemnon's inconsistent use of patterns conforms to the poem's depiction of him elsewhere as a weak rhetorician, it more importantly points to the absence of a single long-term strategy.[95] Agamemnon and Achilleus both, as we will see, configure and reconfigure their formulations of the situation of damage; they do so episodically and in reaction to the tactics of their opponent. Their immediate goal is to deploy their capital as well as 'convention' effectively in order to defend or increase their status in the political field. Ambiguity allows for a situation in which antagonists can deploy competing social rules against one another. The weakness of his rhetoric notwithstanding, Agamemnon manages to deploy discourse and the capital at his disposal so as to retain his hold on the "father" position, occupied by Chryses in the first of the poem's exchanges, all the way to Book 19.

If Agamemnon's speech is heard episodically, his reformulation and subsequent demand may be defended from the standpoint of the conventions of Homeric society. Achilleus' acquiescence attests that this is the case.[96] It is from a paradigmatic perspective that the fault lines in Agamemnon's reconfigurations show up most clearly. The syntagmatic and paradigmatic perspectives thus exist in tension for the external audience. I propose that Agamemnon's strategy depends most heavily on

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[95]Cf. Martin (1989) 74.

[96]Adkins (1982) 294, notes that, although Achilleus replies in angry and insulting tone, he ends up by promising that the Greeks will recompense Agamemnon three- and four-fold. See below.

his final point: it is 'common sense' that it is unfitting for him to be *agerastos*. It is this claim that Achilleus will counter with another social rule about what is *ouk epeoike* (1.126).

Chapter 5: The Quarrel

ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν τήνδε θεῷ πρόες· αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ
τριπλῇ τετραπλῇ τ' ἀποτείσομεν, αἴ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς
δῷσι πόλιν Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαλαπάξαι.
(*Iliad* 1.127-29)

Politically, the challenge to exchange is a challenge to what is being kept out of the exchange.[1]

5.1 THE QUARREL AS A STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

With Agamemnon's announcement that he will return Chryseis and send a *hekatomb* to Apollo (1.116, 141-47), the first two compensation themes are brought to formal resolution (see Figure 4.1). Dramatic resolution, the actual return of Chryseis, is delayed, however, while the implications of the exchange are debated in a public forum. In three cycles of speeches, Agamemnon and Achilleus compete to define the new situation of damage and to determine appropriate compensation. The first pair of speeches (1.121-29, 130-47) concerns a *poinē* theme in which Agamemnon defends his loss of *geras* as damage for which compensation must be made. Agamemnon's threat to redress the damage by taking someone else's *geras*, perhaps Achilleus', initiates yet another *poinē* theme (the fourth theme on Figure 4.1) and leads to a second pair of speeches (1.148-71, 172-87). Although the these of speeches are devoted largely to casting blame and to threats, the dispute about Agamemnon's compensation continues and spills over to the damage Achilleus will

[1]Weiner (1992) 46.

suffer if Agamemnon takes his *geras*. When Achilleus threatens to resort to physical violence, Athene intervenes to suggest in effect that just as Agamemnon appropriated the position of Chryses in his *apoina* theme, so Achilleus should employ Chryses' strategy in his *poinē* theme. An intermezzo involving Achilleus and Athene momentarily suspends the assembly speeches. The substance of the third cycle of speeches turns on the damage Agamemnon intends to inflict on Achilleus, Achilleus' threatened reaction, and the impasse that results.

The speeches that make up the quarrel are described in terms that identify their genre as '*neikos*'.[2] Moreover, the diction, especially of Achilleus' speeches, conforms to the IE category of blame.[3] Martin demonstrates that this genre carries with it a set of rhetorical conventions, which it shares with other "flyting" or traditional contest genres.[4] He adds that *apeilai*, threats, can be subsumed under the category of blame as assertives or commissives.[5] Thus, the insults and threats Agamemnon and Achilleus exchange are not ancillary, but integral to the power struggle. Moreover, the allegations may be read in terms of traditional categories,

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[2]See for example *epeesin. . .oneidison*, 1.211; *atartētois epeesin*, 1.223; *oneidea muthēsasthai*, 1.291; and *antibiouisi epeesin*, 1.304.

[3]*Philokteanōtate*, 1.122; *anaideiēn*, *kerdaleophron*, 1.149; *anaides*, 1.158; *kunōpa*, 1.159; *oinobares*, *kunos ommat. . .kradiēn elaphoio*, 1.225; *dēmoboros*, 1.231. Agamemnon does not wield traditional language as Achilleus does; nonetheless *ekhthistos* (1.176) is an index of blame poetry. In addition, *ekpaglotat'* (1.146) is intended as an insult, on which see Martin (1989) 115; see also Kirk (1985) 68. On the opposition of praise and blame as a fundamental principle in IE tradition and Archaic Greek society, see Detienne (1973) 18-27; Nagy (1979) 213-64, (1989), (1990b) 392-95; Gentili (1988) 107-14; Martin (1989).

[4]Martin (1989) 68.

[5]Martin (1989) 72.

rather than as the personal ethics of Achilleus over and against those of Agamemnon.[6] That is to say, both speakers cast their adversary in a negative light using traditional categories and social rules. The social rules are thereby brought into conflict, or, perhaps more accurately, an essential contradiction in the social rules of Homeric society is put on display. As Martin observes, the ability to compose insults characterizes speakers as performers; as performers, they are subject to audience evaluation in traditional societies.[7] I suggest that the narrative strategy in the quarrel is to keep all the conflicting constructions of reality before the audience, against the backgrounds of the narratorial account, the discrete themes, and the archetypal theme.[8]

The first term used to describe the quarrel in the poem is *eris*, in the phrase Τίς τάρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι (1.8).[9] *Eris* words designate, and I would add, evoke, essential themes underlying the story of the *Iliad*. The Trojan war actually begins with the arrival of *Eris* at the wedding of Thetis and Peleus; and the war itself may be designated as *eris*.[10] Moreover, *eris* and *neikos* are successfully displaced onto the human realm when Paris is asked to judge which of three goddesses, Hera,

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[6]*Contra* 'moralizing' readings, such as Whitman's, which take the charges at face value; also *contra* Adkins' (1982) 294, psychoanalytic interpretation of the insults as socially acceptable "release valves for anger."

[7]Martin (1989) 94.

[8]Mackenzie (1978) 9, observes that an impasse occurs because Agamemnon and Achilleus each have an arguably equally powerful card to play. She is accurate as far as she goes, but she stops short of identifying the social contradictions that make such a scenario possible. On this, see below.

[9]See also see 1.6,177, 210, 277, 318. On the primeval *eris* theme, see 5.3 below.

[10]*Cypria* 1.5 (Allen).

Athene, or Aphrodite, is supreme in beauty (see *Il.* 24.29-30).[11] Agamemnon's and Achilleus' *eris* thus recalls the primordial strife scenes which are the mythological foundations of the war.[12] As important, *eris* can be seen to reflect their competition to define the situation and their struggle for dominance no less than their quarrel over Chryseis/Briseis. Agamemnon is thus once again cast in the role of father, and Achilleus, true to prophecy is *aristos*.[13] Their quarrel thus enacts the cosmic struggle for dominance that would have occurred had Zeus mated with Thetis.[14]

5.1.1 The first set of speeches (1.121-147)

Agamemnon left the typology of his surrender of Briseis ambiguous (1.106-20, above). The exigency was nonetheless unequivocal: whether as repayment for *apoina* or as compensation for damages in a *poinē* theme, a *geras* must be provided to replace Chryseis. Achilleus' first reaction is to deploy the conventions of blame against Agamemnon with the accusation that Agamemnon is *philokteanōtatos pantōn* (1.122; see below). After reminding him that all the booty has been distributed, Achilleus contests Agamemnon's 'common sense' about being *agerastos* with another orthodoxy: in pointed contrast to Agamemnon's claim,

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[11]See Nagy (1979) 213; Slatkin (1991); Mayer (1996).

[12]Nagy (1979) 314, singles out the feast at Mecone and the feast at the wedding of Thetis and Peleus as multiforms of a primordial strife scene that caused the human condition. See also Slatkin (1991) and below.

[13]See 5.3 below.

[14]See Mayer (1996) and below.

Achilleus argues that if anything would be unfitting (cf. *oude eoike*, 1.119), it would be to call back the prizes from the *laoi*.

> λαοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐπέοικε παλίλλογα ταῦτ' ἐπαγείρειν
> (1.126)

Achilleus thereby puts Agamemnon in a position of violating social rules if he requires a *geras* to be given him from among those that have already been awarded. Nevertheless, Achilleus yields to Agamemnon's *poinē* theme, and he proposes an exchange by which the plague may be averted and Agamemnon compensated for damages.

> ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν τῆνδε θεῷ πρόες· αὐτὰρ 'Αχαιοὶ
> τριπλῇ τετραπλῇ τ' <u>ἀποτείσομεν</u>, αἴ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς
> δῷσι πόλιν Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαλαπάξαι.
> (1.127-29)

Achilleus propounds a two-fold resolution. The first resolves the *poinē* theme involving Chryses and Apollo: Agamemnon shall return the girl to the god (1.127). The second resolution however (1.127-29), suggests that he is treating the return of Chryseis as damage, in accordance with Agamemnon's formulation of his own *poinē* theme: the Achaians, among whom Achilleus numbers himself, will pay Agamemnon in *timē* (*apotinein*) three and four-fold when they sack Troy (1.128). Achilleus, it appears, is willing to allow Agamemnon to construct his loss of Chryseis as a *poinē* theme.[15] He holds out an opportunity for Agamemnon to recover his losses in *timē* with interest. Achilleus' proffered exchange nonetheless constitutes a challenge to what Agamemnon would keep out of exchange:

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[15]That Achilleus conceives of the replacement prize as *poinē* is confirmed by the use of *apotinein* (1.128).

Achilleus' 'generosity' masks a threat to Agamemnon's position in the relatively fixed-system in that Achilleus presumes he himself will divide the spoils.[16]

Achilleus aggressively appropriates Agamemnon's *poinē* theme; he concedes Agamemnon's position as injured party but recasts the two unstable positions (see Figure 5.1 below). By designating the god as the one to whom the girl is sent, Achilleus figures Apollo, and not himself, as the abductor/perpetrator of damage. By offering to secure compensation for Agamemnon from the Trojans (1.129), Achilleus scripts himself and the Achaians in the role of advocate. He moreover holds the Trojans, presumably as Apollo's *philoi*, vicariously liable for Apollo's *poinē*. Achilleus thus puts Apollo, his ritual antagonist in the poem, in the position which Agamemnon had potentially assigned to Achilleus, and positions himself opposite Apollo as a thematic antagonist.[17]

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[16]See below. Adkins (1982) 294, contends that Achilleus' offer to repay Agamemnon three to four-fold is reasonable and moreover, that both Achilleus and Agamemnon know it would be "better" for Agamemnon to receive more recompense. He suggests that, although Agamemnon knows it would be disastrous to disregard the "command of Apollo," he is nonetheless angry; the insults are an acceptable release valve for anger. Adkins concludes that the problem occurs in *Iliad* 1 when insults are followed by offensive deeds. I am suggesting that Achilleus' words in fact constitute a very real threat and that Agamemnon's insults are part and parcel of his strategy to maintain dominance.

[17]On ritual antagonism between a god and a hero, see Chirassi Colombo (1977); Nagy (1979) 62, 142-50; Nagy (1990) 12; Rabel (1990); Cook (1995) 20, 110, and 128-170; Muellner (1996) 90, 102-3.



Figure 5.1: Achilleus' configuration of Agamemenon's *poinē* theme

Achilleus' reconfiguration of Agamemnon's *poinē* theme conforms fully to social rules for *poinē*, which allow vicarious generalization of liability to the perpetrator's *philoi*. He furthermore effectively deploys Agamemnon's own attempted arrogation of the Helen *muthos* against him: he seizes on the instability in Agamemnon's theme so as to place himself in a position homologous to Agamemnon's privileged position in the archetypal theme involving Helen, thereby relegating Agamemnon to the position of Menelaos (See Figure 4.4). Achilleus thus presents himself as Agamemnon's *philos* and advocate, but in so doing threatens to place Agamemnon in a dependent position in relation to him. Interestingly, Apollo occupies the position of Alexandros, in accordance with the partial conflation of the two in myth.[18]

[18]See *Il.* 19.416-17 and 22.358-60; Pindar, *Paean* 6.78-80; see also Nagy (1979) 59-75.

Achilleus' offer also would require that Agamemnon be for an indefinite period of time *agerastos*. Furthermore, he makes Agamemnon's compensation dependent upon Zeus giving Troy to be plundered. No less operative for being unspoken is an assertion that Agamemnon, in fact, depends upon Achilleus to plunder Troy. Achilleus will ensure that Agamemnon is dependent upon him by enlisting Zeus' help in a strategy of *tisis* against him. If there is any doubt that Achilleus is contesting Agamemnon's position of dominance, the condition on which his offer rests dispels it. Agamemnon would gain nothing by Achilleus' offer that he would not gain for himself if he both retains his privileged position and sacks Troy. If, on the other hand, Agamemnon accepts Achilleus' offer, his position in both the fixed-system and the *timē*-based fluid system is put in jeopardy: he will depend on Achilleus to pay him *timē* from the spoils of Troy and Achilleus will adopt the role of distributor of spoils. In other words, Agamemnon would be in a dependent position in relation to Achilleus and the Achaians identical to what Achilleus and the other *basilēes* are in relation to him now.

Achilleus' strategy is not lost on Agamemnon, who reads Achilleus' offer as an attempt to cheat and deceive him by keeping a *geras* while he goes without.[19]

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[19]See Stanley (1993) 42; see also van Wees (1992) 112, who suggests that Agamemnon suspects ulterior motives without good reason; but cf. van Wees (1992) 361 n. 108. On ἀγαθός περ ἐών (1.131), cf. Nestor's appeal to Agamemnon (1.275); and see below.

μὴ δ' οὕτως ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν θεοείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ
κλέπτε νόῳ, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρελεύσεαι οὐδέ με πείσεις.
ἦ ἐθέλεις ὄφρ' αὐτὸς ἔχῃς γέρας, αὐτὰρ ἔμ' αὔτως
ἧσθαι δευόμενον, κέλεαι δέ με τήνδ' ἀποδοῦναι;
135 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοὶ
ἄρσαντες κατὰ θυμὸν ὅπως ἀντάξιον ἔσται
εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι
ἢ τεὸν ἢ Αἴαντος ἰὼν γέρας, ἢ Ὀδυσῆος
ἄξω ἑλών· ὃ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἵκωμαι.·
(1.131-39)

Determined neither to lose *timē* in the surrender of Chryseis nor to be put in a dependent position in relation to Achilleus, Agamemnon reasserts his earlier position. He will resolve the situation with Apollo by sending the girl straightway (*nun d'*, 1.141). It seems not to matter at this point whether Agamemnon considers Chryseis as ransom for Achaian lives in an *apoina* theme or as damage in a *poinē* theme. Either way he will not wait for Achilleus and the Achaians to secure compensation (*poinē* or repayment of *apoina*) for him from the Trojans. Agamemnon's role as distributor of *timai* is one of the primary means by which he maintains his position of superiority; he dares not surrender it to Achilleus. If the Achaians do not at once give (*dōōsin*) him a *geras* that is adequate (*antaxion*, 1.136), Agamemnon will see to it himself. Moreover, he will take a *geras* (*autos helōmai*, 1.137) from one of the Achaian *basilēes* (1.138). Agamemnon thus repudiates Achilleus' reformulation of his *poinē* theme. He continues to treat the Achaians as responsible for damages and to insist that they are liable for immediate compensation.[20] As he did with

[20]Agamemnon's demand could, alternately, be construed as a displacement of Apollo's *poinē* onto Agamemnon's *philoi* rather than vicarious extension of it to Apollo's.

Chryses, Agamemnon arbitrarily imposes a resolution on the assumption that he occupies a position of superiority in relation to Achilleus.[21] He apparently (mis)calculates that he can hold on to his privileged position in the relatively-fixed system, use his position to recover the *timē* he has lost in the fluid-ranking system, and plunder Troy (thereby acquiring for himself the τριπλῇ τετραπλῇ τ' promised by Achilleus). Once again, the proximity of the injured party to a god eventually thwarts Agamemnon's objectives, and once again Agamemnon pays for his miscalculation with the loss of Achaian lives. As we shall see, he also responds once again to the loss by offering *apoina* on behalf of the army.[22]

5.2 THEME 4: ACHILLEUS, BRISEIS, AND AGAMEMNON

Agamemnon's threat to resolve his own *poinē* theme by taking a *geras* from one of the Achaian *basilēes* generates a new theme. Achilleus regards the potential loss of his *geras* not as compensation for Chryseis, but as damage in a *poinē* theme in which he is the injured party. Competition to resolve Agamemnon's *poinē* theme thus spills over into competition to define the resulting situation of damages in Achilleus' theme (see Figure 4.1 above).

That does not, however, seem to be Agamemnon's representation of the exchange at this time.

[21]Crotty (1994) 34, contends that, as leader of the Achaians, Agamemnon has the power to take whatever he likes, but he exercises that power without regard to the dictates of shame. Although I agree in general, Achilleus has, in this case however, put Agamemnon is a no-win situation; to act with restraint in this instance would mean jeopardizing his privileged position.

[22]See Chapter 6.

5.2.1 The second set of speeches (1.148-187)

Achilleus' second speech (1.149-71) is composed largely of blame directed at Agamemnon's leadership of the panAchaian forces and aimed at categorizing Agamemnon as greedy and shameless.[23] He directly invokes the overarching compensation theme that organizes his relationship to Agamemnon: Achilleus claims that the Trojans have inflicted no damages on him for which he must secure compensation (1.152-57); he has, rather, come to Troy to win *timē* for Agamemnon and Menelaos (1.159).[24]

> ἀλλὰ σοὶ ὦ μέγ' ἀναιδὲς ἅμ' ἑσπόμεθ' ὄφρα σὺ χαίρῃς,
> <u>τιμὴν ἀρνύμενοι</u> Μενελάῳ σοί τε κυνῶπα
> (1.158-59)

Achilleus thus continues to position himself as an advocate who secures *poinē* for the injured parties in the theme involving Helen. The implicit claim, which Agamemnon does not miss (see 1.186-87), is that Achilleus holds a position at least equal to that of Agamemnon. That Achilleus has come to Troy to win *timē* for himself, and not just to win back *timē* for the Atreidai, is confirmed by his objections concerning the distribution of

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[23]See for example *kerdaleophron* (1.149) and *kunōpa* (1.159). Nagy (1979) 226-27, argues that *kuōn* signifies greed in blame poetry; cf. Kirk (1985) 77, who connects *kuōn*-based blame with shamelessness. Cf. also Hesiod *WD* 38-9, 67, 263-4.

[24]Taplin (1992) 57, describes the agreement whereby a "summoner" persuades other *basilēes* to join forces with him by promising proper *timē* as a "*charis* agreement." He suggests that once the war is engaged, summoned *basilēes* are committed to the supervision of the summoner and, at the same time, retain substantial independence. Although Agamemnon's position among the Achaian *basilēes* is no doubt maintained in part by his role in summoning them, the poem represents his position as deriving from the fact that he leads the largest contingent, from the authenticating power of the *skēptron*, from the consensus that he is *basileuteros*, and even (by Agamemnon's own claim) from his age. See Chapter 3.3.

booty and by his threat to go home rather than be made *atimos* while accumulating *timē* for Agamemnon (1.171).[25]

οὐ μὲν σοί ποτε ἶσον ἔχω γέρας ὁππότ' Ἀχαιοὶ
Τρώων ἐκπέρσωσ' εὖ ναιόμενον πτολίεθρον·
165 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πλεῖον πολυάϊκος πολέμοιο
χεῖρες ἐμαὶ διέπουσ'· ἀτὰρ ἤν ποτε δασμὸς ἵκηται,
σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μεῖζον, ἐγὼ δ' ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε
ἔρχομ' ἔχων ἐπὶ νῆας, ἐπεί κε κάμω πολεμίζων.
νῦν δ' εἶμι Φθίην δ', ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερόν ἐστιν
170 οἴκαδ' ἴμεν σὺν νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὐδέ σ' ὀΐω
ἐνθάδ' ἄτιμος ἐὼν ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν.
(1.163-71)

Achilleus issues a comprehensive protest about the operation of the fixed and fluid systems. According to Achilleus, although he does the greater labor of war (1.163-66), the greater *geras* goes to Agamemnon (1.167). He protests specifically, in fact, that he does not receive a prize equal to that of Agamemnon (1.163), but returns to his ships, war-weary, with only something *oligon* and *philon* (1.167). Agamemnon has not only failed to compensate Achilleus adequately for his labor, he now threatens to inflict unprovoked damages by stripping Achilleus of the *geras* he does have (1.161). Achilleus alleges that the *timē*-based fluid system, by which warriors win status in relation to one another, has suffered irreparable damage because of Agamemnon's abuse of the fixed-system. Agamemnon has in fact, according to Achilleus, made winning *timē* at Troy impossible.[26] Achilleus does not contest Agamemnon's ability to take away his *geras*, but he rails against the system that allows him to do

[25]Cf. Agamemnon's deployment of *agerastos*, 1.119.
[26]Cf. Taplin (1990) 69.

so.[27] He concludes his speech with a declaration that he will return to Phthia (1.169-71).[28]

In this speech, Achilleus makes an implicit claim that the *eris* between himself and Agamemnon originates in a long-standing conflict regarding Agamemnon's privileged position and the *timē*-based status system. The opposition is not, as it is often construed, between traditional kingship and a leading warrior.[29] Their conflict arises instead from a contradiction in a socio-political system that contains a relatively fixed-system, in which Agamemnon is preeminent, and a fluid *timē*-based system in which Achilleus can legitimately claim to be *aristos Akhaiōn*. Achilleus asserts that the systems have become confounded so that the one has completely disabled the other. Moreover, as we will see, he reveals that he is frustrated by a fixed-system that has cast him in a position of dependence and prevents him, by cultural consensus ('common sense'), from effectively contesting it. Achilleus' dissatisfaction with his dependent position is implicit in the quarrel with Agamemnon; it becomes more apparent in his complaint to Thetis.[30] Achilleus puts the contradiction on public display as irresolvable.

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[27]But see below. Achilleus will in fact challenge Agamemnon's ability to take anything from him ever again.

[28]The accusations that Achilleus levels at Agamemnon and Achilleus' threat to return home to Phthia anticipate his response to the embassy, where he makes his charges and his threat more specific.

[29]On this, see Chapter 3.3.

[30]On this, see below.

Agamemnon responds to Achilleus' accusations with a counter-accusation. Achilleus is *ekhthistos* to Agamemnon, (ironically) because of the very characteristics which make him a consummate warrior—his love of *eris*, war, and fighting:

> ἔχθιστος δέ μοί ἐσσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων·
> αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε·
> εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἐσσι, θεός που σοὶ τό γ' ἔδωκεν·
> (1.176-78)

Turned against the enemy, Achilleus' qualities make him a virtually indomitable foe. Agamemnon's words suggest, however, that he cannot always depend on Achilleus being turned against the Trojans.[31] The quarrel itself, which Agamemnon designates *eris* and correctly reads as an attempt to contest his position of dominance, is a case in point.[32] If Achilleus now wants to go home to Phthia rather than be in a dependent position in relation to Agamemnon, Agamemnon is willing to let him go. Agamemnon claims to have others who will give him *timē*.

> φεῦγε μάλ' εἴ τοι θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται, οὐδέ σ' ἔγωγε
> λίσσομαι εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο μένειν· πάρ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι
> οἵ κέ με τιμήσουσι, μάλιστα δὲ μητίετα Ζεύς.
> (1.173-75)

If there is an 'advocate' figured into Agamemnon's pattern of relations, that advocate shall be Zeus, not Achilleus.[33] He thus implicitly repudiates Achilleus' inference that he is at least equal to Agamemnon.

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[31]For detailed discussion of Achilleus as a figure who brings *akhos* to his own *laos*, see Nagy (1979).

[32]For detailed discussion, see below.

[33]I note Achilleus' ironic echo of this in 9.608.

Each time Agamemnon has articulated his demand for compensation, he has, in response to Achilleus' opposition, become more specific about what he will take. He now states unequivocally the resolution he intends to impose with respect to his *poinē* theme.

ὡς ἔμ' ἀφαιρεῖται Χρυσηΐδα Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,
τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ σὺν νηΐ τ' ἐμῇ καὶ ἐμοῖς ἑτάροισι
πέμψω, ἐγὼ δέ κ' ἄγω Βρισηΐδα καλλιπάρῃον
185 αὐτὸς ἰὼν κλισίην δὲ τὸ σὸν γέρας ὄφρ' ἐῢ εἰδῇς
ὅσσον φέρτερός εἰμι σέθεν, στυγέῃ δὲ καὶ ἄλλος
ἶσον ἐμοὶ φάσθαι καὶ ὁμοιωθήμεναι ἄντην.
(1.183-87)

The path Agamemnon describes is prestige goods for prestige goods, but the direction remains problematic. Agamemnon represents Apollo as the one who is taking his *geras*, Chryseis; he singles out Achilleus, however, as the one from whom he will exact a *geras*, namely Briseis, as compensation. Agamemnon, it appears, still holds Achilleus ultimately responsible for robbing him of *timē*. In any case, even if Apollo is the immediate cause of his loss, Agamemnon can hardly exact *poinē* from the god. He can, however, displace liability for *poinē* from Apollo, whom he can't compel to pay in *timē*, to Achilleus, whom he can.[34] Agamemnon admits, in fact, that he will exact *poinē* from Achilleus to demonstrate to him, and anyone else who might try to claim equality with him, that he is *pherteros* than they are. Taplin suggests that Agamemnon resorts to brute force here.[35] Although I would identify his actions as an exercise of *biē*, I propose, that

[34]By the conventions of Homeric society, however, Agamemnon should generalize *poinē* to Apollo's *philoi*, not his own.

[35]Taplin (1992) 65.

Agamemnon is still using symbolic violence rather than overt violence: he is deploying the consensus that he is *pherteros* in order to enforce his position of dominance and to construct a culturally-defensible public meaning for seizing Briseis.

5.2.2 Intermezzo: Achilleus and Athene (1.188-222)

Frustrated and angered by Agamemnon's fiat and by the *timē* he will lose if Agamemnon takes Briseis, Achilleus considers (*mermērixen*, 1.189) whether to draw his sword and take Agamemnon's life at once (1.190-92), or to restrain his *kholos* and *thumos* (1.192).[36] His deliberation conforms to traditional *mermērizein*-scenes in which the impulse of the passions (or organs, such as the *thumos*) is set in opposition to the restraining impulse of the intellect.[37] The traditional motif sets the audience up to expect Achilleus to act on his second impulse. Achilleus instead draws his sword, complying with the dictates of his *kholos* and *thumos*. He is intercepted by Athene, the goddess who embodies *mētis*, who induces him to act with restraint (*iskheo*, 1.214): she bids him leave

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[36]Cf. 9.635.

[37]Arend (1933) 106-115, observed that at important points, the narrator stops the heroes in uncertainty over what they should do. The hero either seeks how he might achieve a desired goal or, as in this scene, has to decide between two possible actions. In the latter type, the second alternative is usually chosen. He proposed that, since the audience already knows what the hero ultimately decides, the interest lies in how the decision comes about, whether through the hero himself or from outside (110). On this, see *inter alia* Pucci (1987) 69-75; Edwards (1992) 317-18; Pelliccia (1995) 126-35.

off from *eris* (*lēg' eris* 1.210), and he will receive τρις τόσσα . . . ἀγλαὰ δῶρα on account of Agamemnon's *hubris* (1.213).[38]

Put another way, Athene bids him restrain himself from exacting *tisis* for *timē* by force (taking Agamemnon's life). She herself offers, as a *philos*, to secure compensatory goods for him as the injured party, on the condition that he wait an indefinite period of time and, consequently, be placed in a dependent position in relation to her. Her offer of compensatory gifts may thus be compared to the offer Achilleus had just made to Agamemnon (1.127-29). Agamemnon, however, had refused to delay 'gratification', even for the promise of a three- to four-fold increase in *timē*. Moreover, he had spurned being put in a dependent position in relation to Achilleus, choosing rather to exact compensation forcibly from the Achaians.[39] Agamemnon is represented as failing to act with restraint in his own *poinē* theme, as he was in Chryses' *apoina* theme (1.22-23). In contrast, Achilleus, although he too is angry (*kekholōmenon*, 1.217), agrees to Athene's offer, with its conditions, to resolve his *poinē* theme. In other words, Achilleus is represented as acting in accordance with *mētis*.

Adkins observes a significant difference in Achilleus' offer to Agamemnon and Athene's offer to Achilleus. He suggests the reason Achilleus accepts the deferred three-fold gifts and Agamemnon does not is not a difference in character, but because "the consequences of

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[38]Athene thus concurs with Achilleus' accusation that Agamemnon's treatment of him amounts to *hubris* (1.203).

[39]Agamemnon's choice to reject Achilleus' offer also reveals the implicit assumption that Agamemnon could take Troy without Achilleus' help. See above.

disobeying Athene or Hera are different from those of disobeying Achilles."[40] I would qualify Adkins' conclusion by suggesting that 'consequences' have less to do with disobedience than with the resulting pattern of relations. For Agamemnon, accepting Achilleus' offer means being placed in a dependent position in relation to him, and thereby jeopardizing his own position in the relatively fixed-system. For Achilleus, accepting Athene's offer means being placed in a dependent position in relation to deity.

Sitta von Reden, in the most recent monograph on exchange in ancient Greece, contends that Achilleus accepts the recompense offered by Athene precisely because it is unspecified in size and timing.[41] She argues that Athene's gifts do not conform to the short-term exchange order of human society (which includes honor bestowed by the other Achaians), but conform instead to the "timeless order of metaphysical justice" and partake of an "indefinite certainty." She concludes that Athene's offer represents to Achilleus *kleos* as opposed to *timē*. Von Reden constructs Achilleus' choice as between Agamemnon's gifts, offered in Book 9 (which are "specified" and "immediate"), and Athene's gifts, which are "more adequate" by virtue of being "indefinite" and "unspecified." Von Reden does not, however, take account of the narrative detail that the choice Achilleus makes in Book 1 is not between Agamemnon's gifts and Athene's gifts, however Athene's gifts may be construed. The choice he

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[40]Adkins (1982) 296.
[41]von Reden (1995) 19-21.

makes is between exacting *tisis* immediately in his own 'right and might' by taking Agamemnon's life, and waiting for a deferred material exchange for which he is dependent on the gods (*aglaa dōra*, 1.213).[42] I have suggested that the choice implicitly involves a choice between *biē* and *mētis*. By accepting Athene's offer, Achilleus renounces neither material compensation nor the honor of human society; rather, he elects a strategy of *mētis* for securing both. To repeat a point made earlier, the strategy Achilleus adopts is that of Chryses in his *poinē* theme.[43]

5.2.3 The third set of speeches: (1.223-303)

Achilleus restrains his hand, but not his anger (1.224, καὶ οὔ πω λῆγε χόλοιο). Athene had given him leave to reproach Agamemnon (1.211), which he does with even more intensity than before. Using traditional categories of blame, Achilleus accuses Agamemnon of greed and cowardice:

225 οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο,
οὔτέ ποτ' ἐς πόλεμον ἅμα λαῷ θωρηχθῆναι
οὔτε λόχον δ' ἰέναι σὺν ἀριστήεσσιν 'Αχαιῶν
τέτληκας θυμῷ· τὸ δέ τοι κὴρ εἴδεται εἶναι.
ἦ πολὺ λώϊόν ἐστι κατὰ στρατὸν εὐρὺν 'Αχαιῶν
230 δῶρ' ἀποαιρεῖσθαι ὅς τις σέθεν ἀντίον εἴπῃ·
δημοβόρος βασιλεὺς ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις·
(1.225-231)

Achilleus castigates Agamemnon for taking advantage of the *timē*-based status system without daring to fight alongside the *aristoi* in

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[42]Agamemnon's gifts have not even been offered when Achilleus elects to take Athene's offer. It is, in fact, Achilleus' choice in this deliberation that eventually leads to Agamemnon's offer of gifts.

[43]See 5.1 above; see also 5.3 below.

ambushes, where *timē* is earned. Instead, Agamemnon stays in the camp and uses his position of superiority to take booty from anyone who crosses him. In the matter of Agamemnon's abuse of the status system, the Achaians themselves do not escape Achilleus' sharp rebuke (1.231): Agamemnon is a *dēmos*-devouring king because he rules *outidanoi*.[44] Achilleus contends that if the panAchaian forces were not *outidanoi*, Agamemnon would not again be able to perpetrate the kind of *lōbē* that he is inflicting on Achilleus (1.231). He thus implicates the Achaians in Agamemnon's damages; consequently, multitudes of Achaian heroes will pay with their lives for Achilleus' *timē*.

Turning from general categories to specific damages, Achilleus assesses the situation of debt. He defines Agamemnon's insult and the threatened seizure of Briseis as damage generating a new *poinē* theme.[45] He characterizes the damage as *lōbē* (*lobēsaio*, 1.232).[46] Achilleus' charge amounts to an accusation that Agamemnon has violated *philotēs* and has treated Achilleus like an enemy. Achilleus sums up the damage by accusing Agamemnon of failing to give *timē* (*ouden etisas*, 1.244) to the *aristos Akhaiōn*. Achilleus appropriates the language the narrator and Kalchas used to characterize Agamemnon's refusal of Chryses' *apoina* (1.11, 94) to claim that Agamemnon is treating him like he treated

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[44]Cf. the blame Hesiod levels against 'gift-devouring' *basilēes* (*WD* 260-64).

[45]Achilleus thus contests Agamemnon's *poinē* theme, in which Agamemnon adjudges Achilleus liable to surrender Briseis as *poinē* for Chryseis.

[46]The use of *lōbē* anticipates Achilleus' demand for compensation in Book 9 (9.387); see Chapter 7. On negative reciprocity, see Donlan (1993) 16. Cf. Gouldner (1960); Sahlins (1968) 82-86 and (1972) 190-196; and Humphries (1969) 177, 205-6.

Chryses. The inference is clear: if Agamemnon treats Achilleus like Chryses, Achilleus will respond as Chryses did. He will recover his loss of *timē* through a strategy of *tisis*, effected not through his warrior-skills—for which he has become *ekhthistos* to Agamemnon—but through inactivity.[47] The intermezzo with Athene marked a turning point in Achilleus' strategy: he will not go home to Phthia, but he also will not fight:[48]

240 ἦ ποτ' Ἀχιλλῆος ποθὴ ἵξεται υἷας Ἀχαιῶν
σύμπαντας· τότε δ' οὔ τι δυνήσεαι ἀχνύμενός περ
χραισμεῖν, εὖτ' ἂν πολλοὶ ὑφ' Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο
θνήσκοντες πίπτωσι· σὺ δ' ἔνδοθι θυμὸν ἀμύξεις
χωόμενος ὅ τ' ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτισας.
(1.240-44)

Achilleus swears that one day, when the Achaians are being slaughtered by Hektor, they will long for him; on that day Agamemnon will "lacerate" his *thumos*, angry that he so dishonored the *aristos Akhaiōn*.[49] His reference to the Achaians dying (1.243a) evokes the *loigos*—apparently still raging—that resulted from Agamemnon's dishonor of Chryses. More important, Achilleus' words constitute a plot summary which controls the plot of the *Iliad* up to Book 9.[50] Achilleus' oath, which

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[47]On Achilleus' appropriation of Chryses as a model of revenge through inactivity, see Rabel (1988) 474.

[48]Cf. Schadewaldt (1966) 135, who interprets Achilleus' change of mind as a sign of the mildness that forms one pole of the psychic polarity which identifies and drives him. Schadewaldt's interpretation lives on in the proposal that Achilleus' regular pattern is a violent response which is subsequently toned down; see Griffin (1995) 26.

[49]That he swears by a *skēptron* carried by Achaians who administer the justice of Zeus is surely not lost on Achilleus, who considers Agamemnon's insult an act of injustice. On the *skēptron* as symbol of divine authority, see most recently Palaima (1995).

[50]See Schadewaldt (1966) 145.

he passionately confirms by flinging the *skēptron* to the ground, anticipates the nod of Zeus, by which Achilleus' plot is subsumed under the *Dios boulē*.[51]

Achilleus sits down, apparently having spoken his final word in the assembly; across from him Agamemnon still rages. The quarrel has come to a deadlock. Neither antagonist has forced the other to back down; neither can afford to surrender. Nestor steps between them and enters the competition to define the status relation of the two heroes in order to bring an expeditious end to the quarrel. The greater part of Nestor's speech, however, is devoted to legitimating his own status: he "reels off a list of the mightiest warriors of an earlier generation" who were persuaded by his *muthos*.[52] The point of his recollection is clear: Agamemnon and Achilleus should listen to him too. Nestor issues explicit instructions first to Agamemnon and then to Achilleus, which he legitimates with an appeal to what amounts to the consensus about their respective social positions:

275 μήτε σὺ τόνδ' ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν ἀποαίρεο κούρην,
ἀλλ' ἔα ὥς οἱ πρῶτα δόσαν γέρας υἷες Ἀχαιῶν·
μήτε σὺ Πηλείδη 'θελ' ἐριζέμεναι βασιλῆϊ
ἀντιβίην, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποθ' ὁμοίης ἔμμορε τιμῆς
σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, ᾧ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν.
280 εἰ δὲ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,
ἀλλ' ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.
Ἀτρεΐδη σὺ δὲ παῦε τεὸν μένος· αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε

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[51]*Contra* the interpretation that Achilleus flings down the *skēptron* as a sign of his rejection of Achaian society. See for example Griffin (1980) 11; Stanley (1993) 42.

[52]Adkins (1982) 298.

λίσσομ' Ἀχιλλῆϊ μεθέμεν χόλον, ὃς μέγα πᾶσιν
ἕρκος Ἀχαιοῖσιν πέλεται πολέμοιο κακοῖο.
(1.275-84)

Nestor urges Agamemnon, ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν (1.275), not to take the *kourē* the Achaians gave to Achilleus as a *geras*.[53] Moreover, Agamemnon should let go of his *menos* and *kholos* toward Achilleus (1.282-83). To Achilleus, Nestor gives instruction not to strive with a *skēptoukhos basileus* to whom Zeus gives *kudos* (1.277-79). Nestor then invokes the legitimating power of Agamemnon's cultural capital to substantiate his counsel: the *skēptron* and leadership of the large Argive contingent confirm the difference in *timē* between Agamemnon and Achilleus. As a *skēptoukhos basileus*, Agamemnon is, by Nestor's reckoning, authenticated by Zeus as *pherteros*; Achilleus should therefore not contend with him.[54] Since, however, Achilleus' superiority as *karteros* (1.280) confirms him, in Nestor's scheme of things, as πᾶσιν | ἕρκος Ἀχαιοῖσιν (1.283-84), Agamemnon would be wise not to endanger the expedition by taking his *geras*. He thus implicitly cautions Agamemnon against miscalculating his need for Achilleus, not only to plunder Troy, but to ward off defeat.[55]

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[53]Mackenzie (1978) 9, interprets ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν (1.175) to mean there is no inherent sanction to prevent Agamemnon from doing what he likes.

[54]Many scholars accept Nestor's construction of the hierarchy as 'the' traditional vision of reality in Homeric society (and Achilleus' as therefore to some extent against the traditional vision of reality). See for example Segal (1971) 93; Mackenzie (1978) 9; Collins (1988).

[55]Segal (1971b) 101, points out that, while Agamemnon puts the issue of Achilleus' withdrawal in terms of the Greek offensive (he is confident he can eventually take Troy without Achilleus), Nestor puts the matter in terms of the Greek defensive by referring to Achilleus as a "bulwark." (Cf. Nestor's defensive strategy to build the wall [7.336-43].) In Book 9, Nestor will confront Agamemnon explicitly with his dependence on Achilleus.

Nestor affirms what must seem obvious: if Achilleus' divine birth makes him *karteros*, Agamemnon's divine heritage makes him *pherteros*.[56] That Achilleus' divine birth should, however, put him in an inferior position in a human relatively fixed-system is a double irony that will emerge most clearly in Achilleus' speech to Thetis.[57] Inasmuch as he seems to give each man his 'due' *timē*, however, Nestor appears to be an impartial arbiter.

Nestor's first instruction concerns the disposition of Achilleus' *geras*, which he represents the quarrel as being 'about'. What Nestor does not address, and what makes his speech ineffectual, is that the disposition of Briseis is only the index of what is really at stake in the quarrel: the difference in *timē* between Achilleus and Agamemnon.[58] Although Nestor proposes that Agamemnon limit his prerogatives by taking Achilleus' *timē* into account, his resolution nonetheless takes for granted Agamemnon's position in the fixed-system—the position that Achilleus has just accused him of abusing. Stanley, among others, therefore characterizes Nestor as the voice of tradition.[59] Nestor is, in fact, the voice of one aspect of tradition: the circle of belief about the legitimacy of Agamemnon's

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[56]Diomedes invokes a similar division of *timai* in Book 9 (37-39).

[57]See below.

[58]Cf. Taplin's (1992) 90, comment on Nestor's speech in Book 9: "Nestor fails to heal the dispute because he defers too much to Agamemnon"; see also Segal (1971b) 97: "Homer provides an ironical reflection of Nestor's failure to grasp the issues at stake in the fact that Nestor maintains the authority due the 'scepter-bearing king' (279) just after Achilles has dashed to the ground the scepter which symbolizes this authority (234-46).

[59]Stanley (1993) 41.

symbolic capital.[60] As we have seen, however, there is evidence in the poem of ambiguity surrounding Agamemnon's position of authority. Moreover, Achilleus and Kalchas have aggressively tried to put Agamemnon in a position of dependence by wielding other, conflicting traditions. Nestor is therefore not a neutral arbiter; rather, he deploys his own cultural capital to confirm the relations that Achilleus is calling into question.[61]

Agamemnon addresses Nestor with respect, but spurns his advice. He articulates what has been implicit in the quarrel over *poinē*: the *neikos* is about dominance.[62] Has Nestor missed that?

> ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα γέρον κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες·
> ἀλλ' ὅδ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει περὶ πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,
> πάντων μὲν κρατέειν ἐθέλει, πάντεσσι δ' ἀνάσσειν,
> (1.286-88)

Agamemnon says plainly that Achilleus wants to be in command (1.286-88). Lowenstam contends that Agamemnon's fear should be understood as unfounded: "... all that Achilles has asserted is that he himself will no longer follow Agamemnon. . . . There is never any question about the particular claims, that one is the rightful leader or the other the best warrior."[63] Agamemnon reads the events of the assembly, from Kalchas'

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[60]Cf. Segal (1971) 91, who points out the similarity in Nestor's function in the quarrel between Achilleus and Agamemnon and Hephaistos' function in the quarrel between Hera and Zeus at the end of Book 1 (573-600).

[61]See Taplin (1990) 64.

[62]See also van Wees (1992) 101-25 and 360 n. 100.

[63]Lowenstam (1993) 61-62. Whereas Lowenstam argues that they misunderstand one another, I maintain that Agamemnon and Achilleus understand perfectly the intent of the rhetoric the other is deploying.

prophecy to Achilleus' offer of gifts, as an attempt by Achilleus to usurp his authority. He says, however, he doesn't believe anyone would actually obey Achilleus (1.289).[64] When the mythological background and Achilleus' own claims to equality with Agamemnon (16.52-54) are taken into account, Agamemnon's fear does not seem unfounded.[65]

Achilleus has the last word in the cycle of speeches in Book 1 (1.293-303); he too spurns Nestor's counsel. He makes no response to Agamemnon's charge that he wants to rule everyone, but only insists that for his part, he will not yield to Agamemnon.[66]

> ἄλλοισιν δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπιτέλλεο, μὴ γὰρ ἔμοιγε
> σήμαιν'· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔτι σοὶ πείσεσθαι ὀΐω.
> ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι·
> χερσὶ μὲν οὔ τοι ἔγωγε μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα κούρης
> οὔτε σοὶ οὔτέ τῳ ἄλλῳ, ἐπεί μ' ἀφέλεσθέ γε δόντες·
> (1.295-99)

Achilleus does, however, yield to Agamemnon's demand for Briseis. He claims he does not intend to fight Agamemnon or anyone else *heineka kourēs* (1.298).[67] Yet Achilleus manipulates the discourse about the exchange to represent the Achaians, not Agamemnon, as the ones who gave and who now take away Briseis.[68] Achilleus declares he will surrender the girl, whom it is increasingly clear he cannot keep, but he

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[64]Cf. Achilleus' retort that he doesn't believe he will obey Agamemnon (1.296).

[65]On the mythological background, see below.

[66]Achilleus claims he would be called *deilos* and *outidanos* if he never contested Agamemnon's commands. Cf. 1.231.

[67]*Heineka kourēs* anticipates Book 9, in which Achilleus insists Briseis is more than a *kourē*, much to the embassy's dismay. Cf. especially 9.637-8).

[68]After the assembly breaks up, Achilleus names not the Achaians but Agamemnon alone as abductor of Briseis. See 1.335-36 and 356 below; see also 9.335-36 and 344.

does so without seeming to be cast in a dependent relation to Agamemnon, which he cannot afford to do. As if to reinforce the position of strength he claims, Achilleus cautions that if Agamemnon tries to take anything else from him against his will, he will kill him (1.302-3).

At this, the assembly disperses, with neither Agamemnon nor Achilleus emerging as the clear winner. The hierarchy of performers has, however, been thrown into dispute. Therefore, the distribution of power is also destabilized.[69] It remains to be seen which man actually holds the dominant position and will therefore be able to impose a resolution to Achilleus' *poinē* theme. The participants are depicted as departing in three groups: Achilleus goes to his ships with Patroklos and his companions; Agamemnon sends a ship off to Chryse with Chryseis; and heralds are dispatched to Achilleus' hut to lead away Briseis.[70] When the heralds appear at his hut to take Briseis, Achilleus refers to her once by name (1.336) and twice as *kourē* (1.336 and 337). He thus reckons the damages in the same terms as did Agamemnon (1.184-85). Although the narrator designates Briseis as *gunē* (1.348), I find no reason to conclude that the

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[69]Martin (1989) 55 has shown how, in oral cultures, notions of performance structure the distribution of power.

[70]Adkins (1982) 296, says it is less offensive for Agamemnon to send heralds after Briseis than for him to come and take her himself, because it lessens the likelihood of bloodshed. Agamemnon's refusal to go to Achilleus' hut may, however, be an additional insult. Cf. Agamemnon's refusal to come to Achilleus' hut to offer gifts in Book 9. Or, given Achilleus' near attempt on Agamemnon's life in the assembly, we may suspect that Agamemnon is hesitant to go himself to take the girl from Achilleus out of fear for his own life.

narrator is implying a distinctive use of *gunē* so as to locate Briseis in the sphere of persons.[71]

Before the heralds leave, Achilleus calls them to be witnesses, if the need should ever arise for him to beat off the grievous *loigos* (ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι, 1.341). Achilleus' use of *loigos* reveals he is forging a connection between the *tisis* Apollo inflicted on the Achaian hosts (1.67 and 97) and the *tisis* he intends to inflict.[72] Thus in the space of a few lines of narrative, the first and second compensation themes move toward dramatic resolution (the ship leaves with Chryseis and the *hekatomb* on board), and the third theme achieves its resolution (Agamemnon takes Briseis to compensate for his *geras*). The pace of the narrative thus mirrors the characters' differing demands for gratification. Agamemnon will have his compensation at once; Chryses' and Apollo's is deferred. The internal and external audience alike must also wait to hear whether Apollo is propitiated and the plague lifted. The audience in this way experiences some of the uncertainty, dramatic delay, and restraint inherent in symbolic exchange. The fourth theme, however, in which the damage is Achilleus' loss of *timē*, suffered in Agamemnon's abuse and seizure of a *kourē*, begins a sustained and grievous path of redefinition and conflation.

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[71]Out of 15 occurrences of nominative singular *gunē*, ten follow a weak caesura (as in 1.348), and five are located in the first half of the line (metrical positions 2-3 and 4-5). I do not detect a pattern linking specific meanings of *gunē* with a metrical position.

[72]On Apollo as a model for Achilleus, see Blickman (1987) and Rabel (1990); see also below.

5.3 THE PRIMEVAL THEME: ACHILLEUS, THETIS, AND ZEUS

The *Iliad,* from the outset (1.1-10), aligns Achilleus with Apollo, his ritual antagonist, through the *mēnis* theme.[73] If the poem aligns Achilleus with Apollo, however, Achilleus seems to align himself with Chryses through the *poinē* theme.[74] Achilleus does not, however, align himself with Chryses' *apoina* theme until Book 24.[75] As we have already seen, in the course of the quarrel Achilleus implicitly adopts various elements of Chryses' *poinē* theme as a model for his reaction to Agamemnon's damage. I have suggested that his strategy does not proceed from a fully-formed plan, but advances in a not entirely linear fashion in response to Agamemnon's strategies. Achilleus' appropriation of Chryses as a model begins with adoption of a similar pattern of relations and progresses to deliberate verbal echoes.[76]

Agamemnon's revelation that the *geras* he intends to take from Achilleus is a *kourē,* Briseis, generates a diachronic and synchronic

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[73]On the *mēnis* of Apollo, see 1.75; 5.444; 16.711. On the *mēnis* theme in the *Iliad,* see especially C. Watkins (1977); Nagy (1979); Slatkin (1991); Muellner (1996); Cramer (1997).

[74]See Rabel's (1988) 475, suggestion that, though 'Homer' likens Achilleus to Apollo on the formal pattern of strife, "the young hero appreciates only his own affinity with Chryses." Achilleus will actually conflate some of the characteristics of Chryses and Apollo in his speech to Thetis (on this, see below), but with respect to the quarrel itself, Rabel's observation seems accurate. Achilleus' shifts his model in Book 9 from Chryses' *poinē* theme to the archetypal *poinē* theme; on this, see Chapter 7.

[75]On this, see Chapter 8. In contrast to Chryses' first strategy for recovery of his daughter, *apoina,* Achilleus' damages lead straight to *poinē.*

[76]The the pattern of relations suggests that Achilleus is initially aligning himself with Chryses and not with Apollo. Just as Chryses secured *poinē* with Apollo's assistance, Achilleus will do so with divine assistance. That Achilleus will seek out Zeus' assistance does not become clear until the conversation with Thetis.

comparison between Achilleus and Chryses: Agamemnon robs both of women, a concubine and a daughter respectively (see Figure 4.1). The intervention of Athene in Achilleus' deliberation scene (1.188-222) marks his first formulation of a recognizable *poinē* theme arising from Agamemnon's threat to take Briseis. By accepting Athene's offer of gifts, Achilleus also puts himself in a dependent position in relation to a divine advocate, as Chryses did in relation to Apollo.[77] Like Chryses, Achilleus judges his position strong enough to contend with Agamemnon's resolution and his domination.[78] Athene represents the realization that, with an effective strategy, Achilleus may emerge from the situation of damage with a three-fold gain in *timē* rather than a loss. In the third set of speeches, which follows the intermezzo, Achilleus describes Agamemnon's abuse of him in language the narrator and Kalchas had used to designate Agamemnon's abuse of Chryses.[79] He thereby tacitly accuses Agamemnon of going so far as to violate *philotēs* by treating him just as he had treated the enemy. Moreover, Achilleus publicly projects a strategy of *tisis* through inactivity, in order to construct a public meaning of the devastation his withdrawal will bring which arrogates the public meaning of the plague. He thus sets himself up to be appeased with gifts

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[77]See above. As we have already seen, it is difficult to say whether the 'idea' is represented as divine in origin or as sprung from Achilleus' head.

[78]Once Chryses' *apoina* theme fails, he does not acknowledge Agamemnon's position of superiority or his gains in *timē*. Achilleus will not adopt the dependent posture of the victim required by *apoina*, nor does he acknowledge Agamemnon's position of superiority for purposes of the exchange.

[79]Cf. 1.244 and 1.11, 94; see above.

in the same manner that the assembly is preparing to appease Chryses and Apollo. As if to ensure that the Chryses' model is clear to the Achaians, Achilleus reminds the heralds who come for Briseis that he will someday be needed to ward off a *loigos* (1.341), the very term with which he himself (1.67) and Kalchas had designated the plague (1.97).[80]

The narrator forges a parallel between Agamemnon's refusal to release Chryseis and his seizure of Briseis with the repeated line, "κρατερὸν δ' ἐπὶ μῦθον ἔτελλε" (1.25, 326). After Briseis is led away, the alignment between Achilleus' and Chryses' *poinē* themes is made even more explicit.[81] Up to this point, Achilleus seems to have been the one primarily driving the comparison.[82] With the narrative that begins at 1.347, however, the narrator scripts Achilleus' theme even more intently to echo Chryses'. The narrator at times even fills in details that Achilleus would not have 'known':[83]

αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς
δακρύσας ἑτάρων ἄφαρ ἕζετο νόσφι λιασθείς,
350 θῖν' ἔφ' ἁλὸς πολιῆς, ὁρόων ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον·
πολλὰ δὲ μητρὶ φίλῃ ἠρήσατο χεῖρας ὀρεγνύς
(1.348-51)

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[80] I have already suggested that, although the narrator discourages a cynical reading, there is ample evidence for collusion between Achilleus and Kalchas.

[81] On this, see Segal (1971b) 103.

[82] If, however, Athene is credited with suggesting the model to Achilleus, we may say the comparison is divinely impelled.

[83] But see above, where I suggest that Achilleus' knowledge' is part of a poetic strategy to represent Achilleus as a skilled reader of *muthoi*.

In the narrative of the events following immediately upon the seizure of Briseis, the narrator echoes several conspicuous details of the Chryses episode. Achilleus, like Chryses, walks alone along the beach:[84]

<u>Achilleus:</u> θῖν' ἔφ' ἁλὸς πολιῆς, ὁρόων ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον (1.350)

<u>Chryses:</u> βῆ δ' ἀκέων παρὰ θῖνα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης (1.34).

Like Chryses, Achilleus is represented as stretching forth his hands and praying *polla*. Achilleus prays to his mother, Thetis, Chryses to Apollo:

<u>Achilleus:</u> πολλὰ δὲ μητρὶ φίλῃ ἠρήσατο χεῖρας ὀρεγνύς (1.351)

<u>Chryses:</u> πολλὰ δ' ἔπειτ' ἀπάνευθε κιὼν ἠρᾶθ' ὁ γεραιὸς | Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι (1.35-36).

Also like Chryses, the compounding of losses brings Achilleus to tears:

<u>Achilleus:</u> Ὡς φάτο δάκρυ χέων (1.357)

<u>Chryses:</u> τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα (1.42).

Achilleus' prayer to Thetis echoes Chryses' *poinē* theme in some respects. Achilleus complains that Agamemnon has taken *timē* from him (*ētimēsen*, 1.356). Inasmuch as he is seeking out divine assistance to recoup both his *timē* and the stolen woman, Achilleus adopts the pattern of relations evinced in Chryses' theme. The basis on which Achilleus makes his appeal, however, is singular. Whereas Chryses employed a *hypomnēma* (*ei pote*, 1.39) recalling his past favors to Apollo, Achilleus

[84]Only the content of these two lines is repeated, not the formulaic language.

summons up a tangled web of debts and damages. The logic of his appeal comprises three steps: a premise, a conclusion, and a complaint:

μῆτερ ἐπεί μ' ἔτεκές γε μινυνθάδιόν περ ἐόντα,
τιμήν πέρ μοι ὄφελλεν Ὀλύμπιος ἐγγυαλίξαι
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης· νῦν δ' οὐδέ με τυτθὸν ἔτισεν·
355 ἦ γάρ μ' Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας
(1.352-56)

Achilleus' argument proceeds obliquely. The conclusion does not appear to follow naturally from the premise; the complaint appears to be capriciously dissociated from both premise and conclusion. What makes the logic of Achilleus' prayer cohere is a story. The story is not told, but each element of Achilleus' prayer is significant in its evocation of mythological and Iliadic traditions. Furthermore, the succession of elements and their intrinsic connection is critical to the developing theme.

"Ἐπεί μ' ἔτεκές γε μινυνθάδιόν περ ἐόντα" (1.352) is the premise, which evokes the mythological background that drives Achilleus' appeal, the marriage of Thetis and Peleus. Laura Slatkin demonstrates that *minunthadion* (1.352) is not neutral, but is on the contrary highly charged.[85] Achilleus moreover reckons his destiny as damage for which compensation is owed him.

"Τιμήν πέρ μοι ὄφελλεν Ὀλύμπιος ἐγγυαλίξαι | Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης" constitutes the conclusion, in which Achilleus holds Zeus accountable for the damage he has suffered by being born *minunthadion*.[86]

[85] Slatkin (1991) 34-36.

[86] Achilleus' logic in the 'conclusion' may be compared to Hektor's *poinē* scene (17.198-208), in which Zeus vouchsafes (*eggualizō*, 17.206) *poinē* to Hektor for a premature

Achilleus claims that Zeus should have compensated him with *timē* for his destiny. He thus invokes the myth behind the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, the succession myth that is never broached directly in the *Iliad*, but which profoundly determines Achilleus' condition, grief, and passion.

The succession myth in its multiforms tells the story of Zeus' final mastery in the struggle to preserve the existing hierarchy of divine power.[87] It points back to a rivalry between Zeus and Poseidon for the hand of Thetis. It activates memory of a disturbing prophecy that Thetis was destined (*peprōmenon*) to bear a son greater (*pherteron*) than his father.[88] Thetis' potency for bearing a son stronger than his father threatened the entire divine order. Had Zeus married Thetis, Achilleus, the son who would have been born of this union, would have displaced Zeus. As a result, the violent struggle for succession would have continued. Zeus emerged victorious over the generational struggle for dominance only by forcing Thetis to marry a mortal. The cosmic order and Zeus' fixed position of dominance in that order were established by ensuring that Thetis' son was mortal. Put another way, "the price of Zeus's hegemony is Achilles' death."[89] Laura Slatkin, in her benchmark

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heroic death. I note that Hektor, too, is *minunthadion* (15.612); Hektor's *poinē* is *kratos*, which brings with it the potential for winning material *timē* and, most important, *kleos*. On this, see Chapter 2 *ad loc.* and Chapter 7.

[87]The 'last' succession story comprises the central myth in Pindar's *Isthmian* 8. See Slatkin (1991); see also Mayer (1996).

[88]See *Isthmian* 8.32-34: εἵνεκεν πεπρωμένον ἦν, φέρτερον πατέρος | ἄνακτα γόνον τεκεῖν | ποντίαν θεόν. Cf. the use of *pherteros* to designate Agamemnon's position in the relatively fixed-system (1.281, 186). Cf. *phertatos* in reference to Zeus (1.581); on this see below.

[89]Slatkin (1991) 101.

work on Achilleus' speech to Thetis, suggests that Achilleus arrogates Thetis' marriage to Peleus, her favor to Zeus, as the *hupomnēma* in his request of favor from Zeus. In other words, Achilleus' favor to Zeus consists of his being *minunthadion*, whereby Zeus' sovereignty is guaranteed.[90] I would offer one qualification to Slatkin's theory, based on the development of the compensation theme. I propose the logic of Achilleus' appeal is that he perceives his mortality as the damage for which Zeus owes him compensation as *timē*.[91]

The *poinē* theme in which Zeus is perpetrator of damages against Achilleus is related only obliquely to the four interlocking themes which comprise the quarrel. Achilleus' complaint thus proceeds from his premise and conclusion in a lateral rather than linear direction. It moves from the divine fixed-system to its human (and not finally fixed) counterpart. The implicit *apodosis* to Achilleus' claim that Agamemnon has dishonored him, is that Zeus has therein not honored him.[92] Achilleus' logic is neither capricious nor heavy-handed; it proceeds on a specific homology between the Olympian fixed-system and the Achaian one. Both fixed-systems are political fields (the field of power) that are organized by homologous relations, analogous specific capital (*timē*), and a similar logic.[93] Agamemnon and Zeus are represented in the *Iliad* as

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[90]Slatkin (1991) 102.

[91]That *timē*, generalized as *kleos aphthiton* is, of course, the *Iliad* itself. See the Conclusion.

[92]See also von Reden (1995) 22.

[93]See Bourdieu (1992) 101: "As a space of potential and active forces, the field is also a *field of struggles* aimed at preserving or transforming the configuration of these

occupying homologous dominant positions in their respective political fields: the field of power among the *aristoi* in the panAchaian host, and the field of power in the divine order.[94] The significant difference between Agamemnon's and Zeus' positions is that Zeus has once for all put an end to generational strife (*eris*) and succession; Agamemnon has not.[95] Agamemnon is not 'the' *wanax*.[96]

That *eris* has been effectively displaced onto the human realm is demonstrated in the juxtaposing of the narrative of the quarrel in the *agorē* with the narrative of a quarrel on Olympos at the end of Book 1 (1.536-611). When Hera realizes that Zeus has conspired with Thetis, and threatens to contest his designs, Zeus imposes his will by force:

> ἀλλ' ἀκέουσα κάθησο, ἐμῷ δ' ἐπιπείθεο μύθῳ.
> μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμωσιν ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν 'Ολύμπῳ
> ἇσσον ἰόνθ', ὅτε κέν τοι ἀάπτους χεῖρας ἐφείω.
> (1.565-67)

There is no one of the Olympians, nor even all of them together, who is able to contend with Zeus in might. Although Hera is, unwillingly, subdued by Zeus' threat, a situation of contentiousness has been created: ὄχθησαν δ' ἀνὰ δῶμα Διὸς θεοὶ Οὐρανίωνες (1.570). In the same

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forces. Furthermore, the field as a structure of objective relations between positions of force undergirds and guides the strategies whereby the occupants of these positions seek, individually or collectively, to safeguard or improve their positions and to impose the principle of hierarchization most favorable to their own products."

[94]On homologous positions in fields, see Bourdieu (1992) 100-104, *inter alia*.

[95]It is this difference that is often missed by scholars who observe the analogy between Zeus and Agamemnon. See for example Nilsson's (1933) 270, observation on the political organization of the Olympic state: "Zeus has full power by right of inheritance, as has Agamemnon. The other gods appear as his retainers whom he summons to counsel or to meals, just as Agamemnon summons the chiefs, etc."

[96]See Chapter 3.3.

manner that Nestor attempts to mediate the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilleus by imposing the belief that Agamemnon is *pherteros*, Hephaistos steps in to settle the divine *neikos* and avert *loigia erga* (1.573) on Olympos.[97] Hephaistos urges Hera to submit to Zeus; moreover, he invokes Zeus' position of superiority, using language that echo's Nestor's speech:

> μητρὶ δ' ἐγὼ παράφημι καὶ αὐτῇ περ νοεούσῃ
> πατρὶ φίλῳ ἐπίηρα φέρειν Διί, ὄφρα μὴ αὖτε
> νεικείῃσι πατήρ, σὺν δ' ἡμῖν δαῖτα ταράξῃ.
> 580 εἴ περ γάρ κ' ἐθέλῃσιν Ὀλύμπιος ἀστεροπητὴς
> ἐξ ἑδέων στυφελίξαι· ὁ γὰρ πολὺ φέρτατός ἐστιν.
> (1.577-81)

Zeus is *phertatos* (1.581). Although the Olympians may try to manipulate, trick, circumvent, or contest his decisions, Zeus' position of dominance is no longer subject to dispute. If *eris* in the human order now threatens to erupt into *eris* in the divine order, it has been disarmed and will come to naught. The quarrel between Hera and Zeus will lead not to an impasse, but to a resolution, protected by Achilleus' mortality.

Achilleus occupies a strangely homologous position in both fields. He is conspicuous by his absence in the divine order, where he is barred from his position as bearer of generational strife against Zeus. He is also conspicuous by his absence in the human order during most of the *Iliad*, where he is also frustrated in winning *timē*, and in contending for dominance, by a relatively-fixed system. Inasmuch as the *neikos* between

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[97] I note that neither Nestor nor Hephaistos is in a position to compete: Nestor is old, Hephaistos is crippled.

Agamemnon and Achilleus objectifies *eris* leading to generational succession (displaced from the divine to the human order), the struggle for dominance between Agamemnon and Achilleus enacts the struggle for dominance that will not take place between Zeus and Achilleus.

In sum, Achilleus claims Zeus should give him *timē* as compensation for his mortality; but Agamemnon has taken *timē* by taking Achilleus' *geras*; therefore Zeus has failed to give Achilleus *timē*. Achilleus neatly, even boldly, conflates the *timē* that Zeus fails to give him with the *timē* that Agamemnon fails to give him. In complaining that dishonor at the hands of Agamemnon amounts to dishonor at the hands of Zeus, Achilleus is merely transferring damage from one homologous position to another. This transfer points to book 9, where Achilleus reverses the direction of the transfer, with cosmological implications.[98]

When Thetis hears her son's cry, she rushes up from the sea to comfort him (1.358). At her request Achilleus, though he represents Thetis as already knowing, nonetheless recalls for her the events that brought him to this point. His speech is the longest in *Iliad* Book 1. It contains reports of all four compensation themes that comprise the quarrel: it begins with the sack of Thebe (1.365-92) and brings the fourth scene right up to Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis. Achilleus does not repeat any of the direct speech contained in the themes. Instead, he controls his own narrative by avoiding *mimesis* and speaking in his own voice as a

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[98]On this, see Chapter 7.

secondary narrator. At times Achilleus repeats the narrator text exactly, at times he summarizes it, occasionally he adapts it substantially.[99]

Achilleus' report of the *apoina* theme involving Agamemnon and Chryses (1.372-79) corresponds in its details to the narratorial account (1.12-32). His report of the *poinē* theme involving Agamemnon, Chryses, and Apollo, however, exhibits two noteworthy differences from it. Achilleus says the priest went away angry: χωόμενος δ' ὁ γέρων πάλιν ᾤχετο· (1.380). The narratorial account, however, reports that Chryses departed in fear: Ὣς ἔφατ', ἔδεισεν δ' ὃ γέρων καὶ ἐπείθετο μύθῳ (1.33). Further, Achilleus claims that Apollo heard Chryses because Chryses was dear to him: εὐξαμένου ἤκουσεν, ἐπεὶ μάλα οἱ φίλος ἦεν (1.381). Chryses' prayer, however, is based on an exchange of favor: ἢ εἰ δή ποτέ τοι κατὰ πίονα μηρί' ἔκηα | ταύρων ἠδ' αἰγῶν, τὸ δέ μοι κρήηνον ἐέλδωρ (1.40-41). I propose that here the poem allows us to see Achilleus at work as an aggressive reader of *muthoi*. Achilleus is not simply remembering Chryses' theme for Thetis' benefit, neither is he simply adopting Chryses as a model of successful *tisis*. Instead, Achilleus is remembering agonistically in order to construct Chryses as a model of successful *tisis*. Moreover, he is constructing Chryses' *poinē* theme, against the narrator, by conflating Chryses and Apollo.[100] By attributing Apollo's anger to Chryses, Achilleus creates an angry (not fearful) injured party; a victim who does not accept a position of inferiority in relation to the perpetrator

[99]See below.
[100]See Rabel (1988) 475-76.

of damages, but in relation to a divine advocate. He creates a model by which the (conflated) injured party recovers, through a strategy of *tisis,* not only the *timē* and the woman (Chryseis), but gifts in addition (the *hekatomb*). Achilleus is not only writing his own narrative, he appears to be re-writing the *Iliad*'s narrative in conformity with his own.

Achilleus summarizes the events of the plague. Though he agrees substantially with the narratorial account, his account lacks vivid details.[101] Achilleus, moreover, remembers the events of the assembly in such a way as to construct himself as pious (1.386) and Agamemnon as an angry and vindictive (1.387-88) man who had made good on his threat to take the *kourē* whom the Achaians had given to Achilleus (1.389-92). With the debt situation between himself and Agamemnon thus defined, Achilleus makes his request to Thetis (1.394-412). He asks her to supplicate Zeus,[102] reminding him of her assistance to him in the past.[103] Achilleus may complain that Zeus owes him *poinē* for his mortality; it would, however, be singular in the compensation themes for him to try to

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[101]1.382-84 <u>ἧκε</u> δ' ἐπ' Ἀργείοισι κακὸν βέλος· οἳ δέ νυ λαοὶ
θνῇσκον ἐπασσύτεροι, τὰ δ' ἐπῴχετο κῆλα θεοῖο
πάντῃ ἀνὰ στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν·

1.45-52 τόξ' ὤμοισιν ἔχων ἀμφηρεφέα τε φαρέτρην·
ἔκλαγξαν δ' ἄρ' ὀϊστοὶ ἐπ' ὤμων χωομένοιο,
αὐτοῦ κινηθέντος· ὃ δ' ἤϊε νυκτὶ ἐοικώς.
ἕζετ' ἔπειτ' ἀπάνευθε νεῶν, μετὰ δ' ἰὸν <u>ἕηκε</u>·
δεινὴ δὲ κλαγγὴ γένετ' ἀργυρέοιο βιοῖο·
οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπῴχετο καὶ κύνας ἀργούς,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' αὐτοῖσι <u>βέλος</u> ἐχεπευκὲς <u>ἐφιεὶς</u>
βάλλ'· αἰεὶ δὲ πυραὶ νεκύων καίοντο θαμειαί.

[102]See 1.394, *lisai;* 1.407, *labe gounōn.*

[103]See 1.394 *ei pote;* 1.407 *mnēsasa.*

exact *poinē* from a god if the god is not already inclined to give it.[104] Achilleus' appeal to Zeus is therefore made on the basis of a favor that Thetis has done for him. Achilleus specifically mentions a time when all the gods tried to bind Zeus. Thetis had set Zeus free and summoned Briareos to his aid (1.394-406), thereby warding off destruction (*loigon amunai*, 1.398). Given the evocative force of Achilleus' earlier allusion to the succession myth, Slatkin is surely justified in suggesting that the reference to Briareos (1.404), who was greater in strength than his father, alludes to the succession myth and to Thetis' own role in it.[105]

Achilleus' request is that Zeus help the Trojans, so the Achaians may be pinned in along the ships and slaughtered (1.408-12). Agamemnon's liability for *timē* is thus vicariously extended to all of Agamemnon's *philoi* (1.410). Implicit in Achilleus' speech, is the request that Zeus grant him *timē* by diminishing Agamemnon's *timē*. Thetis agrees to go to Zeus on Achilleus' behalf and says she thinks he will be persuaded. She instructs Achilleus in the meantime to stay by his ships (1.421), to continue in his anger against the Achaians (not just Agamemnon), and to stay out of the fighting (1.422). Achilleus, angered (*khōomenon*, 1.429) because of the woman, remains by the sea, persisting in the strategy of restraint advised first by Athene, and now by Thetis. He will wait for the *tisis* to bring Agamemnon to his knees, for Agamemnon

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[104]The discrete themes involving Tros (5.265-67) and Hektor (17.198-208) reveal that Zeus is, at least on occasion, inclined to offer *poinē*, even though he is ensconced permanently in a dominant position and cannot be forced to do so.

[105]Slatkin (1991) 69.

to be forced to admit his *atē* (1.411-12), and he will wait for a return of gifts 'three times over'.

Only now is the dramatic resolution to the damages that brought Chryses to the Achaian ships finally narrated (1.430-74). The father's *timē* is restored and he receives back his *thugatēr*. The god is propitiated (1.472-74) and the *tisis* (the *loigos*) is brought to an end. Achilleus' aggressive appropriation of Chryses' model, including his conflation of Chryses and Apollo, lead the audience to expect that, if Agamemnon also returns the *kourē* and offers gifts, Achilleus will be propitiated and will call off the *tisis*. The narrative placement of the joyful scene of Chryseis' return only confirms that belief.

On the twelfth day after the events of the quarrel, Thetis goes to Olympos to find Zeus sitting apart from the others (1.498-99). She approaches him with gestures and words of supplication to make her request (1.500-10). Thetis does not, however, deploy the incident with Briareos as the *hupomnēma* upon which she asks for favor, as Achilleus had suggested. Instead, she refers only obliquely to a favor she might ever have done for Zeus among the immortals. The request she makes for her son, *ōkumorōtatos allōn* (1.505), evokes not the episode with Briareos, but the primeval generational succession myth.[106] The allusion to the succession myth and Thetis' role in it makes the exchange Thetis requests an exchange of compensation. Moreover, what was only implicit in

[106]See Slatkin (1991).

Achilleus' request and in his arrogation of Chryses' *poinē* theme, Thetis makes explicit. She asks Zeus to give Achilleus *timē* by helping the Trojans (*tisis*) until the Achaians give him *timē* (1.510). In other words, Thetis equates *tisis* with *timē*.[107] When Zeus remains silent (1.511-12), Thetis presses her supplication: let him either promise or refuse it, that she may know how much she is most dishonored (*atimētotē*, 1.516) of all the gods. With Achilleus' *timē* thus aligned with Thetis', Zeus finally relents:

> Ἦ καὶ κυανέῃσιν ἐπ' ὀφρύσι νεῦσε Κρονίων·
> ἀμβρόσιαι δ' ἄρα χαῖται ἐπερρώσαντο ἄνακτος
> κρατὸς ἀπ' ἀθανάτοιο· μέγαν δ' ἐλέλιξεν Ὄλυμπον.
> (1.528-30)

The nod that shakes Olympos answers to Achilleus' oath and casting down of the *skēptron* in the *agorē*.[108] What to all appearances is a cosmological version of Chryses' *poinē* theme is underway.

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[107]See Mackenzie (1978) 10, for a lucid summary of the exchange.

[108]See Schadewaldt (1966) 146: "Dieses gewährungnicken ist der größte Augenblick des Gesanges, und er entspricht sichtlich dem Höhenpunkt der irdischen Handlung, dem Schwur des Achilleus vor Agamemnon. An diesen beiden Stellen entscheidet sich, zuerst vom Menschen, nun endgültig vom Gotte aus, der schicksalschwer Weg des Gedichtes."

Chapter 6: Agamemnon's Offer of *Apoina*

ἂψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα.
ὑμῖν δ' ἐν πάντεσσι περικλυτὰ δῶρ' ὀνομήνω.
Iliad 9.120-21

A gift is not signed.[1]

6.1 THE *ILIAD*'S ARTISTIC UNITY AND ACHILLEUS' HEROIC IDENTITY

The embassy to Achilleus in Book 9 has arguably attracted more commentary and lively debate than any other passage in the *Iliad*.[2] It is widely regarded in contemporary Homeric scholarship as the interpretive key to the poem, the linch-pin to its plot and tragic vision.[3] It is, moreover, frequently acclaimed as the zenith of the *Iliad*'s poetic art.[4] Nevertheless, Book 9 is, and has long been, regarded as one of the poem's most intractable *cruces interpretum*. The primary questions are whether Book 9 is fully integrated into the poem, and, if so, what it contributes.

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[1]Derrida (1992) 171.

[2]Since the embassy is widely regarded as central to the development of major Iliadic themes, it figures heavily in most monographs on the poem. Works devoted largely or entirely to Book 9 as an interpretive device for the *Iliad* include: Adkins (1971; 1982); Arieti (1986; 1988); Claus (1975); Donlan (1971; 1993); Eicholz (1953); Griffin (1995); Heubeck (1943); Kakrides (1949); Mackenzie (1978); Martin (1989); Motzkus (1984); Nimis (1986); A. Parry (1956); Reeve (1972; 1973); Rosner (1976); Sale (1963); Scodel (1982; 1989); Segal (1968); Taplin (1992); Tarkow (1982); Thornton (1984); Tsagarakis (1971); von Reden (1995); Whitman (1958); Wilson (1996); Yamagata (1991).

[3]See for example two of the most recent commentaries on *Iliad* 9: Hainsworth (1993) 56, regards Book 9 as the key to the ethical plot of the *Iliad*; Griffin (1995) 19, introduces the ninth book as "the vital hinge of the plot."

[4]See for example Leaf (1900) 371: "Alike in the vivid description of the scene, in interplay of character and in glowing rhetoric, the book is unsurpassed in Homer, perhaps in literature"; Schadewaldt (1996) 131: Und I ist endlich der Diamant in der edelsteinbesetzten Krone Homers"; Willcock (1974) 94: Book 9 is "in many ways the finest in the *Iliad*."

Difficulty arises in part from the failure of the embassy to advance the plot substantially.[5] More important, however, is a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction between the events of the embassy and Achilleus' own words to Patroklos in Books 11 and 16 in which he claims he is still awaiting supplication, gifts, and the return of Briseis from the Achaians:

> νῦν ὀίω περὶ γούνατ' ἐμὰ στήσεσθαι Ἀχαιοὺς
> λισσομένους· χρειὼ γὰρ ἱκάνεται οὐκέτ' ἀνεκτός;
> (11.609-10)

> χώρης ὀλίγην ἔτι μοῖραν ἔχοντες
> Ἀργεῖοι, Τρώων δὲ πόλις ἐπὶ πᾶσα βέβηκε
> 70 θάρσυνος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμῆς κόρυθος λεύσσουσι μέτωπον
> ἐγγύθι λαμπομένης· τάχα κεν φεύγοντες ἐναύλους
> πλήσειαν νεκύων, εἴ μοι κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
> ἤπια εἰδείη· νῦν δὲ στρατὸν ἀμφιμάχονται;
> (16.68-73)

> ὡς ἄν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κῦδος ἄρηαι
> πρὸς πάντων Δαναῶν, ἀτὰρ οἳ περικαλλέα κούρην
> ἂψ ἀπονάσσωσιν, ποτὶ δ' ἀγλαὰ δῶρα πόρωσιν.
> (16.84-86)

Inevitably this apparent contradiction has attracted the attention of the Analysts. Walter Leaf for example declares Achilleus' words "meaningless in the mouth of a man to whom humble supplication on behalf of the Achaians has been made only a few hours before."[6] In Leaf's view the gifts offered to Achilleus through the embassy are "ample atonement," and "satisfaction. . . in abundance" for Achilleus' "wounded

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[5]Bowra (1938) 16-19, suggests that Book 9 does mark vital changes in the course of affairs: at the beginning of Book 9 it is Agamemnon who is wrong, at the end it is Achilleus who is wrong; see also Lloyd-Jones (1983) 18. On this, see Chapter 7.

[6]Leaf (1900) 370, on 11.609-10.

honour."[7] Gilbert Murray likewise finds Achilleus' words to Patroklos, irreconcilable with the embassy:

> Obviously, then, Agamemnon has not offered atonement. Yet there is a book before this which is occupied from first to last entirely with Agamemnon's offers of princely atonement![8]

On these grounds, Paul Mazon assigns Books 11 and 16 to the Urgedicht and Book 9 to the Bearbeiter:

> . . . la phrase [11.609-10] est inintelligible, si Achille a déjà reçu l'ambassade du Chant I. Le rapprochement des deux passages [11.609-10 and 16.56-84] est décisif. . . . Ainsi le Chant I n'existait pas encore quand ont été composés les deux Chants Λ et Π, qui sont parmi les Chants essentiels de l'*Iliade*.[9]

The premise for Analytic criticism of Book 9 is that the embassy conveys an offer of compensation ("atonement") for the damage Agamemnon inflicted. Analysts have accordingly maintained that Book 9 cannot be integrated satisfactorily into the *Iliad*, and have adjudged it a late accretion.[10] Book 9 is thus banished from Analytic reconstructions of the

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[7]Leaf (1892) 170-171.

[8]Murray (1907) 213.

[9]Mazon (1959) 180. For an opposing view, see Schadewaldt's (1966) 128, interpretation of Achilleus' words in Book 16 as a deliberate allusion to the embassy: ". . . die Achilleusrede des Π bringt selbst (61ff) einen eindeutigen Rückverweis auf die letzte Auskunft, die Achilleus im I (650ff) dem Aias gab." He (130) explains that Achilleus is willing to accept gifts in Book 16 and not in Book 9 because in 16 "ist die Lage anders."

[10]See for example Grote (1846-56) Vol 2; Christ (1884); Jebb (1887); Leaf (1892; 1900); Murray (1907) 165-70, 210-13; Wilamowitz (1916); Cauer (1923) 630-32; Mazon (1959) 176-82; cf. Page (1963) 305. The contradiction with Achilleus' remarks in Books 11 and 16 is only the most egregious of Book 9's failings, according to Analytic criticism. The legend of Achilleus' two destinies has been thought by some to be inconsistent with Book 1; the language, geography, and religion evinced in Book 9 has been judged as showing signs of lateness; moreover, the contents of Book 9 are bound up with Book 8, which has widely been held to be one of the latest expansions of the poem. See Leaf (1900); Jebb (1887).

Wrath poem (minimally Books 1, 11, 16-22), and Wilamowitz does not include it in the somewhat more comprehensive *epos* of his 8th century 'Homer' (Books 1-7, 11-17, and 21-24).[11]

A question that remained for Analysts to resolve, however, is why Book 9, or Books 8 and 9, were added. Some argued that the original poem was an *Achilleid* to which Book 9, among others, was added to transform it into an *Iliad*.[12] Sir Richard Jebb proposes another scenario, in which a poet with special rhetorical gifts wished to insert some large piece of his own work. Although Books 11 and 16 would tolerate no additional amplification, it was possible to duplicate the plot without fundamentally changing it:

> The Greeks might be twice discomfited. After the first reverse, they might sue for help to Achilles—and be rejected;—an episode full of splendid opportunities for poetical eloquence and pathos.[13]

Since Book 9 has traditionally been a target of Analytic criticism, it has also become central to Unitarian defenses of the poem.[14] John Scott identifies the narrative coherence of Homeric epic as the key to its artistic value, although he aims his critical remarks less at alleged contradictions

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[11]Jebb (1887) 159; Wilamowitz (1920). Individual scholars differ, however, in exactly what they believe the Wrath poem contained. For a summary of Analysts' views on the composition of the Wrath poem see Jebb (1887) 104-29; Dodds (1954) 1-8.

[12]See for example Grote (1846-56); Geddes (1878); Leaf (1892).

[13]Jebb (1887) 161. Jebb (162) observes rhetorical similarities between books 9 and 24, which lead him to believe they were composed by the same poet.

[14]See Sale (1963) 86: "One of the most important arguments that the Analysts have offered goes to demonstrate that the Embassy to Achilles in Book 9 and the Reconciliation between Achilles and Agamemnon in Book 19 are later than other portions of the *Iliad*." Sale uses the Analytic argument to forge what has become one of the most influential statements of the poem's unified heroic vision. On this, see below.

in the poems than at the Analytic 'detractors' themselves.[15] T. W. Allen concedes that the two attempts to reconcile Achilleus are of some embarrassment to critics. He accounts for the apparent contradiction as a poetic strategy to create dramatic tension.[16] More generally, Unitarian scholars have sought to explain apparent discrepancies, such as the one between Book 9 and Books 11 and 16, as having occurred diachronically in the work of the same poet.[17] Defense of the unity of the Homeric poems emerged most influentially, however, as an argument from unity of narrative structure.

Early efforts to discern symmetrical schemes of balancing motifs and performance units were carried out by Engelbert Drerup, John Myres, and John Sheppard.[18] The effort to establish artistic unity on a structural basis has continued in Homeric studies in the work of Cedric Whitman,

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[15]See for example Scott's (1921) virulent attack on Analysts as men who "do not agree in regard to one single verse, and every line in Homer has been rejected by at least two of them. There can be no Homeric scholarship, no literary appreciation, under such leadership, for Homer ceases to be a poet and his work poetry, and becomes merely a theory of Fick, of Robert, of Muelder, of Bethe, and of Wilamowitz, and of the rest. . . . Homer in such hands will inspire no more poetry" (81-2). Although Scott discusses various types of contradictions in Homer (140-41), I do not find that he discusses the one between Book 9 and Books 11 and 16.

[16]T. W. Allen (1924) 191, suggests that, in order to heighten the calamities of the Greeks, the poet developed the first and unsuccessful embassy.

[17]See for example Lorimer (1950) 463: "the *Iliad* must have been produced in installments"; Reinhardt (1961); Wilson (1996) 22.

[18]For a recent review of Unitarian arguments from design, see Stanley (1993) 26-32. Drerup (1913; 1921) arranges the *Iliad* into performance units according to narrative balance; Myres (1932; 1933; 1954) views the *Iliad's* symmetrical scheme as centering on the embassy (although he omits Books 11-13 to do so). Myres, like Whitman after him, compares the arrangement of the *Iliad* to the arrangement of geometric vase painting.

Oliver Taplin, T. K. Hubbard, Keith Stanley, and Erwin Cook, among others.[19]

Whitman's work has had marked influence on subsequent analyses of design and the relationship between design and meaning in Homeric epic. Whitman proposes that the *Iliad* evinces an "architectonic principle" of concentricity. He thus arranges narrative units to show the balanced symmetry and antitheses of the poem, which he maintains are "altogether consistent with the observable artistic practices of the Geometric age."[20] Whitman argues that Books 9 and 16 are not in conflict but, are, rather, associated by ring-composition: Book 16 completes and reverses Book 9.[21] The unity of the *Iliad* is not, in Whitman's conception, a unity of external form only. He asserts that the secret of Homeric structure lies in an adjustment of oral technique to the psychology underlying Geometric symmetry of the late 8th century.[22] He thus reads the *Iliad* as a study in heroic psychology and the characters as embodying different character types.[23]

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[19]Whitman (1958); Taplin (1992); Hubbard (1992); Stanley (1993); Cook (1995). See also in this context John Niles, Glen Most, and D. G. Miller. For an analysis of narrative structure in relation to meaning in the Odyssey, see Cook (1995) especially Chapters 1 and 2.

[20]Whitman (1958) 250-55. Whitman omits Book 10, however, from his balanced schema. See also Myres (1952).

[21]Whitman (1958) 278.

[22]Whitman (1958) 10.

[23]Whitman (1958) 155, cf. 279. Achilleus, in Whitman's conception, embodies internal values and the spirit; Agamemnon is an anti-type embodying psychology bound by material value.

Stanley likewise attempts a comprehensive analysis of the narrative organization of the *Iliad*. He identifies several sophisticated ring-compositional and interlocking narrative patterns by which traditional elements, such as themes, motifs, speeches, similes, etc., are arranged not only so as to tell the story, but to "constitute its significance."[24] The narrative structure of the *Iliad* thus provides commentary on the action:

> For design in the *Iliad* is not simply a consequence of generic precedent or autonomous artistic play, but provides, as we have begun to see, a consistent and indispensable guide to point of view and thus to poetic discourse.[25]

Wolfgang Schadewaldt represents yet another approach to unity and coherence in the *Iliad*. He contends that the poem's unity is dramatic, effected primarily by a poetic strategy of foreshadowing.[26] The primary structuring device in the *Iliad* is said to be reconciliation (Versöhnung).[27] It is in terms of this dramatic coherence that Schadewaldt defends the integrity of Book 9.

> Die endlich geschlossene Versöhnung des T 'setzt' die fehlgeschlagene des I nicht blos irgendwie 'voraus': T hängt ohne I vollkommen in der Luft, kann ohne die für das gleiche Epos gedichtete Presbeia weder verstanden werden noch entstanden sein.[28]

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[24]Stanley (1993) 26. Stanley breaks each Book down into what he identifies as individual traditional units; he then plots the relationship among parallel units. He omits none of the Books and, like Whitman, accepts the traditional Book divisions as limits of each of his sections (37, 248-61).

[25]Stanley (1993) 28.

[26]Schadewaldt (1966) 153-66, also seeks to correlate the dramatic organization of foreshadowing and postponements with performance time.

[27]Schadewaldt (1966) 134.

[28]Schadewaldt (1966) 134.

Although Unitarian critics have mounted a defense against what they have perceived as an Analytic attack on both the poet and the poem, they have not as a general rule questioned the assumption that Book 9 contains an offer of *poinē*.[29] Scholars have employed a variety of English terms, both legal and nontechnical, to describe Agamemnon's offer.[30] T. W. Allen, for example, suggests that Achilleus refuses to settle for "proper compensation."[31] Cecil Bowra asserts that Agamemnon "offers handsome amends, proclaims his own guilt, and is prepared to end the quarrel."[32] E. T. Owen calls Agamemnon's gifts "gifts of atonement"; Whitman declares them "magnificent amends," which Athene had promised would come to Achilleus on account of Agamemnon's *hubris*.[33] More recent Unitarian, Neo-Analytic, and Oralist criticism is likewise entrenched in the position

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[29]I include here several scholars of the Oralist school who are not 'Unitarians', but who would nonetheless defend the traditional and artistic unity of Homeric epic. See *inter alia* Sheppard (1922) 68-9; T. W. Allen (1924) 191; Bowra (1930) 19; Owen (1946) 43; Dodds (1987) 12; Whitman (1958) 190; Lord (1960) 189; Reinhardt (1966) 221; Lesky (1967) 3; Lohman (1970) 227; Tsagarakis (1971) 260; Reeve (1973) 194-95; Mackenzie (1978) 10; Finley (1979) 130; Nagy (1979) 51, 108; Adkins (1982) 302; Lloyd-Jones (1983) 15; Thornton (1984) 46-59; Arieti (1986) 4; Beidelman (1989) 237; Yamagata (1991) 7; van Wees (1992) 132-33; Hainsworth (1993) 73; Lowenstam (1993) 99-100; Griffin (1995) 19-20; Wilson (1996) 19; Konstan (1997) 27. For detailed discussion, see below.

[30]The lack of a precise and consistent definition of Agamemnon's offer by commentators and translators suggests that Homeric criticism and lexicography alike have been largely dominated by usage outside of Homer and by traditional interpretation of the gifts and, consequently, suffer from a lack of typological clarity. There is, in fact, little or no observable consistency in the rendering of *apoina* and *poinē* in most translations of the *Iliad* into modern English. Cf. Mazon's translation of 9.120, which renders *aperisi' apoina* "immense rançon." It is not clear, however, from Mazon's discussion elsewhere (1942), that he regards the "rançon" as other than compensation for damage.

[31]Allen (1924) 191.

[32]Bowra (1930) 19.

[33]Owen (1946) 43; Whitman (1958) 190.

that Agamemnon's gifts are *poinē* for damage he inflicted when he seized Briseis. Karl Reinhardt calls the gifts "Genugtuung."[34] Albert Lord comes close to my position when he refers to Agamemnon's gifts as "ransom" because of the parallel with the Chryses story pattern; although he elsewhere identifies them as compensation for damage (a "just return").[35] Mary Margaret Mackenzie's outline of the terms of the exchange also has it correspond to an exchange of the *poinē*-type.[36] Hugh Lloyd-Jones identifies Agamemnon's gifts as "enormous compensation" that serves as a material expression of his regret.[37] James Arieti declares the gifts "full and magnificent indemnity."[38] The most recent commentaries on *Iliad* 9 also do not depart from this basic supposition. Christopher Wilson describes Agamemnon's offer as "recompense," and translates *apereisi' apoina* in 9.120 as "unlimited reparation."[39] Emmet Robbins is an exception to the general rule; he notes that Agamemnon offers *apoina* to Achilleus to return to battle.[40] Scholars in the field of ancient law are more precise in the language they apply to Agamemnon's gifts, although the

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[34]Reinhardt (1966) 221.

[35]Lord (1960) 189.

[36]Mackenzie (1978) 10: Achilleus gains *timē* from Agamemnon's compensatory gifts; Agamemnon loses *timē* by giving him the gifts and admitting he was partially wrong; Achilleus will be able to win additional *timē* by defeating Hektor (incidental to book 9); and Agamemnon gains *timē* when Achilleus recognizes his superior *aretē*. Mackenzie recognizes that Achilleus is the overall loser because he still suffers loss of *timē* from the original injury (Agamemnon's *hubris*). She does not, however, follow through on the implications of her observation for Achilleus' *poinē* theme.

[37]Lloyd-Jones (1983) 15.

[38]Arieti (1986) 4.

[39]Wilson (1996) 19, 125. Cf. Hainsworth (1993) 73, and Griffin (1995) 19-20.

[40] Robbins (1991) 12. See below.

Iliadic thematic typology of *apoina* and *poinē* has still gone unnoticed.[41] In sum, previous scholarship not only identified Agamemnon's offer as *poinē*, but it has also conflated *apoina* and *poinē*. As we shall see, the implications of that conflation for analyses of Achilleus' heroic identity and for critical interpretation of the *Iliad* are far-reaching.

Inasmuch as Agamemnon's offer has been almost uniformly presumed to be recompense for damage he inflicted on Achilleus, the conviction that Book 9 is integral to a coherent *Iliad* has presented critics with an interpretative crux. The poet must have Achilleus refuse Agamemnon's offer, or the poem would be truncated by a premature reconciliation. Nevertheless, critics of the Analytic and Unitarian schools could find little fault with Agamemnon's material compensation by the standards of Homeric society. Therefore, the enigma with which Unitarian critics have had to contend is why Achilleus refuses compensation. Leaf had anticipated the problem that Unitarians would face and the basis from which they would defend the text:

> If we accept this book as original, we must regard Achilles as really inexorable, wishing not for satisfaction for his wounded honour, for that is admittedly offered him in abundance, but for simple unreasoning vengeance.[42]

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[41]Gagarin (1986) 39-40, for instance refers to Agamemnon's gifts as a "settlement," and in particular a settlement that involves "restitution for that which one party has taken from another."

[42]Leaf (1892) 170. Cf. T. W. Allen's (1924) 191, suggestion that Achilleus refuses to settle for "proper compensation," but holds out for "infliction of equal pain" on Agamemnon. See also Schadewaldt (1966) 135: "Er. . . will keine andere als blutige Genugtuung und verhärtet sich nun auch gegen die Not der Seinen und den ernsten Zuspruch wohlwollender Freunde."

As Leaf clearly saw, Unitarians would turn to psychological explanations of Achilleus' behavior. To be sure, some Unitarian critics have suggested that Agamemnon's compensation is in fact faulty.[43] The condition of subordination that Agamemnon attaches to his compensation has been singled out as its most egregious failing, and one that could have only provoked Achilleus' ego.[44] This approach, however, remains essentially psychological, and it leaves the relationship between Agamemnon's "generous compensation" and his demand for subjugation vague.[45] The opinion of the overwhelming majority of Unitarian scholars has consequently been that Achilleus' refusal of compensation is 'unreasonable'.[46] In other words, it is viewed as incompatible with the social rules and values of Homeric society. Hence, Achilleus' refusal of

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[43]Bassett (1938) 195-99, for instance, denounces Agamemnon's compensation as unsatisfactory because it deals with the injury on a purely material plane. Bassett infers that Agamemnon's offer of material goods corresponds to his external concept of honor, whereas Achilleus' concept of honor is based on "a true estimate of worth." See also Whitman (1958) 30; Schadewaldt (1966) 81; Tsagarakis (1971) 262; Martin (1989) 119; Taplin (1992) 69, who marks Agamemnon's apology as not "sufficiently heart-felt." Cf. Blickman (1987) and Thornton (1984) 132, who assert that Agamemnon and/or the embassy does offer acceptable supplication and apology. For detailed discussion, see below.

[44]See for example Eicholz (1953) 44; Whitman (1958) 190; Schadewaldt (1966) 129 n. 4.

[45]See for example Mackenzie (1978) 10: "the price Achilleus must pay for his recompense is that he must acknowledge Agamemnon's *aretē*." Cf. Tarkow (1982); Redfield (1994) 105-6. For discussion of social-anthropological analysis, which does clarify the relationship between Agamemnon's gifts and his demand for subordination, see below.

[46]See for example Hainsworth's (1993) 57, conclusion that Achilleus' position in refusing a fair offer is unreasonable and impractical, but Achilleus' "soul is not the real world, and on his terms we can understand it." See also Lloyd-Jones (1983) 17, comment on Achilleus' refusal of "atonement": "There exists a code of behavior according to which a man is thought to be acting unreasonably if he rejects an offer of compensation, provided it is sufficient to ensure him the proper degree of *timē*."

Agamemnon's gifts has been construed as a renunciation of material compensation altogether.[47] Moreover, his supposed rejection of material compensation has been perceived as an expression of his disillusionment with the materialist values of his society and of an established code of behavior often identified as 'the heroic code'.[48] Achilleus' struggle is thus sometimes represented as an internal struggle between two value systems: an external and material valuation of honor represented by 'the heroic code' and embodied in Agamemnon's gifts, and an internal and essential (that is, "true") valuation of honor, not quantifiable in terms of goods, andrepresented uniquely by Achilleus.[49] Achilleus' refusal of Agamemnon's gifts in Book 9 *qua* refusal of the heroic conception of honor has even been identified as Homer's great contribution to our *Iliad*. William Sale expresses the position succinctly:

> . . . I want to argue that the analytical method gives us insight into how Homer transformed the character of Achilles from a rather simple person, angry over the loss of Briseis, who sulks in his tent until his friend is killed, and is ultimately forced to rejoin the heroic society he was angry with, to a man who is driven to question, and eventually to reject, the values upon which that society is based.[50]

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[47]See for example Owen (1946) 91; Schadewaldt (1966) 130: "Er hat aber andererseits auch mit keinem Wort auf die Frau and auf die in dieser Heldenwelt selbstverständliche reale Genugtuung verzichtet"; Reeve (1973) 195; Lloyd-Jones (1983) 17; Wyatt (1982) 256.

[48]See for example Whitman (1958); Sale (1963); Arieti (1986).

[49]See Hainsworth's (1993) 56-57, comment that Agamemnon "is made to offer more than could be reasonably rejected," and that Achilleus rejects it because he sets on his honour "an infinite value in material things." See also Bassett (1938) 195; Whitman (1958) 278-79; Arieti (1986).

[50]Sale (1963) 86, in reference specifically to Book 9. More recently, see Griffin's (1995) 8-9, argument that the addition of Book 9 was the "grand innovation" of the poet of the *Iliad*: "the refusal of Achilles to yield is the central fact in the creation of the *Iliad*

Unitarian and Neo-analytic interest in Book 9 has thus led to explanations of Achilleus' wrath and subsequent rejection of 'compensation' as a moral, ethical, or psychological phenomenon.[51] These approaches to Achilleus' behavior have dominated twentieth-century Iliadic scholarship. They in fact anticipate and coincide with a period of popular disillusionment with materialist values and of burgeoning interest in psychology and psychoanalysis. Assumptions regarding Achilleus' 'internal motivation' have been generated primarily, however, from the fact that there seems to be no satisfactory explanation for Achilleus' apparent refusal of compensation outside of his singular vision or moral makeup. Achilleus is consequently either valorized as a paragon of devotion to transcendental values or adjudged "fallen from heroic standards of virtue." Either way, he is represented as a hero alienated utterly from the beliefs, social rules, and values of heroic society.[52] The

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from the traditional plot of the hero's withdrawal and triumphant return" (26). According to Griffin (19-20), when Achilleus cannot bring himself to accept any quantity of gifts (honor in tangible form), he is thereby made into an ambiguous figure, which constitutes the vital hinge in the plot. See also Reeve's (1973) argument that by having Agamemnon offer back Briseis with "abundant compensation," the poet traps himself in a corner: Achilleus must reject Agamemnon's offer, but cannot reject this offer as unjust; he therefore must "altogether discountenance the idea of material compensation."

[51]See for example Bowra (1930) 17, who reads the tragedy of Achilleus as "essentially moral," and therefore as implying a "series of values which must be largely the poet's own"; Whitman (1958); Schadewaldt (1966) 134-36, suggests that what Book 9 adds is the poet's exploration of the profound internal contradiction that is the essence of Achilleus. Schadewaldt further claims that the poet of the *Iliad* was "ein großer Entdecker des Neulandes der Menschenseele."

[52]See for example Arieti (1986) 15: "The alienation of Achilles is complete. It is an alienation caused in part by Agamemnon's folly in Book 1 and in part by the peculiar lot and sensitivity of Achilles. . ." See also Whitman (1958); Segal (1971);

notion of alienation likewise has considerable resonance in a modern context.

Sociological and anthropological methods applied to the study of traditional poetry offer a different, and in my view, more satisfactory, approach to Achilleus' refusal of Agamemnon's gifts. Anthropological analysis has, for example, helped clarify the relationship between material and non-material forms of *timē* in Homeric society. In particular, Thomas Beidelman has demonstrated that *timē* in material form and *timē* as social status neither exist in polar opposition nor are they woodenly equated; they are, instead, related in dynamic tension as part of a "traditional system of conflicting values."[53] Donlan, in his analysis of the heroic status economy as an analog to historical embedded economies, proposes that *timē* as status is indistinguishable from its material signs.[54] Thus to imagine that Achilleus rejects the material sign in favor of the immaterial essence is in social terms implausible.

Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital provides a sophisticated conceptual model for mapping the relation that Beidelman and Donlan,

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[53]Beidelman (1989) 238. The work especially of Adkins, Gould, A. A. Long, Finley, Segal, Qviller, and I. Morris, provided the theoretical and historical groundwork for Beidelman. Mackenzie's (1978; 1981) work anticipates Beidelman's in some ways, although Beidelman does not indicate familiarity with her work. In the social-anthropological field, Beidelman is expressly indebted to the work of Mauss, Durkheim, Simmel, Sahlins, Bourdieu and Weiner.

[54]Donlan (1993) 160. Welsh (1994) 384, criticizes Donlan's sociology of a historically reconstructed audience. Donlan's historical claims do not, however, undermine the usefulness of his model for analyzing Homeric society. On this, see Chapters 1 and 7.

among others, describe between material and immaterial forms of *timē* in Homeric society.[55] As Bourdieu explains:

> By reducing this economy to its 'objective' reality, economism annihilates the specificity located precisely in the socially maintained discrepancy between the 'objective' reality and the social representation of production and exchange. It is no accident that the vocabulary of the archaic economy is entirely made up of double-sided notions that are condemned to disintegrate in the very history of the economy, because, owing to their duality, the social relations that they designate represent unstable structures which inevitably split in two as soon as the social mechanisms sustaining them are weakened.[56]

I will suggest that it is not Achilleus who breaks up the "double-sided" notion of *timē*, but the reader for whom the social mechanisms to sustain the duality no longer exist.

Sociological analysis moreover demonstrates that Agamemnon's gifts are part of a strategy of domination in a social system in which rank is essentially fluid and under constant negotiation. Agamemnon's gifts constitute, in fact, a "gift-attack against Achilleus."[57] Although Beidelman does not question the classification of Agamemnon's gifts as compensation, he argues that they could not be accepted as such within the conventions of the heroic social system, because they constitute "subordinating compensation."[58] Donlan points out that interpretations

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[55]See Bourdieu (1977; 1980; 1984a; 1986; 1992). In brief, Bourdieu asserts that various forms of capital, including material forms, are converted to symbolic capital (status) through cultural strategies of misrecognition. For detailed discussion, see Chapter 1.

[56]Bourdieu (1990) 113.

[57]Donlan (1993) 164; see also Beidelman (1989).

[58]Beidelman (1989) 237. See also Redfield (1994) 15-16; Wilson (1996) 19.

which regard Agamemnon's gifts as either contributing to Achilleus' *timē* or as a bribe reveal a lack of understanding of the "sociological 'language' of gifts."[59] By showing how Achilleus' rejection of gifts is consistent with the status economy of heroic society, social-anthropological analysis seriously undermines the "material/essential" polarity as an explanation for Achilleus' "great refusal" and, consequently, for his heroic identity.[60]

It is possible to corroborate and build upon the sociological approach to Book 9 with a typological analysis of Agamemnon's gifts which will demonstrate that Achilleus' refusal is fully explicable within the social rules and values of heroic society.[61] Put simply, it is possible to show that Agamemnon does not offer Achilleus compensation for damage. As a consequence, Achilleus does not reject compensation as scholars have traditionally conceived of it, that is, as *poinē*. What Agamemnon offers and Achilleus rejects is *apoina* for Achaian lives. While the difference may seem to be a fine one, it rests on a significant difference in the social-symbolic function of the two typologies of compensation in Homeric society. I will suggest that psychologizing or moralizing interpretations of Achilleus, which rest on his rejection of material compensation and materialist values, are no longer necessary; they are

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[59]Donlan (1993) 165 n. 24.

[60]Social-anthropological analysis aims to furnish an account of a character's actions based on social or anthropological models; it thus generally avoids the impulse, common to moralizing interpretations, to evaluate Achilleus' and Agamemnon's actions as right or wrong.

[61]I reiterate that what I mean by 'Homeric society', or, heroic society, is the society depicted in the *Iliad*.

arguably no longer even tenable. The Achilleus of our *Iliad* is torn by social rather than psychological conflict.

6.2 AGAMEMNON'S OFFER OF *APEREISI' APOINA* (9.1-181)

The awful nod of Zeus that shook Olympos (1.528-30) seems not to have affected events on the Trojan plain up to Book 8. It is only after Zeus weighs the two *kēre* of the Trojans and the Achaians, and the *kēres* of the Achaians sink (8.69-73), that Zeus thunders and the Achaians flee in the grip of terror.[62] Darkness falls untimely for the Trojans on that day, but for the Achaians it brings a brief respite (8.485-88). Both sides anticipate that the coming day will decide the issue of the war. The confidence and light emanating from the Trojan camp (8.553-54) renders stark the dread that settles on the Achaian ships. Thus, as Book 9 opens, the dispirited Achaians are pinned behind a wall that will not long protect them against the Trojan onslaught. Agamemnon is in tears. Summoning the host, he delivers a speech they have heard before:[63]

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[62] The scale episode raises the vexed question of Zeus' relation to fate. Adkins (1960) 17-25, regards the relation as ambiguous in the *Iliad*. He suggests that *Il.* 8.69-73 illustrates a power over which Zeus has no control in the *Iliad*, the *kēres* or fates of death. Adkins observes that elsewhere in the poem, however, Zeus apparently can override an individual's *moira* of death (22.178-80), though to do so does not meet with the approval of the other Olympians. Other scholars (for example Grube [1952] 4) argue that fate is always subject to the will of Zeus; the scales are thus no more than the concrete symbol of the irrevocable decision of Zeus. Cf. Nagy (1979) 81-82 §25n2, on the relationship between Zeus, fate, and the traditional plot of the *Iliad*.

[63] Griffin (1995) 77, argues from 9.17 (ὦ φίλοι 'Αργείων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες) that Agamemnon appears to be addressing the chiefs only and not the mass of men. The gathering is patently a public assembly, however, as the remove to private council makes clear.

Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτῃ ἐνέδησε βαρείῃ
σχέτλιος, ὃς πρίν μέν μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν [64]
20 Ἴλιον ἐκπέρσαντ' εὐτείχεον ἀπονέεσθαι,
νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατο, καί με κελεύει [65]
δυσκλέα Ἄργος ἱκέσθαι, ἐπεὶ πολὺν ὤλεσα λαόν.
οὕτω που Διὶ μέλλει ὑπερμενέϊ φίλον εἶναι, [66]
ὃς δὴ πολλάων πολίων κατέλυσε κάρηνα
25 ἠδ' ἔτι καὶ λύσει· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον.
ἀλλ' ἄγεθ' ὡς ἂν ἐγὼ εἴπω πειθώμεθα πάντες·
φεύγωμεν σὺν νηυσὶ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν·
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι Τροίην αἱρήσομεν εὐρυάγυιαν.
(9.18-28)

Agamemnon attributes the plight of the Achaians to Zeus, who has bound him up in *atē* (9.18). What Agamemnon means by *atē* is not developed in this context; he is arguably not using *atē* in reference to the quarrel with Achilleus. William Wyatt's suggestion that *atē* in this speech consists in "an unrealized attempt to take Troy," or almost the equivalent of "deception," seems reasonable.[67] The consequence of *atē*, in any case, is not in doubt: Agamemnon despairs of taking Troy; he concludes that Zeus has bidden him return home, his own *kleos* besmirched, but at least with the army still largely intact. As a result of the Achaian rout,

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[64]I read πρίν (=1.122) with the Vulgate and in agreement with van Thiel; Aristarchus read τότε, as do Mazon and Allen (1920).

[65]One papyrus and codex C read ἄτην for ἀπάτην; ἀπάτην is the reading chosen by most modern editors.

[66]Lines 23-25 were athetized by Aristophanes and Aristarchus. Griffin (1995) 78, suggests they are not appropriate here, though they are at 2.116-118; he concludes, however, that the crux is insoluble. In place of 23-31, Zenodotus reads ἤτοι ὅ γ ' ὣς εἰπὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἕζετο θυμὸν ἀχεύων | τοῖσι δ' ἀνιστάμενος μετέφη κρατερὸς Διομήδης. Bolling (1950) reads with Zenodotus; most modern editors, however, including van Thiel, Mazon, and Allen (1920) read as above.

[67]Wyatt (1982) 250.

Agamemnon has incurred a substantial loss in *timē*; he stands to lose even more.

Agamemnon's speech is nearly a verbatim repetition of the one he gave to the assembly the morning after the deceptive dream.[68] At that time he spoke the words in anticipation of objections that were not forthcoming. In Book 9, however, the Greek troops are dispirited after suffering a significant defeat, and Hektor is encamped on the Trojan plain. It would seem on this occasion that he speaks in earnest, in which case it is highly ironic that only now does he elicit the response he hoped for earlier.[69] As Bruce Heiden observes, however, Agamemnon's speech conveys a mixed message.[70] The reminders of Zeus' earlier promise of success and of the cities he has already destroyed (9.19-20, 24-25) furnish incentive for the Achaians to stay, as does the prospect of returning home *duskleos* (9.22). In contrast, the assertion that Zeus deceived Agamemnon and now commands him to return, and the claim that the Achaians will not take Troy, say "go home."[71] Whether Agamemnon intends it or not,

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[68]9.18-28 = 2.111-118 + 139-41. Hainsworth (1993) 61, contends it is implausible that Agamemnon is represented as deliberately using the same words he had used in his earlier speech: "As far as concerns Agamemnon therefore the repetition must be understood to be accidental." It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the poem depicts Agamemnon as striving for different ends with the same speech, and failing on both occasions.

[69]Bowra (1930) 94, affirms that Agamemnon "is serious this time"; see also Stanley (1993) 110; Wilson (1996) 210.

[70]Heiden (1991). De Jong (1987) 190, suggests that Agamemnon's failure in performance of speech is typical of his general lack of leadership; cf. Martin (1989) 116.

[71]Heiden (1991) 6: "Agamemnon's διάπειρα therefore places the elements of an exhortation to persevere and prevail *in the context* of an exhortation to succumb and return. It would seem that the poets of the *Iliad* depicted Agamemnon as hoping his listeners (either the other princes, the Achaian troops, or both) will dismantle his speech,

the ambiguity in the speech enables Diomedes to construct an argument against it, which he does (9.32-49). Agamemnon here unwittingly accomplishes his earlier objective in Book 2: in that the Greeks have insisted on remaining at Troy, Agamemnon is in a position to distribute the blame in case of failure, but still garner the credit in case of victory.[72] When the assembly rises up in support of Diomedes, however, Nestor moves the debate to private council. It is patently clear to Nestor that Diomedes' project is not only incomplete (9.56), it is fatally flawed: Troy will not be taken without Achilleus.

In the more intimate setting of a council of Achaian leaders designed to allow Agamemnon to save face, Nestor reminds him of the damage he perpetrated against Achilleus. Inasmuch as Nestor will hold Agamemnon responsible for the *loigos* and require that he give *timē* to Achilleus, his speech could incite the same reaction from Agamemnon as Kalchas' had.[73] Nestor, therefore, begins his speech by upholding the symbolic value of the mainstays of Agamemnon's position of superiority: he is a sceptre-bearing *wanax* over many men (1.97-99).[74] Nestor's quarrel

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taking the elements of his exhortation to persevere out of their immediate context, and with them construct an argument for remaining and fighting on." Heiden does not explicitly apply his conclusion about the *diapeira* to the speech in Book 9, but his argument supports doing so.

[72]See for example Sheppard (1966) 27 and Owen (1947) 21.

[73]On this, see Chapter 4. Nestor has, however, arguably seized the moment because he senses Agamemnon is ready to listen.

[74]See also Nestor's public acclamation of Agamemnon at 9.69: σὺ γὰρ βασιλεύτατός ἐσσι. Cf. Hesiod fr. 144.1-3 (West): ὃς βασιλεύτατος †γένετο θνητῶν βασιλήων | καὶ πλείστων ἤνασσε περικτιόνων ἀνθρώπων | Ζηνὸς ἔχων σκῆπτρον· τῶι καὶ πολέων βασίλευεν.

is only with Agamemnon's rash, and ultimately disastrous, conduct toward Achilleus:

ἐξ ἔτι τοῦ ὅτε διογενὲς Βρισηΐδα κούρην
χωομένου Ἀχιλῆος ἔβης κλισίηθεν ἀπούρας
οὔ τι καθ' ἡμέτερόν γε νόον· μάλα γάρ τοι ἔγωγε
πόλλ' ἀπεμυθεόμην· σὺ δὲ σῷ μεγαλήτορι θυμῷ
110 εἴξας ἄνδρα φέριστον, ὃν ἀθάνατοί περ ἔτισαν,
ἠτίμησας, ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχεις γέρας· ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν
φραζώμεσθ' ὥς κέν μιν ἀρεσσάμενοι πεπίθοιμεν [75]
δώροισίν τ' ἀγανοῖσιν ἔπεσσί τε μειλιχίοισι.
(9.106-113)

The premise of Nestor's remonstration and proposal is that the Achaians are in desperate straits because Achilleus is absent from the fighting; and Achilleus is absent because Agamemnon deprived him of *timē* (*ētimēsas*, 1.110). This account of matters might go without saying: Achilleus had threatened publicly that Hektor would wreak destruction on the Achaians because Agamemnon had not given *timē* to the *aristos Achaiōn*.[76] Nevertheless, *pothē* for Achilleus, which Achilleus had projected would come upon the Achaians (1.240), is not displayed by Agamemnon, who ascribes the grave circumstances simply to Zeus-sent *atē*.[77] Nestor must reassert the connection between the seizure of Briseis

[75]I read πεπίθοιμεν with van Thiel and Mazon. Allen (1920) and Bolling (1950) read πεπίθωμεν (Aristarchus' text).

[76]1.239-44. The external audience, of course, knows about Zeus' nod of assent to Thetis' request.

[77]See Wyatt (1982) 250: "Agamemnon knows that something is amiss because the army is suffering reverses. He does not or cannot, however, recognize the true source of the difficulty, namely that Achilles is not there. And the reason for Achilles' absence is of course Agamemnon's insulting him in Book I." Hainsworth (1993) 73, contends that, although Agamemnon has already realized the quarrel with Achilleus is impeding his conquest of Troy (2.370-80), now it is clear to him that it has put victory in question altogether. As we have seen, however, Agamemnon does not show evidence that this is 'clear' prior to Nestor's rebuke.

and the rout of the Achaians in order to induce Agamemnon to take appropriate action to bring Achilleus back into the fighting. Nestor defines the loss Achilleus has suffered in the same terms Achilleus used in his speech to Thetis: *ētimēsas* (9.111); *kourē* (9.106) and *geras* (9.111).[78] Moreover, he assigns responsibility for the damage to Agamemnon alone.[79]

Nestor narrates Achilleus' theme in a manner that evokes Chryses' *poinē* theme. *Ētimēsen* (9.111) echoes both Kalchas' (1.93) and the narrator's (1.11) language for the damage Agamemnon had inflicted on Chryses. The public meaning of the plague has been that Agamemnon dishonored the priest and angered Apollo by refusing to release Chryses' daughter for *apoina,* and that Apollo consequently inflicted a *loigos* on the Achaians (1.93-100).[80] The Achaians appease Apollo and gain an end to the *loigos* by returning the girl *anapoinos* and offering a hekatomb to the god. For his part, Agamemnon attempts to script Achilleus into his own role by depriving him of the spear-bride Briseis. Achilleus, however, successfully scripts himself as Chryses, by his withdrawal and successful appeal to Zeus to punish Agamemnon with the loss of his men. Although

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[78]Cf. ἠτίμησας. ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχεις γέρας, 9.111, and ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας, 1.356. See also Thersites' accusation: ὃς καὶ νῦν 'Αχιλῆα ἕο μέγ' ἀμείνονα φῶτα | ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας (2.239-40).

[79]See also 9.106· ἔβης κλισίηθεν ἀπούρας. Agamemnon himself did not go to Achilleus' hut, but he ordered the matter done, contrary to Nestor's advice.

[80]The narrator (1.8-11), Achilleus (1.370-84), and Chryses (1.451-56) all concur with Kalchas on this point. The strategy of *tisis*, as we have already seen, was to give *timē* to Chryses and to restore his daughter by diminishing Agamemnon's *timē*. On this, see Chapter 4.

he avoids overt reference to the incident with Chryses, Nestor exploits the similarity between the situations in order to advance his plan, and in so doing tacitly accepts Achilleus' success. Whereas in Chryses' theme it is Apollo who is angry and brings the *loigos,* Nestor ascribes anger to Achilleus. Nestor thus configures Achilleus' *poinē* theme in the same way as Achilleus himself had (1.380-81): he conflates Chryses, whose *kourē* Agamemnon had taken, with Apollo, whose anger must be appeased in order to bring an end to the *loigos.* Given the parallel he evokes between Achilleus and Chryses/Apollo, Nestor's proposal seems self-evident (9.113): Agamemnon should give Achilleus impressive gifts (*dōroisin aganoisin*) accompanied by soothing words (*epea meilikhia*).[81]

The gifts as Nestor recommends them correspond typologically to a payment of *poinē.* Agamemnon should lose *timē* in the exchange and Achilleus should gain it. The *epea meilikhia* Nestor requires of Agamemnon would ensure the appropriate transfer of *timē.* Gifts could transfer *timē* to either Achilleus or Agamemnon. Consequently, the meaning of the social-symbolic transaction must be defined by discourse. If Agamemnon returns the *kourē* and additional gifts, accompanied by *epea meilikhia,* and if Achilleus accepts, the disequilibrium created by Agamemnon's damage would be corrected. Achilleus' *tisis* having accomplished its purpose, he could be expected—according to the

[81]Lattimore translates *epessi meilikhioisi* as "words of supplication," which may convey the spirit in which the gifts were to be offered, though the *epea meilikhia* is not used of supplication in any of the discrete themes.

Chryses/Apollo model—to reenter the fighting and, as a result, bring an end to the *loigos*.

The external auditors have already been served notice that there will be no successful reconciliation just yet. Zeus has declared it fated (*thesphaton esti*, 8.477) that Achilleus would reenter the fighting only when it takes place among the ships over the fallen Patroklos (8.470-83). Nestor's efforts to continue 'writing' Achilleus' *poinē* theme in accordance with that of Chryses would bring the poem to a premature end, contrary to the *Dios boulē*. The Homeric audience would be waiting to hear not if but how the *Dios boulē* prevails. They would not have to wait very long, for Agamemnon's reformulation of the gifts derails Nestor's plan.

Agamemnon formally acknowledges the correlation between his dire circumstances and the quarrel.[82] He echoes Nestor's use of *etisan* at 9.110, and uses it to explain why Zeus is subduing (*damasse*, 9.118) the Greeks. So much of Nestor's strategy succeeds. He then, however, replaces *atimaō* with *atē* so as to mitigate his own responsibility. His formulation even leaves it open that Zeus sent *atē* to him as part of his strategy of giving *timē* to Achilleus. He sums up the situation, which Nestor has just described in terms of *atimaō*, as *atē*:

115 ὦ γέρον οὔ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατέλεξας·
ἀασάμην, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀναίνομαι. ἀντί νυ πολλῶν
λαῶν ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ ὅν τε Ζεὺς κῆρι φιλήσῃ,
ὡς νῦν τοῦτον ἔτισε, δάμασσε δὲ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν.
(9.115-18)

[82]Agamemnon pointedly does not refer to Achilleus by name in this speech.

As in the earlier passage, scholars have discussed at length the implications of Agamemnon's use of *atē*.[83] Lesky demonstrated that by the principle of double-motivation Homer can ascribe human action to divine influence without eliminating human responsibility for action.[84] Nevertheless, John Bryan Hainsworth and Jasper Griffin, in two recent commentaries on *Iliad* 9, contend that Agamemnon's use of *atē* does, in fact, constitute an attempt to palliate his conduct in the quarrel.[85] Most scholars would agree that, even if the appeal to *atē* allows Agamemnon to save face to some extent, it does not fully absolve him of 'responsibility'.[86]

Achilleus assuredly did not intend for Agamemnon to be relieved of 'responsibility' for the debacle that resulted from Achilleus' withdrawal (1.411-12). Instead, he hoped to diminish Agamemnon's *timē* until he recognized his mistake in depriving Achilleus of *timē*, and returned the girl together with appropriate compensation for his insult. Achilleus' strategy of *tisis* has succeeded in diminishing Agamemnon's *timē*. Adkins concludes that Agamemnon consequently accepts responsibility to "recompense" Achilleus for the insult.[87] Donlan agrees that this is what the social rules of Homeric society require: "What is required by custom, let us be clear, is for him to return Briseis with a public apology and a

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[83]See for example Dodds (1951); Adkins (1960); Lesky (1961); Dawe (1968); Stallmach (1968); Wyatt (1982); Lloyd-Jones (1983); Stanley (1993) 111; Wyatt (1982).

[84]Lesky (1961); see also Adkins (1960)

[85]Hainsworth (1993) 73: "to ascribe an action to ἄτη is exculpatory"; Griffin (1995) 89: *atē* is always "an attempt to understand or palliate past conduct."

[86]See for example, Dodds (1987) 12; Adkins (1960) 52; Lloyd-Jones (1983) 10, 23; Wyatt (1982) 255-58;

[87]Adkins (1960) 52.

fitting compensatory gift."[88] As we have seen, the transfer of *timē*, as Nestor formulates the exchange, also corresponds typologically to a payment of *poinē*.

Agamemnon agrees to a material exchange, but his reformulation does not conform to the typology of *poinē*. He deploys none of the language typically associated with *poinē* (*poinē, tinō, apotinō*), nor does he admit damage for which the gifts are recompense. He nowhere concedes that his actions amount to *atimazein*. Agamemnon admits only *atē* and thereby evades responsibility for damage to Achilleus and for the resulting defeat of the Achaian *laoi*, which he will implicitly assign to Achilleus. He further manipulates the discourse so as to accept liability, or, obligation, as commander in chief, for preserving the lives of the defeated Achaian *laoi* (not to mention preserving his own *kleos*); in so doing, he invokes the typology of *apoina* (9.120):[89]

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέῃσι πιθήσας,
120 ἂψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ᾽ <u>ἀπερείσι᾽ ἄποινα</u>[90]
ὑμῖν δ᾽ ἐν πάντεσσι περικλυτὰ δῶρ᾽ ὀνομήνω

* * * *

ταῦτά κέ οἱ τελέσαιμι μεταλήξαντι χόλοιο.
δμηθήτω· Ἀΐδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἠδ᾽ ἀδάμαστος,
τοὔνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν ἔχθιστος ἁπάντων·

[88] Donlan (1993) 164.

[89] *Aresai* (9.120) could, as Donlan (1993)161, points out, refer to amends in an insult situation, but the use of *apoina* tells against it here. I suggest rather that Agamemnon refers to satisfying Achilleus for what he would lose by sparing Achaian lives. See below.

[90] 9.120 is omitted in one papyrus (205), but it is nowhere athetized by the Alexandrians. It is included by Bolling (1950) and by all modern editors.

160 καί μοι ὑποστήτω ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι
ἠδ' ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος εὔχομαι εἶναι.
(9.119-21, 157-61)

Agamemnon uses the single most significant recurring word group for battlefield "ransom" scenes in the *Iliad* to name his gifts: *apereisi' apoina* (9.120). This fact has attracted surprisingly little attention in the scholarship. Emmet Robbins notices that Agamemnon offers *apoina* to Achilleus to return to battle, and, further, that it is the single instance of a Greek's offer of ransom.[91] He stops short, however, of investigating the typology of Agamemnon's offer or the implications of it for Achilleus' refusal. Most critical interpretations proceed on the assumption that the gifts correspond to a payment of *poinē*.[92] Agamemnon's formulation, however, defines the gifts as an exchange aimed not at recompensing the original damage he inflicted on Achilleus, but at sparing the Achaians from the destruction that he represents Achilleus as now inflicting on them (9.118).

As we have seen, exchanges of *apoina* in the discrete themes presuppose a situation of hostility; never are *apoina* exchanged between *philoi*. *Apoina* are a conventional reaction to being cast into a position of dependence, whether by defeat in battle or capture; it is most frequently offered by a defeated warrior, on behalf of his father, in an effort to preserve his own life. As we have also seen, the father is not cast into a

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[91] Robbins (1990) 12.

[92] Hainsworth (1993) 73, for example indicates that Agamemnon "names ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα, recompense for the seizure of Briseis." For detailed discussion, see above.

position of dependence *per se*, although he has no power of coercion, but only the appeal of the exchange. The *apoina*, consequently, constitute tacit acknowledgment of the victor's position of superiority. In other words, the system dictates that accepting *apoina* should cost the victor none of his gains in *timē*.

The Greek defeat, narrated vividly in Book 8, and Agamemnon's use of *apereisi' apoina* would arouse the expectation, generated by the discrete themes, of an *apoina* theme. In fact, Agamemnon's offer of *apoina* does commence in such a way that it fulfills expectations that naturally adhere to deployment of the typology. Agamemnon, assuming the role of the father, begins to name the *apoina* he will give in an effort to preserve the lives of the Achaians, who have been defeated in battle: seven tripods; ten talents of gold; twenty cauldrons; twelve prize-winning race-horses; seven women of Lesbos, whom Achilleus himself had captured; and, not least, Briseis, with whom Agamemnon swears he has not slept. Moreover, if Troy is sacked, Achilleus may have all the gold and bronze he can load in his ship and twenty Trojan women.[93] Agamemnon's list goes on: if they return to Argos, Achilleus may be Agamemnon's son-in-law with his choice of three daughters to wed without a bride-price. In fact, Agamemnon claims he will *tiō* Achilleus like a son, like Orestes. To top it off, Agamemnon will give seven cities inhabited with men who will *tiō* Achilleus like a god.

[93]Cf. the terms of Achilleus' offer of three-and four-fold gifts to Agamemnon when Troy was plundered (1.127-29).

To the auditor, whose interpretation has been conditioned by the discrete themes, it becomes apparent, only a few lines into the theme, that Agamemnon is manipulating, even contravening, the typology of *apoina*. Agamemnon's catalog of *apoina* is unparalleled in the *Iliad*, both in detail and in sheer volume.[94] In the discrete themes, *apereisia* is a necessary fiction, because in fact the material goods offered are usually quite modest.[95] Agamemnon's excessive list, however, inverts the social function of *apoina*: the gifts would cease to represent status that Achilleus had earned and make it a function of Agamemnon's own largess. They would, moreover, place Achilleus under a heavy obligation to Agamemnon in a variety of ways.[96] At the same time, Agamemnon's *apoina* reasserts his claim to superiority. In fact, several of the items, by their very nature, consolidate his position of superiority in relation to Achilleus. The seven women of Lesbos (9.129-30) had been captured by Achilleus himself in a raid. The fact that Agamemnon had taken possession of them (*exelomēn*, 9.130), and is able to dispose of them as he wishes, is patent affirmation of his role as the one who co-opts and distributes *timai*. Even Agamemnon's return of Briseis may contain what

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[94]Agamemnon's largess is approached only by Priam's (24.228-35). On this, see Chapter 8.

[95]On this, see Chapter 3.

[96]See above and Chapter 3. See also Bourdieu (1977; 1990); Beidelman (1989); Donlan (1993) 160; *contra* van Wees (1992)104.

Martin has characterized as "an intrusive jibe": she is not such a desirable *geras* after all![97]

By means of an offer of *apoina,* Agamemnon is attempting to redefine his position in relation to Achilleus vis à vís the Chryses paradigm. Nestor has accepted Achilleus' appropriation of Chryses' *poinē* theme, in which Achilleus corresponds to Chryses, Briseis to Chryseis, Zeus/Thetis to Apollo, Agamemnon to Agamemnon, and the Achaians to the Achaians—just as he did in Book 1. Agamemnon, however, tries to reassign his own and Achilleus' roles. In Book 1 he cast Achilleus as the one who loses the girl; now he casts him in the role of Apollo (cp. Figures 4.5 and 6.1 below).[98] In both cases, Agamemnon's strategy is the same: he tries to preserve his own status by casting himself as the 'father' who offers *apoina* to ransom his army (previously Apollo's victims, and now Achilleus'), rather than as the perpetrator of damage who gives *poinē* to repay an insult (see Figure 6.1 below).



Figure 6.1: Agamemnon's *apoina* theme in relation to Achilleus

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[97]Martin (1989) 115-16, points out that it is characteristic of Agamemnon to insert flying speech wherever possible; see also Beidelman (1989) 238.

[98]I note that Achilleus is thereby again scripted into the position of his ritual antagonist in the poem. Cf. Figures 4.4 and 5.1.

The last items that Agamemnon names are situated in an undetermined future; they are, moreover, dependent on the sack of Troy (9.135-39) and a successful *nostos* to Argos (9.141-55).[99] In this way, Agamemnon makes Achilleus' *apoina*, which is offered to persuade him to reenter the fighting, dependent on his ensuring the plunder of Troy. Achilleus' *apoina* are thus conditional upon his participation in the *timē*-based fluid ranking system, which has been irreparably disabled by Agamemnon's conflation of systems, and upon his gaining a *nostos*, which he will claim he would forfeit by reentering the fighting (9.410-16).[100] Furthermore, as Donlan and Beidelman observe, Agamemnon's offer to make Achilleus his *gambros*, by giving him a daughter without bride-price, and to set him over seven villages is a standard motif of domination.[101] Agamemnon has not only positioned himself as 'father' in relation to the Achaians, he is trying to do so in relation to Achilleus. Agamemnon asserts that if Achilleus wants to be obeyed and given *timē* like a god (9.155-56), he will have to accept a dependent position in relation to Agamemnon.

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[99]Agamemnon vehemently rejected a similar proposal from Achilleus during the quarrel (1.127-29), because he regarded it as an attempt to cast him in a dependent position.

[100]For detailed discussion, see Chapter 7.

[101]Donlan (1993) 165, cites *Od.* 14.199-213 (Odysseus' Cretan tale) and *Il.* 13.363-82 (Othryoneus). Cf. 9.142. There is, in addition, ample evidence in Hittite documents that the marriage of a vassal to the suzerain's daughter sealed the subordination of the vassal. The language for the new relationship, 'father' and 'son' were virtually interchangeable with the terms 'master' and 'slave'. For Hittite documents, see Beckman (1996) 37, 45-46, 121.

Agamemnon not only transforms the offer of *poinē* prescribed by Nestor into one of *apoina*, and then deploys *apoina* as a gift-attack against Achilleus, but he also eschews *epea meilikhia*. In fact, as we have seen, refusal to offer such words is a necessary part of his strategy of transforming the offer. He neither supplicates Achilleus nor does he appeal to his *aidōs*, either of which would acknowledge Achilleus' "victory."[102] Agamemnon refuses to admit defeat; instead, he displaces the role of defeated warrior/son onto the Achaians. From the position he has arrogated to himself, that of father, Agamemnon makes an overt demand for Achilleus' subordination. He replaces *epea meilikhia* with: δμηθήτω. . . καί μοι ὑποστήτω ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι | ἠδ' ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος εὔχομαι εἶναι (9.158-61).

By naming his gifts *apoina*, Agamemnon intentionally takes no account of damage inflicted on Achilleus. He instead initiates a new theme and thereby leaves Achilleus' *poinē* theme unresolved. To add insult to insult, Agamemnon's offer of *apoina* is a measure reserved for relations that fall outside the bounds of *philotēs*. Agamemnon's gifts consequently suggest that, as he did when he seized Achilleus' *geras*, Agamemnon is even now treating Achilleus as an enemy. Agamemnon has, however, so configured the social-symbolic meaning of his gifts, that they will fail to compel Achilleus to reenter the fighting and ward off the *loigos* from the Achaians. In effect, Agamemnon has made an offer

[102]On *aidōs* as an appeal to restraint in victory, see Chapter 4.

Achilleus cannot but refuse. If Agamemnon's gifts are to be harnessed for the project of dominating Achilleus and enticing him back into the fighting, his offer must be brought into line with the conventions of heroic society. This task the embassy will do.

Chapter 7: The Embassy to Achilleus

ὦ πέπον ἦ μὲν σοί γε πατὴρ ἐπετέλλετο Πηλεὺς. . .
(*Iliad* 9.252)

So long as overt violence is collectively disapproved of. . .symbolic violence, gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such. . . that of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues honoured by the ethic of honour, presents itself as the most economical mode of domination because it best corresponds to the economy of the system.[1]

7.1 THE EMBASSY'S PROJECT

Nestor pronounces Agamemnon's gifts acceptable (δῶρα μὲν οὐκέτ' ὀνοστὰ διδοῖς Ἀχιλῆϊ ἄνακτι, 9.164). His praise, however, is subdued, considering the display Agamemnon has just made of his *apereisi' apoina*. More important, he disregards Agamemnon's assertion that the goods are *apoina* and explicitly refers to them as *dōra*; furthermore he ignores Agamemnon's imprudent demand that Achilleus acknowledge his superiority. Nestor apparently despairs of eliciting *epea meilikhia* from Agamemnon himself, but, as we shall see, he hopes to use the embassy to deploy them. Accordingly, Nestor sets about managing the details of an embassy to convey Agamemnon's offer to Achilleus.[2] Phoinix he appoints as leader, followed by Aias, Odysseus, and two heralds (9.165-72). Before the embassy leaves for Achilleus' shelter, Nestor gives them instructions to which the external audience is not privy:

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[1]Bourdieu (1990) 127.

[2]See Martin (1969) 61. Martin singles out praise and control as the Nestorian strategy.

τοῖσι δὲ πόλλ' ἐπέτελλε Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ
δενδίλλων ἐς ἕκαστον, Ὀδυσσῆϊ δὲ μάλιστα,
πειρᾶν ὡς πεπίθοιεν ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα
(9.179-81)

I suggest we can surmise Nestor's instructions from the strategy that Odysseus in fact adopts. It is therefore plausible that the substance of his instruction involves the *epea meilikhia*, which will be now be entirely up to the embassy. Nestor is thus represented as unwilling to let half of his proposal go unheeded, or to sanction Agamemnon's breach of social rules among the *philoi hetairoi*.[3] Given Nestor's characterization as a staunch (and believing) advocate of the heroic ethos, we may suppose that he urges the embassy to bring the meaning of Agamemnon's gifts into conformity with it.[4] Put another way, if Agamemnon's *apoina* are to be effective in persuading Achilleus, the embassy must disguise the true nature of the offer. Nestor's "glance," although it has attracted little attention in the scholarship, is telling. His pointed look at Odysseus seems privately to undermine his 'public' appointment of Phoinix as leader, and to stress Odysseus' role in the embassy.[5] Although Odysseus' traditional enmity with Achilleus might seem to disqualify him from any role in the embassy, much less from having special responsibility in it, I suggest that the opposite may be true.[6] Odysseus' traditional role as a

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[3]For discussion of Agamemnon's offer of *apoina* as a breach of social rules in Homeric society, see Chapter 6.

[4]For detailed discussion, see below.

[5]See Nagy (1979) 50-51.

[6]See Od. 8.75-81; cf Nagy's (1979) 42-58, argument that the tradition of a quarrel between Achilleus and Odysseus is not a late pastiche, but an epic tradition that contrasted their heroic identities in terms of *mētis* and *biē*.

figure of "cunning intelligence," or, a trickster, and his traditional enmity with Achilleus qualify him uniquely for the task of dissembling and for the embassy's mission; at the same time they doom him, in this poem, to fail.[7]

Jasper Griffin claims that all the heroes regard Agamemnon's offer as satisfactory in terms of the heroic code.[8] I suggest that, at the very least, none of the embassy did. Each of the embassy speeches is, as we shall see, an attempt to manage the discourse about Agamemnon's offer in order to make it culturally acceptable to Achilleus. The embassy's project, no less than Agamemnon's, is to dominate Achilleus, their status as Achilleus' *philtatoi hetairoi* notwithstanding. Whereas Agamemnon deployed gifts and an overt display of force in the project, the embassy deploys gifts and *epea meilikhia*:[9] they appeal to values and conventions of heroic society which they presume Achilleus shares, including the conventions of compensation. Achilleus, as we shall see, not only shares these conventions, he effectively appropriates them for his own project of resistance and domination.

Pierre Bourdieu calls the 'presumption' of shared values in the interest of domination "symbolic violence."[10] Symbolic violence is the

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[7]Cf. Cook (1995) 9; Nagy (1979) 51-2. Nagy observes that "the success of Odysseus in the Embassy would have entailed the failure of Achilles in his own epic."

[8]Griffin (1995) 21.

[9]Cf. Martin (1989) 20-21: ". . . *epea* in the system of Homeric diction represent the means of conducting social life; they participate in an economy of exchange." Cf. the heroic model of words and gifts in the Meleagros myth; see below.

[10]Bourdieu (1990) 122-34.

orthodoxy of conventional values and rules maintained and imposed as legitimate in the interest of a dominant group. Because the arbitrariness of orthodoxy is misrecognized, orthodoxy is 'recognized' as natural. In other words, it is taken for granted. Symbolic power thus does not and cannot operate by overt force. It is the "invisible" power of orthodoxy, wielded to impose the common sense of the social world and, thereby, to effect political violence, or domination. Symbolic violence succeeds, in part, because the one wielding it believes he or she is acting in good faith; the belief, and the rhetoric, must be that there is no intimidation. I hope to show that Bourdieu's notion of symbolic violence offers a useful conceptual model for interpreting the embassy speeches and Achilleus' response.

Nestor appointed three envoys and two heralds to convey an offer of gifts to Achilleus. As soon as the embassy departs, however, they are designated with dual forms (9.182-98). The issue of the duals has produced a lengthy debate which I will not rehearse here.[11] In what follows, I adopt the position, argued by Gregory Nagy, that the duals refer to Aias and Phoinix and, further, that the duals are generated by a traditional enmity between Odysseus and Achilleus.[12]

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[11]For a recent and succint survey of the problem and the primary approaches to resolving it, see Griffin (1995) 51-53; see also *inter alia* Motzkus (1964) 84-105; Segal (1968); Lohmann (1970) 227-31; Köhnken (1975); Burkert (1976); Thornton (1978); Gordesiani (1980); and Martin (1989) 235-7.

[12]Nagy (1979) 52-58.

In order to demonstrate that the internal auditors of Agamemnon's speech have fully understood its import, I will discuss how each of the embassy speeches masks the true nature of Agamemnon's offer. Further, I will show how the embassy reformulates Agamemnon's *apoina* theme, reconfigures Achilleus' own *poinē* theme, and deploys traditional *muthoi* and conventional relationships with the aim of inducing Achilleus to reenter the fighting. Finally, I will show that Achilleus' responses indicate his full recognition of the typology of Agamemnon's offer of *apoina*.

The *epea* that the embassy direct to Achilleus contain, as Nagy has pointed out, two codes.[13] They contain one message for the character-speakers, and another, of which the speakers themselves may not be aware, for Achilleus and the external auditors.[14] In other words, the character-speeches are shaped in performance to address the Homeric audience; they contain an embedded message about the death of Patroklos, which Achilleus does not acknowledge or even hear. The silent interaction of Patroklos with the embassy during the speeches draws attention to the embedded message, but only for the Homeric audience. For the purpose of investigating compensation as practice in Homeric society, I limit my discussion to the codes meant for the speakers, which is, as we shall see, what Achilleus also hears and to which he responds.

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[13]Nagy (1979) 80, 110; see also (108): "The words of Ajax are a code with one message for Ajax himself but with quite another message for the audience of our *Iliad*"; and Martin (1989) 81.

[14]Cf. Nagy (1979) 110.

When the embassy reaches Achilleus' shelter, he warmly welcomes two of them, arguably Phoinix and Aias, as *Akhaiōn philtatoi* (9.198). Although Achilleus regards Agamemnon as having violated *philotēs*, and though he arguably does not even acknowledge Odysseus' presence, he does not seem to consider himself entirely detached from the *philoi hetairoi*. Achilleus has Patroklos prepare a meal, which he shares with his guests. After the meal, Aias signals to Phoinix, who is the official leader of the embassy. Odysseus, however, notices it and usurps his speech, perhaps on direct orders from Nestor.

7.2 ODYSSEUS AND ACHILLEUS (9.225-429)

Odysseus' speech may be arranged in five sections as follows:[15]



Figure 7.1: Narrative arrangement of Odysseus' speech

[15]My divisions are compatible with Lohmann's (1970) 233-34: I. 225/51 Steh den Achaiern bei! Motivierung: Sie haben Hilfe nötig. II. 252/909 Lege deinen Zorn ab! Motivierung: 1. Erinnerung an die Mahnung des Peleus. 2. Geschenke Agamemnons. III. 300/6 Steh den Achaiern bei! Motivierung: Du selbst wirst dir Ruhm erwerben.

Odysseus begins by mentioning Agamemnon's name, thus ignoring, for his present purpose, the hostile relation that the offer of *apoina* and Achilleus' withdrawal both assume (9.225-28). He depicts the Achaians' desperate circumstances in personal and vivid terms (9.229-51). He, in fact, frames his account of Trojan victories (9.232-44) with first person plural verbs expressing fear for "our" lives if Achilleus does not rescue the army:[16]

> δείδιμεν· ἐν δοιῇ δὲ σαωσέμεν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι
> νῆας ἐϋσσέλμους, εἰ μὴ σύ γε δύσεαι ἀλκήν
> (9.230-31)

> ταῦτ' αἰνῶς δείδοικα κατὰ φρένα, μή οἱ ἀπειλὰς
> 245 ἐκτελέσωσι θεοί, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ αἴσιμον εἴη
> φθίσθαι ἐνὶ Τροίῃ ἑκὰς Ἄργεος ἱπποβότοιο.
> ἀλλ' ἄνα εἰ μέμονάς γε καὶ ὀψέ περ υἷας Ἀχαιῶν
> τειρομένους ἐρύεσθαι ὑπὸ Τρώων ὀρυμαγδοῦ.
> (9.244-48)

By mentioning Hektor's reliance on Zeus, Odysseus (or the poet speaking metatextually) may be alluding to the success of Achilleus' strategy of *tisis*. He nonetheless identifies Achilleus' interests with those of the Achaians.[17] If Achilleus does not rescue the Achaians, he will share in their lot: he will have *akhos* without *akos*.[18] Odysseus thus paints the picture of the Achaian rout darkly, but he uses insider language to figure Achilleus into the picture as one of "us," rather than as an enemy to

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[16]Martin (1989) 123, notes that the use of first person plurals is characteristic of Odysseus' speech.

[17]See Hainsworth (1993) 93.

[18]For discussion of the embedded message "for" Achilleus and to the Homeric audience, see Nagy (1979) 80.

whom *apoina* must be given (9.247-51).[19] Although Odysseus' inclusiveness falls short of an appeal to *philotēs*, it assumes that a social bond is intact between Achilleus and the Achaians, even if the bond is one of expediency.

From a relationship involving *hetairoi* Odysseus moves to familial relationships (9.252-59). He 'reminds' Achilleus of his father's advice to restrain his *thumos* and leave off from *eris*: if Achilleus takes pity on the Achaians, they will *tiō* him like a god (9.254-58).[20] He consequently replaces Agamemnon's offer with one that is immediately available and presumably more desireable. Odysseus' recollection has little to do with Peleus' actual words; it has everything to do with Odysseus' ability to construct a memory by which he can manipulate Achilleus.[21] He thus attempts to exploit Achilleus' relationship with Peleus in order to legitimate the message of subordination that he dares not communicate directly from Agamemnon. Nevertheless, whereas it is true that both attempt to use paternal authority to persuade Achilleus to restrain his *thumos*, accept gifts, and return to battle, in other respects Agamemnon and Odysseus differ. Agamemnon demands that Achilleus acknowledge

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[19]For my present purposes, it is irrelevant whether by 'enemy' we mean *ekhthros* or *polemios*.

[20]Stanley (1993) 353 n. 14, suggests that Odysseus balances Agamemnon's excessive list of goods with evocation of advice from an elder, an argument that Achilleus has already rejected when it came from Nestor in Book 1. Willcock (1977) 46, without explanation assigns lines 254-58 to Phoinix rather than Odysseus.

[21]Martin (1989) 61.

his 'paternal' authority, while Odysseus attempts to deploy acknowledged paternal authority as a persuasive device.

Only then does Odysseus introduce the gifts that Agamemnon will give if Achilleus puts away his anger (*metallēxanti kholoio*, 9.261). Odysseus rehearses Agamemnon's entire list of gifts, but he masks the typology by replacing *apereisi' apoina* (9.120) with *axia dōra* (9.261).[22] He further omits Agamemnon's overt demand for subordination (cf. 9.158-61). Instead, he brings the offer to a close by repeating the condition on which the gifts may be had (*metallēxanti kholoio*, 9.299). Conceding that Agamemnon's gifts may be ineffective because Agamemnon himself is hateful to Achilleus (9.300-301), Odysseus appeals once again to familial relationships (9.302-3). He evokes memory of Achilleus' father by appropriating to himself the language he had formerly put in Peleus' mouth: if Achilleus takes pity on the Achaians, they will *tiō* him like a god (9.302-3). Odysseus concludes his speech by returning to the theme of common interest with which he began (9.303-306).[23] This time he appeals to Achilleus' common interest with one's *hetairoi*: if Achilleus returns to the fighting, he might kill Hektor and win great *kudos* among them.[24]

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[22]See also Nestor's use of *dōra* to refer to the gifts Agamemnon should send (9.113).

[23]Cf. Lohmann (1970) 234: "Der dritte Teil [9.300-306] . . . weist deutlich thematisch, aber auch in wörtlichen Anspielungen, auf den ersten zurück." See also Hainsworth (1993) 99.

[24]Stanley (1993) 112, observes that Odysseus replaces Agamemnon's demand for subordination with an appeal to *kudos*.

Odysseus seems to have repaired Agamemnon's culturally objectionable offer of *apoina*. He narratively wraps Agamemnon's *apoina* in insider language by appealing to relationships—*hetairoi* and paternal—which he regards as still intact and as having a claim on Achilleus.[25] He mitigates the gift-attack to some extent by adding a disclaimer: the gifts are not even necessary (9.300-301).[26] Although the gifts remain the central element of the offer, their social meaning has been changed by the *epea meilikhia* that surround them. They are consequently stripped of their typology and attendant conditions. In sum, Odysseus' speech neatly reverses the import of the speech it replaces and, moreover, largely eliminates Agamemnon from the picture.[27] In the course of bringing Agamemnon's offer into conformity with the social rules of heroic society, however, Odysseus expunges any reference to compensation. His speech contains no compensation theme, no recognition of the damage Agamemnon inflicted, and no resolution to Achilleus' *poinē* theme. Odysseus therefore fails even more completely than Agamemnon to reckon adequately with Achilleus' unsettled damages.

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[25]It is often suggested that Odysseus' speech is impersonal and fails to appeal to the relationship of *philotēs* sufficiently to be persuasive to Achilleus. See for example Reinhardt (1961) 221-2; Lohmann (1970) 234-36; Hainsworth (1993) 94.

[26]In Book 19, however, Odysseus will insist on a public exchange of the *apoina* (19.172-180).

[27]*Contra* views that Odysseus conveys Agamemnon's offer faithfully. See for example Lohmann (1970) 235: "Peinlich genau wiederholt der Redner die von Agamemnon in der Gerontenversammlung vorgetragene Liste und beweist damit seinen offiziellen Status als 'Delegierter' und 'Beauftragter'. . ."; also Donlan (1993) 166.

Despite Odysseus' clever shroud, Achilleus responds to the typology of Agamemnon's offer rather than to Odysseus' rhetoric.[28] His first words unmask Odysseus' dissembling:

> ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν
> ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ
> (9.312-13)

Taplin suggests that Achilleus' words refer to himself: Achilleus hates a man who says one thing and hides another in his heart; therefore he will say what is in his heart.[29] It is reasonable to suppose that Achilleus' words refer to himself in a positive aspect, and at the same time to Odysseus and Agamemnon in a negative aspect: he will speak truthfully; they, however, do not. If the foregoing analysis is sound, then it provides a significant validation of Nagy's argument that Achilleus criticizes Odysseus, by showing in what respect he criticizes him: Achilleus accuses Agamemnon of subterfuge involving a gift attack, and Odysseus of hiding the fact.[30]

Odysseus had eliminated both Agamemnon and the vexed issue of compensation for unresolved damage from his appeal to Achilleus. Achilleus, however, refuses to let Agamemnon, or the matter of damage that Agamemnon has inflicted, be discounted. He accordingly reasserts his complaint, set forth in the quarrel, about Agamemnon's abuse of the

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[28]Tarkow (1982) 33 n. 6, observes that although Odysseus tactfully omits Agamemnon's demand for subordination, Achilleus "seems to intuit them." Hainsworth (1993) 94, notes that Achilleus siezes "on the very point that Odysseus was careful to omit, the real attitude of Agamemnon"; he infers, however, that Achilleus is depicted as an "unreasonable young man to whom glory now means nothing." Cf. below.

[29]Taplin (1992) 70.

[30]See Nagy (1979) 52.

timē-based fluid system (9.315-334).[31] Achilleus alleges that there is no *kharis* in fighting (9.316).[32] Agamemnon has failed to distribute *timai* appropriately; instead, he has used his position of superiority to make it impossible for the heroes to earn material forms of *timē* by fighting and, thereby, to win status in relation to one another. The dynamic of warrior-society is, according to Achilleus, irreparably disabled. It will do Odysseus no good to appeal to him on the basis of common interest with the *hetairoi* as long as the system itself is incoherent. Put another way, Achilleus is not willing to fight without the possibility of earning *timē*, in both material and non-material forms. Hence, as long as Agamemnon is distributor and *timē* remains his to withhold or to bestow, it makes no sense for Achilleus to participate in the expedition.

Achilleus also refuses to let Odysseus eliminate the issue of the damage Agamemnon inflicted by publicly and forcibly taking Achilleus' *geras* (9.335-44). He links the seizure of Briseis to Agamemnon's general abuse of the *timē*-based system with the claim that Agamemnon has singled out Achilleus alone of all the *basilēes* for a raid (*heilet'*, 9.335).[33] Achilleus thereby reintroduces the language of hostility that Odysseus had suppressed; besides carrying out a raid against him, Agamemnon deceived him (*apatēse*, 9.334), insulted him (*ephubrizōn*, 9.368), and

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[31]For detailed discussion, see Chapter 5.

[32]Taplin (1992) 68, questions how Achilleus can still maintain that the *kharis*-compact remains spoiled or unsatisfied, following Agamemnon's offer of gifts.

[33]Cf. 11.697, where *haireō* (*heilet'*) is used of Neleus' cooptation of a portion of the booty taken in a revenge cattle-raid against Augeias. See Martin (1989) 173; see Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

wronged him (*ēliten*, 9.375).[34] In fact Achilleus asserts that Agamemnon's violation of *philotēs* is no less serious than Alexandros' violation of *xenia* when he robbed Menelaos of Helen. The implication is obviously that Achilleus is no less justified than the Atreidai in seeking to redress damage suffered:

τοῖσι μὲν ἔμπεδα κεῖται, ἐμεῦ δ' ἀπὸ μούνου 'Αχαιῶν
ἕλετ', ἔχει δ' ἄλοχον θυμαρέα· τῇ παριαύων
τερπέσθω. τί δὲ δεῖ πολεμιζέμεναι Τρώεσσιν
'Αργείους; τί δὲ λαὸν ἀνήγαγεν ἐνθάδ' ἀγείρας
'Ατρεΐδης; ἦ οὐχ 'Ελένης ἕνεκ' ἠϋκόμοιο;
340 ἦ μοῦνοι φιλέουσ' ἀλόχους μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
'Ατρεΐδαι; ἐπεὶ ὅς τις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐχέφρων
τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλέει καὶ κήδεται, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν
ἐκ θυμοῦ φίλεον δουρικτητήν περ ἐοῦσαν.
νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ἐκ χειρῶν γέρας εἵλετο καί μ' ἀπάτησε.
(9.335-44)

Achilleus overtly narrates his own *poinē* theme in relation to the Helen *poinē* theme by embedding the archetypal theme into his own:[35]

9.335-37	Agamemnon took his *alokhos thumarēs*
9.337-41	The Trojan war is *Helenēs henek'*
9.342-44	Agamemnon took his *geras* and deceived him

Figure 7.2: Narrative arrangement of 9.335-44

When Achilleus redefines the seizure of Briseis as loss of an *alokhos thumarēs* (9.337), he puts her in familial relationship to himself and,

[34]Martin (1989) 173, notes that Achilleus uses the conventions normally used for speaking about relations with outsiders when he talks about his own commander.

[35]On the relation of the Briseis pattern to the Helen pattern, see also Lord (1960) 190; Oka (1974).

thereby, relocates her from the sphere of prestige goods to that of family.[36] The mention of loss of an *alokhos* could of itself evoke the Helen *muthos*; Achilleus, however, mentions Helen explicitly in order to appropriate the archetypal *poinē* theme in support of his own demand. Why are the heroes fighting at Troy if not over an *alokhos*? Achilleus contends that, unless the Atreidai alone among men love their *alokhoi*, there is no difference between the *poinē* theme generated by the rape of Helen and the *poinē* theme generated by the seizure of Briseis. Put another way, Achilleus co-opts the Trojan War, now a public political undertaking, for his own private cause.[37] Figure 7.3 below, Achilleus' *poinē* theme, may be compared with Figures 7.4, the *poinē* theme involving Helen, and 7.5, Chryses' *poinē* theme, in order to observe the homology in the pattern of relations.

[36]Cf. Od. 23.323, the only other place in Homer where *alokhon thumarea* is found.

[37]For discussion, see Chapter 8 and Conclusion. On the linking of public and private causes in the Trojan War, see Mayer (1996) 13; cf. van Wees (1992) 174.



Figure 7.3: Achilleus' *poinē* theme



Figure 7.4: Archetypal *poinē* theme involving Helen



Figure 7.5: Chryses' *poinē* theme

Achilleus' "love" for Briseis, whom he calls his *thumarēs alokhos*, is a topic that has sparked considerable speculation. Taplin sees hints of a "special 'romantic' relationship between Achilleus and Briseis in Achilleus' reply to Odysseus.[38] He conjectures that Achilleus adds ἐκ θυμοῦ φίλεον (9.343) to make the point that his feelings go deeper than the official *philia* which any right-minded man should feel for his own wife. Sale also contends that the most serious insult Agamemnon inflicted was taking a woman who was "no mere *geras*, but a woman [Achilleus] loves."[39] Sale even infers it is as a result of this violation that Achilleus loses faith in the heroic system. Stanley also links Achilleus' "rejection of external forms in favor of essential value" to his love for Briseis:

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[38]Taplin (1992) 214-15. Taplin, in fact, concludes that Achileus' feelings for Briseis are more 'romantic' than those Agamemnon feels for his *kouridiē alokhos*.

[39]Sale (1963) 94.

> Achilleus' rejection of external forms in favor of essential value is perhaps most poignantly expressed in his assertion (341ff) that even though Briseis was a captive of war his feeling for her was genuine. . . . By asserting the emotional aspect of sexual partnership and insisting that a proper regard for it is characteristic of a good and prudent man. . . Achilleus implicitly condemns the values inherent in Agamemnon's earlier preoccupation with the social function of relationship as an indicator of status. . . in which, given parity of beauty and domestic skill, one female is interchangeable with another.[40]

Stanley does not, however, mention Achilleus' wish, after the death of Patroklos, that Briseis had been killed on the day he captured her (19.56-60). Taplin acknowledges the wish, but attempts to dismiss it with the somewhat facile remark that Achilleus "would rather she were dead than have regained her at this price."[41] It is my contention that the poem is less interested in representing Achilleus' 'true' feelings for Briseis—if, in fact, it shows us anything of his feelings for her—than in representing a struggle for dominance in which Briseis is a playing piece for Agamemnon and Achilleus alike. Moreover, the struggle for dominance waged "over" Briseis evokes the struggle for dominance waged "over" Helen. The location of women is, as we have seen, ambiguous in Homeric society. When it suits Achilleus' purpose, as it does in his response to the embassy, he defines Briseis in relation to himself as *alokhos*. As a consequence, he vastly augments the damage he can claim for her loss,

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[40]Stanley (1993) 112.

[41]Taplin (1992) 216. Sales (1963) 100 n. 5, in a note admits it is fair to ask what has happened to Achilleus' love for Briseis in Book 19: "Such Mediterranean rhetoric merely emphasizes his greater love for his companions than for her. . . ." Once again, we see an argument deriving from the psychologizing or spiritualizing strain of Unitarian scholarship.

and, moreover, the paradigm he can appropriate in his struggle for dominance. When, however, it suits Achilleus' purpose, as it does following the death of Patroklos, he can transfer Briseis quite easily back to the exchange order of prestige goods, or even wish that she were dead (19.56-60). Achilleus' conflict is over status; the woman is represented as merely the occasion.

The centerpiece of Achilleus' response to Odysseus (9.335-400) comprises a set of narrative doublets in which he reiterates the damage Agamemnon inflicted when he seized Briseis (9.335-44 and 367-69); a declaration that he will not participate in the expedition against Troy or in any *ergon* with Agamemnon (9.345-63 and 374-77); and a claim that he has many prestige goods, including women, and even a *kouridiē alokhos*, which are available to him in Phthia when and if he returns (9.364-67 and 378-400). I suggest, therefore, that we may view the narrative relationship between the parallel units as follows (Figure 7.6):[42]

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[42]For detailed structural analysis of Achilleus' speech, see Lohmann (1970) 236-45; Stanley (1993) 114.



Figure 7.6: Narrative arrangement of 9.335-400

I propose that, when Achilleus refers explicitly to the seizure of Briseis, he brings prior damage to bear on the present situation. Further, the pronouncement that he will not participate in the fighting and, consequently, rescue the Achaians, exposes both the fact and the intent of Agamemnon's offer of *apoina*. In fact, Achilleus describes his own wealth in Phthia with the same language that defeated Trojan soldiers commonly use to designate the *apoina* that their fathers will offer in exchange for their

lives (9.365-66).[43] I suggest that, to the auditor whose interpretation has been conditioned by the discrete themes, the arrangement of elements and the terminology contained in Achilleus' speech would evoke the mixed-type theme.[44] Achilleus discloses Agamemnon's offer as an exchange of *apoina*, and then disrupts Agamemnon's *apoina* theme by introducing a *poinē* theme for prior damage. Moreover, I contend it is in this thematic context that Achilleus' celebrated renunciation of Agamemnon's gifts must be read:

ἐχθρὰ δέ μοι τοῦ δῶρα, τίω δέ μιν ἐν καρὸς αἴσῃ.
οὐδ' εἴ μοι δεκάκις τε καὶ εἰκοσάκις τόσα δοίη
380 ὅσσά τέ οἱ νῦν ἔστι, καὶ εἴ ποθεν ἄλλα γένοιτο,
οὐδ' ὅσ' ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν ποτινίσεται, οὐδ' ὅσα Θήβας
Αἰγυπτίας, ὅθι πλεῖστα δόμοις ἐν κτήματα κεῖται,
αἵ θ' ἑκατόμπυλοί εἰσι, διηκόσιοι δ' ἀν' ἑκάστας
ἀνέρες ἐξοιχνεῦσι σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν·
385 οὐδ' εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε,
οὐδέ κεν ὣς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸν πείσει' Ἀγαμέμνων
πρίν γ' ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην
(9.378-87)

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[43]In fact, outside of the description of Hera's chariot in Book 5.720-32, the only passages in the *Iliad* in which *khalkos*, *khrusos*, and *sidēros* occur together are the *apoina* themes involving Adrestos (6.45-65, a mixed-type theme), Dolon (10.375-56), Peisandros and Hippolochos (11.122-47, a mixed-type theme), and Achilleus' rejection of Agamemnon's *apoina*.

Martin (1989) 203, points to the collocation of terms in Achilleus' speech and in battlefield ransom scenes. He infers that the connection between Achilleus' speech to the embassy and the battlefield ransom scenes is supplication. He concludes, accordingly, that Achilleus is manipulating the language of supplication scenes not to make supplication, but to reject the supplication being made by the embassy. I note, however, that neither Agamemnon nor the embassy has supplicated Achilleus, and propose that Achilleus is manipulating the language of themes of the *apoina*-type to reject *apoina*.

[44]For mixed-type themes in the *Iliad*, see 6.45-65; 11.122-47; 21.34-135; see Chapter 2 ad loc.

Achilleus declares Agamemnon's gifts hateful.[45] Agamemnon could, in fact, offer him all the prestige goods that might be collected from the wealth of the world, and he would still not be able to persuade Achilleus to rescue the Achaians, until he paid him back all his own heart-rending *lōbē*.

A long debate has been waged over the meaning of πρίν γ' ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην (9.387). The question concerns whether Achilleus is requiring that Agamemnon pay him back for all his heart-rending outrage, or that he literally pay back the outrage. A dispute over syntax has led to a dispute over the language of Achilleus.[46] Adam Parry, for example, argues that repayment of *lōbē* is impossible, and therefore, an abuse of traditional language. He infers that Achilleus resorts to such abuse because he has "no language with which to express his disillusionment."[47] Reeve disagrees that Achilleus is abusing language, and describes Achilleus' demand as "misuse" of a different sort: Achilleus discountenances material compensation by making a demand amounting to a logical absurdity—"undo what you did."[48] Claus tries to refute Parry's conclusion by showing that Achilleus could make both traditional and non-traditional statements with words. Claus goes on to

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[45]Cf. Odysseus' words at 9.300-301.

[46]See, in addition to sources mentioned below, Schein (1984) 105-10; Scully (1984); Griffin (1986) 36-57; Nimis (1986); Lynn-George (1988) 81-152; Martin (1989) 146-230; Stanley (1993) 115.

[47]A. Parry (1956) 6.

[48]Reeve (1973) 195. Reeve presumes that grievous injuries "cannot be paid back by the person who inflicted them." But see below.

suggest an analogy between the possibility for different meanings of words and the possibility for different traditional modes of behavior within the heroic code.[49] Martin demonstrates that the poem represents Achilleus as uniquely skilled in the art of innovating with traditional language: Achilleus' singular art, however, is that of "expansion."[50] I propose that a partial solution to the dilemma of Achilleus' language in 9.387 may be found not in its syntax, but in Achilleus' expansion of the traditional mixed-type compensation theme.

Apodounai is not a recurring term in discrete compensation themes; forms of *tinō* and *apotinō* appear most frequently. The noteworthy exception is the scene on the shield, in which *apodounai* is used explicitly to refer to payment of *poinē*: δύο δ' ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς | ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου· ὃ μὲν εὔχετο πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι (18.498-99). There are no exact verbal parallels with which to compare Achilleus' phrase: ἀπό. . . δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην (9.387). Agamemnon's words to Peisandros and Hippolochos in 11.142 (νῦν μὲν δὴ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεικέα τίσετε λώβην), however, are analogous to Achilleus' words, both in syntax and, as we shall see, in their function in the theme: in that the embassy present the offer of the absent father rather than an offer on their own behalf, the scene in Book 9 exactly reproduces the battlefield

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[49]Claus (1975) 16-17.
[50]Martin (1989) 205, 206-219.

situation.[51] Moreover, Agamemnon rejects the offer in Book 11 for the exact reason, a prior *lōbē*, as Achilleus rejected the offer made by the embassy. Agamemnon's words to Peisandros and Hippolochos constitute an emphatic denial of their offer of *apoina* and, additionally, a declaration that he will exact *poinē* from them for their <u>father</u>'s outrage.[52] Agamemnon exacts *poinē* by taking their lives. A similar mixed-type theme may be found in the theme involving Agamemnon and Adrestos (6.45-65).[53] I propose that Achilleus' passionate and absolute rejection of goods, in any quantity, until Agamemnon ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην, constitutes rejection of the *apoina* that Achilleus knows Agamemnon has offered. Further, it constitutes a declaration that Achilleus will continue to exact *poinē* for Agamemnon's damage by refusing to rescue the Achaian *laoi*.[54]

As we have seen, there are no sanctions associated with *apoina* in the *Iliad*. The defeated warrior or captive may appeal to the victor's *aidōs*, but the victor may consolidate his gains in *timē* as he determines. Hence, Achilleus is within the social rules of compensation to refuse *apoina*. Moreover, he exercises the only response to *apoina* that the poem allows

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[51]As we have seen, *tinō* in discrete *poinē* themes is construed with the accusative of the damage; therefore, Agamemnon requires that Peisandros and Hippolochos pay <u>for</u> their father's outrage. See Chapter 2 *ad loc* and Chapter 3.

[52]On the etymological and semantic connection between *poinē* and *tinō*, see Chapter 3.

[53]See Chapter 2 *ad loc*.

[54]For use of *tinō lōbēn* in relation to exacting compensation from a father in the context of generational strife and succession, see also Hesiod, *Theogony* 165-66 (Gaia to her children): πατρός κε κακὴν τεισαίμεθα λώβην | ὑμετέρου· πρότερος γὰρ ἀεικέα μήσατο ἔργα. Cf. Hesiod, *Fr.* 129.2 (M-W): μεγάλην [ἀπετείσα]το λώβην.

within its own narrative sequence until Books 19 and 24: he privileges *poinē* for prior damage over *apoina* in the present.

Although Achilleus' refusal constitutes only one segment of a larger theme, it has been singled out, in previous scholarship, as the key to Achilleus' heroic identity, and even as the key to our *Iliad*. When, however, Achilleus' rejection of *apoina* is read in its thematic context, it becomes clear that he is not rejecting material forms of *timē* on principle. I propose, moreover, that Achilleus leaves the possibility of material gifts open: he will accept *apoina*, but only after he has received *poinē*. His strategy is clear, since *apoina* can only affirm his *timē* in relation to the army, and this particular offer of *apoina* is expressly designed to subordinate him to the father figure who offers it. By exacting *poinē* however, Achilleus secures what he most desires: retribution (*tisis*) on the father for diminishing his *timē*. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the discrete scenes, what Achilleus seeks is an impossibility: the father offers gifts as *apoina* for sparing the son; sometimes, however, the hero kills the son as *poinē* for a prior offense by the father, which is moreover called a *lōbē* in the case of Peisandros and Hippolochos. Yet Achilleus' explicit strategy following Aias' speech is to allow the Achaians to die so as to exact *poinē*, and only then to accept Agamemnon's gifts. Just as this strategy is seen to be impossible from the perspective of the discrete scenes, the message of the Meleagros myth is that *apoina* and *poinē* are exclusive alternatives. This message Achilleus rejects, to his ultimate loss.

Following his rejection of material goods, Achilleus refuses the dominance that would be effected through marriage to one of Agamemnon's daughters.[55] At this point, however, his motivation seems to take an arbitrary turn:

> οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον οὐδ' ὅσα φασὶν
> Ἴλιον ἐκτῆσθαι εὖ ναιόμενον πτολίεθρον
> τὸ πρὶν ἐπ' εἰρήνης, πρὶν ἐλθεῖν υἷας Ἀχαιῶν,
> * * * *
> ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λεϊστὴ
> οὔθ' ἑλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἕρκος ὀδόντων.
> (*Iliad* 9.401-3, 408-9)

Achilleus declares any amount of goods not worth the value of his life, and of a different order than life, which can never be recovered once it is gone. In other words, Achilleus declares Agamemnon's goods unable to compensate for his life. Agamemnon has not, however, inflicted damage to life on Achilleus. To complicate the situation, Achilleus next announces that he has a double-destiny:

> μήτηρ γάρ τέ μέ φησι θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα
> διχθαδίας κῆρας φερέμεν θανάτοιο τέλος δέ.
> εἰ μέν κ' αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι,
> ὤλετο μέν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται·
> εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ' ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
> 415 ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν
> ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.
> (*Iliad* 9.411-16)

I suggest that Achilleus is flinging Agamemnon's offensive typology back in his teeth: if Agamemnon really wants to compensate

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[55] *Contra* Stanley (1993) 112, who contends that, by rejecting Agamemnon's daughter, Achilleus rejects a depersonalized ethic in which one woman is interchangeable with another. See above.

Achilleus with *apoina*, he will have to compensate him for life. This Achilleus declares is impossible. Moreover, I suggest that Achilleus is not only aggressively appropriating Agamemnon's typology in order to turn it against him, he is also appropriating Agamemnon's conflation of systems. Agamemnon has, according to Achilleus, wielded his position in the fixed system to violate, and even disable, the fluid status system. In his speech to Thetis, Achilleus advanced his own strategy of conflating Agamemnon's and Zeus' fixed positions in homologous political fields, by subtly relating the *timē* Agmemnon failed to give him to the *timē* of universal sovereignty Zeus had denied him.[56] Achilleus now reverses the conflation, and holds Agamemnon liable for damages he has suffered at the hand of Zeus: his own mortality. Agamemnon has, Achilleus claims, made it impossible for him to earn the *kleos* that was to compensate him for his mortality; Achilleus will therefore make it impossible for Agamemnon to retain his position of superiority and still take Troy. The implications of Achilleus' closing words are unmistakable. Even *kleos aphthiton*, the immortality conferred by traditional poetry, cannot compensate him for mortality; Achilleus chooses life. He will leave for Phthia tomorrow.

7.3 PHOINIX AND ACHILLEUS (9.432-619)

Achilleus' refusal of Agamemnon's *apoina* reduces the embassy to stunned silence. Phoinix bursts into tears in his fear for the Achaian ships

[56]See Chapter 5.

and finally speaks (9.432-33).[57] He makes his appeal to Achilleus first on the basis of their relationship, then on the basis of supplication and gifts, formulated as a divine model, and finally on the basis of gifts and entreaties, formulated as a heroic model (see Figure 7.7 below).[58] Phoinix expands each appeal with a *paradeigma* which furnishes a negative or a positive *exemplum* and which recasts Agamemnon's offer or the damage incurred. Hence, I suggest that the speech may be divided in the following narrative arrangement:[59]

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[57]Phoinix' speech was regarded by critics of the Analyst school as even later than the rest of Book 9. Leaf (1900) 409, criticized the Meleagros episode as an Epic Ballad that was poorly integrated into the speech. Other elements were analyzed as "Hesiodic" and, therefore, late. See for example Jebb (1877) 163; Noé (1940) 34; Page (1959) 297-315; cf. Kirk (1962) 217.

[58]Cf. Lohmann (1970) 253: "Götter: Opfer u. Gebete—Heroen: Geschenke u. Worte."

[59]Lohmann (1970), 245-6, proposes a bipartite structure for Phoinix' speech: "Das Verhältnis zwischen Phoinix und Achill," 9.434-95, and, "Appell an Achill, den Zorn aufzugeben und die Geschenke anzunehmen," 9.496-605. My arrangement is compatible with Lohmann's, although I have described the narrative relationship between the segments somewhat differently than he does. Rosner (1976) 314-15, divides the speech into three "panels": 9.438-97, Phoinix' autobiography; 9.497-526, Allegory of *Litai*; and 527-605, Parable of Meleagros. Stanley (1993) 116, follows Lohmann's bipartite structure.

9.434-47	Motivation: Phoinix and Achilleus' relationship is like that of father and son. Phoinix will stay by Achilleus' side.
9.448-84	*Paradeigma*: Phoinix' autobiography. Phoinix and his father have a *neikos* over a *pallakis*; Amyntor curses Phoinix; Phoinix flees to Peleus' household, where he is taken in.
9.485-95	Appeal: Phoinix and Achilleus' relationship is like that of father and son; Achilleus used to stay by Phoinix' side; he should now ward off the *loigos* from the old man.
9.496-501	Motivation: Even the immortals are turned from anger by offerings and supplication; Achilleus should also conquer his anger.
9.502-12	*Paradeigma*: For the *Litai*, daughters of Zeus, follow *Atē* to bring healing, but if they are refused, they send *Atē* to bring punishment.
9.513-23	Appeal: Agamemnon sends *dōra* accompanied by supplication (*lissesthai*); Achilleus should give *timai* to the daughters of Zeus and accept.
9.524-28	Motivation: The heroes, when they were angry, took gifts and were persuaded with words.
9.529-99	*Paradeigma*: Meleagros was angered by his mother's curse; he refused to defend the Aitolians from the Kouretes though he was offered gifts and supplicated; when he did finally fight, he received no gifts.
9.600-605	Appeal: Achilleus should accept the gifts while they can be had and rescue the Achaians, who will *tiō* him like a god; if he fights without gifts, he won't have the same *timē*.

Figure 7.7: Narrative arrangement of Phoinix' speech

Phoinix' autobiography (9.448-84) accomplishes two purposes in the embassy's project: it constructs the connection between Peleus,

Phoinix, and Achilleus that enables Phoinix to represent himself as father (9.434-47 and 485-95); second, it provides a *paradeigma* involving a *neikos* over a *pallakis*. Phoinix tells how Amyntor, his father, brought home a *pallakis* (9.449), and used to dishonor (*atimazeske*) his wife by making love to the concubine. Phoinix' mother kept supplicating him (*lissesketo; gounōn*, 9.451) to have sex with the *pallakis* and thereby cause her to detest the older man (9.452).[60] Phoinix consented to his mother's request, whereupon Amyntor cursed him with sterility or impotence.[61] Unable to restrain (*erētuet'*, 9.462) his *thumos*, Phoinix resolved to leave home, since his father was also angry (*khōomenoio*, 9.463).[62] He was, however, forcibly restrained (*katerētuon*, 9.465) by relatives who supplicated him (*lissomenoi*,

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[60]Hainsworth (1993) 122, points to II Samuel 16.21-23 and 20.3 to show that the effect would be to alienate the *gerōn*, not the *pallakis*. The usefulness of the parallel is severely undermined, however, by the fact that Abishalom's public entry into the royal harem constituted a claim to David's throne. Nonetheless, we might suppose that Phoinix' mother was motivated by desire to shame or take revenge on her husband, and that Amyntor interpreted Phoinix' action as an act of rebellion. The point of the story is not, however, the motivation but the resulting anger.

[61]Cf. Genesis 35.22 and 49.4 in which Reuben loses right of primogeniture because he has sex with his father's concubine.

[62]9.458-61 reports Phoinix' near-attempt on his father's life, which is intercepted by some deity who cautions him against parricide. The lines are missing from the manuscript tradition and the scholia, and are cited in full only in Plutarch, *Mor.* 26F (and in part in *Mor.* 72B and *Vita Coriolani* 32). Plutarch claims that Aristarchus excised the lines (ὁ μὲν οὖν 'Αρίσταρχος ἐξεῖλε ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη φοβηθείς). I find it unlikely that Aristarchus would have excised instead of athetized. The lines are undoubtedly designed to echo 1.188-205 and to make Phoinix' anger explicit. The narrative flows quite smoothly from 9.456-67 to 9.462-3. Modern editors, including van Thiel, include the lines, though they bracket them. It is possible and, given the seriousness with which the Alexandrians took Platonic moral criticism, even likely, that the lines belong to a pre-Alexandrian textual tradition. I decline, however, to put weight on them for analyzing Phoinix' *exemplum* in light of the compensation theme.

9.465), presumably to stay and be reconciled with his father.[63] Phoinix reports a rather inglorious escape from his guards (φύλακάς τ' ἄνδρας δμῳάς τε γυναῖκας, 9.477), which he accomplishes by leaping over a courtyard wall and fleeing to Phthia. The tale of his flight to Phthia and of his rich reception by Peleus brings Phoinix back again to the father-son relationship he claims to have with Achilleus.

The story of Phoinix' eventual arrival in Phthia indirectly invokes Achilleus' relation with Peleus. Agamemnon, as we have seen, had tried to make Achilleus a son through relations of dominance: he would make him like Orestes; or he would give him one of his daughters in marriage.[64] Odysseus, although he astutely suppresses Agamemnon's overt demand for submission, is seen to further this strategy, by transferring the demand to Peleus himself. Achilleus' response was to claim that his "true" father, Peleus, would arrange a marriage for him. Phoinix' autobiography now serves to nominate himself directly as the figure of paternal authority: not through the dominating relation of marriage to a daughter, since he is childless, but through his own relation to Achilleus' father.[65] Phoinix

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[63]More vivid description is devoted to the relatives' feasting than to their supplication (9.466-69). The scene is, as Scodel (1982) 132, notes, more reminiscent of Penelope's suitors than of the embassies to Meleagros or to Achilleus.

[64]On this, see Chapter 6.

[65]Lohmann (1970) 247, suggests that by establishing the operative relationship at the beginning of the speech, Phoinix puts his entire speech under the rubric of a father's instruction. Contra Stanley's (1993) 116, comment that the bipartite structure of Phoinix' speech "fails to integrate, personal feeling and the requirements of the code."

claims that Peleus loves him as a father loves a son (9.481-82).[66] He recounts how he himself had fed Achilleus as an infant on his own knees; Peleus is thereby relegated to the role of grandfather as Phoinix asserts his own position as father. Thus, the text presents us with a sequence of candidates for the role of father: first Agamemnon, then Odysseus, and now Phoinix. Phoinix *qua* father presents himself as commanding not only Achilleus' trust and loyalty, but eventually, his protection.

The account of Phoinix' *neikos* with his father is meant to evoke Achilleus' *neikos* with Agamemnon so as to persuade Achilleus to accept the offer conveyed by the embassy and, now, to deter him from leaving at once for Phthia (see 9.421-29).[67] The persuasive goal of the story rests on two contacts. First, Amyntor's curse and Phoinix' anger stem from a dispute over a *pallakis*.[68] By implicitly 'rewriting' Achilleus' narrative in relation to his own, Phoinix contests Achilleus' appropriation of the Helen *poinē* theme. Hence, despite Achilleus' claim that Agamemnon robbed him of his *thumarēs alokhos* (9.337), Phoinix urges that Briseis is no more than a *pallakis*. Modern interpreters frequently adopt Phoinix' perspective

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[66]The narrator uses the formulaic *gerōn hippēlata* for Phoinix (9.432); Phoinix applies it to Peleus (9.438). Although the adjacent usage may be only a formular reflex, it is possible that the narrator may be understood as supporting Phoinix' representation.

[67]For a concise summary of interpretations of the nature of the resemblance between Phoinix' autobiography and Achilleus' situation, see Scodel (1982). The bT scholium, for example, suppose the analogy is between Achilleus and Peleus: as Peleus "forgave" Phoinix, so should Achilleus forgive Agamemnon. Rosner (1976) proposes a somewhat convoluted analogy in which Phoinix represents Agamemnon with two paternal relationships: a villainous father, represented by Amyntor, and a gift-bestowing father, represented by Peleus. Thus, like Phoinix took gifts from Peleus, so Achilleus should take gifts from Agamemnon.

[68]Cf. 9.462· ἔνθ' ἐμοὶ οὐκέτι πάμπαν ἐρητύετ' ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸς. Cf. 9.635.

as that of the 'poet'.[69] As a result, they fail to recognize that Phoinix is not only trying to manage Achilleus' reaction to the quarrel with Agamemnon, but he is also trying to define what the quarrel with Agamemnon involves. Phoinix is, in sum, competing with Achilleus to write his *poinē* theme, or, the *Iliad*.

A second point of comparison concerns Phoinix' reaction to the impasse between him and his father: he did not accept the supplication of his family, and instead fled to Phthia. Ruth Scodel contends that the tone of Phoinix' story depicts the action he intends to deprecate in Achilleus:

> Phoinix was involved in a νεῖκος, and his response was to do what Achilles has threatened to do: to ignore the pleas of his friends and to depart. This alternative is presented in a way that makes it seem obviously impossible. Achilles has invited the Achaeans to watch him sail away along the Hellespont (359-61), and Phoenix' answer is to describe himself, gallantly evading a crowd of slave women.[70]

Scodel concludes that, by touching his own story with the ridiculous, Phoinix intends to slip past Achilleus' "resistance" and lead him to dismiss refusal of supplication and departure as possibilities. So much of Scodel's argument is compelling. I propose, however, that the matter of Phoinix' implicit representation of "supplication," on which an "appropriate" response would depend, merits closer attention.

In Phoinix' autobiography the angry hero is supplicated by nondescript town-folk and cousins (*etai* and *anepsioi*, 9.464). His

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[69]Scodel (1982) 131, for instance assumes that "both the *Iliad* and the Phoenix story involve a dispute over a concubine." See also Stanley (1993) 115.

[70]Scodel (1982) 133.

suppliants, moreover, restrain him forcibly while they themselves eat apparently without restraint. The scene is, as Scodel observes, "as close to the sordid and ignominious as the epic style could permit a heroic character to descend."[71] Phoinix' response is thus represented as inappropriate to Achilleus because Phoinix implicitly represents the embassy's "supplication" as an entirely different scenario.[72] Achilleus is not forcibly restrained; his suppliants concede his right to leave as he wishes. Phoinix claims he will even go with him. Achilleus is, moreover, not being supplicated by a motley and gluttonous crew of neighbors and distant relatives; he is, instead, supplicated not only by his *philtatoi hetairoi*, but by one who makes a convincing claim to stand in place of his own father.[73]

Phoinix' supplication in the role of 'father' inverts the paradigm of the dominant father and casts him in a dependent position. Phoinix' self-presentation however, constitutes a manipulation, and arguably a misrepresentation, of the embassy's entreaty. His story portrays Achilleus as refusing supplication if he rejects the embassy, and in particular, as refusing supplication from a father. In fact, neither the embassy, nor

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[71]Scodel (1982) 133.

[72]On this, see Scodel (1982) 133: "By suggesting that departure is an appropriate event in a story touched by the ridiculous, it effectively dismisses it as a truly possible choice."

[73]Lohmann (1970) 248-52, suggests that this is why Phoinix' prehistory is narrated—to "reveal" him as a father: the function of the entire speech is none other than the supplication of the second father.

Agamemnon, has evinced any sign of formal supplication.[74] Phoinix employs the term *lissomai* frequently in his *paradeigmata*, as Rosner observes, but he directs no words or gestures of supplication to Achilleus himself.[75] The narrator also gives no indication that the embassy supplicates Achilleus. By deploying the *paradeigma*, Phoinix implicitly, but unmistakably, reformulates the embassy's conveyance of Agamemnon's offer as supplication in order to induce Achilleus to respond to their request.

The story of the *Litai* and *Atē* is frequently singled out as the central panel of the embassy, or even as the archetypal motif for the *Iliad* itself.[76] More important, it is commonly regarded as the poet's *paradeigma* for interpreting Achilleus' rejection of the embassy as 'the' transgression that leads to Achilleus' own punishment in the death of Patroklos.[77] The traditional reading, in my view, collapses an important distinction between the characters and the external narrator. I suggest that confusion

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[74]Cf. for example Lykaon's overt supplication of Achilleus· γουνοῦμαι σ' 'Αχιλεῦ· σὺ δέ μ' αἴδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον· | ἀντί τοί εἰμ' ἱκέταο διοτρεφὲς αἰδοίοιο· (21.74-75). For arguments that the embassy does not in fact offer supplication, see for example Whitman (1958) 30; Schadewaldt (1965) 81; Eichholz (1953) 142; Tsagarakis (1971) 262.

[75]See Rosner (1976) 316.

[76]Cf. Thornton (1984) 113-42.

[77]Cf. Yamagata' (1991) 13: "the most popular interpretation of the *Litai-Atē* allegory of Phoenix [is] that it symbolizes what happens to Achilles in the following course of events." See for example Thornton (1984) 135-6: "According to the plea of the goddesses of supplication to Zeus (I 512), Blind Madness 'follows' Achilles, and it does so by attacking his 'substitute', his beloved friend Patroclus. . . . The death of Patroclus is the punishment (I 512) which Zeus inflicts upon Achilles for rejecting the supplications of the Embassy and of Patroclus. . ."; Allen (1924)191: "Achilles is thus, like Agamemnon, taken with *atē*"; Bowra (1930) 19; Griffin (1995) 27-28: Achilleus is a supremely great hero whose stubbornness and enjoyment of his own anger "bring about the death of his dearest friend and the ruin of his own life."

has arisen from a tendency to identify the *Litai* and *Atē* story with the project of the narrator as opposed to Phoinix.[78] Unlike the embedded message about Achilleus' *akhos* (9.249), the poem does not take up and repeat an embedded message about Achilleus' *atē*. In fact, as Naoko Yamagata points out, the *Iliad* nowhere suggests that Patroklos' death comprises or is a result of Achilleus' *atē*, nor do Achilleus or any other of the internal characters suggest any such thing.[79] It is, rather, the character Phoinix who deploys the monitory account of the *Litai* and *Atē* in an effort to persuade Achilleus to reenter the fighting. Phoinix prefaces his account with a protreptic appeal to divine behavior:

. . . στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀρετὴ τιμή τε βίη τε.
καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσι
500 λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.
(*Iliad* 9.497-501)

Significantly, the prayers, or supplication, are offered by those who are guilty of some transgression.[80] Yamagata, among others, infers that "this exactly matches the present situation."[81] Phoinix thus tacitly acknowledges what Agamemnon refuses to acknowledge, namely that Agamemnon has in fact inflicted damage on Achilleus. Previous scholarship however goes the additional step of assuming that the story of

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[78]See also Crotty (1994) 92: "Phoenix's story. . . is motivated by his attempt to persuade Achilles to accept Agamemnon's gifts. To see it as the key to all occurrences of the ceremony, I think, underestimates Phoenix's rhetorical purpose and puts more weight on the parable than it can comfortably bear."

[79]Yamagata (1991) 8-15.

[80]See also Yamagata (1991) 5.

[81]Yamagata (1991) 5.

the *Litai* and *Atē* likewise represent the actual events of the poem. By this view, just as the appeal to divine behavior effectively epitomizes Books 1-9, the actual story 'foreshadows' those that follow.[82] As we have seen however, the poem makes it clear that Agamemnon does not supplicate, nor does he offer gifts intended to compensate for damage. Instead, he begins a new compensation theme—an *apoina* theme—and blatantly ignores the prior damage. Furthermore, as we have also seen, the internal auditors are cognizant of the import of Agamemnon's offer; in fact they reformulate his offer so as to bring it into conformity with convention. In this light the *Litai* and *Atē paradeigma* can be seen as a stratagem for constructing the view that the embassy, and Phoinix in particular, wish Achilleus to take of the offer they convey. By this view, Phoinix deploys the *paradeigma* to transform the embassy into an act of supplication by the transgressor. In so doing, he satisfies Nestor's request for *meilikhia epea* in addition to *dōra*. This entitles Phoinix to argue that if Agamemnon were not sending gifts along with the supplication of the embassy, Achilleus might still retain his *mēnis*. Ultimately, however, Phoinix is no more able than Odysseus to disguise Agamemnon's refusal to offer anything like supplication. The *Litai* offered remained those of the *philoi*, which his own life story has shown to be ineffective.

[82]Cf. Wyatt (1982).

The final motivation that Phoinix deploys in his speech is an epic model. Phoinix reminds Achilleus that one can learn from the *klea* of heroes of old:

οὕτω καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἐπευθόμεθα κλέα ἀνδρῶν
525 ἡρώων, ὅτε κέν τιν' ἐπιζάφελος χόλος ἵκοι·
δωρητοί τε πέλοντο παράρρητοί τ' ἐπέεσσι.
μέμνημαι τόδε ἔργον ἐγὼ πάλαι οὔ τι νέον γε
ὡς ἦν· ἐν δ' ὑμῖν ἐρέω πάντεσσι φίλοισι.
(*Iliad* 9.524-28)

These lines evoke memory of Achilleus at the time of the embassy's arrival: he was singing the *klea andrōn* (9.189).[83] Phoinix reminds Achilleus that the heroes whose *kleos* is perpetuated in song were open to persuasion with gifts and words (*dōrētoi* and *pararrētoi epeessi,* 9.526). Phoinix was ostensibly going to narrate *klea andrōn* to tell of men who were *dōrētoi* and *pararrētoi epeessi;* instead he re-composes the traditional *muthos* as a negative *exemplum* of the hero Meleagros who is persuaded with words too late to receive gifts. The thrust of Phoinix' deployment of the myth could hardly be made more forcefully than he makes it in the lines immediately following the narration of the story:

ἀλλὰ σὺ μή μοι ταῦτα νόει φρεσί, μὴ δέ σε δαίμων
ἐνταῦθα τρέψειε φίλος·
(*Iliad* 9.600-601)

The recomposed traditional *muthos* is the basis of both Phoinix' warning and his prediction of what the outcome of Achilleus' wrath will be:

κάκιον δέ κεν εἴη
νηυσὶν καιομένῃσιν ἀμυνέμεν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ δώρων

[83]Moreover, the words point outside themselves to the poem itself, which is by its own conceit *klea andrōn.*

ἔρχεο· ἶσον γάρ σε θεῷ τίσουσιν Ἀχαιοί.
εἰ δέ κ' ἄτερ δώρων πόλεμον φθισήνορα δύῃς
605 οὐκέθ' ὁμῶς τιμῆς ἔσεαι πόλεμόν περ ἀλαλκών.
(*Iliad* 9.601-606)

According to Phoinix, Achilleus in fact has only two choices: he will reenter the fighting in time to win gifts and be honored by the Achaians in the manner suggested by Odysseus, as a god; or he will fight only when fire is set to the ships, without gifts and with less *timē*. Phoinix implicitly represents the embassy as fulfilling the heroic model for turning aside anger—gifts and words: at least one of his messages is that this is the hour for Achilleus to accept both the obligation and the reward of being a *philos* in warrior society.

The bibliography on the Meleagros myth is extensive.[84] Much of the scholarship derives from Neo-Analytic interest in a *Meleagris*, which critics of that school believe preceded the formation of our *Iliad*. Other critics, many of them from the Parry/Lord school of oral composition in performance, investigate the Meleagros myth with a view to "tradition and innovation" in the *Iliad*. Another rehearsal of the parallels between the stories of Meleagros and Achilleus will surely not serve understanding. The foregoing analysis, however, permits me to make one

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[84]See for example Howald (1924); Heubeck (1943); Kakridis (1949) 11-42; Motzkus (1964) 37-46; Schadewaldt (1965) 139-42; Austin (1966); Willcock (1964; 1977); Lohmann (1970) 254-71; Braswell (1971); Rosner (1976); Bannert (1981); March (1987); Swain (1988). On the didactic use of the myth, cf. Stanley (1993) 116, who contends that the immediate point of the Meleagros myth is that the timely aid of a man whose actions are properly acknowledged by conferral of gifts wins greater honor than the man who acts on his own." Collins (1988) 35, suggests that the Meleagros story instructs Achilleus in heroic etiquette

observation about the gifts in the Meleagros story and two points with respect to Phoinix' use of the story. The gifts that are offered to Meleagros are represented as a measure to induce him back into the fighting when his *philoi* are in desperate straits. They are related to the curses of Meleagros' mother only inasmuch as they are intended to assuage the anger that resulted from the curse. The gifts, in other words, address the present situation directly; they are offered by those whose lives are endangered by the debacle;[85] there is no indication that they are intended in any way to satisfy any "damage" that Meleagros suffers.

The second point I wish to make with respect to Phoinix' deployment of the Meleagros myth, then, is this: Phoinix performs a traditional story to disguise the true nature of the *apoina*, and to depict Agamemnon's offer as a gift exchange conventional among *philoi*. He moreover implicitly represents the embassy (through the parade of suppliants) as conforming to a heroic paradigm of gifts and words, by which heroes, whose *klea* are sung, are persuaded to put away their wrath. As a corollary to this point, I repeat Scodel's observation that Meleagros is a model for what Phoinix wants Achilleus to do and not for what he does.[86] More important, just as he did with the *Litai* and *Atē* story, Phoinix uses traditional narrative to conflate Agamemnon's gifts with the *epea* of the embassy in order to produce an offer that is culturally acceptable. I

[85]Kakridis (1949) 19, 32, argues that the mother, Althea, must come in the parade of suppliants because the mother is part of the topos. Her presence in the list does not suggest that she offers recompense for damage.

[86]Scodel (1982) 129 n. 4.

suggest that the strategy does not succeed, not because Achilleus rejects tradition, but because he penetrates the stratagem and deploys tradition even more effectively than does Phoinix.

Achilleus responds first to Phoinix' final appeal and then to Phoinix' claim about loyalty. In answer to Phoinix' claim that Achilleus will not have the same *timē* if he fights without gifts, Achilleus denies that he needs *tautē timē* (9.607-8). In other words, Achilleus' refusal is directed solely toward Agamemnon's *apoina;* once again it can hardly be generalized into a rejection of material forms of *timē* altogether. Achilleus' next words, which have generated no end of commentary, affirm, I believe, that this is the case:

> . . . . . . φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ
> (*Iliad* 9.608)

In fact, it is possible to discern a consistent strategy of excluding Agamemnon from the exchange: Phoinix, not Agamemnon, is *in loco parentis*; the embassy, not Agamemnon, makes supplication; and *philoi*, not Agamemnon, offer gifts for protection, as was the case with Meleagros. In the course of the quarrel in Book 1, Achilleus claimed that the heroes had come to Troy to win *timē* for the Atreidai; nonetheless, he then threatened to go home rather than to earn *timē* for Agamemnon and be left *atimos* himself. Agamemnon had replied that Achilleus was free to go, for Agamemnon had others who would *timaō* him, μάλιστα δὲ μητίετα Ζεύς (1.175). Achilleus in response appropriated the Chryses model for a

strategy of *tisis*.[87] Thetis asked and Zeus agreed that he would give Achilleus *timē* by taking *timē* from Agamemnon until such time as he should give him proper *timē*. I propose that Achilleus' refusal of gifts and his claim concerning Zeus' honor constitute both a refusal to reenter a *timē*-based status system where, as he claims, Agamemnon has made it impossible to earn *timē*, and a declaration that he will pursue a strategy of *tisis*. I suspect that Achilleus may be represented as taking a risk similar to the one Agamemnon took in Book 1. There, Agamemnon calculated that he could take Briseis and still take Troy; now, Achilleus calculates he can hold out until Agamemnon is cast in a dependent position, and still win material *timē*—if not from Agamemnon (in the form of *apoina*), then from the plunder of Troy.[88] Hence, he will stay by his ships, not return to Phthia. Both characters moreover assume they have the support of Zeus. If Achilleus is going to risk taking his strategy of *tisis* that far, however, the Chryses/Apollo model he has adopted will not serve him.[89]

Finally, Achilleus gently, but unmistakably, calls into question the traditional relations of loyalty (father-son and friendship) that Phoinix has claimed:

> μή μοι σύγχει θυμὸν ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων
> Ἀτρεΐδῃ ἥρωϊ φέρων χάριν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ

[87]On this, see Chapters 4 and 5.

[88]For discussion, see below.

[89]Rabel (1988) 480, observes that Achilleus discards the Chryses/Apollo model that he had adopted in Book 1. He suggests that Achilleus does not relent in Book 9 because his conflation wrongly attributes Apollo's anger to a mortal and makes reduplication of the Chryses episode impossible, and second, because his mortality interferes with his anger.

τὸν φιλέειν, ἵνα μή μοι ἀπέχθηαι φιλέοντι.
615 καλόν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν ὅς κ' ἐμὲ κήδῃ·
ἶσον ἐμοὶ βασίλευε καὶ ἥμισυ μείρεο τιμῆς.
(*Iliad* 9.612-16)

Phoinix has brought traditional obligations of family and *philotēs* to bear on Achilleus. Achilleus nowhere denies these obligations, he simply wields the ambiguity they contain against Phoinix: love your friends (and the friends of your friends) and hate your enemies (and the enemies of your friends). If Agamemnon is Achilleus' enemy, Phoinix cannot, by his own code, love them both, or so Achilleus claims. I suggest that the offer of "half my kingdom," though it may be genuine, nonetheless constitutes throwing down a gauntlet, as does the offer to discuss whether they shall leave together for Phthia or stay on the Trojan plain. Phoinix will have to decide where his loyalties lie. It is Achilleus' own form of symbolic violence.

7.4 AIAS AND ACHILLEUS (9.624-655)

So far, the embassy has failed dismally in its mission of persuading Achilleus with its repeated attempts to reconfigure and hence disguise the true nature of Agamemnon's offer. Odysseus had incited a knee-jerk reaction, and Phoinix' speech has, if anything, only brought them back to ground zero. Aias, the final speaker, performs the first embassy speech introduced as a *muthos* (9.623).[90] He has apparently, however, despaired of persuading Achilleus with words of any sort, and proposes to

[90]See Martin (1989) 40.

Odysseus that they should leave, since it seems that no conclusion would be brought to the matter by *muthoi.*

Like Odysseus' speech, Aias' is arranged by ring-composition so that the matter of accepting Agamemnon's offer is narratively framed with material having to do with relationships:

9.628-31	Achilleus has no regard for *philotēs.*
9.632-39	A man accepts *poinē* for the death of a family member, but Achilleus is implacable because of a *kourē.*
9.639-42	Make your *thumos hilaos;* feel *aidōs with* respect to your guests; "we" want to be *kēdistoi* and *philtatoi* to you.

Figure 7.8

Aias charges that Achilleus shows no regard for *philotēs,* in respect to which the Achaians have honored him above anyone else.[91] Aias' short blame-speech is peppered with harsh words for Achilleus' "intractability" in rejecting the embassy: *agrion. . . thumon* (9.629); *skhetlios* (9.630); *nēlēs* (9.632).[92] Achilleus, in Aias' view, has unambiguously and unreasonably violated *philotēs.*

Aias introduces a compensation theme of the *poinē*-type as the positive *exemplum* to which he contrasts Achilleus' conduct:

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[91]See Nagy's (1979) 108, observation that Aias' charge that Achilleus neglects his *philoi* suggests an analogy between Achilleus and Meleagros.

[92]I note that *agrion, skhetlios,* and *nēlēs* all fall into the first metrical position in the line. *Skhetlios* and *nēlēs* are further emphasized by enjambement and asyndeton.

καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
ποινὴν ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος·
καί ῥ'ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ πόλλ' ἀποτίσας,
635 τοῦ δέ τ' ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
ποινὴν δεξαμένῳ.[93]

(*Iliad* 9.632-36)

Aias' *exemplum* is an aphorism arising from the context of the *oikos* or *polis*. As such it constitutes patent deployment of "common sense." It corresponds to an epitome of the *poinē* type compensation theme, and is, significantly, most like the scene on the shield.[94] No setting is indicated; nonetheless a scenario in which such exchanges are transacted under the auspices of institutions for the administration of justice is likely.[95] Although grammatical ambiguity related to the genitives in the *exemplum* leads to further ambiguity in the social meaning of the exchange,[96] it does not obscure the basic outline of the transaction.[97] A person accepts *poinē*,

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[93]On the dative, see Palmer (1963) 134; Hainsworth (1993) 143; Griffin (1995) 143.

[94]See 18.497-508 and Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[95]See also the trial scene on the shield, Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[96]In the discrete themes, when *poinē* is construed with a noun in the genitive case, the genitive most often denotes the damages for which payment is made; the damage usually entails the life of the victim (see for example 5.266 *huios poinēn;* 13.659, *poinēn. . . paidos*; 14.483, *kasignētoio. . .poinēn*; 16.398, *poleōn. . .poinēn*; 21.28, *poinēn Patrokloio*; 18.498-99, *poinēs andros apophthimenou*). Here, however, the syntax of *poinē* plus the genitive is somewhat ambiguous, since both the murderer and the victim(s) are designated in the genitive case. The genitives may be construed "*poinē* from the murderer of his brother or of his dead child," "*poinē* from the murderer for his brother or for his dead child" (ablatival genitives), or "*poinē* [in exchange] for the [life of the] murderer of his brother or of his dead child. Leaf (1886) 319, notes the problem and suggests that the lines may be construed "from the slayer of his brother or of his dead son," but observes that it is more "natural" to construe the genitive *paidos* after *poinēn*, "compensation for his dead son."

[97]Raymond Westbrook (1992) 55, proposes, for instance, that in the case of homicide, material goods accepted as *poinē* serve as a ransom for the life of the killer rather than as payment for the life lost. The consistent syntax of the discrete themes, that is, *poinē* with the genitive of the thing or person damaged, may suggest that the rhetoric

that is, a material exchange, "for" a slain brother or child.[98] As a result of a material exchange, the homicide avoids exile or death, and the heart and *thumos*, or, the anger, of the victim's kinsman is restrained (*erētuetai*, 9.635). *Edexato* (9.636) could imply that the kinsman arbitrarily determines whether or not to accept a payment in goods, but context argues against it: in other words, the kinsman of the victim conventionally takes *poinē* as a payment in material goods.[99] The *exemplum* deployed by Aias thus contests Achilleus' earlier truism that goods are not for life (9.401-3). It fails, however, fully to account for Achilleus' singular demand: the life for which Achilleus seeks to secure *poinē* is his own.

Aias uses the *poinē* theme to make an *a fortiori* argument:

νηλής· καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
* * * * *
σοὶ δ' ἄληκτόν τε κακόν τε
θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι θεοὶ θέσαν εἵνεκα κούρης
οἴης·

(*Iliad* 9.632 and 636-38)

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of compensation expresses one kind of satisfaction (personal) and the social reality another (communal).

[98]The exchange of material *poinē* for a life I designate "composition." No distinction is made terminologically in the discrete themes, however, between exchanges that involve goods for life and those that involve life for life; see Chapter 3.

[99]The argument might be made that in Greek society, or even in Homeric society, relatives preferred the option of forcing the homicide into exile. See Hainsworth (1993) 143. Notwithstanding, the fact remains that different social rules, and sometimes conflicting social rules, remain in force; parties engaged in a struggle for dominance try to legitimate that part of convention that best suits their purpose.

The likelihood of a kinswoman securing *poinē*, while not precluded in Aias' *exemplum*, is dubious. Women would not have had this legal prerogative in Athens, though the relevance of this to conventions of Homeric society is questionable. Compensatory exchanges are usually gendered masculine in the *Iliad*; Hekabē offers a striking exception to this sexual division of labor (24.200-216; see Chapter 2 *ad loc.*).

The premise is that family members are located in a different exchange order, or sphere, than captive women. Hence, if even a kinsman accepts goods as payment of *poinē* for the life of a family member, how can Achilleus not take goods (seven captive women and more) for the (lesser) damage he has suffered? Aias' only solution is that Achilleus' *thumos* is *allēkton* and *kakon*, on account of "*one* miserable girl!" (9.637-38).[100] He accordingly appeals to Achilleus to make his *thumos hilaos* (9.639), and to feel *aidōs* concerning the guests under his roof (*melathron*, 9.640). By making a plea for *aidōs*, Aias tacitly acknowledges the position Achilleus has won, and he pleads for him to act with restraint.[101] Aias concludes his appeal with a variation on the theme of *philotēs* with which he began: he and a multitude of Achaians wish to be regarded with affection by Achilleus, as he has been by them (cf. 9.630-31).[102]

In by far the shortest speech of the embassy, Aias radically reconfigures Achilleus' damage and the social meaning of Agamemnon's gifts. Aias, disregarding Achilleus' definition of Briseis as a *geras* who is a *thumarēs alokhos*, blurts out his definition of the damage: she is only a *kourē*. Moreover, as neither Odysseus nor Phoinix try to do, Aias reverses the direction of exchange from *apoina*, which Agamemnon actually offers, to a payment of *poinē*. In so doing, he invokes an *exemplum* that applies to

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[100]Griffin (1995) 143. Griffin captures the emotive force of the enjambed *oiēs*.

[101]See Crotty's (1994) 33, suggestion that Achilleus' intransigence in refusing the compensation Agamemnon offers seems to Ajax a failure in *aidōs*; if Achilleus feels shame he would heed his friends' urgent plea.

[102]Cf. Phoinix' speech, in which the relationship of loyalty is similarly brought full-circle.

settlements constrained by the administration of justice. Aias is not so skilled as Odysseus and Phoinix in the art of *epea meilikhia*. Instead, he blames, wields convention woodenly, and denigrates Achilleus' loss. Aias gets it all wrong; and in so doing, he gets it precisely right.

Aias seems to succeed, as neither of the other two speakers have, in getting Achilleus to concede to the embassy's complex discourse about the gifts. Achilleus' response to Aias is initially encouraging: πάντά τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἐείσω μυθήσασθαι (9.645). Lloyd-Jones accordingly proposes that Achilleus recognizes the strength of Aias' argument and is "in effect acknowledging that he is right. But since his *thymos* is swelling with anger, he cannot bring himself to act upon his knowledge."[103] Arieti suggests that Aias talks Achilleus further back from the edge of his "alienated and pitiless intransigence."[104] Here again we may observe the effects of the Unitarian psychological argument. Stanley reverses the direction of influence, but not the character of the argument, when he proposes that Achilleus is receptive to Aias' speech because Aias "joins Achilleus in departing from the traditional correlation of honor and gifts."[105] It is possible to read Achilleus' words as less an admission of a change in his own thinking than as an affirmation that Aias' words resonate at some level with what Achilleus himself has been demanding

[103]Lloyd-Jones (1983) 18-19.

[104]Arieti (1986) 21; he adds that what Aias has said fits almost (*ti*) according to Achilleus' *thumos* (9.645), but "in that *ti*, that undefined, indistinguishable somewhat... lies the core of the poem, for it refers to the alienation we have been analyzing."

[105]Stanley (1993) 117.

all along. Aias' reconfiguration of Agamemnon's *apoina* as *poinē*, though neither artful nor adequate, at least represents the gifts in line with Achilleus' theme: damage and *poinē*. Aias acknowledges a situation of damage. Thus Aias comes close enough to be pulled into Achilleus' orbit: Achilleus can affirm and appropriate Aias' words so as to imply that he is open to compensation that is culturally acceptable.

Nor does Achilleus deny the obligation of *philotēs* as Aias presents it. Achilleus himself had received at least Phoinix and Aias as *philoi andres* (9.197), who were *Akhaiōn philtatoi* to him even in his anger (οἵ μοι σκυζομένῳ περ 'Αχαιῶν φίλτατοί ἐστον, 9.198). Achilleus is still not moved, however, in his resolve to refuse Agamemnon's gifts and not to rescue the Achaians. As he did in response to Odysseus' and Phoinix' speeches, Achilleus singles out Agamemnon and the damage he inflicted as the cause of his anger. He reminds Aias that Agamemnon had disgraced him publicly (μ' ἀσύφηλον ἐν 'Αργείοισιν ἔρεξεν, 9.647). Moreover, he claims Agamemnon treated him like some *atimēton metanastēn* (9.648), like an outsider who possessed no *timē* with which Agamemnon must reckon.[106] In which case, it would be Agamemnon whom Aias should charge with having no regard for *philotēs*.

Achilleus concludes his speech, and the embassy's visit, with a message for Aias to take back to Agamemnon: he will not reenter the fighting until Hektor threatens the Myrmidon ships with fire. Achilleus'

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[106]See also Achilleus intimation in Book 1 that Agamemnon treated him like Chryses, like an enemy. See Chapters 4 and 5.

aggressive appropriation of a conflated Chryses/Apollo model had brought him the embassy and Agamemnon's *apoina*. His strategy of *tisis* has failed, however, to produce a culturally acceptable offer of *poinē* or to cast Agamemnon in a dependent position. Achilleus is, I suggest, determined that Agamemnon's superiority is, unlike Zeus' own position, not unassailable; Achilleus will deploy his strategy of *tisis* to the limit in the struggle for dominance. Moreover, he does so not by rejecting heroic tradition, but by appropriating it and aggressively exploiting its ambiguities. Phoinix had performed a traditional *muthos* of Meleagros, as a negative *exemplum*, in an effort to impose limits on Achilleus. Achilleus, himself skilled at singing *klea andrōn*, will recompose the traditional *muthos* as a positive *exemplum*, in an effort to take *poinē* and, after that, *apoina*.[107] Achilleus' strategy has changed little during the course of the embassy: he is no less dissatisfied with his position of dependence; he is resolute in his refusal to fight; he maintains a strategy of *tisis* as a means of securing *timē* in all its forms. The offer of *apoina* has, however, forced a realignment of his strategy on the *mētis-biē* axis. I have suggested that, when Achilleus, at Athene's behest, restrains himself from killing Agamemnon on the spot in favor of waiting for gifts, he elects a strategy of *mētis* for securing *timē* (both material and non-material). Conversely, even though Achilleus' refusal of *apoina* in Book 9 conforms to

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[107]For the idea that Achilleus adopts Meleagros as a positive, instead of a negative paradigm, see *inter alia* Scott (1924) 152; Whitman (1958) 191; Scodel (1982); Lowenstam (1993) 95.

conventions of heroic society as well as to the conventions of the poem, it nevertheless aligns him with *biē*, and it is turned inward against Agamemnon and the Achaians.

Agamemnon never receives the message that Achilleus will stay by his ships until Hektor threatens them with fire. Odysseus reports to him only Achilleus' first answer (9.677-683). Hence, Book 9 ends with Diomedes' plan, which was in the beginning discarded in favor of Nestor's, being put into action. The embassy's motive is clear: if Odysseus had reported the full response, the army would have simply ceased to fight.

Chapter 8: Agamemnon's, Hektor's, and Priam's *Apoina* Themes

Πηλεΐδης δ' οἴκοιο λέων ὣς ἆλτο θύραζε
* * * * *
ἐϋξέστου δ' ἀπ' ἀπήνης
ᾕρεον Ἑκτορέης κεφαλῆς ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα.
(*Iliad* 24.572, 578-9)

8.1 FROM THE EMBASSY TO THE ASSEMBLY

After the death of Patroklos, Achilleus, who has been absent from the fighting since the quarrel, summons an assembly, and announces that he has ceased his wrath: νῦν δ' ἤτοι μὲν ἐγὼ παύω χόλον (19.67). Achilleus is ready to reenter the fighting without delay; Agamemnon, it seems, is ready for him. He extends his offer of *apoina* again:

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην καί μευ φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς,
ἂψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι, δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα·
(*Iliad* 19.137-38)

The first time Agamemnon offered *apoina*, it was as an inducement for Achilleus to reenter the fighting and as insurance that he would do so in subjection to Agamemnon. The embassy tried, unsuccessfully, to disguise the true nature of the offer in order to make it culturally acceptable to Achilleus and, therefore, viable as inducement.[1] In Book 19, however, Agamemnon offers *apoina* publicly, with no intermediaries and no disguise. His offer is no less offensive and his project no less domination; but this time, Achilleus needs no incentive. Achilleus wants to fight; Agamemnon wants to use *apoina* to control him. The *apoina* which was

[1] See Chapters 6 and 7.

offered earlier as inducement to fight is now held forth as a condition of the same.

Critics frequently infer that in Book 19 Achilleus accepts compensation, which he had refused only the day before, so as to reenter the war and take revenge on Hektor.[2] By this interpretation a personal or social reconciliation is effected, or at least initiated, between Achilleus and Agamemnon. Although the overt struggle for dominance between the two antagonists diminishes following Book 19, it is not, as we shall see, because a reconciliation is effected. Agamemnon persists in defining the goods, and the theme, as *apoina*; Achilleus, as we shall see, also persists in his strategy of not accepting *apoina* until he takes *poinē*.[3]

Although Achilleus has not been moved from his resolve to secure *poinē*, as we shall see, his world has changed almost inconceivably since the embassy's visit. In two speeches to Thetis in Book 18 (79-93 and 98-126), Achilleus synopsizes his world as he sees it after Patroklos' death, and he attempts to script his role in the Iliadic narrative in light of that world. For this reason, I begin my analysis of the last overarching compensation themes in the *Iliad*, the *apoina* themes involving Achilleus and Agamemnon in Book 19, Achilleus and Hektor in Book 22, and Achilleus and Priam in Book 24, with these two speeches. They will take

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[2]See for example Schadewaldt (1965) 132; Thornton (1984) 128-131; see also Nagy (1979) 128-9, 134. Alternately, see Donlan (1993) 170, on the exchange in Book 19: "Achilles has taken great treasure from his rival on his own terms, and without obligation. He has not even acknowledged his acceptance of them. It is a stunning victory."

[3]See also Stanley (1993) 196.

us back to the events of the previous day and they will send us forward to the assembly in Book 19.

The poem sets the scene for Achilleus' speeches in Book 18 in such a way that the distinction between Achilleus and Patroklos is blurred.[4] When Antilochos brings word of Patroklos' death to Achilleus, Achilleus responds with a cry that is heard by Thetis and the other Nereïd nymphs, who gather about him on the shore. Achilleus is depicted lying on the

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[4]Patroklos' identity in relation to Achilleus has attracted a good deal of scholarly interest. It is commonly recognized that the death of Patroklos inside the *Iliad* foreshadows the death of Achilleus outside it (cf. Pestalozzi [1945]; Taplin [1992] 181: "Patroklos is a pale reflection of Achilleus' own fate."). Whitman (1958) 136-37, 199-203, argues that in death, the role of Patroklos becomes identical with that of Achilleus; he describes Patroklos as Achilleus' epic surrogate. Although most critics agree that that the destinies of Patroklos and Achilleus are linked and, further, that the poem blurs the distinction in their identities, the vector through which the poem joins the two figures is disputed. Nadia van Brock (1959) proposes that the connection is a ritual one, established through the term *therapōn* (see Sinos [1975] 44-60; Nagy [1979] 292-96 and [1990a] 129). She contends that *therapōn* has a diachronic meaning of "ritual substitute" by way of the Anatolian cognate (cp. Hittite *tarpašša-/tarp(an)alli*). Van Brock (119) describes the *therapōn* as an alter-ego (usually of a king) upon whom the impurities of the king and the community may be ritually transferred: "Le *tarpalli-* est un autre soi-meme, une projection de l' individu sur laquelle sont transférées par la magie du verbe toutes les souillures dont on veut se débarasser." Dale Sinos (1975) 44-60, develops the concept specifically in relation to Patroklos and Achilleus. He proposes that while Patroklos is near Achilleus and is granted the epithet *therapōn*, his status is equalized to that of Achilleus; when, however, Patroklos is separated from Achilleus and loses the epithet *therapōn*, he undergoes a loss of his own heroic identity and takes on the identity of his counterpart, thereby becoming a substitute for Achilleus. See also Nagy (1979) 33, 192-97 and (1990a) 48, 129. Janko (1992) 339, however, contends the idea that *therapōn* is cognate with Hittite *tarpašša-/tarp(an)alli*, ritual substitute, is "implausible," although on what basis he does not indicate.

Erwin Cook *viva voce* proposes that the armor, which represents Achilleus' divine self and which symbolizes the immortal strife that was averted by the wedding of Thetis and Peleus is the vector that transfers Achilleus' impurity to Patroklos and Hektor. The impurity consists in *eris*, which is none other than Achilleus' attempt to identify with and assert his divine self. In what follows, I adopt the position argued by Cook where it impinges on my argument. On the armor as a vehicle that marks Patroklos as "vulnerable surrogate," see Taplin (1992) 181.

ground, soiling his head with dust, and mourning for Patroklos;[5] the Nereïds stand about Achilleus, weeping for him;[6] and Thetis holds her son's head in her hands, as one would a corpse, in a gesture of mourning.[7] The narrative, which, since the end of Book 16, has been about the death of Patroklos, is thus become at the same time about Achilleus'. In other words, the "corpse" in the audience's purview is no longer Patroklos, but Achilleus' own.

Thetis asks Achilleus why he is crying (18.73-4). Her words recall the question she put to him in Book 1, when he was weeping over Agamemnon's insult and the seizure of Briseis (1.362-3). She reminds him that the Achaians are suffering in answer to his earlier request that Zeus give him *timē*. Achilleus answers her as if from the dead. He claims there is no pleasure in what Zeus has accomplished since Patroklos, whom he loves as his own self, has died. Not only that, but Patroklos died, in Achilleus' judgment, because he did not protect him (18.100).[8] Achilleus' explicit answer to Thetis' question is that the death of Patroklos is the cause of his *akhos* (cf. 18.22). In both speeches, however, Achilleus makes an "impossible wish" (18.83-87 and 105-13) which evokes the primeval

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[5]Cf. Achilleus' helmet, which is defiled for the first time with blood and dust when Apollo knocks it from Patroklos' head (16.794-96), and Hektor's head, which is dragged in the dust when Achilleus drags Hektor's corpse behind his chariot (22.402-3). See Griffin (1980) 134-48.

[6]Neo-Analysts hold this scene of the Nereïds rising from the sea as modelled on that of Achilleus' death in the *Cypria*.

[7]See also 23.136 and 24.724. See Macleod(1982) 147.

[8]Cf. 18.100. An *arēs alktēr* may ward off death in battle or ward off another kind of destruction (loss of *timē* and/or mutilation of the corpse) after death. See 14.478-85 and Chapter 2 *ad loc*.

succession myth and points to the underlying cause of his *akhos*: specifically, he wishes that the marriage of Thetis and Peleus had not taken place (18. 83-87), and that *eris* and *kholos* would be gone from humans and immortals (18.105-13). Achilleus' *akhos* thus encompasses not only Patroklos' death, but his own mortal condition.

Achilleus tells Thetis that when Hektor killed Patroklos, he stripped him of the armor the gods had given Peleus on the day they compelled Thetis to marry him:

> τεύχεα δ' Ἕκτωρ
> δῃώσας ἀπέδυσε πελώρια θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι
> καλά· τὰ μὲν Πηλῆϊ θεοὶ δόσαν ἀγλαὰ δῶρα
> ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σε βροτοῦ ἀνέρος ἔμβαλον εὐνῇ.
> (*Iliad* 18.82-85)

The armor is thus the segue from the death of Patroklos to the marriage of Thetis and Peleus (19.82-84); it is also, as we shall see, the vector through which the effects of that union are transmitted through Achilleus to Patroklos and then to Hektor. The divine armor reifies the displacement of immortal *eris* to earth, even as Achilleus himself does as the *gonos* of that displacement. Achilleus' wish that Thetis had remained among the Nereïds instead of having married Peleus is surely more than pity for his immortal mother, who will sorrow for him forever.[9] It is, rather, a lashing out against the fate marked out for him and the *akhos* it has brought him: he is a mortal, the mortal, whose essential identity is *eris*, which is nothing less than a drive to assert his divinity. Achilleus is the 'almost' son of

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[9]See for example Edwards (1991) 157.

Zeus who would have deposed him, but whose eristic drive was displaced onto the human plane first by the marriage of Thetis to Peleus (by which Achilleus was made mortal), and by the judgment of Paris (by which strife was displaced). If he could, Achilleus would will *eris* and *kholos* (the human condition), imposed by the *Dios boulē* and localized in himself, out of existence. He singles out the *kholos* Agamemnon has toward him, which has now resulted in Patroklos' death. For his part, Achilleus says he will let go of what was done and subjugate his *thumos* out of necessity (18.112). It is, however, Archaic Greek cosmology that *eris* cannot be destroyed; it can only be displaced from the divine to the mortal sphere, and back again, but only after being rendered harmless in the gods' struggle to protect their favorites.[10] If it is impossible, as the poem leads us to believe, for Achilleus either to deny his birthright or simply to obliterate *eris*, then the question becomes what he does with *kholos* and *eris*. First, however, I need to discuss the *akhos* to which Achilleus refers in his speech to Thetis and which compels him to summon the assembly in Book 19: the death of Patroklos. This takes us back to Book 11.

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[10]See Hesiod *Fr.* 204.95-123 (MW) which links the *eris* of the Trojan War to the permanent separation of gods and mortals. On the displacement of *eris* from the divine to the human realm in Archaic Greek cosmology, see Nagy (1979) 219-21; Arthur (1982; 1983); Nagler (1988); and Mayer (1996), who demonstrates a cultural construct, similar to the displacement of *eris* in Archaic Greek cosmology, in Near Eastern, Iranian, and Indian mythology in which "victorious gods resolve their problems by passing them onto mortals, thereby securing for themselves a carefree existence." Muellner (1996) 78-79, refers to the continuity of *eris* as a pressing dilemma for the succession myth in Hesiod: ". . . how is it possible for a stable soveriegn order to be established when the principle of succession—which is nothing more or less than a particular menifestation of the metonymic rule, whereby the next episode is built upon the previous one—always obtains?"

Achilleus' plan, which has been subsumed since Book 1 under the *Dios boulē*, and his appropriation of Meleagros as a positive epic paradigm seem to be working in Book 11.[11] The battle on the day following the embassy begins with an Achaian advance, but when Agamemnon is forced to leave the battlefield because of a wound (11.273-83), it is a sign to Hektor that Zeus is turning the tide in favor of the Trojans (11.284-90). Within a short time, Diomedes (11.375-77), Odysseus (11.434-39), and finally Machaon, the *iētēr* (11.506-7), are also wounded and forced to withdraw. Achilleus, who is watching the battle from the stern of his ship, sees Nestor's chariot arrive at the camp carrying Machaon by way of the opposite gate. Confident that the Achaian situation is intolerable and that an embassy will soon be on its way to supplicate him, Achilleus summons Patroklos:

> δῖε Μενοιτιάδη τῷ ἐμῷ κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ
> νῦν ὀΐω περὶ γούνατ' ἐμὰ στήσεσθαι 'Αχαιοὺς
> λισσομένους· χρειὼ γὰρ ἱκάνεται οὐκέτ' ἀνεκτός.
> (*Iliad* 11.608-10)

As we have seen, Achilleus' strategy of *tisis* is designed to diminish Agamemnon's *timē* to the point that he is cast into a dependent position in relation to him and, consequently, forced to give him the *timē* Achilleus believes is his due. The first time the Achaians were pinned in around the ships, Agamemnon managed to cast the Achaians in the dependent position, relegate to himself the role of father, and offer *apoina* to Achilleus from a position of relative strength. Consequently, as I have suggested,

[11]See 9.650-55; cf. Chapter 7.4.

Achilleus' words to Patroklos in Book 11 do not contradict the events of Book 9, but confirm the strategy Achilleus has pursued.[12] Achilleus sends Patroklos to Nestor's shelter, ostensibly to find out whom Nestor brought in. His action is motivated, no doubt, by a desire to show himself interested in the welfare of the Achaian *laoi*, and to show himself open to being persuaded with appropriate compensation.

When Patroklos finally returns from Nestor's shelter (Book 16), he comes prepared with a different proposal than Achilleus anticipated:

ἀλλ' ἐμέ περ πρόες ὦχ', ἅμα δ' ἄλλον λαὸν ὄπασσον
Μυρμιδόνων, ἤν πού τι φόως Δαναοῖσι γένωμαι.
40 δὸς δέ μοι ὤμοιιν τὰ σὰ τεύχεα θωρηχθῆναι,
αἴ κ' ἐμὲ σοὶ ἴσκοντες ἀπόσχωνται πολέμοιο
Τρῶες, ἀναπνεύσωσι δ' Ἀρήϊοι υἷες Ἀχαιῶν
τειρόμενοι· ὀλίγη δέ τ' ἀνάπνευσις πολέμοιο.
ῥεῖα δέ κ' ἀκμῆτες κεκμηότας ἄνδρας ἀϋτῇ
ὤσαιμεν προτὶ ἄστυ νεῶν ἄπο καὶ κλισιάων.
(*Iliad* 16.38-45)

The plan comes as no surprise to the external auditors. Patroklos only repeats what Nestor has suggested to him (11.794-803). More important, however, Nestor's and Patroklos' plan conforms to the plot summary Zeus announced when he awoke from his sleep to find the *Dios boulē* derailed by Hera's and Poseidon's machinations (15.59-77).[13] Patroklos first tells Achilleus about the wounded leaders and rebukes him for his intransigence. He then appeals to Achilleus to let him go out in his stead. Following Nestor's suggestion, Patroklos asks that Achilleus give

[12]For discussion, see Chapter 6.1

[13]As Slatkin (1991) 110-11 observes, Zeus loses control over the plot of the *Iliad* as a result of Hera's *apatē*, and his first concern is damage control for the *Iliad* and his promise to Thetis.

him his armor so the Trojans would think Achilleus had reentered the fighting and would therefore draw back, giving the Achaians a little breathing space. Even as Patroklos speaks, Aias is desperately trying to fend off fire from the ships. Before Patroklos receives a response from Achilleus, however, the narrator reminds the audience where his request will take him:

> Ὣς φάτο λισσόμενος μέγα νήπιος· ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν
> οἷ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι.
>
> (*Iliad* 11.46-7)

Hence, although Achilleus' *boulē*, or his intended plot of the *Iliad*, and the *Dios boulē*, Zeus' plot of the *Iliad*, have run parallel up to this point, they diverge as soon as Patroklos emerges as a leading actor.

Patroklos asks, in accordance with Nestor's instruction (11.794-95), if there is a prophecy Achilleus has heard from his mother that holds him back from the fighting (16.36-37). Achilleus thus has an opportunity to appeal to his double destiny. He assures him, however, that there is no prophecy, and appeals instead to *akhos* that derives from his social conflict with Agamemnon: it causes him grief when a man despoils (*amerdō*) another who is his equal (*ton homoion*) and robs him of his *geras*, when he surpasses him in *kratos* (16.52-54).[14] Achilleus' claim to be Agamemnon's equal is explicit, as is his frustration with being cast in a dependent position. He asserts that Agamemnon had, in effect, treated him as if he

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[14]The syntax of 16.54 (ὅτε κράτεϊ προβεβήκῃ·) is ambiguous. Janko (1992) 323, notes that the subjunctive confirms that ὅ τε should be read ὅτε; he concludes that Achilleus means someone with more status, like Agamemnon. Nevertheless, Achilleus surpasses Agamemnon in *kratos*; he is at least potentially exploiting the ambiguity.

were an outsider whose *timē* did not have to be reckoned with.[15] Put another way, Agamemnon must be either friend or enemy:[16] he had treated Achilleus as not-*philos*; Achilleus has consequently appropriated Agamemnon's treatment and acted like not-*philos*.

Nonetheless, Achilleus tells Patroklos that he will let go the things that had been done.[17] He claims that it was not his intent to remain angry perpetually, even though he had said (*ephēn*, 16.61) he would not put his anger aside until the fighting reached his own ships (16.61-63). What Achilleus had said, according to our text, is that he would not fight until the fire touched his own ships (9.653-55).[18] In fact, Achilleus' window of opportunity is very small, as the scene at the end Book 15 reveals; he is represented as fearing for the Myrmidon ships (16.80-82). Achilleus will keep his word and not reenter the fighting yet; though he turns over to Patroklos the task of warding off destruction from the Myrmidon ships (*loigon amunōn*, 16.80). The phrase *loigon amunai* recalls the scene in Achilleus' hut when heralds had come from Agamemnon to take Briseis. Achilleus had projected that the Achaians would need him to ward off the *loigos* that would befall them in his absence (1.341). In other words, Achilleus had constructed a theme in which he occupied a position of superiority in relation to both the Achaians and Hektor, In sending

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[15]See also 9.648; see Chapter 7.

[16]See Blundell (1989) 26-59.

[17]Cf. 18.111-13.

[18]For this reason, commentators frequently interpret *ephēn* (16.61) to mean "I thought," thereby removing any reference to the embassy. See for example Mazon (1942) 178-89); Janko (1992) 323. But cf. Schadewaldt (1965) 128.

Patroklos out to beat back the *loigos* from the ships, Achilleus scripts Patroklos into his own position of superiority, a role Patroklos is not equipped to fill.

Achilleus agrees to let Patroklos lead the Myrmidons into battle and, further, to let Patroklos wear his armor, but only after a stern warning:

> πείθεο δ' ὥς τοι ἐγὼ μύθου τέλος ἐν φρεσὶ θείω,
> ὡς ἄν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κῦδος ἄρηαι
> 85 πρὸς πάντων Δαναῶν, ἀτὰρ οἳ περικαλλέα κούρην
> ἂψ ἀπονάσσωσιν, ποτὶ δ' ἀγλαὰ δῶρα πόρωσιν.
> ἐκ νηῶν ἐλάσας ἰέναι πάλιν· εἰ δέ κεν αὖ τοι
> δώῃ κῦδος ἀρέσθαι ἐρίγδουπος πόσις Ἥρης,
> μὴ σύ γ' ἄνευθεν ἐμεῖο λιλαίεσθαι πολεμίζειν
> 90 Τρωσὶ φιλοπτολέμοισιν· ἀτιμότερον δέ με θήσεις·
> μὴ δ' ἐπαγαλλόμενος πολέμῳ καὶ δηϊοτῆτι
> Τρῶας ἐναιρόμενος προτὶ Ἴλιον ἡγεμονεύειν,
> μή τις ἀπ' Οὐλύμποιο θεῶν αἰειγενετάων
> ἐμβήῃ·
>
> (*Iliad* 16.83-90)

Ironically, Achilleus puts limits on Patroklos. He must do no more than drive the Trojans back from the ships, both for Achilleus' sake and for his own. He must, in fact, do only enough to win *timē* and *kudos* for Achilleus and to allow the Achaians opportunity to offer gifts (with Agamemnon in an appropriately dependent position).[19] Patroklos must not, however, do so much that Achilleus is rendered dispensable and, as a consequence, even more *atimos* than before.[20] Specifically, Achilleus warns Patroklos not to drive too close to the walls of Troy for fear that Apollo (who is

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[19]As we have seen in the discrete themes, a family member or *hetairos* can win back *timē* for another. Cf. 16.270-74. For discussion, see below.

[20]Cf. 1.171.

Troy's chief ally and Achilleus' own ritual antagonist in the poem) may kill him. His wish that the Trojans and Achaians alike would perish and that he and Patroklos alone would "loose the sacred veil of Troy" (16.97-100) expresses his own overreaching; it bodes ill for this one whom Achilleus is sending out as himself, but with 'limits'.

Even as Achilleus and Patroklos speak, Aias gives way and the Trojans throw fire on the ships; the condition for Achilleus' return is thus partially met, and he urges Patroklos to hurry. Achilleus marshals the Myrmidons while Patroklos arms himself in Achilleus' armor. Patroklos emerges a mortal in immortal armor, a human counter-part for the mortal trace-horse yoked to the immortal horses that pull his chariot.[21] Thus, Patroklos' armor, his team of horses, and his assignment to ward off the *loigos*, overdetermine him as bearer of displaced *eris*, or, as an Achilleus figure whose status as a demi-god reflects his function of transferring succession and *eris* of generational conflict from the divine to the human spheres.[22]

Before Patroklos and Automedon lead the Myrmidons out, Achilleus pours a libation to Zeus and prays, in effect, that Zeus will adjust his *boulē* to conform to Achilleus' (16.233-48). He prays that Zeus will give *kudos* to Patroklos and, moreover, that when Patroklos has beaten the Trojans back from the ships, he will return to Achilleus unscathed, with the armor and his *hetairoi*. Achilleus has no promise of

[21]The immortal horses also were a gift of a god, Poseidon, to Peleus (23.277-78).
[22]For discussion, see below.

Zeus' alliance in his strategy of *tisis*, for when fire touched the Achaian ships, Zeus' promise to Thetis to honor Achilleus was fulfilled (see 15.592-602). Zeus' partial granting of Achilleus' prayer confirms what the external auditors have already heard in his plot summary: Zeus will allow Patroklos to beat back the Trojan assault from the ships, but not to return from the battle. The plot of the *Iliad* is now out of Achilleus' control, and we are entitled to see a certain presumption in Achilleus' hopes to the contrary.[23]

Achilleus' action in sending out Patroklos is frequently interpreted as a weakening of his resolve or, alternately, as the gradual emergence of mildness in his character.[24] I propose instead that Achilleus has merely abandoned his strategy of withdrawal, which has failed to produce the intended result of putting Agamemnon in a dependent position in relation to himself and of securing appropriate *timē*. His new strategy, however, is one of incremental return in that the Myrmidons reenter the fighting, but he himself does not, except in the person of Patroklos.[25] In admitting this

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[23]Zeus seems to be firmly in control of the *Iliad* following the deception of Hera, until he wavers on Sarpedon (16.431-61). At that point, it becomes apparent that Zeus is only one of the character writers of the *Iliad*; there is yet another writer at the helm of the *Iliad*. See Conclusion.

[24]See for example Schadewaldt (1965) 135; Janko (1992) 324. This runs counter, however, to his short fuse in Book 24 and to Patroklos' own characterization of him to Nestor as quick to anger (11.648-54). It moreover runs counter to the portrayal of Achilleus prior to the events of Book 1 (see especially Andromachē's report of Achilleus' burial of her father [6.414-20] and his releasing of Isos and Antiphos for ransom [11.101-12]).

[25]On the reentry of Patroklos into the fighting as an element in a withdrawal, devastation, and return pattern underlying the *Iliad*, see A. Lord (1960) 195-97; Nagler (1976) 135-41.

strategy, Achilleus intends for Patroklos to give the Achaians only enough breathing room so that Agamemnon has a chance to throw himself at Achilleus' feet and offer an acceptable transfer of *timē*.[26] He does not request that Zeus bring an end to the *loigos*; nor does he enter the fighting to ward off the *loigos* himself. He thus has not let go of his struggle for dominance or his desire for compensatory *timē* and the status that attends it.[27] Put another way, Achilleus has not abandoned his *poinē* theme; he has adopted a strategy to secure it in accordance with his attempt to re-write the Meleagros paradigm and make it the continuation of the *Iliad*.

Patroklos, as he is "over-determined" to do, ignores Achilleus' warning and overreaches the limits set for him. After he kills Sarpedon, Patroklos, blinded by *atē* (*aasthē*, 16.685), pursues the fleeing Trojans.[28] Three times he rushes the city wall only to be beaten back by Apollo (16.698-704). Patroklos gives ground only on his fourth attempt, when Apollo warns him; for the moment, he escapes the death that Achilleus had feared.[29] Three times he charges successfully into the ranks of the

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[26]See also Lynn-George (1988) 168-69; Janko (1992) 325. That this is the case is confirmed in Patroklos' rallying cry to the Myrmidons as they leave the Achaian camp (16.269-74).

[27]Only if Achilleus' rejection of Agamemnon's *apoina* in Book 9 is taken as a rejection of material *timē* on principle does his action in Book 16 present a radical change in motivation. Cf. Janko (1992) 325, who comments that even if Achilleus did renounce gifts forever, there is no reason he can't cool off and make concessions. As we have seen, however, Achilleus rejected Agamemnon's *apoina* specifically as an unacceptable transfer of *timē*, as a ploy to attain domination, and further, as not worth the value of his life. See Chapter 7.

[28]See the narratorial comment on Patroklos' pursuit: νήπιος· εἰ δὲ ἔπος Πηληϊάδαο φύλαξεν | ἦ τ' ἂν ὑπέκφυγε κῆρα κακὴν μέλανος θανάτοιο (16.686-87).

[29]16.705-11; cf. 16.91-95.

Trojans; the fourth time, however, Patroklos (*daimoni isos*, 14.786) is struck from behind by Apollo. After Apollo sends the helmet, shield, and corselet flying, Euphorbos also strikes Patroklos from behind. Hektor delivers the fatal thrust of a spear. When Hektor finally strips Achilleus' armor from Patroklos and dons them himself, the narrator alludes to their connection to the marriage of Thetis and Peleus (17.194-197). Zeus then "fits" the immortal armor to Hektor, sealing his fateful, and fatal, link to Patroklos and Achilleus (17.209-212).

While the battle rages over the corpse of Patroklos, Antilochos leaves the battlefield to let Achilleus know of his death. Achilleus, watching the tumult, wonders if perhaps Patroklos has been killed and reminds himself that he had, after all, warned him not to fight Hektor (18.13-14). When, however, Antilochos actually gives him the news, Achilleus assumes blame not only for the death of Patroklos, but also for his other *hetairoi* who died while he sat beside his ships. This, then, brings us back to Achilleus' speeches to Thetis in Book 18.

In these speeches, Achilleus twice mentions the *nostos* he will not have (18.90, 101). He had intimated to the embassy that he had a choice between a long life without *kleos*, or *kleos aphthiton*, the immortality conferred by the *Iliad*, without a *nostos* (9.411-16).[30] Achilleus now accepts the destiny that has always been his: his life is defined exclusively by the fact of his mortality. His *akhos* over the death of Patroklos will send him

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[30]On *kleos aphthiton*, see Nagy (1979; 1989;1990a; 1990b).

back into battle to take compensation from Hektor and, consequently, to earn *kleos*. Achilleus' own death, as Thetis confirms, will follow closely upon Hektor's. The death of Patroklos is, as Nagy has observed, the pivot that turns Achilleus from inflicting *akhos* on his own *laos* to inflicting it on the Trojans.[31] Achilleus' *kholos* against Agamemnon and his *poinē* theme for the damage Agamemnon inflicted is subordinated to the *poinē* theme for Patroklos. In his speeches to Thetis, Achilleus 'writes' the conclusion of the *Iliad* as a complex *poinē* theme—*timē* for Patroklos and *kleos* for himself—that will be resolved first in the death of Hektor, and then in his own death (18.92-93; 114-26).

8.2 AGAMEMNON'S SECOND OFFER OF *APOINA*

If Achilleus is going exact *poinē* for Patroklos' death, he must, at least nominally, reenter the fighting with the Achaians. In his speech to the assembly, before Agamemnon has a chance to speak, Achilleus publicly renounces his anger and relocates Briseis in the sphere of prestige goods (*kourē*, 19.58). [32] He thereby radically redefines the nature of the quarrel between himself and Agamemnon, and he abandons the Helen paradigm.[33] As if to reinforce the transfer, he devalues Briseis' life in relation to the Achaian *laoi*: he wishes that, instead of the Achaians dying because of his anger, she herself had died on the day she was captured

[31]See Nagy (1979) 69-82.

[32]Cf. Aias' assessment of the damage at 9.637-38.

[33]The *eris* that should be directed against the enemy, but that has been turned inward by Agamemnon, is thus turned outward again.

(19.59-63). Achilleus patently intends to reenter the fighting without sharing a meal with Agamemnon and without accepting his *apoina* (19.65-73). Accepting the *apoina* would constitute a resolution and would thus mean forfeiture of his *poinē* theme; sharing a meal would ratify it.[34] Achilleus' strategy is to take *poinē* from Hektor and the Trojans without reintegrating socially and formally into the *timē*-based fluid system that operates, or, rather, is in his opinion, inoperative, under Agamemnon's domination. More important, even though Achilleus' *poinē* theme against Hektor has eclipsed his *poinē* theme against Agamemnon, as long as the *poinē* theme against Agamemnon remains unresolved, it remains in effect. Achilleus has claimed he will not accept *apoina* until he takes *poinē*; in the assembly, as we shall see, he remains absolutely consistent in how he represents the situation and in his stratagem.

Agamemnon in his reply to Achilleus' 'renunciation' of his wrath also brings up the quarrel, but only to say that he has been falsely accused of being at fault in the matter:

> πολλάκι δή μοι τοῦτον Ἀχαιοὶ μῦθον ἔειπον
> καί τέ με νεικείεσκον· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι.
> (*Iliad* 19.85-86)

"I am not to blame" is the sum of Agamemnon's discourse on *atē*.[35] Taplin shows that attribution of *aitia* is attribution of blame "which expects the payment of the price for the fault."[36] Put another way,

[34]See Cook (1995) 128-70.
[35]Cf. 9.18, 115-16, 119; for discussion of *atē*, see Chapter 4.
[36]Taplin (1992) 207-8, 98-100.

attribution of *aitia* constitutes a claim that one is liable for a payment of *poinē*. Taplin infers, correctly in my view, that "the claim that one is οὐκ αἴτιός (not to blame) (or ἀναίτιος [blameless]), and the claim that someone else is, amounts to a proposal that one should not have to pay the price and that the other party should." Taplin contends that Agamemnon, by admitting *atē*, accepted attribution of blame in Book 9, "hence his willingness to offer reparation."[37] He proposes, however, that "ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι" (19.86) is a retraction of what Agamemnon said in Book 9.[38] Taplin's conclusion, that there is a contradiction in Agamemnon's claim that he is *ouk aitios* and his willingness to pay "reparation" in Book 19, is based on Taplin's equation of *apoina* and *poinē* type exchanges. As we have already seen, however, *apoina* does not comprise "reparation"; Agamemnon's claim that he is *ouk aitios* is thus consistent with his offer of *apoina*.

As he did in Book 9, Agamemnon presents himself as willing to take responsibility for rectifying circumstances that resulted from the quarrel. Without unseating himself in any respect, Agamemnon assumes the position of the father and offers *apoina* to Achilleus, not as inducement to reenter the fighting, which Patroklos' death has already accomplished, but as a material exchange that obligates Achileus for the lives of the

[37]I depart from Taplin in my conclusions regarding Agamemnon's offer in Book 9. For discussion, see Chapter 4.

[38]Taplin (1992) 208, further suggests that since Agamemnon's auditors know he is to blame, his blaming of the gods is special pleading. Agamemnon is therefore asking the Achaians to be sympathetic to him and not contest his face-saving excuses.

Achaian *laoi*.[39] Agamemnon thus, again, positions the Achaian army in the role of the defeated warrior. His *apoina*, as we have seen, by its volume and nature, also places him in a dominant position as "father" in relation to Achilleus. If Agamemnon hopes to retain his position and harness Achilleus' *biē* for the Achaian cause, he must control Achilleus' reentry, and the social meaning of Achilleus' reentry, by means of the *apoina*. Then, and only then, does he dare release Achilleus to rouse up the army to fight (19.139).

As we have seen, when the embassy conveyed Agamemnon's offer of *apoina* to Achilleus, they attempted to deploy relationships that were, in fact, still 'intact'. Ironically, in Book 19, Agamemnon, with Odysseus' support, makes a public offer of *apoina*, ordinarily directed toward outsiders, in an effort to reintegrate Achilleus into the system and obligate him to it, at the very moment when Achilleus has placed himself outside of human society.[40] Agamemnon does implement his strategy of *apoina*, but Achilleus declares it irrelevant:[41]

> δῶρα μὲν αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσθα παρασχέμεν, ὡς ἐπιεικές,
> ἤ τ' ἐχέμεν παρὰ σοί· νῦν δὲ μνησώμεθα χάρμης
> αἶψα μάλ'·
>
> (*Iliad* 19.147-49)

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[39]Agamemnon remains seated (19.77) as a part of his strategy, not because of his wounds or because of embarassment.

[40]That Achilleus has placed himself outside human society is evinced most clearly in his refusal to eat or drink (19.150-53, 199-214). On vows to neither eat nor drink, see Martinez (1995).

[41]See also Crotty (1994) 98 n. 19.

Achilleus thus manages not to accept *apoina* without formally rejecting it. There is no resolution to Agamemnon's *apoina* theme, and no reconciliation. Achilleus is a dead man: he enters the battle with nothing to lose, and only *poinē* and *kleos* to gain. Whereas in Book 1 Achilleus claimed he had no damage to recover from the Trojans, but had come to Troy to win *timē* for the Atreidai (1.158-59),[42] he now fights for his own *poinē* from Hektor and with no need for distribution of *timai* by Agamemnon: Achilleus fights for solely for *tisis*.[43] Achilleus is back, but he is not integrated and therefore not subject to the constraints or conventions of warrior-society, and he is out of Agamemnon's control.

8.3 HEKTOR'S OFFER OF *APOINA*

Achilleus exacts *poinē* from the Trojans with a fury that approaches something more, or less, than human. He chooses out 12 Trojans as *poinē* for Patroklos, to be burned on Patroklos' funeral pyre (21.26-33).[44] He denies Lykaon's plea for his life, *'ameilikton'* (21.98).[45] Achilleus concedes that, before Patroklos was killed, he used to take captives, but now he deals only in death.[46] As we have seen, the practice of taking defeated

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[42]See Chapter 5.2.

[43]The primary object of Achilleus' attempt to secure *poinē* is thus no longer Agamemnon, but Hektor.

[44]See Chapter 2 *ad loc.* On the theme of the mutiliation of the corpse in the *Iliad*, see Segal (1971).

[45]Again, see Chapter 2 *ad loc.* Cf. 11.137.

[46]I have already proposed that the intercalation of a 'past' meeting into the present one in the Lykaon narrative is to encourage the auditors to compare past to present. See 21.34-135, Chapter 2 *ad loc.* The scene with Lykaon may further be compared to the scene involving Agamemnon and Adrestos (6.45-65): Achilleus allocates

warriors captive in order to exchange them for *apoina* is represented as an act of self-restraint on the part of the victor, or, an act of *mētis*. Achilleus' pronouncement that he no longer takes captives, but is fixed on making the Trojans pay in life for life for Patroklos and the other Achaians who were killed during his absence, confirms what the narrative already depicts: Achilleus is pure *biē*, with no limits of any kind, and certainly no restraint. In an extraordinary extension of life for life, Achilleus flings Lykaon into the river to be eaten by fish.[47] From that point the battle, as if in response to Achilleus' own fury (*daimoni isos*, 21.227), reaches cosmological proportions. I suggest, however, that the climax of the cosmological furor is not when Achilleus fights Skamandros, but when he kills Hektor and refuses his offer of *apoina*.

When Achilleus finally closes in on Hektor and delivers the fatal thrust of his spear (22.322-27), he has exacted *poinē* as life for life. Hektor, with his last breath, offers *apoina* on behalf of his parents, for the release of his corpse:

> <u>λίσσομ'</u> ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς καὶ γούνων σῶν τε τοκήων
> μή με ἔα παρὰ νηυσὶ κύνας καταδάψαι 'Αχαιῶν,
> 340 ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν <u>χαλκόν</u> τε ἅλις <u>χρυσόν</u> τε <u>δέδεξο</u>
> δῶρα τά τοι <u>δώσουσι πατὴρ</u> καὶ πότνια μήτηρ,
> σῶμα δὲ οἴκαδ' ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν, ὄφρα πυρός με
> Τρῶες καὶ Τρώων ἄλοχοι λελάχωσι θανόντα.
> (*Iliad* 22.337-43)

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for his personal *poinē* theme the prerogatives claimed by Agamemnon, and approved by the narrator as *aisima*, with respect to public *poinē*.

[47]See Chapter 2, *ad loc.*

Hektor's offer conforms in most respects to offers of *apoina* made by defeated warriors on the battlefield. He supplicates Achilleus and asks not that his life be spared, but that the dogs in the Achaian camp not be allowed to mutilate his corpse. Hektor offers prestige goods, *khalkos* and *khrusos* (22.340), which he claims his father and mother will give in exchange for his body. In the archetypal theme involving Chryses, as in the discrete themes, it is, with only two exceptions, the father who provides *apoina* for the release of his son or daughter.[48] The mention of a mother, except as an object of exchange, is singular.[49] I suggest that Hektor's mention of his mother anticipates the *apoina* theme in Book 24, in which Hekabe in fact tries to disrupt Priam's exchange of *apoina* in favor of an exchange of *poinē*.[50]

Hektor's offer of *apoina* constitutes recognition of Achilleus' victory and an appeal to him to exercise restraint. Moreover, Hektor offers to Achilleus a singular opportunity. Achilleus has attempted to re-write the Meleagros myth, and his own *poinē* theme in relation to it, so he could take both *poinē* and *apoina*, in that order (cf. 9.386-87). The order is crucial, for it inhibits the ability of *apoina* to undermine Achilleus' status. In Book 22, Achilleus has, in effect, attained a position that is, according to the discrete themes, impossible: he can take both *poinē* and *apoina* from Hektor. This

[48]The exceptions are Priam's sons, who would potentially give *apoina* for him (24.683-88) and Lykaon's ransom by a *xeinos* (21.42-43). See Chapter 2 *ad loc.*

[49]The closest analogy is the theme in which Priam mentions that he would be able to ransom Lykaon and Polydoros with *khalkos* and *khrusos* that Altes gave as dowry when Priam married the boys' mother, Laothoë (22.46-51).

[50]24.200-216; see Chapter 2 *ad loc.* For discussion, see below.

situation is moreover only possible because Hektor is only attempting to secure the release of his corpse, not of his life. Achilleus, however, refuses unconditionally to accept *apoina* of any quantity:

> μή με κύον γούνων γουνάζεο μὴ δὲ τοκήων·
> αἲ γάρ πως αὐτόν με μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἀνήη
> ὤμ' ἀποταμνόμενον κρέα ἔδμεναι, οἷα ἔοργας,
> ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃς σῆς γε κύνας κεφαλῆς ἀπαλάλκοι,
> οὐδ' εἴ κεν δεκάκις τε καὶ εἰκοσινήριτ' ἄποινα
> 350 στήσωσ' ἐνθάδ' ἄγοντες, ὑπόσχωνται δὲ καὶ ἄλλα,
> οὐδ' εἴ κέν σ' αὐτὸν χρυσῷ ἐρύσασθαι ἀνώγοι
> Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος· οὐδ' ὧς σέ γε πότνια μήτηρ
> ἐνθεμένη λεχέεσσι γοήσεται ὃν τέκεν αὐτή,
> ἀλλὰ κύνες τε καὶ οἰωνοὶ κατὰ πάντα δάσονται.
>
> (*Iliad* 22.345-54)

His refusal echoes his rejection of Agamemnon's *apoina* in Book 9 (378-85). Moreover Achilleus wishes his *menos* and *thumos* would let him cut Hektor up and eat him raw. As it is, he will not exchange Hektor's corpse for *apoina*, but will leave it for the dogs and the birds. Achilleus' words and his wish echo the *poinē* themes involving Hera and Hekabē. As we have seen, these female characters are joined by a particular expression of the *poinē* theme, characterized by *biē* and comprising three elements: negation of compensatory goods in favor of untrammeled *tisis;* the wish to commit omophagy; and negation of common interest with one's *philoi*.[51] Improper eating sets one outside the commensal political order and marks formalized relation with him or her as impossible. Thus, the homology aligns improper eating with rejection of compensatory exchange of goods in a paradigm of disorder; it marks the person associated with the

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[51]Cook (1995) 160.

paradigm as an ambivalent figure of *biē* who is as dangerous to his or her *philoi* as he or she is to his or her enemies. Achilleus is the only other figure in the *Iliad*, besides Hera and Hekabē, who is aligned with this homology: he rejects Hektor's offer of *apoina* in favor of untrammeled retribution; he expresses his desire for retribution as a wish to commit omophagy; and he is not reintegrated with his society, but remains an ambivalent, and dangerous, figure on the margins.

Behind the paradigm lurks the threat of non-displacement: the wish to eat one's enemy raw constitutes non-displacement of *biē* almost too immediate to be spoken. Achilleus frames the possibility as an unattainable wish, but, as Gregory Nagy has shown, "Achilles means what he wishes. . . . The beastly wish is an amplification of an already beastly premise [that Achilleus will gives Hektor's corpse to the dogs]."[52] The very possibility that Achilleus may adopt a female homology aligns him already with disorder;[53] the possibility that he may align with the Iliadic homology associated with Hera and Hekabē is represented as a real threat, not only to his enemies and his *philoi*, but to cosmological order. Further, I propose that the poem darkly depicts the extent to which Achilleus has pushed the limits of social order, in anticipation of a gradual move, which Zeus scripts for him, back to displacement, that is, the compensatory exchange of goods which corresponds to *mētis*.[54]

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[52]Nagy (1990a) 300-301.
[53]See Silverman (1983) 273.
[54]On the poem's role in that process, see the Conclusion.

8.4 THE FUNERAL GAMES FOR PATROKLOS

When Achilleus is roused from his sleep the morning after Patroklos' funeral rites, he sets about managing the details of the funeral games. The funeral games contain no formal compensation themes (although the games themselves are a form of compensation for Patroklos); nor does Achilleus' distribution of prizes, which differ from *poinē* both in typology and social function, affect or resolve his *poinē* theme against Agamemnon. Instead, Achilleus' role in the games illustrates the dominant position in relation to Agamemnon into which the poem scripts him and, moreover, it anticipates his meeting with Priam in Book 24. The overarching compensation themes in Books 1 through 16 were taken up with the politics of the struggle for dominance between Agamemnon and Achilleus. When, however, in Book 19 Achilleus dismisses the political profits of *apoina* as irrelevant and reenters the fighting for the sake of his own *poinē* theme without being placed in a dependent position in relation to Agamemnon, the political struggle between the two antagonists diminishes. The poem, however, now scripts Achilleus into a position of dominance which is uncontested. The poem's interest in transfers of compensatory *timē* is, hereafter, in representing the success of social mechanisms of exchange. On the basis of the foregoing investigation, I make two observations with respect to Achilleus' role in the games that relate to the overarching compensation themes and the pattern of relations that have characterized those themes.

First, Achilleus takes charge of assembling the Achaians for the games, and he brings the prizes out of his own ships (23.257-70). He does not participate in the games, because, as he says, he would carry off first prize (23.275). Instead, Achilleus positions himself apart from the competitors and presides over the games as distributor of prizes. In this way, Achilleus occupies a position over the ritualized conflict of the games analogous to Agamemnon's position of superiority in the military conflict over Helen. Moreover, by not participating in the competition for *timē*, he retains a minimal level of social integration.[55]

The games consist of eight contests: a chariot-race (23.287-652), boxing (23.652-99), wrestling (23.700-739), running (23.740-97), armed combat (23.798-825), weight-throwing (23.826-49), archery (23.850-83), and spear-throwing (23.884-97). My interest is in the last, and the briefest, of the games, the spear-throwing contest (23.884-97). The two contestants are Agamemnon and Meriones:

τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπε ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς·
890 Ἀτρεΐδη· ἴδμεν γὰρ ὅσον προβέβηκας ἁπάντων
ἠδ' ὅσσον δυνάμει τε καὶ ἥμασιν ἔπλευ ἄριστος·
ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν τόδ' ἄεθλον ἔχων κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας
ἔρχευ, ἀτὰρ δόρυ Μηριόνῃ ἥρωϊ πόρωμεν,
εἰ σύ γε σῷ θυμῷ ἐθέλοις· κέλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε.
(*Iliad* 23.889-94)

When Agamemnon and Meriones stand up to compete, Achilleus does not let the contest go on. Instead, he declares that, since everyone knows Agamemnon is the best, Agamemnon may take the first prize, an unfired

[55]I note that Achilleus also does not yet eat with the other Achaians.

cauldron, back to his ship. In other words, Achilleus gives Agamemnon a prize without allowing him to earn it in competition. Viewed from the perspective of gift exchange, Achilleus has just accomplished a noteworthy coup: he has sent Agamemnon away under obligation to him, with no way to repay.[56] I suggest it is also possible that Achilleus is offering himself as a model of the successful ruler and distributor of prizes in the games, and moreover, that he can be seen to impose that model on Agamemnon here.[57] The funeral games, with Achilleus at the helm, represent a return to orderly management of the relations of status and of the resulting tension between *philoi hetairoi.*

8.5 PRIAM'S OFFER OF *APOINA*

The solutions for displacement of *eris* among the *philoi hetairoi* that are represented by the funeral games are, however, as the depiction of Achilleus in the opening scene of Book 24 reveals, intolerably inadequate to address his *poinē* theme for Patroklos (24.3-22). Achilleus cannot sleep; he tosses and turns; he longs for Patroklos; he cries; he paces the beach; and he drags Hektor's body around Patroklos' tomb and then leaves the corpse lying face-down in the dust.

The gods feel compassion for Hektor (24.23) and would have his body stolen away from Achilleus, except that Hera still rages against the

[56]*Contra* the view that Achilleus' act is one of pure generosity; cf. Golden (forthcoming); van Wees (1992) 95.

[57]Conversely, Achilleus has just allowed Agamemnon to impose his position in the fixed system on the fluid system (as the gods arguably do in the chariot race [23.382-400]).

house of Priam because of the judgment of Paris.[58] Apollo rebukes them all for not returning the body of Hektor to his family for burial rites (24.35-39). He characterizes Achilleus with a lion simile which recalls Achilleus' wish to commit omophagy when he rejected Hektor's offer of *apoina*:

λέων δ' ὣς ἄγρια οἶδεν,
ὅς τ' ἐπεὶ ἂρ μεγάλῃ τε βίῃ καὶ ἀγήνορι θυμῷ
εἴξας εἶσ' ἐπὶ μῆλα βροτῶν ἵνα δαῖτα λάβῃσιν·
(*Iliad* 24.41-43)

Achilleus "knows wild things," like a lion who yields to his *biē* and his *thumos* and ranges among the flocks of mortals to make a meal of them. Put another way, Achilleus is *agrios*. Whereas other lion similes in the *Iliad* comprise comparison of behaviors, Apollo's simile, and his charge, is essential: Achilleus embodies unmitigated *biē*. He is, according to Apollo, a political liability, a source of danger to the community of mortals, and consequently, unassimilable in human society.

The solution to Achilleus', and the immortals', dilemma is orchestrated by Zeus. In contrast to Achilleus' scripting of the continuation of the *Iliad* as pure *tisis*, Zeus scripts an *apoina* theme with intent both to affirm Hektor's *timē* (24.65-70) and to grant to Achilleus *tode kudos* (24.110). He summons Thetis and sets in motion a plan whereby Achilleus will release the body of Hektor for *apoina*:[59]

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[58]The judgment of Paris has hovered over all the events of the *Iliad*, but is not mentioned until 24. 29-30; even then, the poem only alludes to it.

[59]I note that Zeus reasons it would not be possible to take Hektor's corpse from Achilleus by force because Thetis stays by his side. The power of Thetis is, therefore, still a force with which Zeus must reckon. See Slatkin (1991).

ὥς κεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
δώρων ἐκ Πριάμοιο λάχῃ ἀπό θ' Ἕκτορα λύσῃ.
(*Iliad* 24.75-80)

I here repeat a point made earlier that the poem has forged a connection between Zeus and traditional poetry. I suggest that although the poem represents Zeus as the explicit author of the plot of the *Iliad*, and therefore of Achilleus' *kleos*, the implicit conceit of the poem is that it not only celebrates, but constructs, Achilleus' *kleos*.

Zeus sends Thetis and Iris with instructions to Achilleus and Priam respectively for transacting an exchange by which Priam may release (*lusasthai*, 24.118) his son's body by means of a material exchange (*dōra*, 24.119 and 147; *apoina*, 24.137 and 39). Achilleus' initial response to Zeus' behest is aquiescent indifference: whoever brings *apoina* may take away the dead man, if the Olympian wishes it so (24.139-40).

Priam's response is in marked contrast to Achilleus'. In fact, much of Book 24 is taken up with Priam's elaborate preparation of the *apoina* and with his journey to Achilleus' hut. He immediately goes to a storeroom and begins to gather prestige goods to offer in exchange for Hektor's corpse. The anticipation of a successful *apoina* theme is darkened only by Hekabe's *poinē* theme (24.200-216), which introduces a variation on the mixed-type theme.[60] Hekabē's competing theme threatens to derail Zeus' 'script' for Achilleus and for the *Iliad*, but her *muthos* fails to divert Priam from his course of action. The *apoina* that Priam brings from his

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[60]See Chapter 2 *ad loc*, Chapter 3 and above.

store and loads onto a cart rivals Agamemnon's in Book 9: twelve robes and as many mantles, blankets, cloaks and tunics; ten talents of gold, two tripods, four cauldrons, and a goblet (24.228-36). Zeus sends Hermes to escort Priam to the Greek ships.[61]

The scene in Achilleus' hut takes us back to the original scenario: an old father comes to the Achaian ships, bringing *apoina* for the release of a child, in this case, the child's corpse. The Chryses *apoina* theme is reenacted, but with a different cast of characters and, as a result, a different outcome. Priam, who is narratively established as both king- and father-figure, enters the room unnoticed and immediately supplicates Achilleus; he takes hold of his knees and kisses his terrible 'manslaughtering' hands:

> τοὺς δ' ἔλαθ' εἰσελθὼν Πρίαμος μέγας, ἄγχι δ' ἄρα στὰς
> χερσὶν Ἀχιλλῆος λάβε γούνατα καὶ κύσε χεῖρας
> δεινὰς ἀνδροφόνους.
>
> (*Iliad* 24.477-79)

The poem thus scripts Achilleus into a position of uncontested dominance in the role of victorious warrior who is supplicated by both king and father. His position is thus analogous to Agamemnon's in Book 1.[62] This is not to say that the Homeric audience is to think of Achilleus as displacing Agamemnon as panAchaian leader; a military displacement is irrelevant. Achilleus has been narratively positioned for a reenactment of

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[61]On Priam's nighttime trip to Achilleus' shelter as a *katabasis*, see Whitman (1958); Nagler (1974); Cook (1995).

[62]Agamemnon's position was, however, ambiguous because of his own qualities, See Chapters 4 and 5.

the archetypal *apoina* theme that will bring the *Iliad* to its conclusion. Priam is cast in the role of Chryses; Hektor's body is, like Chryseis, the object of exchange.

Priam appeals to Achilleus' memory of his own father, Peleus. He asks Achilleus to remember his father and, consequently, to feel *aidōs* before the gods (*aideio*, 24.503), to have mercy on him (*eleēson*, 24.523), and to release his son in exchange for *apereisi' apoina* (24.501-2).[63] Achilleus gently pushes away Priam's hand, and both men weep: Achilleus for his father and friend, the father for his son (24.508-512). At Achilleus' urging that he eat, Priam presses him to not detain him, but to make the exchange quickly (24.555). Achilleus' anger flares, whereupon he reminds the old man that he could still kill him. The scene attracts, significantly, another lion simile, this time from the narrator:

> Πηλεΐδης δ' οἴκοιο λέων ὣς ἆλτο θύραζε
> (*Iliad* 24.572)

Achilleus leaps to the door, like a lion, and proceeds to gather the *apoina* off the cart and have it hauled into his shelter. The lion simile is in stark contrast to other lion similes in the *Iliad*, especially those in which the lion eats its prey.[64] It evokes most potently, however, the simile Apollo applied to Achilleus in 24.41-43. Apollo had said Achilleus was like a beast governed by *biē* who feeds on human prey; the narrator, however, constructs a somewhat incongruous image of Achilleus leaping

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[63]See especially 24.502: λυσόμενος παρὰ σεῖο, φέρω δ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα, and 1.13: λυσόμενός τε θύγατρα φέρων τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα.

[64]See 1.23-28; 13.198-202; 18.161-64.

like a lion toward a cart filled with goods. Achilleus takes compensatory goods like a lion, thereby displacing *biē* and acting in his full heroic character comprising both *mētis* and *biē*. Achilleus remains a dangerous host, and a dangerous hero; the poem insists that he is, nonetheless, not only assimilable, but that he combines in himself the vital qualities of a leader as Agamemnon was never able to do.[65]

The poem has already led its audience to compare compensation themes temporally, past and present. Achilleus' acceptance of the old father's *apoina* answers to Agamemnon's rejection of Chryses' *apoina* in Book 1. The correspondence is not merely formal.[66] Nor does the scene mark Achilleus' maturation into new and transcendent heroic stature.[67] The successful *apoina* theme instead marks a social and personal return, the only return that Achilleus will get: Hektor is returned to his *philoi* and Achilleus to his. Moreover, the social mechanisms for managing *eris* that were formerly in place, but that have been inoperative, are set back in order.[68] Achilleus' acceptance of *apoina* may be understood to reverse the effects of Agamemnon's rejection of Chryses.

What Achilleus had wanted, that is, to identify with his divine self and to attain to universal dominance, has eluded him. What the poem allots him is the supplication of a mortal king and father. Unlike

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[65]See the Conclusion.

[66]*Contra* Redfield (1994) 219.

[67]Such views fail to take into account, for example, Achilleus' conduct in relation to Andromachē's father and Isos and Antiphos.

[68]See Chapter 3 and Conclusion.

Odysseus, however, and, by extension, Phoinix, Priam does not deploy the figure of the father as a stratagem for domination, but as the basis of an appeal for restraint. The irony and pathos of his appeal is that its persuasive force is based on assimilating Achilleus to the position of the father, when he shall shortly be a dead son.[69]

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[69]See Crotty (1995) 70-88.

Conclusion

> *The ideology of the inexhaustible work of art, or of 'reading' as re-creation masks—through the quasi-exposure which is often seen in matters of faith—the fact that the work is indeed made not twice, but a hundred times, by all those who are interested in it, who find a material or symbolic profit in reading it, classifying it, deciphering it, commenting on it, combating it, knowing it, possessing it. Enrichment accompanies aging when the work manages to enter the game, when it becomes a stake in the game and so incorporates some of the energy produced by the struggle of which it is the object.*[1]

The *Iliad* presents itself as a text under negotiation, a text that, like the heroes it celebrates, must assert itself against competitors. It presents itself as agonistic, in part, by disclosing the attempts of character-writers to compose Achilleus' compensation theme, or, the *Iliad,* in accordance with their own *boulai,* or, intended plots. As we have seen, the competition to control the plot of the *Iliad* that occurs in overarching scenes (especially Books 1, 9, 19, and 24) comprises attempts to reconfigure Achilleus' themes in relation to archetypal *poinē* and *apoina* themes involving Helen and Chryseis. The 'scripts' introduced by human character-writers, including Achilleus himself and even the narrator, threaten, however, to truncate the poem contrary to tradition and, as a result, to rob Achilleus of the *kleos* that the *Iliad* confers.[2] I suggest that intratextual competition to write the *Iliad* spills over to intertextual

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[1]Bourdieu (1993) 111.

[2]See for example Agamemnon (Chapter 4.4), Nestor (Chapter 6.2), Phoinix (Chapter 7.3), Odysseus (Chapter 7.2; Odysseus reconfigures Achilleus' theme as other than compensation and does not, therefore, deploy an archetypal theme), Achilleus (Chapters 5, 7, and 8; see also below), and even Zeus (Chapters 6.2 and 8; see also below).

competition in the *Iliad*'s framing environment.[3] In other words, the politics of compensation within the *Iliad* is an analog to the politics of compensation in which the *Iliad* competes with other poetic and ritual traditions. Before I suggest implications of the politics and social meaning of the *Iliad*'s manipulation of the concept of compensation, I will summarize the politics and social meanings of compensation in Homeric society.[4]

Formal analysis of compensation themes reveals a coherent theme that contains two distinct typologies—*apoina* and *poinē*—as well as a mixed-type.[5] The social rules, or conventions, for compensation in Homeric society evince a coherent social system which nonetheless tolerates a fair degree of ambiguity and ambivalence. In this system, compensation functions as a social-symbolic exchange: exchanges of compensation constitute exchanges of *timē* (construed as a dual notion comprising material goods and status) which are deployed in the political

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[3]For an analogy, cf. the relation of the Meleagros myth to its narrative frame, the embassy to Achilleus. See Chapter 7.3.

[4]On the idea that traditional poetry is not about 'idea or institution X' in reality, but about manipulating or constructing concepts of 'X', see I. Morris (1994).

[5]The *Iliad* takes advantage of the etymological unity of *apoina* and *poinē* to present a unified theme, and the distinction in the words to present distinct typologies. Outside of the *Iliad*, *apoina* occurs infrequently in Archaic and Classical Greek literature; it can bear either the meaning of *apoina* (e.g., Herodotus VI.79; Euripides, *Rhesus* 177; Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica* 2.967) or *poinē* (e.g., *HH Aphrodite* 210; Aeschylus, *Persai* 808; *Agamemnon* 1420 and 1670; Euripides *Alcestis* 6; *Iphigenia at Tauris* 1459) . Cf. *HH Aphrodite* 140, where *apoina* corresponds to *hedna*; Pindar, *Olympian* VII 16, in which *apoina* is compensation, not for damages but for the ordeal of athletic competition (see also *Pythian* II 14; *Nemean* VII 16; *Isthmian* III-IV 7; and *Isthmian* VIII 4). The usage in Herodotus IX 120 employs both meanings: Actaÿctes says he will give *apoina* as payment to the god for the treasure he took from his temple and, additionally, as payment to the Athenians if they will spare his life.

struggle for status and dominance in warrior society. The discrete themes suggest, and the overarching themes confirm, that exchanges of compensation are, moreover, implicitly aligned with the opposition of *mētis* and *biē*. Willingness to accept *apoina* is aligned with *mētis* and unwillingness to accept it with *biē*. Willingness to acknowledge and be limited by *peirata* conventionally established for *poinē* (including composition) is aligned with *mētis*; untrammeled *tisis* is, conversely, aligned with *biē*. *Mētis* and *biē* are, in turn, aligned in the *Iliad* with culture (i.e., Greek cultural norms) and disorder, or 'nature' respectively. Moreover, the female homology in the *Iliad* marks improper eating, expressed as a wish for omophagy, as a central index of unrestrained and uncivilized behavior.[6] Thus, we may go one step further and, on the basis of the foregoing investigation, infer that the social meaning of compensation in Homeric society is integrally related to social order.[7] The polarities that relate to the meaning of compensation in Homeric society may thus be arranged as follows:

Mētis	*Biē*
acceptance of *apoina*	rejection of *apoina*
composition/*peirar* for *poinē*	untrammeled *tisis* vs. *talio*
male	female
culture	'nature'
social order	social disorder

[6]See Cook (1995) 11: "...cultural representatives are distinguished by their capacity to subordinate physical force to intelligence."

[7]See again Cook (1995) 151: "... the *Odyssey* and *Iliad* are thematically consistent in their identification of unrestrained *biē* as a threat to civilization."

The location of the gods in these sets of oppositions is ambiguous in the *Iliad*. Hera, as female and chthonic, is aligned with *biē*;[8] Apollo with *mētis* by virtue of his acceptance of the *hekatomb* and the limits he acknowledges with respect to *tisis*. The tension between *mētis* and *biē* is localized especially in Zeus, who is liable to act with unmitigated force and violence, but who is also aligned with exchanges of compensatory goods (5.265-67) and with traditional poetry as compensation for heroic death (17.198-208).[9]

Temporal comparison of compensation themes in the *Iliad* reveals a narrative strategy in which the compensation theme is systematically developed. The poem represents social mechanisms for displacement of *eris* as intact prior to Agamemnon's rejection of Chryses' *apoina* and as inoperative following it.[10] Specifically, the limits, or *peirata*, traditionally established for *poinē* are being eradicated; *apoina* is no longer being accepted; and Agamemnon and Achilleus are relating as enemies, reversing the insider-outsider polarity even to the extent that Agamemnon sends an embassy to Achilleus with an offer of *apoina*, and Achilleus refuses it in order to continue a strategy of exacting *poinē* by taking Achaian lives. Put another way, Agamemnon's refusal of Chryses' *apoina* is represented as inaugurating a reign of non-displacement and *biē* that

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[8]See O'Brien (1991; 1993).

[9]See Chapter 2 *ad loc*; see also below.

[10]Athletic competition against *hetairoi*, for example, and and war waged against outsiders both provide for displacement of *eris*, which, if not displaced, produces violent generational strife.

escalates steadily until Achilleus accepts *apoina* from Priam in Book 24. Achilleus in fact charges that Agamemnon had rendered the 'displacement system' by which the heroes earned status in relation to one another inoperative long before he seized Briseis.[11]

I contend that Achilleus' *mēnis* derives from a lack of honor in the human community that extends to a lack of divine honor. His wrath is represented as a direct result of Agamemnon's conflation of systems, which has made it impossible for Achilleus' to earn the *timē* he believes is his due and, as a consequence, the *kleos* that should compensate him for his mortality. Further, Achilleus' own essential identity as a figure of *eris*, who strives against domination by Agamemnon in lieu of striving against Zeus, makes the disruption of displacement mechanisms not just difficult, but intolerable and deadly. For this reason, teleological approaches to Achilleus' actions in Books 23 and 24, which interpret his acceptance of Priam's *apoina* as evidence of spiritual maturation or the perfection of Achilleus' heroic identity are untenable. His conduct prior to the arrival of Chryses (as characters and the narrator represent it), his conduct during the funeral games and his willingness to accept *apoina* from Priam signal, even effect, a return to social mechanisms by which *eris* and generational succession, which have been displaced from the divine community, may be successfully managed by the human community.

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[11]See Chapters 5-7.

I have shown that the overarching compensation themes comprise five themes of the *apoina*-type: Chryses' offer of *apoina* in Book 1 (which leads, in a series of interlocking themes, to Chryses' *poinē* theme and to Achilleus' damage: Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis, which Achilleus subsequently conflates with Zeus' imposition of mortality); Agamemnon's offer of *apoina* in Book 9; Agamemnon's offer of *apoina* in Book 19; Hektor's offer of *apoina* in Book 22; and Priam's offer of *apoina* in Book 24. These scenes have been interpreted by previous scholarship, however, as *apoina* (Book 1), *poinē* (Book 9), *poinē* (Book 19), *apoina* (Book 22); Book 24 is variously interpreted as *apoina* for Hektor's body, as *poinē* for the death of Patroklos, or as a conflation of both. Scholars' conflation of *apoina* and *poinē* in the *Iliad* has had far reaching effects in the critical interpretation of the poem. Most important, it has lead to psychologizing or moralizing interpretations of Achilleus' heroic identity and, consequently, to psychologizing or moralizing interpretations of his conflict.[12] In addition, the conflation of *apoina* and *poinē* has resulted in failure to discern the unifying sequence of *apoina* themes in 1, 9, 19, 22, and 24 and, thus, failure to explore the implications of the sequence of themes for Achilleus' heroic identity, for the social meaning of compensation in Homeric society, and for the social and ritual meaning of the *Iliad* in Archaic Greek society.

The foregoing investigation has demonstrated that the conflict which tears Achilleus, and nearly tears the fabric of Homeric society, is the

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[12]See Chapter 6.1.

result of a seemingly irresoluble social contradiction: Agamemnon's ability to use his privileged position to conflate fixed and fluid ranking systems. The systemic contradiction, which does not necessarily lead to conflict, does in fact result in conflict when Agamemnon abuses his position and when Achilleus has both the force and the will to contest his domination.[13] In the struggle for dominance the antagonists, as well as other internal characters and even the narrator, deploy competing definitions and arrogation of roles in archetypal patterns of relations.

The development of the conflict and its resolution may be tracked through the overarching *apoina* themes. Achilleus demands *poinē* to compensate him for damage at the human and divine level; in the poem, however, he is offered only *apoina* and he takes *poinē* only as *tisis*. Achilleus' efforts to write a *poinē* theme that will satisfy for his mortality into the *Iliad* are frustrated by repeated offers of *apoina* and, I suggest, by the poem's implicit insistence that it is, itself, the only *poinē* for his mortality. Zeus himself, moreover, according to the poem, 'writes' Achilleus' final *apoina* theme and, consequently, the end of the *Iliad* as a return to social order. Or, perhaps better, *Iliad* tradition 'writes' Zeus 'writing' Achilleus' final compensation theme and the end of the *Iliad* as a

[13]Giddens (1979) 131-164, defines contradiction as a "disjunction of structural principles of social systems, where those principles operate in terms of each other but at the same time contravene one another," (141) and conflict as a "struggle between actors or collectivities expressed as definite social practices" (131). I note there is ample evidence that redistribution economies and exchange economies co-exist historically in communities without necessarily giving rise to overt conflict; the contradiction is managed by rhetorical strategies in which the system is represented differently to insiders and to outsiders. See Liverani (1990).

return to social order. Priam's *apoina* is not ersatz for the *poinē* that Agamemnon himself never pays. It is, rather, *apoina* for the release of a son's corpse made on the basis of an appeal to Achilleus' relationship with his own father—whose dead son he will soon be. Achilleus is thus at the same time positioned in the (mortal) roles of victorious warrior, father, and son. It is only his own willingness to accept *apoina*, I propose, that finally re-assimilates Achilleus into the system and, at the same time, restores the integrity of the system. Put another way, Achilleus, the hero of the *Iliad*, brings social/cultural order back from the brink of chaos by means of supreme act of self-restraint, or *mētis*.

I wish to suggest a few implications the preceding interpretation of the overarching *apoina* themes might have for the performance of the *Iliad* as 'practice', that is, as an event situated temporally, spatially, and paradigmatically in Greek society.[14] I adopt the concept of *mimēsis*, as articulated by Gregory Nagy and as deployed in relation to the Odyssey by Erwin Cook, as a model for relating the *Iliad* as traditional poetry to historical Greek society.[15] I will not rehearse Nagy's argument here, except to say that *mimēsis* is dramatic reenactment of an archetypal action which entails an interaction of myth and ritual.[16] *Mimēsis* is therefore not simply imitation. The character of a recomposition-in-performance of

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[14]It is my hope that the foregoing analysis of Homeric society and the *Iliad* as a social text will contribute to further exploration of the 'situation' of an *Iliad* recomposed in performance for panHellenic festival audiences.

[15]See especially Nagy (1996b) and Cook (1995).

[16]Nagy (1996b) especially 54-57.

traditional poetry as *mimēsis* depends on the mentality of a group performance: "So long as the mentality of group performance is there, everyone who is present at a mimesis becomes a part of it."[17] It is thus a social event with implications for social stability and identity. Cook's observation that by such mimetic events, which include the interaction of myth and ritual, the "body politic reconstituted and articulated itself," is compatible with the social/theological reading of compensation and of Achilleus' heroic identity that I offer above.[18] On the basis of the foregoing investigation, I offer the following observations and implications:

1) Our *Iliad* evinces a concern for social order, which it addresses vis-à-vis the related socio-political issues of compensation and competition for status. It presents an inherently stable system that evinces a primary contradiction between two fields of power.[19] Although the contradiction does not appear to render overt conflict inevitable, conflict is represented as always on the surface among contenders for status in the Homeric fluid ranking economy and it must, therefore, be managed. The poem reenacts, or better, exploits, a conflict that arises from the contradiction and leads to a crisis of order. It brings the disorder to resolution explicitly by re-establishing in the constructed society an

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[17]Nagy (1996b) 83.

[18]Cook (1995) 150, further notes with specific reference to the Odyssey, that traditional poetry "insists that the deed and the poetry which celebrates the deed are one."

[19]I infer that the system is conceived of as inherently stable from the return to the same system with new leadership at the end of the *Iliad*.

operative system of *apoina* and *poinē*, on which civilization depends, and implicitly, by its own performance. In the reenactment, female figures who assert themselves in the male-dominated domain of formalized exchange are figured as sources of disorder and of *biē*, or 'nature'; they are consequently figured out of the political realm of exchange, by which stable power relations are established and maintained between men.

2) Our *Iliad* destabilizes the polarities of *mētis* and *biē*.[20] It reenacts both the necessity of heroic *biē* for the protection of *philoi*, and the threat to civilization that is posed by unrestrained heroic *biē*. Achilleus is both necessary and dangerous; the poem constructs an identity for him which holds *mētis* and *biē* in tension and, thereby, assimilates him as a cultural hero. Our Odyssean Odysseus restores order with an act of "culturally generative violence," "an act of vengeance marked by unrestrained behavior";[21] our Iliadic Achilleus, in diametrical contrast, reestablishes order by a supreme act of self-restraint—a exchange of *apoina*—which he takes like a lion.

Cook suggests that the Odyssey "dramatizes the need for and the virtual impossibility of integrating wisdom and force in the person of the king"; he moreover contends that this "Achilleus and Agamemnon are never able to manage, Odysseus just barely."[22] It is my contention, however, on the basis of the foregoing investigation that, although the

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[20]See Cook (1995) for a demonstration that the Odyssey does so also.
[21]See Cook (1995) 14, 151-2.
[22]See again Cook (1995) 32.

Odyssey may represent Achilleus as a figure of unmitigated *biē*, the *Iliad* insists that he is a hero of martial exploit who exercises both 'cunning intelligence' and force. In short, the *Iliad* immortalizes Achilleus as an integrated hero and kingly-figure in contrast to Agamemnon explicitly and to Odysseus implicitly.

3) The *poinē* for mortality, which Achilleus had sought to exact from the father, is realized only through the recomposed performance of the *Iliad*. Traditional poetry, which the poem has already aligned closely with Zeus, bestows the only *poinē* that, according to its own self-referentiality, compensates mortality: *kleos aphthiton*, a kind of immortality conferred by song.[23] The *Iliad* thus is Zeus' *poinē* for Achilleus' mortality—a *poinē* he initially rejects in Book 9. The performance of Achilleus' *kleos/poinē* does not dispense with *eris* and mortality as realities of the human condition; rather it holds out in the midst of human limitation the possibility of immortal fame.

4) Finally, the concept of our *Iliad* as a social text that reenacts dissolution and re-establishment of order in a ritual setting suggests that it may profitably be compared to traditional literatures of the ancient Near East. I suggest, as one example, the *Poem of Erra*.[24] The plot of the poem involves a divine or semi-divine warrior figure who cannot be roused from his state of inactivity so as to take up war; once he is roused to

[23]The poem ordinarily represents Zeus as controlling the plot of the *Iliad*. When, however, Zeus hesitates on the matter of Sarpedon's death (16.431-61), Hera reminds him of a force to which he should bow—*aisa* (16.441).

[24]Cagni (1977); see also Machinist (1983).

activity however, his violence exceeds all bounds and causes a civil war in Babylon. Erra is finally, and only with difficulty, appeased and persuaded to cease from his berserk state. The conceit of the poem is, according to Machinist, that rest and violence revolve in continuous cycles; the tension evinces both beneficial and deleterious sides.[25] The problem that remains for humans is how to deal with this tension and, specifically, how to deal with the god's violent side. The poem, in conclusion, offers the power of its own words as the means for neutralization of the destructive effects of the cycle: "the very remembering and reciting of the song. . . is what will provide the needed defense against a repetition of Erra's violent behavior."[26]

> "In the sanctuary of the god who praises this song (=the poem),
> may abundance be heaped up,
> (But) may that (god) who rejects it no longer smell incense!
> May the king who extols my name rule the (whole) world!
> May the prince who proclaims the praise of my heroism have no
> rival!
> The singer who chants (it) shall not die in the destruction,
> (But) to king and prince shall his word be welcome.
> The scribe who commits it to memory shall escape the enemy
> country (and) shall be honoured in his own country.
> In the sanctuary of (those) sages where they constantly mention my
> name, I will grant them wisdom.
> To the house in which this tablet is placed—however furious Erra
> may be, however murderous the Sibitti may be—
> The sword of destruction shall not come near: salvation shall alight
> on it.

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[25]Machinist (1983).

[26]Machinist (1983) 226.

May this song (=the poem) last forever! May it endure to eternity!
May all the countries hear it and celebrate my heroism!
May (all) the dwellers know (it) and glorify my name!"

Poem of Erra 19.49-61[27]

[27]Cagni (1977) 60.

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









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